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Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia

PIETY AND PRAGMATISM

MASDAR HILMY

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Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia

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MASDAR HILMY

INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES
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PWNU JAWA TIMUR

Ketua LP Ma'arif NU Jawa Timur
Prof. Masdar Hilmy, MA., Ph.D.

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Masdar Hilmy
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2 March 2009

PENGURUS WILAYAH
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1

INTRODUCTION

No idea has been as vibrantly debated and contested in post-New Order Indonesia as the notion of democracy. The collapse of Soeharto's authoritarian regime in 1998 paved the way for all elements of society to actively reconsider what constitutes the public good for the country.[1] The regime shift — from Soeharto's authoritarian regime to the so-called *Era Reformasi* — accordingly unleashed once-idle Islamist movements to become actively engaged in public debates over the ideological foundations of the country. Islamist social organizations such as MMI (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia, or The Council of Indonesian Muslim Holy Warriors), HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, or Indonesian Islamic Party of Liberation), FPI (Front Pembela Islam, or Front of the Defenders of Islam), FKAWJ (Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah, or Communication Forum of Ahlussunnah wa al-Jama'ah), and others have come to the fore, with the agenda of replacing Pancasila, the philosophical foundation of the country, with Islam. In a development reminiscent of the multiparty era in the 1950s, Islam-based political parties mushroomed during this early transitional period.[2] Pancasila has come to face sustained challenges and attacks from the Islamists. The Jakarta Charter, which had been included in the first draft of the constitution's preamble but which was eventually left out of the document, has been put back on the parliamentary agenda by Islamist parties, but their repeated efforts to reinsert the Charter into the preamble through constitutional amendments have failed.

Attempts at incorporating Islam into the state constitution did not stop there; the Islamists have tried incessantly and through various means to replace Pancasila with the ideology of Islam and to make Indonesia more Islamic. Having failed at the political and structural level, many Islamists

turned to a cultural struggle by attempting to Islamize society from below. Starting at the individual level, they hoped that the cells of Islamic society could be expanded more broadly into the state structure. Propagating Islam by means of religious gatherings all over the country, and by infiltrating local organizations or bureaucracies, the Islamists hoped to boost their strongholds in gradual steps towards the national level. Islamizing the state constitution was no longer regarded at the rhetorical level as an urgent priority. Rather, the Islamization of society and culture was now considered more important.[3] To support their efforts, they established a "non-structural alliance" in which Islamist groups from different segments of Islam could get together to formulate a well-armed proposal for an Islam-based Indonesia.[4] In this manner, they believe that a wider web of Islamism will eventually be instituted. To allay public distrust, they usually deploy democracy as the foundation of the freedom of expression. The proposal of an Islamic state in Indonesia, they argue, does not contradict the essence of democracy and human rights, particularly as Muslims comprise the majority of the population in the country.[5]

In addition, the multidimensional crises that have afflicted the country since the collapse of Soeharto's New Order have also been deployed by the Islamists as another reason why a return to Islam might be the solution for the country. They argue that if secular democratic regimes have been tried and proven unsuccessful, it is reasonable to try again with Islam. In their argument, the economic and political crises are partly attributed to the adoption of secular and democratic principles that have proven to be unsuccessful. It is simply fair, they argue, to try adopting Islam as the foundation of the country since it had been the foundation of some parts of Indonesia such as Aceh prior to Dutch colonialism.[6] Islam also brought about the glory of Muslims in the past.

The discourses and counter-discourses on democracy, as developed by Indonesian Muslims — particularly Islamists *vis-à-vis* non-Islamists — have become an important part of the country's long historiographical venture. Despite the harsh and at times extreme use of language, these discourses have been conducted in a relatively non-violent manner. Several violent acts perpetrated by *jihadi* Islamists undoubtedly do not represent the majority of Indonesia's Islamists and therefore will not be portrayed in this study. The reality of Islamism in the country is extremely complex and its trajectory will very much depend on many different variables. It is a matter of fact that Islamism is multifaceted and may not be understood through a single lens. The dynamics of Islamism in the country tends to follow the fluctuations of global and local geopolitics. In order to grasp the phenomenon of

Indonesia's Islamism, more than one perspective must be employed so that gross generalizations may be avoided.

Much has been written about the relations of Islam and democracy.[7] There has been a heated scholarly debate with regard to whether or not Islam is compatible with democracy. By all accounts, two opposite camps have emerged as a result of this debate. First, those who argue that Islam is inimical to democracy. They base their arguments either on normative grounds such as religiously derived values or on historical and factual phenomena of the Muslim world, which is considered to be lagging behind other non-Muslim civilizations, particularly the West. In these scholars' arguments, Islam constitutes a never-changing cultural element that is hostile to the idea of democracy. In the language of sociology and political science, the protagonists of this camp are commonly referred to as culturalists or essentialists.[8]

The second camp comprises those who argue that religion-based cultures are not static entities.[9] Just as Catholicism and Confucianism proved able to give birth to new forms of democracy, despite the fact that Weber had considered Protestant-based culture to be the only civilization suited to modernity and democracy, so Islam might prove itself capable of embracing democracy.[10] One of the basic arguments of this camp is that the birth and development of democracy has a lot to do with structural matters such as the distribution of wealth, the level of literacy, the relations between society and the state, the provision of room for freedom and self-expression, and so forth. The proponents of this camp, who might be called structuralists, do not believe in "essentialism"; instead, they look at the social and political realities of the Muslim world. In contrast to the culturalists, they believe that there will always be an opportunity for Islam to embark on the same course as that of Catholicism and Confucianism, which have already journeyed towards democracy.

This study seeks to move a step further than the seemingly never-ending debate portrayed above. Namely, it intends to portray the relationship of Islamism and democracy in the Indonesian context. The question of what Islamism contends about democracy and electoral politics, particularly in the Indonesian context, has not received adequate attention in academic circles.[11] One of the main reasons for this is the widespread belief that the firm stance of Islamism in rejecting democracy needs no further confirmation. Indeed, it is widely accepted that Islamists view democracy an alien to Islam and that it must therefore be rejected. At a rhetorical level, the Islamists' rejection seems to leave no space for compromise. Nevertheless, as this study shall demonstrate later on, the complexity of social phenomena means that they are never firmly black nor white. When we broach the subject of Islamism

in relation to social and political issues, it is misleading to apply one single monolithic approach, while neglecting the diverse and complex nature of Islamism amidst the rapidly changing global geopolitical context. The current study attempts to fill the theoretical gap by providing an analysis of Islamism and democracy in post-New Order Indonesia.

As many have argued, Islamists might pretend to accept democracy by taking part in general elections and playing down Islamist causes while secretly championing their hidden agenda.[12] It is also widely assumed that having gained power they would harness democratic institutions to exterminate democracy. As the notion of Islamic democracy is presumed to be an oxymoron, any government controlled by Islamists would be highly unlikely to be democratic. The argument that Islamists only "borrow" democracy in order to kill has been proposed by scholars in several Middle Eastern countries, with regard to the case of Algeria's FIS (Islamic Salvation Front), Turkey's Refah Party, and Palestine's Hamas.[13] Based on these experiments, it is argued that Islamists in Indonesia would be likely to behave the same way given the opportunity to take part in democratic processes.

Be that as it may, understanding Indonesia's Islamism in light of its counterparts in some other Muslim countries necessitates caution, particularly the various socio-political backgrounds and historical settings involved. The investigation of Islam, Islamism, and discourses on democracy in the context of post-New Order Indonesia might provide nuance to existing studies on such topics in other parts of the Muslim world. To date, only several somewhat cursory and broad-spectrum studies on Islamism and democracy in Indonesia have been undertaken.[14] However, they do not elaborate on the relationship between Islamism and democracy. The "thick description" of how discourses and counter-discourses on democracy have been produced should now be taken into account. The Islamists are often difficult to understand; their world-views, attitudes, and behaviours are not black and white. Some of them may be explained by the double-standard theory alluded to earlier, but others deal in good faith.

The current study focuses on three Islamist organizations: (1) MMI (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia, or The Indonesian Council of Muslim Holy Warriors); (2) HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia); and (3) PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, or Prosperous Justice Party). The choice was based on the fact that these three organizations represent two ends of the spectrum of Islamist political ideas in contemporary Indonesian Islam. The first two organizations represent the pole that employs extra-parliamentary struggles to reject democracy, while the third represents the pole that seeks intra-parliamentary means to promote Islam through democracy.

There are of course other Islamist groups and movements whose agenda and world-views are similar to or the same as those of the three above-mentioned Islamist organizations. These would be groups such as FKAWJ (Forum Komunikasi Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah, or Forum for Communication of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah) with its paramilitary wing Laskar Jihad, FPI (Front Pembela Islam, or Islamic Defenders Front), and many others. This study, however, does not cover these Islamist groups as some of them have been the subject of other works.[15] In addition, MMI and HTI have very distinctive approaches to the notion of democracy and power in general; while the first urges the total implementation of Shari'ah (*tatbiq al-Shari'ah*), the latter employs the issue of transnational Islamdom (*khilafah Islamiyah*) to attract a wider audience. Overall, all three Islamist organizations under scrutiny occupy an *avant-garde* position in the configuration of post-New Order Islamism and have developed relatively systematic discourses and counter-discourses on democracy through their own far-reaching media and publications.

The argument of the current book rests on the notion that discourses and counter-discourses on democracy among Indonesian Islamists are diverse and multifaceted. It is not democracy per se that is rejected by the utopian Islamists, but rather such typically Western values as liberalism, secularism, and capitalism. Furthermore, the Islamists' rejection of democracy is not purely blind; at a political level, it also serves as constructive criticism of inconsistencies of certain Western countries, particularly the United States, on the global political stage. Furthermore, the discourses and counter-discourses on democracy are usually inseparable from wider power discourses. The utopian Islamists' rejection of democracy, therefore, cannot be dissociated from internal and external socio-political circumstances faced by Muslims in Indonesia and beyond.

Post-New Order Indonesia provides fertile ground for public debates over the importance of democracy. People are starting to get used to the idea of freedom of expression and public deliberation — integral elements of democracy. Unlike during the New Order regime, the government now has no other option but to provide for the process of fair and public deliberation. Within this changing context, the participation of the Islamists is in fact unavoidable. Even though they may reject the idea of democracy at a rhetorical level, the Islamists do not have any choice but to follow the rules of the game as provided by democratic institutions. Indeed, Islamists have eventually been forced by circumstances to acknowledge the multicultural nature of Indonesia; regardless of their own parochial beliefs about the ideal society presided over by God. The new realities of post-New Order Indonesia

have compelled the Islamists to put up with differences within society and to live in coexistence with non-Muslims.

As this study will demonstrate, there is a split in Islamists' attitudes towards democracy. At one end of the spectrum are those Islamists who reject democracy, although inconsistencies are to be found on a practical level. At the other end of the spectrum are those who welcome democracy critically. To the latter, democracy means an open, public arena in which free and fair competition is constitutionally set. In their minds, the rise of another sort of "democracy" other than Western liberal democracy, that is, an "Islamic democracy", is not impossible. This sort of democracy would allow its stakeholders to engage freely in open and public deliberation. Democracy can mean winning the hearts and minds of constituents, even though for the utopian Islamists democracy also means revolt against God's sovereignty.

Islamism may be defined as a movement or organization that seeks to change Muslim societies by deriving its programmes and ideologies from the basic texts of Islam.[16] Unlike the terms "fundamentalists", "militants", "radicals", or "terrorists", which carry connotations of Western borrowings and may imply reductionism, the term "Islamists" (*Islamiyyun*) is a term that people who belong to Islamist movements use to identify themselves. "Islamist" is different from "Muslim" in that the former refers to people with a conscious, activist agenda while the latter is a nominal identity for people with a range of ideological views. Islamism refers both to Islamist politics and the process of re-Islamization. In this context, Salwa Ismail explains further that

> Islamist politics points to the activities of organizations and movements that agitate in the public sphere while deploying signs and symbols from Islamic tradition. It entails political ideology articulating the idea of the necessity of establishing an Islamic government, understood as a government which implements the Shari'a (Islamic law). Islamization or re-Islamization signifies a drive to islamize the social sphere. It involves a process whereby various domains of social life are invested with signs and symbols associated with Islamic cultural traditions.[17]

In terms of its genealogy, Olivier Roy argues that contemporary Islamism can be traced to two religious movements and organizations: first, the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood (*Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*), established by schoolteacher Hasan al-Banna in 1928, and, second, the Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan, founded by Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi in 1941.[18]

Islamism was created both along the lines of and as a break from the modern *salafiya* (the return to the ancestors), spearheaded by three ideologues: Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–98), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), and

Rashid Rida (1865–1935).[19] By and large, Islamists adopt Salafist ideology: they preach a return to the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and the Shari'a and reject the commentaries that have been part of the tradition. Islamism begins with a theological concept that is the very foundation of Islam: *tawhid* (divine oneness), which says that God is transcendent, unique, and without associates. Islamists seek to apply this theological stance to society.

The construction of the concept of Islamism is inextricably linked to the circumstances surrounding Muslim politics. In the pre-September 11 environment, this term had been applied to those Muslim activists, liberal or radical, who had been actively involved in politics using religion as a yardstick in their struggles. During the 1980s and 1990s, for instance, several social scientists tended to lump the term "Islamist" together with "fundamentalist" to indicate any Islamic activism whose purposes were mainly to challenge with Islam an existing, often authoritarian, regime. These social scientists included associates of Muslim thinkers inclined towards democracy such as Hasan al-Turabi, the leader of the Islamic National Front in Sudan, and Rachid al-Ghannouchi, an exiled leader of Tunisia's Nahda Party, and radicals such as members of Algeria's FIS and the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.[20]

The September 11 tragedy, however, signified a turning point in studies of Islamism. Both emphasis and direction have changed as it seems that the meaning of Islamism in the context post-September 11 has now been narrowed down exclusively to radical activism whose political interests are different from, if not contradictory to, democracy. Those liberal Muslims who seek to define Islam within the framework of democracy have accordingly been excluded from the nomenclature of Islamism. The studies on Islam have associated Islamism with those radicals who deploy Islam as the main reference in their programmes for changing society.

This study, however, will use Islamism to refer to religious activism that deploys Islam both as symbol and substance in its political struggles. This study further focuses on those Islamists who reject the idea of democracy and also those who occupy the in-between position: on the one hand, these latter Islamists stand firmly on their Islamic identity but on the other hand they try to accommodate democracy as a means of political struggle.

The first group of Islamists espouse what I call Utopian Islamism. In the context of Indonesian Islamism, this variant is well represented by two of the Islamist organizations under scrutiny: MMI and HTI. Utopia means an "imaginary place or state of things in which everything is perfect".[21] This term is attributed to some of the Islamists in recognition of the fact that they are obsessed with establishing an ideal state of being and an ideal community

based on religion. Yet utopia is more than mere imagination. Mannheim in his now classic work defines utopia as "that type of orientation which transcends reality and which at the same time breaks the bonds of the existing order".[22] In his opinion, a state of mind is considered utopian when it is incongruent with reality, oriented to objects that are alien to reality, and when it transcends actual existence. However, not all incongruous states of mind are utopian; only those that, when translated into conduct, tend to shatter, either partially or entirely, the existing order of things.[23]

The second group is referred to as meliorist Islamism. In the Indonesian context, PKS represents this stance par excellence. Meliorism, developed in the context of religious ethics debates in the aftermath of World War I, essentially argues that the world can be made a better place without necessarily devastating the existing social and political orders. It basically condemns the existing world as "a sorry state of affairs", and affirms with confident assurance the ability of human intelligence to improve on it. It advocates a practical motto: "Let us make a better world!" Meliorists are militant yet not necessarily radical in a pejorative sense, as they look at the reality of the world positively.[24] The basic assumption of meliorism is that

> The appearance of man was expressed in terms of struggle, and his history was said to consist in efforts to improve his status by acquiring greater control over the various elements constituting his environment and thus affecting his security and well-being. Thus the emphasis was shifted from possession to endeavor; from worship to work; from a sense of belonging to a wider order of reality and sharing in its life and spirit to a concern for remoulding the world wherever it thwarted desire.[25]

Meliorism has a lot to do with human effort in pursuit of religious causes; it is about promoting human progress in the world of materialism with a religious spirit that distinguishes itself from pragmatism, instrumentalism, and realism, which are all secular in tone. In the minds of meliorists, religion provides a prophetic code of conduct for its believers to achieve the betterment of life. In this context, religion in general is widely perceived of as consciousness of the highest social values. On the other hand, being irreligious is a state of indifference or hostility to that which promotes human well-being.[26]

It is important in this study to have a clear definition of democracy, even though the concept is not easily defined, as an "essentially contested concept".[27] The definition used here covers two meanings. First, institutional or procedural democracy as Joseph A. Schumpeter defines it: "the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's

vote".[28] Another definition of democracy has been offered by David Beetham as "a mode of decision-making about collectively binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control".[29] Procedural democracy has been elaborated further by Robert Dahl as the form of government that meets the following criteria:

1. Free and periodic competition between at least two candidates occurs for all effective decision-making positions. The end result is a peaceful succession of governments.
2. A high degree of political participation in the elections of leaders exists. The entire adult population is allowed to participate in elections; suffrage is universal.
3. There are guarantees of human rights and civil liberties, such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to join and form political parties, etc.
4. Leaders are held accountable to the public as long as they hold office. This requires the existence of a means of removing leaders from office if they violate the law.[30]

There are some other factors closely associated with democracy and democratization such as Lipset's theory of economic development[31] and Huntington's list of twenty-seven variables that are conducive to democracy (such as a market economy, a strong middle class, high levels of literacy and education, Protestantism, democratic authority structures within social groups, low levels of political polarization and extremism, political leaders committed to democracy, experience as a British colony, and so forth).[32] These factors are, however, beyond the reach of this study. Instead, procedural democracy will be the working framework in which the involvement of Islamists in general elections and/or their adoption of voting procedures in internal leadership elections will be analysed.

Second, democracy also covers such basic substantive values as liberty, equality, tolerance, and respect for the law as well as justice. As cited by Held, liberty or autonomy is seen by Aristotle as central to the idea of democracy, where the ideal is "not being ruled, not by anyone at all if possible, or at least only in alteration".[33] Aristotle goes on to argue that liberty also means "to live as you like", which is the essence of being free, "since its opposite, living not as you like, is the function of one being enslaved".[34] For a democrat, liberty and equality are, according to Aristotle, inextricably linked. There are two criteria of liberty: (a) "ruling and being ruled in turn" and (b) "living as one chooses".[35] In order to establish the first criterion as an effective principle of government, equality is essential: "without numerical equality", "the

multitude" cannot be sovereign. "Numerical equality", namely an equal share of the practice of ruling, is said by classical democrats to be possible because (a) participation is financially remunerated so that citizens are not worse off as a result of political involvement; (b) citizens have equal voting power; and (c) there are in principle equal chances to hold office.[36] Put simply, equality is the moral and practical basis of liberty.

Even though liberty is essential to democracy, obedience to public authority and the law is no less essential. While the idea of democracy is maximum freedom and autonomy, the very concept of rule involves limits on freedom. According to Pericles, a respected citizen, general, and politician at the time of Athenian democracy, rules and laws must be established on the basis of public-spiritedness, where private life must be subordinated to public affairs.[37] "The public" and "the private" are basically intertwined, although tolerance is likewise essential so that people can enjoy themselves "in their own way".[38] Put differently, the principle of tolerance involves self-imposed limits and restraints on spontaneous reactions such as keeping distance from other people's private lifestyles.

Central to the idea of tolerance is pluralism. Pluralism not only means the existence of a diversity of interests and competing value systems, but also denotes how these different interests and value systems are moderated by means of democratic mechanisms. This study will not go further into the complex debate on the causal relationship between democracy and pluralism, but it assumes that an ideal democracy necessitates the condition in which pluralism and tolerance are two sides of the same coin.[39] I tend to argue that pluralism can promote democratic norms by increasing tolerance, namely by making people aware of democratic processes as well as strategies of compromise and peaceful conflict resolution.

On the basis of the above mentioned definitions of democracy, this study employs both procedural and essential democracy as its conceptual framework for analysing Islamist discourses and counter-discourses on democracy in post-New Order Indonesia. While procedural democracy rests on ideas closely associated with general elections and electoral politics developed within the circles of the Islamists, essential democracy rests on civic liberties such as freedom of religion, freedom of expression, equality, pluralism, and tolerance. These values, however, will be used only occasionally as an additional yardstick for analysing the extent to which a particular group of Islamists is engaged in discourses on democracy. In this way, this study hopes to reflect accurately the contemporary debate on Islamism and democracy in post-New Order Indonesian Islam. Accordingly, it must be understood from the outset that this study is not intended to evaluate whether or not a particular group is,

or may become, democratic. Rather, it is aimed at providing an account of how far the Islamists are engaged in discourses and counter-discourses on democracy.

The main question I shall develop throughout the current study is: what discourses and counter-discourses on democracy are being developed in Islamist political thought in post-New Order Indonesia? More specifically, how do Islamists approach the notion of democracy? Do they have a unified response to democracy? These questions will be expanded into several more detailed research questions, as follows:

1. To what extent is the scholarly debate about the relationship between Islam and democracy being developed?
2. How can the relationship between Islam and democracy in the Indonesian context be explained?
3. How can we portray Islamism in Indonesia?
4. On what grounds is the notion of democracy rejected by the Islamists? This query tries to provide an analytical explanation of the first variant of Islamism, namely, utopian Islamism, as represented by two Islamist groups: HTI and MMI.
5. To what extent do Islamists approach and craft their own conception of democracy? This question examines the second variant of Islamism, namely, meliorist Islamism, which tends to be accommodating towards democracy.
6. How can we analyse Indonesian Islamism in the context of the power discourse among the Islamists?

This study consists of a qualitative examination based on the combination of theoretical and empirical investigations. Data were collected through bibliographical surveys and fieldwork. The internal publications of the three organizations studied here are of particular importance. Such materials include books, magazines, pamphlets, and documents such as the bulletin *al-Islam* and the journal *Al-Wa'ie*, both of which are published by HTI. The stockpiled materials were then codified, classified, and analysed using the methods of discourse analysis.[40]

A series of interviews was conducted throughout a four-month period of fieldwork (March–June 2005) in five cities in Indonesia (Surabaya, Malang, Solo, Yogyakarta, and Jakarta). A purposive, snowball sampling, technique was employed; the interviews were conducted on the basis of cues given by earlier interviewees. For example, the interview with K.H. Wahyuddin, director of the *pesantren* al-Mukmin Ngruki and son-in-law of Abdullah Sungkar, who was also a rank-and-file member of the Solo-based MMI,

was conducted based on a recommendation given by Irfan S. Awwas, the executive leader of MMI, in an interview in Yogyakarta. It must be noted that all interviews with MMI leaders were conducted before a rupture took place within the MMI organizational structure — a rupture which led to the departure of Fauzan Al-Anshari and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir from the organization in 2007 and 2008 respectively. The respondents were also taken purposively from those three organizations. They ranged from rank-and-files members to supporters and sympathizers at the grassroots level. The accessibility of data on the internet helped me to enrich and reconfirm the accuracy and reliability of the data at the analysis stage. The analysis itself formed an integral part of data gathering in order to minimize the discrepancies and paradoxes within the data.

Interviewees were always asked for their consent prior to each interview as a part of ethics of conduct in research. Interviews were not always easy since some of the people that were interviewed tended to be reluctant to provide correct and honest information. This was because the interviews were conducted during a sensitive period for the Islamists in which they were under close scrutiny by security officers following several Jihadist operations. The academic background of the researcher as an IAIN (State Institute for Islamic Studies) lecturer and student of a Western university — notoriously regarded by the Islamists as agents of liberal and secular thinking — also brought about another sort of inconvenience that influenced the flow of the interviews. Some of the interviewees were unfriendly, even hostile, and did not refrain from expressing their contempt at the involvement of the researcher in the afore-mentioned institutions. Nevertheless, this difficult situation was overcome by the researcher listening humbly and wholeheartedly to the information given by the interviewees, showing neutrality and taking part in some ritual activities such as prayers at the location of the interview.

Comparative analysis is employed to discern where the variants of Islamism clash and where they meet. This approach is particularly crucial in delineating the argument that internal cleavages are to be found in Islamism with regard to how Islamist ideas are achieved at a practical level. Multidisciplinary and "thick description" analyses have helped me unravel the "universe of meaning" contained within the many layers of delicate facts. By these means, it is hoped that the complexity of Islamism may reasonably be represented by this study.

This book is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the background and significance of the study, the focus of the study, the main theoretical argument, the conceptual framework, the methodological note, and the structure of the book.

Chapter 2 seeks to reexamine the intricate relationship between Islam and democracy from a theoretical perspective, starting with a discussion of the cultural essentialist approach to democracy, followed by counter-arguments from the structural-instrumentalist approach. It concludes with an overview of the internal debate within Muslim society, which reflects the multivocality of Islam.

Chapter 3 is devoted to explaining the discourse on Islam and democracy within Indonesian Islam. This chapter deals with three main issues: first, the conceptual definition of Indonesia's democracy; second, a brief historical account of the development of Indonesian concepts of and experiences with democracy; and third, approaches to democracy among Indonesian Muslims.

Chapter 4 provides the context for the focus of the study, that is, Islamism in the Indonesian context since the fall of Soeharto. This chapter attempts to analyse the emergence and development of Islamism in post-New Order Indonesia. It starts with a general overview of Indonesian Islamism and the socio-political backdrop to and historical roots of Islamism. A brief description follows of the Islamist organizations analysed in this study, namely, MMI, HTI, and PKS.

Chapter 5 analyses the discourses on democracy within the utopian variant of Islamism, that is, HTI and MMI. This chapter covers the following issues: the Islamists' conception of democracy, the roots of exceptionalism in the Islamists' arguments, the social construction of anti-democracy discourses, the role of the media, the employment of democracy to reject democracy, the Islamists at ballot box, and their rejection of secularism, pluralism, and liberalism.

Chapter 6 deals with the other variant of Islamists, that is, the meliorists, whose attitude and response to democracy is accommodating. The issues covered in this chapter are: the new era of political Islam, the new paradigm in Islamic politics, the reconsideration of an Islamic state, and the deployment of the Madinah Charter instead of the Jakarta Charter in politics.

Chapter 7 seeks to analyse comparatively the two variants of Islamism in light of power relations theory, beginning with the rise of Islamism in the light of public Islam, the Islamists' perception of power, manifestations of power among the Islamists, the Islamists' approaches to power structures, and commonalities and cleavages among the different streams of Islamism.

Chapter 8 concludes the study in terms of theoretical findings and reflection on whether or not a genuinely "home-grown" democracy could ever be constructed by the meliorist Islamists on the basis of Islamic and Indonesian values and norms.

Notes

1 For further discussion on the transition from the New Order to post-New Order regimes, see, for instance, Donald K. Emmerson, ed., *Indonesia beyond Soeharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); Henk Schulte Nordholt and Irwan Abdullah, eds., *Indonesia in Search of Transition* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2002); Damien Kingsbury and Arief Budiman, eds., *Indonesia: The Uncertain Transition* (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2001); Chris Manning and Peter van Diermen, eds., *Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000); Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).

2 For an authoritative account on political parties and democracy under Sukarno's regime, see Daniel S. Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957–1959* (Ithaca, NY: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1966); cf. Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962).

3 The shift of strategy among the Islamists from state-structure to society-culture has been aptly highlighted by Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (London: Hurst, 2004), p. 3. See also, Masdar Hilmy, "Looking into God's Heaven: Theological Constructs of Islamic Radicalism in Post-New Order Indonesia", *Asian Cultural Studies* 15 (2006): 11.

4 MMI, for instance, has put serious efforts into developing a subdivision intended to conduct research on the feasibility, formulation, and spreading of Islamic Shari'a into society. This attempt has produced a proposal to amend the Constitution of 1945 with a Shari'a-based constitution. See MMI, *Usulan Amandemen UUD '45 Disesuaikan dengan Syariat Islam* (Yogyakarta: Markaz Pusat Majelis Mujahidin, n.d.).

5 See, for instance, one of the points in what the MMI calls the "Yogyakarta Charter" (*Piagam Yogyakarta*), which says that "whoever of the Muslims oppose the implementation of Islamic shari'a, they can be classified as hypocrites and human rights transgressors and are inclined to the life of conflict as indicated in some areas such as Ambon-Maluku, Aceh, Poso and others". See MMI, *Mengenal Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia: Untuk Penegakan Syari'ah Islam* (Yogyakarta: Markaz Pusat Majelis Mujahidin, 2001), p. 6.

6 See, for instance, Herry Nurdi, "Risalah Islam Nusantara", special edition, *Sabili* 9 (2003): 8–15.

7 A number of volumes have been dedicated to investigating the complexity of the relationship between Islam and democracy. See, among others, M.A. Muqtader Khan, ed., *Islamic Democratic Discourse: Theory, Debates, and Philosophical Perspectives* (New York and Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006); cf. Ali Reza

Abootalebi, *Islam and Democracy: State-Society Relations in Developing Countries 1980–1994* (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 2000).

8 Samuel P. Huntington, with his "clash of civilizations" theory, has been recognized as one of the leading culturalist scholars advocate a firm fault line dividing Islam-based communities from the democratic Western world. Francis Fukuyama has enriched the culturalist viewpoint by arguing that human civilization has entered the last stage of its history, in which Western-style democracy has been confirmed as the champion in the "battle of ideologies". For further accounts of their theoretical constructs, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996) and Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

9 See, among others, Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, "Arab, Not Muslim, Exceptionalism", *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 4 (October 2004): 140–46. cf. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

10 For Weber's view on Islam, see *The Sociology of Religion*, 5th ed. (London: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 265–66.

11 Saiful Mujani's Ph.D. thesis, at any rate, has been a pioneering study on the relationship of Islam to democracy in Indonesia, with particular emphasis on the two largest Muslim organizations in the country: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. This study shows there is no convincing evidence that Islam is inimical to democracy, even though incongruence between the two is to be found in Islamist groups such as MMI, HTI, FPI, and Laskar Jihad. See Saiful Mujani, "Religious Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 2004).

12 Gudrun Krämer, "Islamist Notion of Democracy", *Middle East Report* 23, no. 4 (1993): 2–8. See also Daniel Brumberg, "Democratization in the Arab World? The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy", *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 4 (October 2002): 56–68.

13 For more detailed information on discourses on democracy developed by Muslims in the Arab world, see, among others, Larbi Sadiki, *The Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-Discourses* (London: Hurst & Company, 2004). See also, Najib Ghadbian, *Democratization and the Islamist Challenge in the Arab World* (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview Press, 1997).

14 Many studies and research projects on Islamism in post-New Order Indonesia have been produced since the collapse of the New Order. See, for instance, S. Yunanto et al., *Gerakan Militan Islam di Indonesia dan di Asia Tenggara* (Jakarta: Ridep Institute and Friedrich-Elbert-Stiftung (FES), 2003); cf. International Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP) in cooperation with JICA, "Islam and Peace Building in Indonesia: The Analysis of Radical Movements and Their Implication for Security-Development Prospects", unpublished final report (Jakarta: ICIP-JICA, 2004); cf. Khamami Zada, *Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-*

ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002); cf. Wardi Taufiq et al., *Gerakan Radikal Islam di Indonesia, dalam Sorotan!* (Jakarta: ASEAN Youth and Student Network, 2004); cf. Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, eds., *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2004); cf. Endang Turmudi and Riza Sihbudi, eds., *Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia Press, 2005), and many others. None of these studies, however, investigates the Islamists' rejection of democracy in great detail.

15 For more detailed information on Laskar Jihad, see Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2006); cf. Michael Davis, "Laskar Jihad and the Political Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia", *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24, no. 1 (April 2002): 12–32. cf. Muhammad Sirozi, "The Intellectual Roots of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: Ja'far Umar Thalib of Laskar Jihad (Jihad Fighters) and His Educational Background", *The Muslim World* 95, no. 1 (January 2005): 81–119.

16 Najib Ghadbian, *Democratization and the Islamist Challenge*, p. 6.

17 Salwa Ismail, "Being Muslim: Islam, Islamism and Identity Politics", *Government and Opposition* 39, no. 4 (2004): 66.

18 Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, translated by Carol Volk (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 35.

19 For the difference between *salafiyya* and Islamism, see ibid., pp. 31–34 and 36–40.

20 For further information on the use of the term "Islamist", see, among others, Raghid El-Solh, "Islamist Attitudes towards Democracy: A Review of the al-Ghazali, al-Turabi and 'Amara'", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 20, no. 1 (1993): 57–63; cf. Glenn E. Robinson, "Can Islamists be Democrats? The Case of Jordan", *The Middle East Journal* 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 373–87; Claire Heristchi, "The Islamist Discourse of the FIS and the Democratic Experiment in Algeria", *Democratization* 11, no. 4 (August 2004): 111–32; cf. Yahia H. Zoubir, "Algerian Islamists' Conception of Democracy", *Arab Studies Quarterly* 18, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 65–85; cf. Vickie Langohr, "Of Islamists and Ballot Boxes: Rethinking the Relationship between Islamisms and Electoral Politics", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33 (2001): 591–610.

21 *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), S.V. 'Utopia'.

22 Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 173. In contrast to Mannheim, who highlights the importance of utopia and ideology in politics, Judith Shklar postulated that the last vestiges of utopian faith have vanished. See Judith Shklar, *After Utopia: The Decline of Political Faith* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. vii. For more detailed debates about utopia and utopianism, see, for instance, Ian Clark, "World Order Reform and Utopian Thought: A Contemporary Watershed?" *The Review of Politics* 41, no. 1 (January 1979): 96–120; cf. Lyman Tower Sargent, "Authority

& Utopia: Utopianism in Political Thought", *Polity* 14, no. 4 (Summer 1982): 565–84. For the discussion on utopia and democracy in Islamist context, see Lahouari Addi, "Islamicist Utopia and Democracy", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 524 (November 1992): 120–30.

23 Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, pp. 173–84.

24 I am referring to the conceptual framework developed by Daniel Sommer Robinson in his article, "A Critique of Meliorism", *International Journal of Ethics* 34, no. 2 (January 1924): 175–194.

25 Edward L. Schaub, "Spirit Militant and Spirit Harmonious", *The Philosophical Review* 32, no. 2 (March 1923): 177.

26 Ibid., p. 162.

27 W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 56 (1956): 184.

28 Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 269.

29 David Beetham, "Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Democratization", in *Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West*, edited by David Held (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p. 55.

30 Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991).

31 Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy", *American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1 (March 1959): 69–105.

32 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), especially pp. 37–38.

33 David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p. 19.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid., p. 20.

37 Ibid., p. 17.

38 Ibid.

39 For a philosophical discussion on the causal relationship between pluralism and democracy, see, for instance, Paul H. Conn, "Social Pluralism and Democracy", *American Journal of Political Science* 17, no. 2 (May 1973): 237–54.

40 I employ the term "discourse" in a Habermasian sense, as the exchange of reasons among the stakeholders of democracy over what constitutes the common good for all elements of society along with the process of public deliberation. Habermas' "discourse theory of democracy" can be seen as an epistemic explanation that is both procedural and complex, for it entails the rationality of deliberation in terms of the complexity of reason-giving procedures. See Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, 2 vols., translated by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1984), especially pp. 1–42 and 237–73.

2

ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY
Re-examining the Intricate Relationship

At the turn of the millennium, the relationship between Islam and democracy is hotly contested and debated both in and outside the Muslim world. As democracy has entered the public sphere of the Muslim world through globalization, the Muslim world seems to have come under sustained attack. Muslim world-view concepts and institutions that here invincibly been upheld for many centuries, such as the concept of the Islamic state or empire (*khilafah*, or caliphate) are now challenged. The abrupt expansion of democracy has not only resulted in schisms among Muslims, but also shaken the theological underpinnings of Muslim civilization. Practically speaking, Muslim political thought is at a crossroads. The diversity of the intellectual responses to this debate is unavoidable, not only because of Islam, but also because the socio-political constellations of the Muslim world are sophisticated and multifaceted.

The reasons for this are at least threefold: First, public debate about the relationship between Islam and democracy was stirred up by "cultural-essentialist" scholars such as Bernard Lewis, Samuel P. Huntington, and Francis Fukuyama, who suggested that Islam is by nature incompatible with democracy. This thesis invited much controversy and has been rejected by other scholars, particularly those representing the "structuralist-instrumentalist approach". Second, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, being perpetrated by the international Muslim radicals of Al-Qaeda, were perceived by many as confirming the presence of a fault line between the Christian West and Islam. Third, in the dynamic internal debates among Muslims, a few major

Islamist groups axiomatically rejected the notion of democracy, claiming that Islam is the best and only all-encompassing religion for dealing not only with matters in the world to come but also in the present world. Democracy, for these Islamists, is considered as alien to Islam because it comes from a culture of non-believers. For these groups, the adoption of democracy would constitute a revolt against God's most supreme law, that is, Islamic Shari'ah.

This part seeks to reexamine the intricate relationship between Islam and democracy from a theoretical perspective, starting with a discussion of cultural essentialist approaches to democracy. Then the counter-arguments of the structural-instrumentalist school are elucidated, and finally an overview of the internal debate among Muslims themselves is presented.

CULTURAL ESSENTIALIST/EXCEPTIONALIST APPROACHES

The question of how or to what extent the traditions of Islam might affect the likelihood of successful democratization in the Muslim world has been widely discussed since the turn of the twentieth century. Western scholarship on Islamic subjects has long been shaped by the "cultural essentialist" approach. This approach tends to view cultural factors either as impediments or prerequisites to the reception of democracy.[1] With regard to the relatively slow progress of democratization in the Muslim world, this approach argues that Islamic culture provides infertile ground for the making and growth of democracy. This approach gave birth to the "incompatibility thesis" in academic circles that tends to stereotype particular religious traditions as being essentially democratic or undemocratic.

Max Weber was one of the pioneering cultural essentialists of the early twentieth century. He initiated the discussion about the connection of religious traditions to modernization and capitalism. His argument about the origins of modern capitalism has been one of the most influential in the history of the social sciences, prompting much discussion throughout the twentieth century.[2] In his seminal work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904–05), Weber suggested that certain psychological conditions had contributed in the creation of the modern capitalist system and that these were determined in large part by religious forces.[3] Specifically, he linked the Calvinist notions of "calling for piety" and the piety of "predestination", arguing that they gave birth to a peculiarly "worldly asceticism" that encouraged the pursuit of wealth as long as it was not consumed for worldly pleasure. It should be emphasized that Weber was not constructing an argument about democracy as such, despite the fact

that some of the implications of his thesis have been extended to suggest a connection between Protestantism and democracy.[4] In particular he argued that the Reformation helped break down the traditional cultural barriers to economic modernization, which in turn created a growing separation of labour and a degree of egalitarianism.[5]

The Weberian link of Protestantism and democracy might be traced from the Protestant emphasis on the individual's relationship with God — an idea that is inherently egalitarian in nature. At the heart of Luther's religious vision was the notion of the priesthood of all believers which, at least in the spiritual sphere, made no distinction between prince and beggar when it came to one's relationship with God. Similarly, Calvin's "calling" was something that could come to any member of society and on paper his congregational polity might be seen as a prototype for democratic forms of governance. In practice none of the leading Reformers were democrats in the modern sense of the word. Luther stressed the naturalness of the given social order, relied heavily on princes for the defence of his new teachings, and vigorously denounced the peasants who rose up against their masters. Equally, Calvinist congregational polities were often heavily dominated by their pastors. Calvin's own experience of struggling with Geneva's notionally representative assembly rendered him sceptical about whether any particular form of government conformed to the divine ideal.[6]

If Protestantism was seen as a key contributor to the emergence of democratic orders or at the very least a particularly "suitable" religion for democracy, nearly all other religious traditions have tended to be viewed as in some sense incompatible with a pluralist polity. The fact that democracy had largely emerged within the Protestant world meant that for some time the Roman Catholic Church did not have to engage directly with democratic forms of rule. The excesses of the French Revolution, ostensibly committed to give citizens the right of political participation, reinforced the view of the Church that democracy was in some sense associated with chaos, anarchy, and hostility towards true religion. Moreover, the very notion of popular sovereignty appeared to contradict divine sovereignty, while genuine tolerance was viewed as threatening to the ideological hegemony of the Church.[7]

Weber saw Islam not only as a religion of backwardness but also as incompatible with rational thinking: "Islam, in contrast to Judaism, lacked the requirement of a comprehensive knowledge of the law and lacked that intellectual training in casuistry which nurtured the rationalism of Judaism".[8] Again, Weber was not arguing the incompatibility of Islam and democracy. Nevertheless, one might infer from his remarks about the low level of

rationalism in Islam a sense that this religion was less than conducive to modernization and its embedded system of democracy.[9]

In a similar vein, through his provocative and controversial thesis of "the clash of civilizations", Samuel P. Huntington — following the Weberian argument — claims that Islam, together with Confucianism, is incompatible with democracy.[10] In Huntington's view, the global process of modernization and democratization brings about growing cultural pressures that are likely to culminate in a clash of civilizations.[11] He is particularly concerned that the demographic surge of the Islamic world is a threat to the West.[12] For Huntington, the characteristic of Western, Christian culture most clearly distinguishing from the Muslim world relates to the values associated with representative democracy.[13] He argues that this claim is given plausibility by the failure of electoral democracy to take root in most states of the Middle East and North Africa.[14]

The clash of civilizations thesis is a continuation of Huntington's earlier "third wave of democratization" thesis.[15] Here he argued that changes in five independent variables during the 1960s and 1970s had made possible the new democratic wave and that these included religious change, most notably within the Catholic Church.[16] Huntington notes the ongoing relationship between democracy and Protestantism, quoting a 1960s study suggesting that, in ninety-one countries studied, a greater proportion of Protestants correlated with a higher level of democracy. He explains this by noting that Christianity presents a surer doctrinal and institutional basis for opposing political repression by promoting ideas of equality and respect for authority beyond that of the state.[17] He argue that the reason why Catholicism is closely behind Protestantism in the development of democracy is that countries where Catholics comprise the majority had recently experienced higher rates of economic growth. Moreover, he also notes the changes within the Catholic Church as another reason.[18]

Another influential cultural essentialist, Bernard Lewis, pointed out in the 1950s that

> The political history of Islam is one of almost unrelieved autocratic. … There are no parliaments of representative assemblies of any kind, no councils or communes, no chambers of nobility or estates, no municipalities in the history of Islam; nothing but the sovereign power, to which the subject owed complete and unwavering obedience as a religious duty imposed by the Holy Law … For the last thousand years, the political thinking of Islam has been dominated by such maxims as "tyranny is better than anarchy" and "whose power is established, obedience to him incumbent".[19]

Lewis' incompatibility thesis is elaborated further in his influential best seller *What Went Wrong?* Relying heavily on his knowledge of Turkish history, he claims in a somewhat hasty manner that Islam's rejection of Western modernity represents an Islamic revolt against the Christian West. Lewis argues that this revolt stems from the centuries-long conflict between Islamic and Christian civilizations.[20] According to Lewis, as Christian civilization came to produce and embody modernity in the past three centuries, Muslim civilization at first rejected modernity due to its Christian nature in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, then tried to replicate it after realizing that it was the only method for survival against Western expansion. Lewis also implies that Muslims turned against the West and modernity in recent decades because of their perennial failure to imitate the Christian West.[21] Lewis' claims as put forward in *What Went Wrong?* lend scholarly weight to the argument that the main cause of Muslim discontent with the international order and the Western world stems from Muslims' inability to harmonize Islam and modernity.

Lewis' narrative of the relationship between Islam and Christianity is preoccupied with the history of conflicts and conquests.[22] The antagonistic encounter between the two begins with the era of Muslim rule in Spain, is followed by the centuries-long Crusades, the Ottoman conquests of Europe, European colonialism over Muslim lands, decolonization, and, finally, by recent anti-Western (that is, American) ideologies. In Lewis' view, the "zero-sum game" seems to be the only pattern available for encounters between Islam and the West. In this pattern, both civilizations are involved in a never-ending and unhealthy contest — either the Muslims are victorious and hegemonic, or the Christians are. Over the past three centuries, the relationship has been marked by the victory of the West with the advancement of modernization on the one hand and Muslims' inability to come to terms with their defeat on the other. The core argument developed in Lewis' *What Went Wrong?* is that, instead of blaming themselves for "what went wrong" in their societies, Muslims blame the West and, particularly, the United States of America.[23]

Lewis' depiction of the history of Muslim-Christian relations differs substantially from that of many other influential Middle East scholars such as Fred Halliday,[24] Lisa Anderson,[25] and Fareed Zakaria.[26] In contrast to Lewis, Zakaria argues that the fourteen-centuries-long history of Muslim-Christian encounters has been characterized mainly by harmonious coexistence.[27] In fact, although Islam and Christianity were historically influential as religious identities, there was never a solid and unified fault line dividing Islam from Christianity, as both Muslim and Christian states often fought against their

co-religionists, sometimes relying on people from other religions as allies.[28] As Cemil Aydin has noted, "there was a qualitative rupture in the relationship between the Muslim world and the West in the first half of the nineteenth century owing to globalization and the secularization of the international order".[29] Aydin is convinced that Muslims' ardent criticisms of Westernization is caused neither by the failure of modernization to take hold nor by a clash of civilizations, but has always been inextricably linked to local political factors.[30]

Francis Fukuyama, another cultural essentialist, argues in *The End of History* that Western democracy represents the ultimate model of all types of governance throughout human civilization. Like his predecessors, he questions whether it is possible to imagine modernity in forms other than that presented by the Western model.[31] For Fukuyama, it is such institutions as liberal democracy and capitalism that characterize modernity. The existence of these institutions qualifies society as having "reached the end of history". Furthermore, Fukuyama posits that "Islam has stood as a major barrier to democratization. As demonstrated by the Algerian municipal elections of 1990, or by Iran a decade earlier, greater democracy may not lead to greater liberalization because it brings to power Islamic fundamentalists hoping to establish some form of popular theocracy".[32] Like other incompatibility thesis advocates, Fukuyama uses Islam as an easy cultural essentialist explanation for the absence of democracy in Muslim countries. He accepts a version of Muslim exceptionalism in which Islam is incompatible with modernity. This means that Islam is the first factor that should be blamed for the impracticability of democracy in certain Muslim countries.[33]

Erroneously lumping the term "Islam" together with "Middle East" and "Arab", Fukuyama argues that Islam has no chance of defeating the essentially Western liberal democracy in the future. Even though Islam is currently undergoing a revival, Islam cannot convince any audience outside of the Muslim world. "The days of Islam's cultural conquests, it would seem, are over: it can win back lapsed adherents, but has no resonance for young people in Berlin, Tokyo, or Moscow. And while nearly a billion people are culturally Islamic — one fifth of the world's population — they cannot challenge liberal democracy on its own territory on the level of ideas".[34] He even predicts that "Islam would seem to be more vulnerable to liberal ideas in the long run than the reverse, since such liberalism has attracted numerous and powerful Muslim adherents over the past century and a half".[35]

In a very similar argument, Elie Kedourie, an eminent scholar of Arab politics, asserts that the absence of a democratic tradition in the Middle East is due particularly to the absence of a democratic culture in the history of this region. He further says that

> In the political theory of Islam, as it has remained to the present day, the caliph is the sole political and military authority within the umma, and all civil officials and military officers are his servants and derive their powers solely from this, the highest public office in Islam. There can be no question of checks and balances or representative assemblies … In its original form, Islamic political theory took for granted that the ruler would be a godly ruler, upholding the Shari'ah, and that his commitment to God's law gave sanction to his authority and constituted the bond between him and the other believers.[36]

In quoting a celebrated medieval Muslim philosopher, al-Ghazali (d. 1111), as saying that "the tyranny of a sultan for a hundred years causes less damage than one year's [chaotic] tyranny exerted by the subjects against each other", Kedourie seems to be convinced that the reason for the failure of democratization in Middle Eastern countries lies in normative Arabic Islamic political culture.[37]

Suffice it to say that the study of world religions has for almost a century been dominated by culture-based approaches. The longevity of the culturalist approach in the landscape of social sciences and humanities explains its endurance in the face of subsequent challenges and criticisms. That this approach has been influential in the scholarship on religions is a matter of fact. Nonetheless, there is no guarantee that it will continue to be dominant. It contains within itself weaknesses and shortcomings that suggest contending ideas, especially the "structural-instrumentalist approach", will take their place in the arena of intellectual discourse.

THE CRITICS: STRUCTURAL-INSTRUMENTALIST APPROACHES

The cultural essentialist approach began to come under sustained challenges from the early 1980s onwards, with criticism taking two forms.[38] The first argues that it is key political actors that are decisive in pushing for democratization. Culture, according to this view, is largely irrelevant or secondary. The second argues that cultural essentialist theories overemphasize the role of religion in shaping contemporary political cultures and equally that they have too static view of religious tradition, thus discounting the role of elements within these traditions that might be supportive of democracy. Subsequently, there emerged — borrowing John Anderson's words — the so-called "new orthodoxy" which tends to concentrate its analysis on institutional or structural, instead of cultural, factors in the making of democracy.[39]

It is difficult to deny a causal relationship between democracy and culture. It is also difficult to disagree with the fact that while democracy finds its strongholds mostly in countries of a Western Christian tradition, it is generally weakest in those with a predominantly Islamic tradition. Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether this correlation may be attributed solely to the role of Islam. Is there no room at all for other factors?[40] Similarly problematic are cultural essentialist explanations that focus less on the immediate activities of Islamic groups than on the role of religion in shaping political cultures that may or may not reinforce old, undemocratic regimes. A corollary question ensues: Does religion serve to shape the culture and ways of a nation, or is it shaped by culture, or, more likely, both? And even if religion is central to the formation of a country's political culture, to what extent is it relevant today, especially in those countries where religious adherence and participation has declined dramatically?

These are some of the complicated questions that apply in the alleged correlation between religion and democracy. The same questions apply in examining whether or not Islam as a cultural system is responsible for the slow progress towards democratization in the Muslim world. In examining the connection between Islamic culture and democracy, one should first of all be aware of the conceptual difference between normative Islam and empirical Islam, and between Middle Eastern Muslims and their non-Middle Eastern counterparts. People in the West often use the terms "Islam", "Middle East", and "Arab" interchangeably, even though they do not mean the same thing. Arabs are indeed an important part of the Muslim world, but "Arab" is an ethnic classification, not a religious one. Furthermore, the Arab world is only one part of the Muslim world and, in a numerical sense, a small one. Of the 1.2 billion Muslims in the world, only 260 million are Arabs.[41]

To explain the low levels of democratization in the Muslim world, Fareed Zakaria, for example, points towards the social structure in the Middle East, which is deeply rooted in authoritarian culture.[42] In supporting his argument, he cites the fact that, of the twenty-two members of the Arab League, not even one is an electoral democracy. In his view, this is because Arab social structure is stuck in patriarchal relations and values that seem to prevail in all public places such as schools, offices, markets, and streets. He argues that at the heart of Arab culture lies a "father figure culture", and this figure is described as

> the rulers over others, monopolizing authority, expecting strict obedience, and showing little tolerance of dissent. Projecting a paternal image, those in positions of responsibility such as rulers, leaders, teachers, employers,

> or supervisors, securely occupy the top of the pyramid of authority. Once in this position, the patriarch cannot be dethroned except by someone who is patriarchal.[43]

The critics of the cultural essentialists build on the question as to whether or not religion plays a key role in the process of democratization in constructing what might be called the "structural-instrumentalist school of thought".[44] Unlike the cultural approach, which relies heavily on religion as an autonomous variable, the structural-instrumentalist approach puts its emphasis on social and political structures where religion and other factors interact with one another in a dialectical relationship. In other words, the structural approach treats religion as an intervening variable within a highly complex pattern of social and political configurations. Religion is therefore secondary, superseded by social and political actors who do whatever is necessary to shove up their interests. It is these agents, not religion, who play a much greater role in determining whether a community will be more or less receptive to democracy. In this context, it is understood that any social change generally involves a complicated structure of power relations among agents — the position of religion is correspondingly less significant.[45]

Among the severest critics of the culturalist approach are Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, who base their critique on the World Values Survey/ European Values Survey (WVS). They conclude from this survey that "there were no significant differences between the publics living in the West and in Muslim religious cultures in approval of how democracy works in practice, in support for democratic ideals, and in approval of strong leadership".[46] In opposition to Huntington, both argue that the notion of the clash of civilizations, especially between the West and Islam, represents an oversimplification of the evidence. Across many political dimensions examined in their book, both Muslim and Western societies prove to have similarly positive orientations towards democratic ideals and practices. Support for democracy is widespread in Islamic societies, even among those who live under authoritarian governments. More strikingly, these authors argue that the cultural fault line that divides the West and the Muslim world is not about democracy; rather, it is about issues of gender equality and sexual liberalization.[47]

Basing their argument on the cumulative results of the two most recent surveys conducted by the World Value Survey (WVS) in 1995–96 and 2000–02 in Muslim and non-Muslim societies around the world, Inglehart and Norris contend that a comparison of the data of these surveys confirms the first claim in Huntington's thesis, that

> Culture does matter — indeed, it matters a lot. Historical religious traditions have left an enduring imprint on contemporary values. However, Huntington is mistaken in assuming that the core clash between the West and Islam is over political values. At this point in history, societies throughout the world (Muslim and Judeo-Christian alike) see democracy as the best form of government. Instead, the real fault line between the West and Islam, which Huntington's theory completely overlooks, concerns gender equality and sexual liberalization … the values separating the two cultures have much more to do with *eros* than *demos*. As younger generations in the West have gradually become more liberal on these issues, Muslim nations have remained the most traditional societies in the world.[48]

By criticizing Huntington's position that the fault line between the West and Islam lies, among other cultural values, in the low level of trust among Muslims towards democracy, Inglehart and Norris are thus not criticizing Huntington's culturalist approach per se. Indeed they use the same category as Huntington does, that is, cultural values, in invalidating the clash of civilizations theory.[49]

By contrast, Fares Al-Braizat challenges Francis Fukuyama's theory that Islam cannot accommodate the very principles of democracy and modernity by using a yardstick besides that of cultural values. Based on an empirical examination of several indicators such as trust and support for democratic government, he found out that generally speaking Muslim countries are likely to accept the notion of democracy.[50] What makes Islamic countries less likely to achieve democratic political governance, he concludes, lies outside of religion: it is "the nature of the overstated, overblown and overstretched state structure and the heavy-handed authoritarian regimes (in most cases) in power at present".[51] In addition, there are factors to consider such as modernization, industrialization, urbanization, literacy, colonial legacy, international trade, international political economy (weapons and oil), interpersonal trust, well-being, secularization, social class, globalization, openness of the market, distribution of economic and intellectual resources, regional and international conflicts, nationalism, state structure, elite orientation, and state legitimacy.[52] All these factors interplay with one another in shaping a political system. They should therefore be taken into consideration when examining the success or failure of a democratization process in particular society. By pointing to the relevance of such a multiplicity of factors, Al-Braizat places Fukuyama's claim about Islam as resistant to democracy under serious challenge.

Whereas Huntington and Fukuyama have stirred up considerable debate with their propensity to see Islam as an insuperable and autonomous

factor in the process of democratization, many scholars working on the Middle East remain sceptical about the role of religion. Fred Halliday, for instance, argues that the barriers to democracy in Islamic countries have to do with "certain other social and political features that their societies share … Though some of these features tend to be legitimised in terms of Islamic doctrine, there is nothing specifically 'Islamic' about them".[53] For Halliday, to accept the cultural essentialist argument on Islam and democracy means "to accept the false premise that there is only one true, traditionally established 'Islamic' answer to the question, and that this timeless 'Islam' rules social and political practice. There is no such answer and no such 'Islam'".[54]

In a somewhat harsher vein, Olivier Roy challenges culturalists who view Islam as

> a discrete entity, a coherent and closed set of beliefs, values and anthropological patterns embodied in a common society, history and territory, which allows us to use the term as an explanatory concept for almost everything involving Muslims … The idea that a perennial, religion-based culture is a relevant factor in explaining most of the characteristics (and specifically most of the drawbacks, failures, dead ends, hopelessness, disillusion and illusions) of Muslims is a cliché in many fields including politics, economics, civil society and the law. What is striking is that many learned scholars (I shall ignore non-academic jumpers on the bandwagon) are repeating the same clichés, without any research to substantiate their arguments.[55]

Roy disagrees with the culturalists' principle that culture exists in itself, is transmitted linearly from generation to generation, and is the ultimate explanatory model for any society.[56] He also disagrees with the ways in which culturalists overemphasize the role of Islam in contemporary societies, viewing culture as "a fairly homogenous and closed set of values, downplaying a centuries-old history of civil wars and ideological conflicts".[57] These are some of the reasons why culturalists are said to fail in their depictions of the alleged role of religion in particular societies.

More interestingly, Roy argues that this approach is used not only by scholars, but also by Islamists and conservative Muslims. This may be seen in Islamists claims, for example, that they hold "the true Islam", that "Islam is (in)compatible with democracy", or that "in Islam there is no separation between religion and politics", and the like. He asserts that critics and "defenders" of Islam remain caught in the culturalist approach. According to Roy, religious communities should be analysed with a political-institutional

approach because the dominant factor that finally determines consensus in religious communities are institutions and structures, not values. Finally, cultural paradigms are misleading to the extent that they do not help one understand what is at hand.[58]

Alfred Stepan, a consistent challenger of religion-based explanations, argues that, like other religions, Islam is a multivocal religion that can provide institutional and intellectual resources in support of democracy or vice versa.[59] Stepan also argues that "Islam as a religion is a community of believers in which all believers can be preachers and where there is no transnational hierarchy".[60] Since Islam has no hierarchical structure whatsoever, any Muslim has the potential to bring Islam into the establishment of democratic tradition or vice versa.[61] This multivocal nature of Islam means that at any point in time, the dominant voices within Islam might prove more or less receptive to the basic principle of democracy. Put differently, the intermingling of Islamic and local customs as expressed through public discourse and in the positions adopted by key religious actors may have some impact upon the success or failure of democratization.[62]

Stepan himself, together with Graeme B. Robertson, does not believe in "Islamic exceptionalism" when it comes to democracy. Yet, he does believe in "Arab exceptionalism", which was suggested by Fareed Zakaria to be the main reason why the Muslim world seems less receptive to democracy.[63] This notion is based on research findings regarding differences in electoral competitiveness in the world's forty-seven Muslim-majority countries. Stepan and Robertson found that "the non-Arab Muslim world has for the last thirty years been much more electorally competitive than the Arab Muslim world".[64] Their thirty-year statistical assessment also reveals that "a non-Arab Muslim-majority country was almost twenty times more likely to be 'electorally competitive' than an Arab Muslim-majority country".[65] Of the forty-seven Muslim-majority countries, six (non-Arab) were found to be "electorally competitive": Turkey, Senegal, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Mali, and Niger.[66] In their analysis, electoral competitiveness was said to be present if the following two conditions were fulfilled: (1) the government springs from reasonably fair elections; and (2) the elected government is able to fill the most important political offices.[67]

The basic argument of the structural-instrumentalist school is that the success of any democratization process and its consolidation is based largely on the involvement of actors and factors that would tend to support democratic change rather than serve to undermine it. This means it is not entirely true that "religious tradition determines political outcomes, or that religious emphases cannot change, or that the world is divided into inevitably

clashing civilizational blocs".[68] The structural-instrumentalist approach insists that religions are not immutable and monolithic entities; rather, they are living organisms that can change with the circumstances.

ON THE MULTIVOCALITY OF ISLAM: MUSLIMS' DEBATES ON DEMOCRACY

Religion is a wide and open text; its manifestations are as diverse as its adherents' readings of the text. As a consequence, there is always an ambiguity about religion because religious texts are ambiguous in nature. Truth claims among adherents of religion are the inevitable consequence of this ambiguity. Religion has frequently been depicted as a double-edged sword as it has abundant potential to be exploited for ends that are morally "bad" or "evil". Religion can also lead to negative outcomes such as war, conflict, or corruption. On the other hand, many believe that religion reveals good and positive things such as peace, love, and so forth. In other words, all religions are multifaceted and multivocal. In this way, the heterogeneous attitudes towards democracy among Muslims are a reflection par excellence of the multivocal nature of Islam.

Reflecting this insight, scholars such as John L. Esposito, Aziz Al-Azmeh, and Ibrahim Moosa stress that Islam is not a monolithic religion. John L. Esposito urges that people ask the question "Whose Islam?" because Islam is always presented through the voices and representatives of Muslim groups and individuals.[69] The South African scholar Ibrahim Moosa and Aziz Al-Azmeh, both note that "there are many 'islams' with a small 'i,' and many Muslims with differences in terms of their practices and understandings, since each person or Muslim community appropriates the discursive tradition differently".[70]

As Esposito and Voll observe, even within those Western communities where democracy has emerged and flourished, the concept of democracy is itself highly contested.[71] This contestation is reflected in the Muslim world, where it is debated whether Muslims should "import" typically Western democracy or achieve some kind of genuinely "Islamic democracy". The multivocality of Islam in responding to the concept of democracy is to some extent a corollary, and by-product, of the contestation in the West.

In Olivier Roy's view, "the many different Islams (liberal, fundamentalist, conservative) with which we are familiar are more a construction than a reality".[72] This seems plausible particularly when one considers the typical life path of an individual, which may represent more a long, lively journey of "becoming" than a stagnant enterprise. For instance, one may, at one stage

in life, live in a very liberal manner, then experience a spiritual crisis, and may be later join an Islamic radical group before turning more "bourgeois" and perhaps becoming a community leader. For this reason, Roy insists, the culturalist approach fails to reveal the reality of religion because it is mostly trapped in discussing religion where it ought to be discussing religiosity.[73] The issue of religion is thus exploited over and over again in justifying arguments that some authors have a vested interest in making.

It has commonly been argued that the processes of reconstruction and deconstruction play an integral part in the making of religious dogma.[74] In other words, religious concepts are subject to public contestation. Throughout the history of religious thought in Islam, nuances of change and continuity are omnipresent.[75] The process of confirmation, challenge, and validation of religious concepts will continue as long as an institutional mechanism for such processes exists. In Islam, for instance, the institutional mechanism for validating or reinvigorating the old with the new is *ijtihad*, through which a process of construction and deconstruction of religious pronouncements is played out.[76]

The emergence of religious schisms in the history of Islam is inextricably linked to this institutional mechanism, which allows those considered capable of conducting independent *ijtihad* to exercise particular Islamic concepts. The emergence of revivalism and reformism in Islam, which has allowed extreme religious variants to come into being, is an immediate result of *ijtihad*. The contextual origins of such extreme religious variants in Islam as Wahhabism, then, can be understood from this perspective. Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, was allowed to challenge whatever he perceived of as a corruption of proper Islam.[77] The ideology of reformism put new religious viewpoints into effect, and existing cultural symbols that were deemed religiously corrupt were destroyed. This confirms what Michel Foucault has pointed out, namely, that religion is an area of power contestation over religious meanings and truths.[78]

The involvement of power and politics in the contestation over religious meanings sharpened the clash within Islam. The intermarriage of power and religious institutions is clearly obvious in the case of Wahhabism, which was formally buttressed by the political power of the Saudi Government. A similar phenomenon occurred in the Middle Ages where the institution called "inquisition" (*mihna*) was established by the Abbasid caliphate to endorse the Mu'tazilite school as the only accepted religious form at that time. One of the immediate victims of this intermarriage is no doubt the freedom of expression. The story of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal is a real case in point where the system of inquisition was applied during the Abbasid caliphate.[79] He was sent

to jail because his opinion differed from that of the formal state school. In jail, he was tortured and eventually passed away.

The internal debate on democracy within Muslim communities shows this multivocality. While one might assume that Islam is not conducive to democracy because it contains elements of authoritarianism, Fareed Zakaria charges that these elements are very likely to be found in the texts of other religions as well:

> [the] Koranic model of leadership is authoritarian. The Muslim holy book is bursting with examples of the just king, the pious ruler, the wise arbiter. But the Bible has its authoritarian tendencies as well. The kings of the Old Testament were hardly democrats. The Biblical Solomon, held up as the wisest man of all, was, after all, an absolute monarch. The Bible also contains passages that seem to justify slavery and the subjugation of women. The truth is that little is to be gained by searching in the Koran for clues to Islam's true nature. The Koran is a vast book, filled with poetry and contradictions — much like the Bible and the Torah. All three books praise kings, as do most religious texts.[80]

Zakaria goes on to argue that it is not fair to identify Islamic culture as the sole factor contributing to the development of authoritarian Islamic regimes. He points also to the very anti-authoritarian elements contained in Islam. As an example, he quotes a saying from the Hadith — sayings of the Prophet Muhammad — that "obedience to the ruler is incumbent on the Muslim only so far as the ruler's commands are in keeping with God's law".[81] Religion, in other words, lends itself to many interpretations among its believers.

The approach to religion of any individual might be closely associated with the degree and kind of intellectual engagement applied in that person's understanding of religion. In other words, the intellectual and educational background of a Muslim greatly affects the way he or she understands Islam. Those educated in formal Islamic institutions might understand Islam differently from those educated in secular educational institutions. It is likely that the method of approaching Islam in religious educational institutions tends to be more multidimensional than that in secular educational institutions. While in the former Islam is usually treated as a subject for close and critical examination, in the latter Islam tends to be viewed from a more limited perspective. As a result, Islam is treated as a holistic and all-encompassing religious system that is believed to contain universal values.[82]

As far as the debate on the relationship between Islam and democracy is concerned, three different camps have come into existence. The first

comprises those who reject firmly the concept of democracy in whatever form. The second consists of those who accept democracy. The third comprises those who accept some parts of democracy while rejecting other parts of it. From a constructivist perspective, each of them bases their arguments on normative grounds rooted in the sacred texts of Islam, the Qur'an and the Hadith. It may be argued that their various opinions are simply based on diverging interpretations of these texts rather than on outright judgements substantive elements of democracy. Their different interpretations of the texts are particularly due to the different approaches used by each of them; while the first relies heavily on a literal understanding of Islam, the second employs a liberal one, while the last tries to stand in between.

ARGUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY PROPONENTS

This multivocal nature of Islam may be seen in the various attitudes among Muslims towards the concept of democracy. For the so-called "liberal-moderate-pluralist Muslims", democracy is in itself completely Islamic, no matter where it originally came from. Rather than deriving their arguments from the concept of consultation (*shura*) in Islamic political thought, they believe that democracy comprises all modern elements of governance such as the principle of equality (*musawah*), consensus (*ijma*'), oath of allegiance (*bay'a*), dissent in opinion (*ikhtilaf*), freedom (*al-hurriya*), and justice ('*adl*), all of which are believed to have long been cardinal Islamic doctrines, but which in reality have suffered from various abuses by despotic and authoritarian regimes throughout the history of the Muslim world.[83] According to Moussalli, these Islamic doctrines of democracy are significantly increasing in popularity among intellectual Muslims due to their desire for a better quality of life. At the same time, he maintains that theological justifications for tyrannical and authoritarian politics are on the wane, as they are perceived to be major impediments to the development of Muslim society.[84]

For liberal Muslim thinkers, the arguments in favour of a despotic application of Islamic governance are considered erroneous. They posit that both classical and modern concepts, doctrines, and institutions are the result of human manipulation, not Divine predestination.[85] In this way of thinking, the adoption of democracy is perceived as part of an unending process of renewal based on interpretation and reinterpretation. Basically, liberal discourses on democracy reject the notion of the past as a normative system or history, of course with the exception of the Qur'an and the Hadith as supreme formative and constitutive texts of Islam.

In Moussalli's view, the liberal interpretation of democracy serves several strategic points. At the religious and ideological level, the Islamic conception of democracy is assumed to contain a theology of liberation and an "epistemological break" with the past. At the political level, this concept widens individual, social, political, and philosophical space in the Muslim world, especially in Arab countries. At the cultural level, this concept serves as a means of communication and dialogue among various civilizations, religions, and political orders. At the international level, this concept provides the Muslim world common ground with the West.[86]

Abdolkarim Soroush, a contemporary Muslim scholar from Iran, posits a "religious democracy" where Islam and democracy are assumed to be able to coexist harmoniously. What he means by "religious democracy" is a combination of religion and reason. In his view, the idea of religious democracy must be established on the principle of subjectivity in the human understanding of religion.[87] He goes on to argue that

> expansion and contraction of knowledge, its constant renewal, the perception of truth as an elusive labyrinthine path, the recognition of man as a tarnished, slothful, and fallible creature who, nevertheless, possesses an array of natural rights have all been among the necessary prerequisites for and epistemological and anthropological foundations of democracy.[88]

This principle of subjectivity all above aims at making the society humane, reasonable, and fair. In a similar vein, Khaled Abou El-Fadl — a professor of Islamic law at the University of California Los Angeles — believes that the tradition of Islamic political thought allows for the development of an interpretative concept and practice of democracy. In his view, democracy can be classified as an ethical virtue and obtaining this virtue is possible without necessarily disregarding Islam.[89] This goal, however, might not be achievable unless Muslims have a strong political will, moral commitment, and an enlightened vision towards the development of society. Despite the fact that the Qur'an does not explicitly dictate the form of government, it is believed implicitly to contain a set of social and political values that may be used to justify the establishment of an Islamic democratic order. El-Fadl points to the following three sets of values considered relevant to this issue: first, establishing a just political order based on social solidarity and mutual help among Muslims (Q.S. 49:13, 11:119); second, building a consultative and non-autocratic governmental system; and, third, institutionalizing affection in social interactions (Q.S. 6:12 & 54; 21:77).[90]

It seems that Abou El-Fadl is very much concerned about the search for an ideal relationship between the ruler and the ruled from which Muslims might take an invaluable lesson from the past. He argues that political power throughout the Muslim history has been generally abused by the rulers for their own interests. To overcome this problem, he proposes what he calls "consultative governance" where Muslim rulers must exercise their power on the basis of the principle of consultation (*shura*).[91] The Qur'an commanded the Prophet to exercise his political power based on this principle, particularly when he dealt with important public issues (Q.S. 3:159, 42:38). Soon after the Prophet passed away, the *shura* signified an institutionalized and regular succession of leadership and public political participation. In his view, the failure of political Islam in the past owes mainly to the malfunction of this principle.[92]

Even though *shura* was not clearly defined in early Muslim history, it referred to more than rulers seeking advice from the public; it also allowed for mass protests against rulers' power abuses, authoritarianism, and oppression. Nevertheless, the public would let an authoritarian ruler stay in power until a leadership succession occurred. In Islamic political thought, Muslim jurists would advise the masses not to revolt against Muslim tyrannical regimes as long as they did not violate Shari'ah law. The ruled were urged to tolerate an authoritarian ruler as a temporary disadvantage until the succession occurred. Not until the third Hijri (ninth C.E.) century did the concept of *shura* become more institutionalized in the discourse of Muslim jurists as a consultative assembly consisting of experts from various backgrounds (*ahl hall wa al-'aqd*) employed to deal with religious and worldly matters.[93]

An important point raised by El-Fadl is his objection to the Islamists' claim that sovereignty belongs to God alone and that the Shari'ah is the only legitimate form of governance fulfilling all Muslims' needs and interests. In his view, God Himself never meant to control everything in human life. Instead, He gives freedom and authority to humans to organize themselves as long as they do not violate standard ethical and moral principles, such as preserving and protecting human dignity and welfare. In the Qur'anic discourse, God has venerated the human's position by giving him special features, that is, the intellect, which cannot be found in other creatures such as animals and angels. In line with this premise, it is not against God's sovereignty to respect the special position of humans. In fact, it is a way to uphold God's superiority.[94]

These liberal Muslim thinkers and activists view democracy as an embedded element of Islam. In their view, there is no specific reason to reject the idea of democracy since it is universally accepted as a moral mechanism

for dealing with public matters. What is to some extent surprising is the fact that, unlike those who were brought up in typically modern and Western educational milieu, these Muslim thinkers were educated in traditional, classical and local learning institutions such as *madrasah*. Among these thinkers are the Egyptians Fahmi Huwaydi, al-'Aqqad, Muhammad Husein Heikal, Zakariya 'Abd al-Mun'im Ibrahim al-Khatib Mahmoud Mohamed Taha of Sudan; Bani Sadr and Mehdi Bazargan of Iran; and Hasan al-Hakim of the United Arab Emirates.[95] Significantly, their educational background gives their arguments for democracy more credibility in the shaping of Islamic political thought. Given their relative lack of familiarity with Western ideas and primary sources, their support for democracy has particular comparative value, especially in relation to those scholars who were educated in the modern Western tradition.

It is Fahmi Huwaydi who made a viable synthesis of Islam and democracy in his book, *Al-Islam wa al-Dimuqratiyyah*.[96] He maintains that democracy should not only feature fair, competitive, and regularized leadership succession mechanisms, but that it should also embrace the principle of governmental accountability. He further argues that democracy should contain mechanisms to elect and possibly re-elect rulers through legitimate electoral institutions. Moreover, it should feature key elements such as the application of majority rule, a multiparty system, freedom of opposition and the press, respect for the rights of minorities, an independent judiciary system, and so on. By means of general elections and the separation of powers among the legislative and the executive branches as well as the judiciary, democracy is a means for resisting authoritarianism and dictatorship. For that reason, Huwaydi goes on to argue, the ideal of democracy is perfectly in line with the spirit of Islamic teaching.

In supporting his argument, Huwaydi employs several normative grounds. First, there are some Hadith indicating that Islam appreciates a government in line with majority rule. In a Hadith narrated by Ibn Majah, Muhammad reportedly said: "There are three persons whose prayers are not ascending even an inch over their heads. The first is a Muslim who leads prayers while the followers hate him …" In a Hadith narrated by Muslim from 'Awf ibn Malik, it was said: "The best leaders of you are those whom you love and they love you. While the worst of your leaders are those whom they hate and they hate you, whom you curse and they curse you".[97]

Second, Islam rejects dictatorship and authoritarianism. There are abundant verses in the Qur'an indicating this. Q.S. 2:258, for example, condemns King Namrud who arrogantly claimed to be able to make a person live or die like God by capturing two people on their own way and

arbitrarily executing one of them. In another verse (Q.S. 44:31) it is said that God condemns Pharaoh who has been arrogant (‘*uluww*) and authoritarian (*tughyan*) and who declared himself a god (Q.S. 79:24, 28:38). God also condemns his cronies such as Haman and Qarun who were united through material interests (Q.S. 40:23–24). Haman is depicted in the Qur’an as an opportunistic politician who devotes his intelligence and experience to Pharaoh, a tyrannical ruler, whereas Qarun is depicted in the Qur’an as a wealthy capitalist who supports Pharaoh’s government and collects his wealth from the people. God also condemns Pharaoh’s military power which oppressed people and He condemns the people who have shown no resistance (Q.S. 28:8, 40 and Q.S. 11:97–98).[98]

Third, in Islam, general elections are viewed as the testimony of adult people in electing their leaders and they, as the Qur’an advises (Q.S. 2:282–83), must not hide their testimony; they must be just and honest and they must not give false testimony (Q.S. 22:30 and Q.S. 65:2). If not, they will be ruled by those who are incompetent. And if general elections are a mechanism for the people to control the ruler and if this institution functions as a mechanism for overthrowing an unjust and untrustworthy ruler, then, in Islam, taking part in general elections is a way of saying what is true to the ruler — the best form of *jihad*, as mentioned in a Hadith narrated by Ibn Majah.[99]

Fourth, democracy is an attempt to bring back the caliphate system of the four rightly Guided Caliphs (*Khulafa’ al-Rashidun*) who were renowned for their just and impartial policies towards all people. This system was retained when the despotic Muawiyyah, the founder of monarchic Umayyad dynasty, seized power. His unjust rule was the first experience of despotic governance that Muslim society had ever gone through.[100]

Fifth, the Islamic state is a just state based on the principle of equality before the law. There are many stories dealing with just rulers in Islam. The testimony of Harun Al-Rashid, one of the greatest caliphs of the Abbasid Empire, for instance, was once rejected in court by a judge, Abu Yusuf, who had been appointed by the caliph himself. The reason given by Abu Yusuf was that Al-Rashid had been arrogant and had not performed his prayers in the mosque with the rest of the congregation. Instead, he had built a mosque within his palace. Another case in point is the king Kamil al-Ayyubi, one of Al-Rashid’s successors, whose testimony was also rejected by the court due to his unjust attitudes.[101]

Sixth, as formulated by Muslim theorists such as al-Mawardi,[102] *imamah* (political leadership) stands for a real social contract between ruler and ruled in which rulers are open to reprimand. If he shows unwillingness to accept the admonishment, he may be dethroned and someone else will replace him.[103]

In response to those who reject democracy on the grounds that it is adopted from a Western tradition, Huwaydi employs several arguments. First, it is difficult to deny that democracy is derived from a Western tradition, but there are many other foreign ideas that have been incorporated into Islamic traditions. For example, during the Khandaq war, Muhammad adopted a strategy common in Persian tradition. Similarly, the seal or official stamp, or the tax and office system were adopted by the second caliph, Umar ibn al-Khattab, from Byzantium and Persia. The post office system was adopted by the Umayyad dynasty. Second, democracy does not mean opposing the sovereignty of God over all humankind. The principle *la hukma illa lillah* (no sovereignty except to God alone) applies to Muslims only, while non-Muslims would still benefit from government protection. Third, the principle of majority rule is not identical with going astray (Q.S. 6:16), nor with unfaithfulness or ungratefulness (Q.S. 2:243), nor with being dull or unwilling to understand God, His teachings and His power (Q.S. 12:103, 11:17, 7, 187) as exemplified in pagan societies. The Prophet himself was reportedly in support of the majority vote in the case of the Uhud war, or as reported in a Hadith narrated by Ahmad, the Prophet supported both Caliph Abu Bakr and Umar when both were said to agree on something, instead of supporting one of them. Fourth, the law-making process in parliament does not usurp God's authority to do the same thing. Decision- and law-making processes in parliament deal merely with social matters unresolved in religion.[104]

Even though Huwaydi makes an almost perfect synthesis of democracy with Islam, he leaves one theological issue unresolved, that is, the problem of self-candidacy, which is perceived by some Muslims as asking for position. It is Zakariya 'Abd al-Mun'im Ibrahim al-Khatib who has attempted to complete this gap by arguing that there is no significant difference between *shura* and democracy, either institutionally or structurally, despite the fact that each has its own source.[105] If the first stems from a revealed religion (*samawi*), the latter is derived from plain rationalism. Substantially speaking, both are based on several principles. The first is the principle of equality. Like democracy, Islam decrees that all human beings are equal before the law and God (Q.S. 5:7). Being of a different colour or race or social status cannot make anyone superior or inferior to others. The only thing that can make humans different from each other is their level of faith and piety (Q.S. 49:13). The second is the principle of freedom, rendered by Islam as individual freedom (Q.S. 35:18), freedom of living (Q.S. 5:33), freedom of religion (Q.S. 10:99), freedom of expression and criticism (Q.S. 4:71), and freedom of action (Q.S. 67:15). The third regards political rights such as controlling

the right of the ruled against rulers because leadership is a socio-political contract. It is written by such Muslim political theorists as Ibn Qudama that political power must be fairly obtained through election and the right to self-candidacy. In al-Khatib's view, the prohibition against asking for position or political power as advised by a Hadith has only to do with greedy ambition. In other words, the right of self-candidacy as it is practised in democratic systems is allowed in Islam.[106]

Viewed either institutionally or structurally, al-Khatib goes on to argue, democracy and Islam are not different from each other. In Islamic tradition, a ruler is elected by a representative body called *shura* (parliament) as in the case of Abu Bakr's election as the first caliph, an election strengthened by an oath of allegiance (*bay'a*) that he took as a sign of devotion in exercising power on the basis of an agreed contract. Over the centuries, this institution has played its function as a controlling agent over rulers' policies and it is entitled to demand the rulers' allegiance when they are considered to be abusing their powers or to be unable to continue to exert their power. Similarly, the ruled also have the same entitlements as parliament, in that they can challenge public policies that are considered corrupt or abusive. In addition, Islam gives much room for the creation of political parties as long as they are used for the sake of the public interest and do not result in social conflict or chaos.[107]

It seems that the work of Huwaydi and al-Khatib is on a historical continuum with that of their predecessors, including al-'Aqqad and Husein Heikal. Al-'Aqqad, for instance, in his introduction to his book *Al-Dimuqratiyyah fi al-Islam* (Democracy in Islam) argued that throughout the history of the religion, democracy has been promulgated by Islam.[108] The same claim has also been made by Muhammad Husein Haikal, who argues that any mechanism that is not erected on the basis of democracy is not in line with the main doctrines expounded by Islam. This is because the doctrines of democracy are identical with those of Islam. To Haikal, Islam and democracy are equally oriented to the basic nature of human beings. Haikal bases his argument on the principle of *shura* (Q.S. 3:159, 42:38), brotherhood in Islam, equality before the law, *ijtihad* (individual rationalism), or freedom of thinking with particular reference to matters unanswered in religion. He argues that the legislation or law-making principle belongs only to judges and not to rulers. Indeed, those democratic principles that were exercised by the Prophet Muhammad in Medina were very similar to the democratic principles developed in modern Switzerland.[109]

In addition to these Egyptian Muslim thinkers, there are others who accept democracy in a Western liberal sense without any reserve. Muhammad

Sa'id al-'Ashmawi and Faraj Fouda, for instance, reject completely the idea of theocracy on the grounds that the practice of Islamic government has a propensity to produce authoritarianism.[110] What most Muslim thinkers have called an Islamic ideology is not a genuinely Islamic concept. In Islam, adds al-'Ashmawi, politics is not something fixed, definitive, and static; rather it is a dynamic and contextual concept. Politics does not have anything to do with divine matters; it is merely a matter for humans. In line with this argument, politics is regarded as part of a ceaseless attempt to achieve a better quality of human life. Democracy is, therefore, not anathema to Islam; indeed, it is simply unavoidable for Muslims to adopt this political system if they want to achieve a better quality of life.[111]

Another Egyptian Muslim thinker, Tawfiq al-Hakim, views certain methods of criminal punishment in Islamic law, such as the cutting off of hands for a thief and the stoning to death or lashing for an adulterer, as not genuinely originating from Islam; rather, they were adopted by the Qur'an from the previous system of law.[112]

ACCOMMODATIONIST APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY

In the middle of the spectrum are those who stand ambiguously in between: they neither accept nor totally reject democracy. More specifically, they adopt some parts of democracy while rejecting some others. Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, a Muslim ideologue and the founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan, is among these scholars whose thoughts on Islam and other contemporary issues are widely influential in shaping Muslim political thought. He rejects democracy on the grounds that it acknowledges the sovereignty of the people, whereas he believes that absolute sovereignty belongs to God alone, who holds the role of Law-Giver and is the head of the socio-political order. In addition, democracy allows for relativism, something he considers to be contradictory to the mainstream belief of Muslims that what God has revealed through Islam is the whole truth. For those reasons, no compromise is possible in terms of state structure except by establishing an Islamic state to guarantee and safeguard the "true" Islam.[113]

> Mawdudi insists that, as an exemplary agent of Islam, the Islamic state is not an evolving model; it is an already perfect one, requiring no changes and containing ever-lasting meaning. There is no chance whatsoever for man to improve on it; he is merely enjoined to institutionalize it and, consequently, preserve it from destruction and extinction. All the

> mechanisms and institutions of a modern polity such as elections and legislations can play only secondary roles in such a state. The executive body in the Islamic state serves merely as vicegerent of God — a political interpretation of the Islamic belief that man is *khalifatullah* (God's vicegerent) on earth.[114] In this conception, God has to become the rationale, the guarantor, and an integral part of the sociopolitical order. The Islamic state is considered to be the sole legitimate medium of interaction between man and God; God's role and image should be translated into action by the Muslim caliphs or rulers to whom all Muslims must pledge their allegiance.[115]

Man, in Mawdudi's vision, serves only as the agency in worldly matters insofar as he does not violate God's law. The position of agency played by man, thus, is limited to anything that has not been spelled out explicitly in the Qur'an and Sunnah. In Mawdudi's conception, man occupies the "limited freedom" given by God. He, thus, does not agree with the notion of "absolute freedom" that he believes is offered by Western democracy. In this context, Robinson maintains that

> Central to Mawdudi's vision is the belief that God alone is sovereign; man has gone astray because he has accepted sovereigns other than God, for instance, kings, nation states or custom. All the guidance which man needs can be found in the Shari'ah, which offers a complete scheme of life where nothing is superfluous and nothing lacking. Political power is essential to put this divinely ordained pattern into effect; the Islamic state has a missionary purpose. Moreover, because God's guidance extends to all human activity, this state must be universal and all-embracing, and because the state's purpose is to establish Islamic ideology it must be run by those who believe in it and comprehend its spirit — those who do not may just live within the confines of the state as non-Muslim citizens (*dhimmis*). Naturally, this state recognises that God not man is the source of all law. The state is merely God's vicegerent (*khalifa*) on earth. It is a vicegerency, however, which is shared by all Muslim citizens of the state with whom, in consequence, the ruler must consult in the process of government. So Mawdudi describes his policy as a "theo-democracy" in which the whole community of Muslims interpret the law of God within the framework supplied by the Shari'ah. The ruler (*amir*) is to be elected by whatever means are appropriate, providing that they ensure that the man who enjoys the greatest measure of national confidence is chosen. His legislature (*madjlis-I shura*) is also to be elected by whatever means are appropriate, provided that they ensure the choice of men with the confidence of the people. Legislation itself takes place in four ways: by

> interpretation, by analogy, by inference, and, in that area of human affairs about which the Shari'ah is silent, by independent judgment.[116]

Democracy, Mawdudi believes, is "the kind of government in which the majority rules whether its views be right or wrong, and in which a minority may hope to have a voice in affairs only by transforming itself into the majority. No guarantees of rights or other safeguards that might be built into a democratic constitution could truly protect a minority in a democratic polity. Democracy, when reduced to its bare bones, amounts only to the tyranny of the majority".[117] This is precisely Mawdudi's concern about the major differences between democracy in Islam and democracy in the West. He further argues that

> What distinguishes Islamic democracy from Western democracy is that while the latter is based on the concept of popular sovereignty the former rests on the principle of popular Khilafat. In Western democracy the people are sovereign, in Islam sovereignty is vested in God and the people are His caliphs or representatives. In the former the people make their own laws; in the latter they have to follow and obey the laws (Shari'ah) given by God through His Prophet. In one the Government undertakes to fulfill the will of the people; in the other the Government and the people alike have to do the will of God. Western democracy is a kind of absolute authority which exercises its powers in a free and uncontrolled manner, whereas Islamic democracy is subservient to the Divine Law and exercises its authority in accordance with the injunctions of God and within the limits prescribed by Him.[118]

Mawdudi maintains that the Islamic state must be based upon the following three principles: *tawhid* (unity of God), *risalah* (prophethood), and *khilafah* (caliphate).[119] One must understand these aspects in order to appreciate the various aspects of the Islamic polity. He further argues that *tawhid* is the core concept of the Islamic faith, upon which Islamic tradition and practice are based. Although it may be expressed in many different ways, *tawhid*, simply defined, is "the conviction and witnessing that 'there is no god but God'", and the consequence of this is that at "the core of the Islamic religious experience, therefore, stands God Who is unique and Whose will is the imperative and guide for all men's lives".[120] Building on this base, in terms of political philosophy, Muslims affirm that there can be only one sovereign and that is God.

Both non-Muslim scholars and some Islamists have argued that *tawhid* means it is impossible to have an "Islamic democracy", because the concept

of sovereignty of the people conflicts with the sovereignty of God. In Mawdudi's analysis, the main lines of an Islamic democratic theory that yet remains closely tied to *tawhid* become clear. Because there is a profound link between God and political legitimacy, "Islam, speaking from the view-point of political philosophy, is the very antithesis of secular Western democracy … [Islam] altogether repudiates the philosophy of popular sovereignty and rears its polity on the foundations of the sovereignty of God and vicegerency (*Khilafah*) of man".[121]

> A more apt name for the Islamic polity would be the 'kingdom of God' which is described in English as a 'theocracy.' But Islamic theocracy is something altogether different from the theocracy of which Europe has had bitter experience … The theocracy built up by Islam is not ruled by any particular religious class but by the whole community of Muslims including the rank and file. The entire Muslim population runs the state in accordance with the Book of God and the practice of His Prophet. If I were permitted to coin a new term, I would describe this system as 'theo-democracy," that is to say a divine democratic government, because under it the Muslims have been given a limited popular sovereignty under the suzerainty of God. The executive under this system of government is constituted by the general will of the Muslims who have also the right to depose it.[122]

Despite repudiating the concept of democracy, Mawdudi seems to play with the terms of "Islamic democracy" and "Islamic state" as an indication that he wanted to appeal to his audience. He maintains that the system of the Islamic state, to some extent, comprises the idea of democracy in that it provides equal opportunity to any Muslim so qualified to give a sound opinion on matters of Islamic law, such a Muslim is entitled to interpret God's law through the *ijtihad* mechanism whenever such an interpretation is necessary. In this sense the Islamic polity is a democracy, but it is a theocracy in the sense that no one, not even the whole Muslim community united, has the right to change an explicit command of God. He recognizes, however, that decisions have to be made regarding the interpretation of these commands.[123]

It seems that Mawdudi's conception of the Islamic state centres on his presuppositions on the idea of power. In his view, only by means of an Islamic state can Islam be fully implemented because the state controls the centres of power. Islam is most likely become marginalized unless an Islamic state is comprehensively established. The victory of Islam hinges on its control of politics. This framework allows Islamic law to stake its claims over both the

public and private spheres of Muslims. The command to establish an Islamic state has been inferred from the Qur'an: "Establish religion and be not divided therein" (Q.S. 42:13). In line with this, the political order must be a clear manifestation of the sovereignty of God. The corollary of the establishment of religion (*iqamat al-din*) is virtuous leadership (*imamat al-salih*) and divine government (*hukumat al-ilahiyyah*).[124]

Mawdudi's idea of the Islamic state was initially developed from his notion that religion has the responsibility to interfere in politics to give a sense of the sacred. This idea eventually led to his realization that only political power could guarantee the implementation and preservation of Islamic norms and values: "In the Muslim world, secularism means anti-religion and state-sponsored persecution of the religious elements".[125] Without political power, what Mawdudi identifies as "true Islam" remains only a vision of utopia, forever threatened with extinction. He depicts the relationship between Islam and politics as a flesh-and-bond construction in which the religious informs the political and the latter sustains the former: "In Islam the religious, the political, the economic, and the social are not separate systems; they are different departments and parts of the same system".[126]

Mawdudi perceives the Islamic state not as a territorial but as a cultural and ethical identity. He defines its borders, mores, and values under Islamic conditions. As the legitimate vicegerent of God, the leadership of the Islamic state is supposed to confirm the principle of the sovereignty of God. Yet, Mawdudi goes to great lengths to assure his readership about the democratic nature of this Islamic state. The debate with critics of the Islamic state has resulted in his making a serious effort to reconcile the state with democracy. However, the very notion of the absolute sovereignty of God makes it difficult for his readers to trust him. This debate has compelled Mawdudi and his followers to define the concept of the Islamic state more clearly and to make it compatible with Western conceptions of governance in general and democracy in particular. As a result, democracy is ambiguous in meaning — in Mawdudi's works, his use of the term epitomizes the difficulties of defining this complex concept.[127]

In defending the role of democracy in the Islamic state, Mawdudi employs the argument of procedural democracy by indicating that the leadership would be fairly elected by a body of representatives (*ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd*) with the legitimate mandate of the whole community.[128] Still, he grasps the core element of this argument in terms of a "democratic caliphate" and a "theo-democracy", a term he coins to depict how the Islamic state would ideally work. Mawdudi's debate with Western political

thinkers has been somewhat antagonistic, but he also incorporates some Western ideas into his interpretation of Islam and the Islamic state. In doing so, Mawdudi is not attempting to incorporate the liberal values of Western democracy; rather, he is concerned solely about providing a means for promoting and safeguarding an Islamic social order. This means that, to him, whether the state would be a democracy or a dictatorship is secondary.[129]

Hamid Enayat observes that, despite his explicit stand for democracy in procedural sense, Mawdudi rejects democracy in terms of importing a particular system of government from the West.[130] In Enayat's opinion, his rejection of the Western system of government may proceed from an "elitist streak" in his mentality.[131] He is also said to denounce many of the institutions associated with democracy such as the multiparty system because it "pollutes the government with a false sense of loyalties".[132] Finally, Enayat argues that "there cannot be much scope for democracy in a state such as one he champions where the most powerful organ is a judiciary charged with upholding not simply the law, but God's law".[133]

The development of Mawdudi's concept of the Islamic state seems to evolve along with values and ideals borrowed from the West. Over the course of his debate with the Western democracy, Mawdudi's Islamic state has gradually extracted democratic ideals to the point where domocrary is named as an objective attribute of the Islamic state. He further argues that a religious and democratic Islamic state would be superior to a secular democracy. However, a close comparison between the two reveals that Mawdudi's notion of an Islamic democracy is in fact somewhat simplistic and oxymoronic. The idea of the absolute sovereignty of God and the absence of pluralism are among the most obvious impediments to Mawdudi's Islamic State being reconciled with true democracy.

Nevertheless, in his conceptions of the democratic caliphate and theo-democracy, Mawdudi envisions an entity that is part romantic utopianist, and part modern. It is neither a thing of the past nor a completely modern phenomenon; it is, rather, a modernizing one. In line with the conceptual framework developed within his thesis, Mawdudi's vision of the Islamic state differs significantly from that of the utopian Islamists in that there is a sense of optimism in Mawdudi's Islamic state: the process of social and political transformation occurs by evolutionary dialogue rather than revolutionary change. This is exactly how Mawdudi's vision in politics conforms with the meliorist vision.[134] He is of the opinion that the world can be made better if his vision of Islamic state is put into practice by combining the ideals of democracy and Islam.

THE ISLAMISTS' CULTURALIST APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY

At the other end of the spectrum are those Muslims who completely reject the idea of democracy. Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian Islamist ideologue and an admirer of Mawdudi of Pakistan, is one of the most renowned of these thinkers. Others are al-Sha'rawi of Egypt and 'Abd al-Qadim Zallum of the Hizbut Tahrir (HT). They all argue that there is no proper place for democracy in Islam and, therefore, Islam and democracy are not to be reconciled.[135]

Qutb identifies the fault line between the Islamic state and democracy most clearly.[136] He argues that Islam by definition rejects anything not derived from its pristine sources, the Qur'an and Hadith. Democracy, together with all non-Islamic matters, is depicted as a revolt against God's authority.[137] Democracy, as an integral part of the package of Western modernity, assumes the superiority of rationalism over God's absolute sovereignty to rule all humankind on earth. To Qutb, the right to rule (*hakimiyah*) belongs to God alone. Democracy is a man-made concept and it contains the very moral decay of materialism and hedonism that undermines the basic tenets of Islam. For that reason, he classifies those who live up to non-Islamic values as "modern ignorant" (*jahiliyah al-mu'asirah*).[138] While pre-Islamic *jahiliyah* was used by the Qur'an to indicate the simple ignorance of Arab unbelievers, modern *jahiliyah* is a conscious usurpation of God's authority. He believes that Islam comprises the complete way of life and is insurmountable by democracy.

As may be seen in his writings throughout the 1950s and 1960s — including his six-volume Qur'anic commentary, *Fi al-Dhilal al-Qur'an* (In the shadow of the Qur'an) and *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Signposts along the road) — Qutb's Islamic political theory may be viewed as a scrupulously logical and consistent explication of his three concepts: ignorance (*jahiliyah*), God's sovereignty (*hakimiyah*), and *jihad* (literally, struggle, but often translated as holy war).[139] In the simplest words this could be broken down into the following scheme: God's sovereignty (*hakimiyah*) is absolute, and men are created to obey God alone. Men are obliged to obey only rulers who obey God. A ruler who obeys God faithfully follows God's mandate. That mandate is clear and all-encompassing. It is available for mankind's guidance through the Shari'ah. To put aside that clear and all-encompassing divine mandate is to lapse into *jahiliyah*. Rulers who violate the Shari'ah deserve to be resisted. Resistance under these circumstances is a legitimate act of *jihad*.[140] These three interrelated factors embodied the spirit of Islam in the Golden Age

— and Qutb was one of those who were obsessed with the reinvigoration of the past.

With regard to the role of the *shura* in the structure of the Islamic state, Qutb defined it as plain collaboration, but said "no specific method administering it has … been laid down".[141] Later on in his commentary on the Qur'an, he suggested that the *shura* might take some entirely unprecedented form, so long as it was inspired by Muhammad's use of it so long as the ruler was selected from among the righteous. Only through a newly established Islamic society could the exact form of consultation be determined. However, in Qutb's view, it would certainly not take the form of European parliamentary democracy, which is built on individualism and designed to protect individual interests rather than the general welfare.[142] Such an adoption of foreign ways would be going against nature — it could not arise from within the Islamic framework, even though many other solutions presumably could.

In order to understand Qutb's rejection of democracy it is important to analyse the socio-political context in which his political thoughts were expressed. His ideology of the Islamic state was initially an intellectual response to the hegemony of the major competing ideologies of his time such as capitalism, communism, nationalism, liberalism, and secularism.[143] Qutb proposed an Islamic ideology as an alternative to these ideologies. Deep within his attempt to construct an Islamic ideology is a desire to arm Muslims for power contestation in the battle of ideologies. To him, an ideology is necessary because it would provide Muslims with a sense of self-esteem.

> The individual without a comprehensive ideology that binds him to heaven and earth is a wretched dwarf and a neglected foundling … The ideology provides the individual with a goal greater than himself, the goal becomes the society in which he lives and humanity of which he is a member.[144]

Through this ideology, Qutb believed, Islam possesses the capacity to solve the basic problems of human beings. It provides a powerful argument against human ideologies and would help solve all the problems caused by those ideologies such as the uneven distribution of wealth, unemployment, poverty, low wages, unequal opportunities, corruption, poor productivity, as well as a myriad of other social problems. Furthermore, this ideology would free Muslims from submission to either capitalism or communism, providing social justice, international respect, and dignity as well as freedom from the evils of strife and war: "A system that provides us with the bread

that communism provides, and frees us from economic and social disparity, realizing a balanced society while sustaining us spiritually".[145]

For another Islamic thinker, Shaykh Fadlallah Nuri, the key problem with democracy is the principle of equality. Writing during the debate about the state constitution in Iran (1905–11), he argued that the existence of inequality in human life is just unavoidable, because every human being is born with his or her own different traits and features. There are the faithful and unfaithful, men and women, rich and poor, *faqih* (experts in Islamic law) and their followers, villains and '*alim* (learned in religious knowledge), and the like. Every single difference in human condition does matter and deserves to be treated accordingly. It is within this framework that one will find the concept of justice in Islam, he argues.[146] Furthermore, he rejects the notion of legislation by people. In his view, Islam does not have any shortcomings to complete. In Islam, there is no single man who is allowed to make law. The doctrine of constitutionalism is, therefore, contradictory to Islam. In Shaykh Fadlallah Nuri's belief, humans are only the executors of God's law, not the makers of it.[147]

In Algeria, Ali Benhadj, a popular preacher and young leader of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), has justified his group's participation in general elections as one way among many of affirming the role of Islam in the public realm and to fight against injustice.[148] However, he has repeatedly claimed that democracy is basically a Judaeo-Christian concept that should be replaced by inherently Islamic principles of governance. Benhadj argues that Western scholars have persistently criticized the democratic system as in itself defective. In particular, the basic conception of majority rule is easily rejected since such issues as right and justice are simply not quantifiable: "The greater number of votes does not translate into greater moral position".[149]

Tabataba'i, a well known exegete and philosopher from Iran, expounds the same argument. Islam and democracy are irreconcilable because of the latter's majoritarian principle. From its genesis onwards, he goes on to argue, each great religion has always been at odds with the principle of majority vote. By citing a verse of the Qur'an (Q.S. 23:71), "If the truth had been in accord with their desires, truly the heavens and the earth, and all beings therein would have been in confusion and corruption", Tabataba'i questions the general notion that the majority is always just and binding. It is erroneous to believe that the majority always guarantees the most righteous decision.[150]

From these arguments, it seems that Roy was right in arguing that the culturalist approach is shared by Western scholars and Islamists alike. Despite their different conceptual origins, each of these positions seems to represent a kind of static, caricaturized perception of religion. Both agree that religion

is a blueprint in which embedded cultural values and beliefs are everlasting for its believers. The Islamists' antagonistic attitude towards democracy stems from their strong belief that Islam was revealed to abrogate its antecedents, Judaism and Christianity, along with their traditions and culture. At the same time, it is very likely that the Western culturalists' view of Islam is shaped by their perception of culture as a "hard entity". If the former construct their version of religion on the basis of firm theological premises, the latter build their construction of culture on equally unyielding grounds. What is also interesting is that although non-Islamic culture is considered to be permeated with Christian values, the Islamists would be happy to adopt Western ways of advancing science and technology to challenge the hegemony of Western civilization, because they consider science and technology as culturally value-free.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that the intellectual debate both inside and outside of the Muslim world is a battle of scholarship and power contestation. It appears that the grand narrative provided by the culturalists falls into trap of reductionism. One of the most obvious fallacies of the culturalist viewpoint is that religion entails a set of closed cultural systems that have remained unchanged and self-sufficient through ages. As a consequence, religion must be read through a single prism. Once Islam is judged, together with Orthodox Catholicism and Confucianism, as incompatible with democracy, this judgement comes to be held as an infallible truism. Everything related to this religion is henceforth viewed through this lens.

Nevertheless, to point out the limitations of the culturalist thesis is not to suggest that cultural factors do not play any role in the process of modernization and democratization. Indeed they do — culture matters. In so far as religion sanctifies certain cultural practices not rooted in it, it plays an important role in the processes of modernization or democratization. To note the limitations of the culturalist thesis is to stress that other factors play equally important roles in these processes. Furthermore, it is a reminder that cultural patterns are not immutable; they do shift in response to socio-politico-economic changes and external challenges.[151]

The internal debate among Muslims themselves on this issue has shown much more vigour compared to that taking place outside of the Muslim world. For the proponents of democracy, Islam is in itself democratic. Reading Islam should be conducted with knowledge of the context of when and where this religion was originally revealed. A careful reading of Islam will result in

the realization that within Islam one can find the very elements of democracy, albeit in embryonic form, such as the concepts of consultation (*shura*), justice (*'adalah*), freedom (*hurriyah*), equality (*musawa*), trust (*amanah*), and the like. Seen in this way, the conception of democracy in Islam is not considered against the sovereignty of God. The concept of the vicegerent of God should be interpreted within this framework: to maximize the excellent features given by God to humanity through a rational mechanism called democracy. Human beings must take care of themselves by preserving what God has given to them.

One of the crucial points debated by both sides centres on the idea of sovereignty. While the proponents of democracy argue that sovereignty rests with the people, the opponents of democracy reject this idea by arguing that the sovereignty belongs to God alone. For the first camp, God has never provided a clear dictate on particular issues regarding human leadership. Democracy is a way of interpreting this absence of a divine edict and to promote humans' position in a respectful way. For the latter, democracy symbolizes a revolt against God's supreme authority to rule human beings. Those who live according to non-Islamic values, including democratic ones, are said to lapse into modern ignorance (*jahiliyah mu'asirah*).

For those Muslim thinkers standing in between, democracy should be treated with the greatest caution, not because it is culturally alien to Islam, but because the complexity of the issue necessitates a careful and sophisticated elaboration. On the one hand, they acknowledge the many positive things about democracy from which Muslims could learn and benefit, such as the principle of equality before the law, social justice, and the like. On the other hand, they — in a very similar vein to that of the opponents of democracy — object to the very tenet that sovereignty belongs to people, not God, and that truth is relative.

As far as the internal dynamics within the Muslim community are concerned, no side has definitively "won" the argument, although each side has put forward convincing arguments. Again, from a theoretical perspective this seems to justify the argument that religion is a matter of construction, not reality itself. Each camp of contestants can refute and challenge whatever its opponents have argued on the basis of the same normative textual grounds. This reminds us that the multivocality of Islam, as with other religions, is simply a matter of fact. The attempts to read and understand Islam are as heterogeneous and diverse as the prisms used by Muslims. These huge differences in perspective in relation to reading Islam and democracy are reflected in the political and religious realities of Indonesian Islam, which will be discussed further in the next part of the book.

Notes

[1] For a more detailed discussion on this approach in Arab-Islamic studies, see, for instance, G. Martin-Munoz, "The Image of Islam and the Arabs in the West: The Prevalence of *Culturalist* Visions", in *Arabs and the West: Mutual Images*, edited by J.S. Nielsen and Sami A. Khasawnih (Amman: Al-Jami`a al-Urdunniya, 1998), pp. 59–71.

[2] For direct responses to Weber's theory of modern capitalism, see, for example, R.H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1926); K. Samuelson, *Religion and Economic Action: The Protestant Ethic, the Rise of Capitalism and the Abuses of Scholarship* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).

[3] Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, translated by Talcott Parsons (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974), pp. 47–78.

[4] An extensive account of the theoretical bridge between Protestantism and democracy has been attempted by Stefan Breuer, "The Concept of Democracy in Weber's Political Sociology", in *Max Weber, Democracy and Modernization*, edited by Ralph Schroeder (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 1–13.

[5] Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*, p. 80.

[6] For a detailed survey of Calvinist notions of democracy, see R. Kingdom and R. Linder, eds., *Calvin and Calvinism: Sources of Democracy* (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1970).

[7] John Anderson, "Does God Matter, and If So Whose God? Religion and Democratization", *Democratization* 11, no. 4 (August 2004): 196.

[8] For Weber's view on Islam, see *The Sociology of Religion*, 5th ed. (London: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 265–66.

[9] Weber's use of the term "modernism" and "modernization" should be treated with care, because he did not point explicitly to the idea of democracy in his view on Islam. The terms "modern", "modernity", "modernism", and "modernization" are indeed equivalents. One version of the definition of "modern" refers to democracy as embedded in the modernization package. This definition implies that no society can be considered completely modernized without the existence of democracy. Another version does not necessarily include democracy as an integral element of modernization. Yet the history of both European modernization and that of non-Western world provides ample examples of societies that acquired many features of "modern" society — such as industrialization, urbanization, secularization, delineation of public and private spheres, and the transformation of traditional patterns of socioeconomic relations and values — without at the same time becoming democracies. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union are the best examples of modernization without democratization, thus raising the question whether these societies can be considered modern — or whether there are simply different types and degrees of modernity. For further discussion see Tamara Sonn, "Islam and Modernity: Are They Compatible?" in *Modernization, Democracy and Islam*, edited by Shireen T. Hunter and Huma Malik (London:

Praeger in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 2005), pp. 64–66.

10 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22–49. This thesis was later elaborated in his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

11 According to Norris and Inglehart, the clash of civilizations thesis puts forward three central claims. First, this thesis suggests that culture matters. In line with this claim, Huntington identifies religion as a determining element that can shape the structural pattern of civilization. Second, this thesis claims that there are sharp cultural differences between the core political values common in societies sharing a Western Christian heritage and the beliefs common in "the rest of the world", especially Islamic societies. Third, Huntington argues that important and long-standing differences in political values based on predominant religious cultures will lead to conflict between and within nation-states, particularly between the Christian West and Islam. See Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 135–36.

12 Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, especially pp. 212 and 240–41.

13 This hypothesis has recently been challenged by Vali Nasr through his statement that the so-called "Muslim democracy" is finding its own way in Muslim countries such as Turkey, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan. In his view, what is more striking is the fact that the emergence of Muslim democracy has begun not from intellectual circles, but from the political arena, where Muslim politicians feel compelled to integrate Islamic values with the pragmatic demands of their constituents. See Vali Nasr, "The Rise of 'Muslim Democracy'", *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 2 (April 2005), pp. 13–27.

14 Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations,* pp. 70–71.

15 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

16 The five factors are as follows: (1) the escalating legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes and their inability to maintain economic performance; (2) the unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s; (3) a striking shift in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church as manifested in the Second Vatican Council of 1963–65, which transformed the Church from defenders of authoritarianism to its opponents; (4) changes in the policies of external actors, most notably the European Community, the United States, and the Soviet Union; and (5) the demonstrated effect of transitions earlier in the third wave in stimulating and providing models for subsequent efforts at democratization. See Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 13.

17 Ibid., pp. 73–74.

18 As suggested by Anderson, "Does God Matter", p. 198.

19 Bernard Lewis, "Communism and Islam", in *The Middle East in Transition*, edited by Walter Z. Laqueur (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), pp. 318–19,

as quoted in John O. Voll, "Islam and Democracy: Is Modernization a Barrier?" in *Modernization, Democracy and Islam*, edited by Shireen T. Hunter and Huma Malik (London: Praeger in cooperation with the Center of Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 2005), p. 84.

[20] Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 3.

[21] Ibid., p. 4.

[22] Cemil Aydin, "The Politics of Conceptualizing Islam and the West", *Ethics and International Affairs* 18, no. 3 (December 2004): 89.

[23] The conflicting relationship between Islam and the Christian West has been one of Lewis' themes theory in portraying the historical interactions of the two. See, for example, Bernard Lewis, *Islam and the West* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993): especially pp. 3–42; and *Cultures in Conflict: Christians, Islam and Jews in the Age of Discovery* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Lewis' cultural explanation of the roots of the Muslim-Christian conflict can clearly be seen in his article, "The Roots of Muslim Rage", *Atlantic Monthly* 226, no. 3 (September 1990): 47–60.

[24] Fred Halliday, *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation* (London: Tauris, 1996).

[25] Lisa Anderson, "Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political Culture Approach", in *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World*, vol. 1, edited by Rex Brynen et al. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 77–92.

[26] Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2003).

[27] Ibid., p. 125.

[28] cf. C.W. Troll, "Mosque and Church: Their Contribution to Inter-Religious Harmony and Reconciliation", *Bulletin of Christian Institutes of Islamic Studies* 2, no. I (1979): 34–46.

[29] Aydin, "The Politics of Conceptualizing Islam and the West", p. 90.

[30] Ibid., p. 90.

[31] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), p. 347.

[32] Ibid., p. 347.

[33] Fares Al-Braizat, "Muslims and Democracy: An Empirical Critique of Fukuyama's Culturalist Approach", *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43, nos. 3–5 (2002): 271.

[34] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, p. 46.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Elie Kedourie, *Democracy and Arab Political Culture*, a Washington Institute Monograph (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992), pp. 6–7.

[37] Ibid., especially pp. 8 and 103–5.

[38] In fact, one of the earliest responses to Weber's theory of the linkage between Protestantism and modern capitalism was advanced in the 1950s. It has been discussed in Robert W. Green, ed., *Protestantism and Capitalism: The Weber Thesis and Its Critics* (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1959). A severe criticism has also been formulated by Richard A. Hamilton. Nonetheless, Hamilton maintains that despite critiques by historians, some scholars continue to believe Max Weber's claim that a strong linkage between Protestantism and worldly success led to the rise of the capitalist West. For further information, see Richard F. Hamilton, *The Social Misconstruction of Reality: Validity and Verification in the Scholarly Community* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996).

[39] Anderson, "Does God Matter", p. 192.

[40] In the social sciences and humanities, this question has become a cliché. Nonetheless, there is no adequate answer to this question so far without reference to other intervening variables. In seeking to answer this question, one might point to such explanatory variables outside of religion as socio-economic decay and dislocation, authoritarianism, identity crises, secularism, and so forth. For further discussion, see, for example, Mansoor Moaddel, "The Study of Islamic Culture and Politics: An Overview and Assessment", *Annual Review of Sociology* 28 (2002): 370–74.

[41] Fareed Zakaria, "Islam, Democracy, and Constitutional Liberalism", *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 1 (2004): 6.

[42] Ibid. See also his book, *The Future of Freedom*, especially pp. 119–60.

[43] Ibid., p. 7.

[44] For further information on this theoretical framework, see Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger, "Does Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical Approaches to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 3 (2000): 641–74.

[45] A Foucauldian perspective on power relations might be helpful in illuminating the existence of power structures in a particular religious tradition. For a more comprehensive discussion, see Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, edited and translated by Colin Gordon (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980).

[46] Norris and Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular*, p. 146.

[47] Ibid., pp. 154–55.

[48] Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, "The True Clash of Civilizations", *Foreign Policy* (March–April 2003): 64–65. This theoretical finding has previously been explained in Inglehart's article, "Islam, Gender, Culture, and Democracy", *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* (December 2002): 224–28.

[49] Other critics of Huntington's theory are discussed in Glenn E. Perry, "Huntington and His Critics: The West and Islam", *Arab Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 31–48.

[50] According to Al-Braizat, Islamic societies are not exceptional compared to other societies as far as interpersonal trust is concerned. For example, "on interpersonal

trust, Turkey scores 19 per cent, Bangladesh 23.3 per cent, Morocco 21.7 per cent, Jordan 27 per cent, Egypt 37.5 per cent, and Iran 55.4 per cent. Denmark, Sweden, and Norway are the only countries (for which data are available) that have higher values on interpersonal trust than Iran. Yet, Turkey and Pakistan score higher than the Catholic Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Philippines, Zimbabwe, Poland, Colombia, Venezuela, Georgia, and Romania. Moreover, Islamic Jordan scores almost as high as the predominantly Protestant U.K. (30 per cent) and higher than the Roman Catholic France, Poland, Hungary, Chile, Romania, and Orthodox Russia … Support for democracy (democracy is better than any other form of government) is very high in Islamic societies: Bangladesh (98 per cent), Jordan (89 per cent), Turkey (88 per cent), compared to the U.K. (78 per cent), United States (87 per cent), and Canada (87 per cent)". See Al-Braizat, "Muslims and Democracy", p. 278.

51 Ibid., p. 281.

52 Ibid., p. 271.

53 Halliday, *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation*, p. 116.

54 Ibid.

55 Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (London: Hurst, 2004), p. 9.

56 For further discussion on this, see, for instance, Edward Shils, *Tradition* (London: Faber, 1981).

57 Roy, *Globalised Islam*, pp. 11–15.

58 Ibid., p. 15.

59 Alfred Stepan, "The World's Religious System and Democracy: Crafting the 'Twin Tolerations'", in *Arguing Comparative Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 213–53.

60 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 261.

61 Louise Marlow, *Hierarchy and Egalitarianism in Islamic Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

62 This is similar to the "Asian values" used in a different sense by political leaders in Singapore and South Korea. While the former might use "Asian values" in defence of authoritarian rule, the same values might be used by the latter to endorse a democratic system of government. For a discussion of "Asian values" in the context of Singapore's politics, see, for instance, Christopher Lingle, *Singapore's Authoritarian Capitalism: Asian Values, Free Market Illusions, and Political Dependency* (Fairfax, VA: Locke Institute, 1996); for an account of the same values in South Korea, see Han Sung-Joo, ed., *Changing Values in Asia: Their Impact on Governance and Development* (Tokyo and New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1999).

63 Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, "Arab, Not Muslim, Exceptionalism", *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 4 (October 2004): 140–46.

64 Ibid., p. 140.
65 Ibid., p. 141.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Anderson, "Does God Matter", p. 193.
69 John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1998).
70 Ebrahim Moosa, *Islam and Cultural Issues* (Victoria, BC: Centre for Studies in Religion and Society, University of Victoria, 2002), p. 7; Aziz Al-Azmeh, *Islams and Modernities* (London and New York: Verso, 1993), p. 1.
71 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 17–18.
72 This frame of thinking has long become an independent school of thought in the fields of sociology and philosophy called "constructivism". This theoretical construct is primarily based on the Kantian paradigm of the reality of human knowledge. In Kant's view, our knowledge is not in itself the authentic reflection of reality, because it is constructed on the basis of human categories. Human knowledge and experiences are therefore human constructions rather than a reflection of genuine reality. For further discussion on this issue, see, for instance, George Karuvelil, "Constructing 'God': A Contemporary Interpretation of Religion", *HeyJ* 41 (2000): 25–46; cf. Michael Arbib and Mary Hesse, *The Construction of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
73 Roy, *Globalised Islam*, p. 9.
74 Deconstruction is a method widely used in philosophy to challenge, contest, or simply "interrogate" existing philosophical theories and concepts. This method has recently also been used in the context of religious studies, especially Islamic studies, by Muslim intellectuals such as Mohammed Arkoun. Derrida is one of the most acknowledged "prophets" of this method. He defines deconstruction as a method of "interrogating a concept, a word, a text, or a position. Just as a deconstruction of a philosophical problem neither solves it nor dissolves it, similarly, a deconstruction of a text or position is not a refutation of the text or position." For more detailed information on deconstruction, see, for instance, Ralph Shain, "Situating Derrida: Between Kierkegaard and Hegel", *Philosophy Today* 44, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 388–403.
75 For a more detailed theoretical account of change and continuity in Islam, see, for example, John O. Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982).
76 *Ijtihad*, derived from the Arabic root j-h-d, meaning serious struggle, is a term commonly used in the context of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) to mean an intellectual struggle undertaken by selected religious scholars to solve contemporary problems that are not explicitly decreed in either of the pristine texts of Islam, the Qur'an and Hadith. For more detailed information on

this, see, for example, B. Weiss, "Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of *Ijtihad*", in *Islamic Law and Legal Theory*, edited by I. Edge (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996), pp. 273–86; cf. in the same volume Wael B. Hallaq, "Was the Gate of *Ijtihad* Closed?" pp. 287–325.

77 For a more detailed account of Wahhabism see, for example, Samira Haj, "Reordering Islamic Orthodoxy: Muhammad ibn 'Abdul Wahhab", in *The Muslim World* 92 (Fall 2002): 333–70. See also Khaled Abou El-Fadl, "The Ugly Modern and the Modern Ugly", in *Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism*, edited by Omid Safi (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), especially pp. 49–62; cf. Aziz Al-Azmeh, "Wahhabite Polity", in his book, *Islams and Modernities*, especially pp. 104–21.

78 See Michel Foucault, *Religion and Culture*, edited by Jeremy R. Carette (New York: Routledge, 1999); cf. his *Power/Knowledge*.

79 Ibn Hanbal's historical and intellectual sojourn is elaborated at length by Nimrod Hurvitz, *The Formation of Hanbalism: Piety into Power* (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002).

80 Zakaria, "Islam, Democracy, and Constitutional Liberalism", p. 4.

81 Ibid.

82 On the contestation of religious meanings among radical Muslims and their liberal counterparts in an American context, see, for instance, M.A. Muqtedar Khan, "Radical Islam, Liberal Islam", *Current History* 102, no. 668 (December 2003): 417–21.

83 Ahmad S. Moussalli, "Islamic Democracy and Pluralism", in *Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism* (Oxford: Oneword, 2003), pp. 286–305. See also his book, *The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2001).

84 Moussalli, "Islamic Democracy and Pluralism", p. 296.

85 Ibid., p. 300.

86 Ibid., p. 287.

87 Abdolkarim Soroush, *Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 133.

88 Ibid.

89 Khaled Abou El-Fadl, *Islam and the Challenge of Democracy* (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 11.

90 Ibid., p. 12.

91 For a close comparison between *shura* and Western liberal democracy, see, for instance, Mishal Fahm Al-Sulami, *The West and Islam: Western Liberal Democracy versus the System of Shura* (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003).

92 El-Fadl, *Islam and the Challenge of Democracy*, p. 26.

93 Ibid., p. 27.

94 Ibid., p. 17.

95 Syukron Kamil, *Islam & Demokrasi: Telaah Konseptual & Historis* (Jakarta: Gaya Media Pratama, 2002), p. 53.

[96] Fahmi Huwaydi, *Al-Islam wa al-Dimuqratiyyah* (Cairo: Mu'assasa al-Ahram, 1993).
[97] Ibid., p. 136.
[98] Ibid., pp. 137–40.
[99] Ibid., p. 141.
[100] Ibid., p. 142.
[101] Ibid., p. 141.
[102] See Al-Mawardi, *Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya wa al-Wilayat al-Diniyya* (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, n.d.).
[103] Huwaydi, *Al-Islam wa al-Dimuqratiyyah*, p. 142.
[104] Ibid., pp. 143–44.
[105] Al-Khatib, *Nizam al-Shura fi al-Islam wa Nizam al-Dimuqratiyah al-Mu'asirah* (Cairo, 1985).
[106] Al-Khatib, *Nizam al-Shura fi al-Islam*, pp. 373–89.
[107] Ibid., p. 389.
[108] As cited in Huwaydi, *Al-Islam wa al-Dimuqratiyyah,* p. 124.
[109] Ibid., p. 95.
[110] As cited in David Sagiv, *Fundamentalism and Intellectuals in Egypt, 1973–1993* (London and Portland: F. Cass, 1995), especially pp. 84–89.
[111] For a further discussion of Al-Ashmawi's political thoughts on democracy, see Muhammad Sa'id Al-Ashmawi, *Al-Islam al-Siyasi* (Cairo: Dar al-Sahwa, 1987).
[112] Sagiv, *Fundamentalism and Intellectuals in Egypt*, pp. 101–3. See also, Muhammad Sa'id Al-Ashmawi, "Islam and Democracy", unpublished paper delivered at the conference "Islam and the West: Islamic and Modern Concept of Governance", Jakarta, 11–12 April 2000, as cited Kamil, *Islam & Demokrasi*, pp. 81–82, f. 22.
[113] Al-Mawdudi, *The Process of Islamic Revolution* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1980), p. 33.
[114] The term *khalifah* (caliph), the title given to a Muslim ruler, literally means successor or vicegerent. From early in the history of Islamic theology, Muslims have debated whether it was appropriate to name the ruler the Caliph of God (*khalifatullah*), but most Muslim intellectuals seemed to prefer the title Caliph of the Prophet (*khalifat rasul Allah*). Nevertheless, the Caliph — whether the Prophet's successor or God's vicegerent — did not enjoy the authority of either the Prophet or God, whose powers of legislation, revelation, forgiveness, and punishment cannot be delegated to any other. It was not until the Umayyad era that the term *khalifatullah* was first used in order to give the authority of the dynasty a sense of the sacred so that a firm allegiance of the ruled to the ruler could be established. See D. Sourdel, "Khalifa", *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. 4, edited by E. van Donzel, B. Lewis, and Ch. Pellat (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), p. 938. See also El-Fadl, *Islam and the Challenge of Democracy*, pp. 10–11; cf. Muhammad Sa'id Al-Ashmawi, *Al-Khilafah al-Islamiyyah* (Cairo: Mu'assasa al-Ahram, 1990).

[115] Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 88–89.
[116] F.C.R. Robinson, "Mawdudī, sayyid abu 'l-a'lā", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, edited by P. Bearman et al., 2007 <http://www.encislam.brill.nl.ezproxy.lib.unimelb.edu.au/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-5052> (accessed 23 January 2007).
[117] Charles J. Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State", in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, edited by John L. Esposito (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 103.
[118] Al-Mawdudi, *The Islamic Way of Life*, translated by Khurshid Ahmad (Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami, 1967), p. 31.
[119] Ibid., p. 40.
[120] Esposito and Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, p. 23.
[121] Al-Mawdudi, "Political Theory of Islam", in *Islam: Its Meaning and Message*, edited by Khurshid Ahmad (London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1976), pp. 159–60, as cited by Esposito Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, p. 23.
[122] Al-Mawdudi, "Political Theory of Islam", as cited by Esposito and Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, p. 24.
[123] Esposito and Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, p. 24.
[124] Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*, p. 81.
[125] Maryam Jameelah, *Who is Mawdoodi?* (Lahore: Mohammad Yusuf Khan, 1973), p. 57, as cited in Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*, p. 82.
[126] Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*, p. 83.
[127] Ibid., p. 84.
[128] For more detailed information on Mawdudi's basic principles, specific characteristics, and institutional mechanisms of the Islamic state, see Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State", especially pp. 111–28.
[129] Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*, p. 84.
[130] Al-Mawdudi, "Political Theory of Islam", p. 62, as cited by Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1982), p. 109.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Ibid.
[134] The conceptual framework of meliorism in this study was explained in Chapter 1.
[135] John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam", *The Middle East Journal* 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 434–38.
[136] See Ahmad S. Moussalli, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992).
[137] See Bruce B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt against the Modern Age* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989); see also Michael Youssef, *Revolt Against Modernity: Muslim Zealots and the West* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985).

138 Sayyid Qutb, *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* [Signposts along the road] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1992), pp. 17–18. The term *jahiliyah* specifically refers to the period of pre-Islamic ignorance in Arabia but was revived by Mawdudi and Qutb to describe a condition rather than a particular period, a state where a society deviates from Islamic values. For more detailed information, see, for instance, Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 56–62.

139 L. Carl Brown, *Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 156.

140 Yvonne Y. Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival", in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, edited by John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 67–98.

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142 Lee, *Overcoming Tradition and Modernity*, p. 107.

143 Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival", pp. 69–70.

144 Sayyid Qutb, *Ma'arakat al-Islam wa al-Ra's Maliyyah* (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1975), pp. 50–51.

145 Ibid., p. 36.

146 Shaykh Fadlallah Nuri, "Refutation of the Idea of Constitutionalism", in *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, edited by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 193–94, as cited in Esposito and Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam", p. 435.

147 Esposito and Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam", p. 435.

148 Ray Takeyh, "Islamism in Algeria: A Struggle between Hope and Agony", *Middle East Policy* 10, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 62–75; cf. Claire Heristchi, "The Islamist Discourse of the FIS and the Democratic Experiment in Algeria", *Democratization* 11, no. 4 (August 2004): 111–32.

149 Esposito and Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam", p. 436.

150 Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 160–66 and 243–45.

151 Shireen T. Hunter and Huma Malik, eds., "Introduction", in *Moderization, Democracy and Islam* (London: Praeger in cooperation with the Centre of Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 2005), p. 15; Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited", *American Sociological Review* 59, no. 1 (February 1995): 5–6.

3

ISLAM AND DISCOURSES ON DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA
Definition, Historical Account, and Muslims' Approaches to Democracy

CONCEPTUALIZING DEMOCRACY IN THE INDONESIAN CONTEXT

Defining democracy in the context of Indonesia is an arduous task. One of the main reasons is that Indonesia has long shown a somewhat idiosyncratic response towards external influences, including Western political concepts such as democracy. This is not to suggest that in order to understand democracy in this country one should be engaged in exceptionalist theories about the cultural uniqueness of Indonesia, for culture — as briefly discussed in the previous part — cannot be assumed to determine the level of hospitality to democracy or good governance in any one society. The extent to which Indonesia is more or less receptive to democracy cannot be attributed solely to cultural factors; other variables such as global and national political configurations should be taken into account. For sure, a single theoretical perspective will not be helpful in understanding the trajectory of democracy in the world's largest Muslim-majority country. We may be reminded of what Ghassan Salamé pointed out in his *Democracy without Democrats*, namely, that there may not be many democrats in the Muslim world, but that does not render the idea of democracy irrelevant or indefensible.[1]

At this point, let us assume that Indonesia is still in a transition towards democracy. The transition is a long and winding road;[2] nonetheless, to

approach this as a transition is to see the likelihood of Indonesian democracy as just a matter of time, on condition that the country can pass successfully through several critical phases.[3] Viewed from this perspective, it is widely believed that Indonesia is now in a historical period of transition from authoritarian rule to democratic political governance. Although the new era has brought about destructive excesses such as ethnic and religious conflicts and regional separatism, the transition to a more democratic order has also opened up unprecedented freedoms, giving the Indonesian people a choice to elect their own leaders for the first time since the 1950s and the liberty to organize themselves based on their own preferences.[4]

It is clear that the collapse of Soeharto's authoritarian New Order regime in May 1998 has proven to be a promising dawn for Indonesia's democracy. Many have hailed this political transition as the era of *Reformasi* (reformation), signifying a replacement of the old corporatist-centralized-authoritarian political system with a new democratic order.[5] The liberalization of politics by means of free and fair general elections, which allow wider access to political participation for the grass roots, is one of the most evident features of the establishment of democratic institutions in this country.

Viewed from the "minimalist" definition of electoral democracy, Indonesia may already be categorized as a democratic country, due to its having managed two consecutive free and fair general elections in 1999 and 2004.[6] Seen from this perspective, it is not exaggerated to say that this mechanism has led to the birth of Indonesia as the world's third-largest democracy.[7] Despite this many are less than optimistic about the future of democracy in the country. The questions asked are: What type of democracy is likely to take shape in Indonesia? Does the ouster of Soeharto's dictatorship guarantee by default the establishment of democratic elements and institutions? Or might democracy be exploited by predatory demagogues to launch and execute their megalomaniacal political ambitions and agendas? As political and social changes in this country proven to respond only very slowly to the global demands for democratization, the answers to these questions remain uncertain so far.

It is within these complex and uneasy issues that pessimism emerges in various degrees. The replacement of the New Order regime with a more democratic order is often viewed cynically as pouring "new wine in the old bottle".[8] The direction of Indonesian politics seems to go nowhere in a way that the replacement of the old regime by the new democratic one does not nurture a fertile ground for democracy in its substantial sense. The emergence of democracy in this country is often underestimated by many as a "mission impossible". At this point, it may be worth attempting to define

what sort of democracy might be viable in the Indonesian context with all of its complexities.

Of course, one of the most obvious burdens for Indonesia in developing democracy concerns the authoritarian image of its past, which is not easy to eradicate. More important in the context of this study are problems associated with the stereotypical culturalist viewpoint that Indonesia is unlikely to achieve democracy simply because the country contains the largest Muslim community in the world. Volpi, for instance, based on Diamond's theoretical construct, sees the emergence in the Muslim world of a phenomenon that he calls "pseudo-democracy," a political reality he describes as "a political order that tries to look like a liberal democracy without trying to becoming one".[9] The reason behind this phenomenon is that, he argues, "by mimicking democracy the powers that be are able to secure a domestic advantage that they could not obtain otherwise — i.e. by being either fully democratic or fully authoritarian".[10]

Nevertheless, while acknowledging instrumental factors contributing to the formation of pseudo-democracy such as the lack of democratic institutions and mechanisms, Volpi concludes that viewing democratization in the Muslim world solely from this perspective can quickly become counter-productive. This is in large part due to a widespread view that favours essentialist definitions of democracy without necessarily remaining trapped in notions of Western liberal democracy. In fact, in Volpi's definition, "pseudo-democracy" is not a downgraded form of liberal democracy, but a stepping stone towards the construction of a different kind of democracy — be it republican, theocratic, or Islamic.[11] The theoretical description of the Indonesian pseudo-democracy coincides with what Larbi Sadiki refers to as "façade democracy", a condition widespread in much of the Muslim world where electoral democracy is not complemented by civic engagement, law enforcement, alternation of power, freedom of the press, or labour organization.[12]

On the basis of a comparative analysis of the Turkish and Indonesian cases, Volpi finds that one of the contributing factors behind the slow movement towards democracy in the Muslim world is the internal constraint that both the elite and the populace remain attracted to non-liberal democratic discourses and practices. In Indonesia, this paradigmatic stalemate could clearly be observed in the reluctance of pre-university students to turn their allegiance from the ideology of Demokrasi Pancasila to liberal democracy.[13] Demokrasi Pancasila had been fossilized, mysticized, and deployed as a fully fledged ideological tool of the authoritarian Soeharto regime. Under the New Order, opposition was considered unnecessary since decisions were made in consensus. The ruling government imposed a stringent ideological

consciousness to the ruled by means of systematic political indoctrination. Under this circumstance, unity and order were much more important than pluralism and accountability. In this system, the leader was supposed to be the paternal figure that maintains political order, economic prosperity, national stability, and social harmony.[14]

The persistence of the former ideology seems to suggest a reluctance of Indonesia to march towards a new democracy. A close examination of the problems and complexities that characterized the two consecutive general elections in 1999 and 2004 would seem to justify this pessimism. Vedi Hadiz, for instance, on the basis of close observation of the two cities Yogyakarta and Medan, suggested that all the problems of the general elections such as money politics, vote buying, and the coalition of political gangsters (*preman politik*) and black capital holders were not the price of liberal democracy, but proof of the existence of a "something else" — a non-liberal form of democracy driven by money politics and thuggery — that was already entrenched, and of which variations may readily be found elsewhere.[15] He labelled the type of democracy that has emerged in Indonesia "illiberal democracy" — a sort of democracy in disguise, but not true democracy.[16]

In contrast, Vali Nasr argues that something called "Muslim Democracy" has been blossoming since the early 1990s in a number of Muslim-majority countries — all, interestingly, outside the Arab world — such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey.[17] It should be noted that Nasr supports the notion of compatibility between Islam and democracy, although he does not provide specific measures of how and what type of democracy is likely to come into existence in the Muslim world. Nevertheless, he argues that Muslim Democracy is not so much driven by an abstract, meticulously considered theological and ideological framework that represents a genuine synthesis of Islam and democracy, but rather by a pragmatic synthesis that is emerging in much of the Muslim world in response to the opportunities and demands produced by the ballot box. Under this circumstance, political parties have no choice except to make pragmatic compromises and down-to-earth policies in order to appeal to as many constituents as possible.[18] In accordance with this, Nasr describes Muslim Democracy in the Indonesian context as "less a platform and more a space wherein a number of parties are struggling to strike the right balance between secular politics and Muslim values".[19]

The proof of the success of Muslim Democracy, Nasr argues, can easily be found in regular competitive elections that have pushed Islamic parties toward pragmatism and pulled other parties into more hard-working attempts at representing Muslim interests. The effect of such contests is to reward

moderation, to win the middle ground. Democratic competition requires Muslim parties to incorporate all elements of the electorate — not only those who vote on the basis of Muslim values but also secular-minded voters, unified under broader platforms and wider coalitions that are more or less pragmatic in nature. This condition is what Nasr depicts as the "triumph of practice over theory and perhaps of the political over the Islamic".[20] He adds that the future of Muslim politics seems to belong to those who can address Muslim moral values, but within a framework of political platforms in democratic settings. Finally, it is believed that only Muslim Democracy can provide the Muslim world with the promise of moderation. Facing the dynamics of Muslim Democracy, Islamists are likely to find themselves caught up in a dilemma: they will have to change their ideological vision or suffer from marginalization.

Anies Rasyid Baswedan, on the basis of a close examination of what he calls "Political Islam", proposes a similar argument to that of Vali Nasr regarding the trajectory of Muslim politics in Indonesia. In his view, "Muslims" (the quotation marks are his) have become more pragmatic in their politics since the collapse of the New Order: they now focus more on the policy level than on the state's philosophical foundation.[21] With this in mind, it would be misleading to assume that Islamic political parties in this country are persistently committed to incorporating the Islamic Shari'ah into the body of the state. The shift in agenda and vision among Islamic political parties from ideological-Islamic to substantial-pragmatic signifies the paradigmatic shift of Muslims' political orientation as a whole, despite the obstinacy of some Islamist fringes outside the sphere of politics.[22]

Given the remarkable achievements in developing its democracy, Indonesia is considered a "semi-democracy" in the World Values Survey, a category used to describe forty-seven countries around the globe that have experienced democracy for less than twenty years and have current Freedom House ratings of 3.5 to 5.5.[23] Freedom House describes them as "partly free" (others use the terms "transitional" or consolidating" democracies), to indicate that these countries do not fully subscribe to "full-fledged democracy".[24] Despite the fact that the survey findings are always subject to debate and criticism, it is difficult to deny the slow pace of democratization in Indonesia, with its complex challenges and constraints. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the survey was based on empirical analysis on the basis of measurable procedures and standards, not with religion in a normative sense. As a result, the assumption that Islam, as the majority religion in Indonesia, is responsible for the slow process of democratization is theoretically unfounded.

ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: A FLUCTUATING RELATIONSHIP

It is almost a cliché to argue with regard to Indonesia that Islam is an important factor in the making and forging of democracy.[25] It has often been argued that Indonesia is a superb example of the compatibility of Islam and democracy.[26] However, the extent to which Islam has been the major colouring force in the country's current democratization process remains vague. One usually refers to the openness of electoral politics as the justification for democracy. The two consecutive general elections of 1999 and 2004, as mentioned earlier, are often said to represent the success of democracy in this country. This success has even been praised by the highly respected news magazine *The Economist*, which described it as the "shining example" of democracy for the rest of the Muslim world. Yet, the question as to whether or not Islam is actually the factor behind this achievement must be examined. If so, the corollary question is: to what extent and how is Islam significant?

One of the arguments frequently made to explain the existence of democracy in Indonesia is the distinctive nature of Islam in this country, which is said to be different from its counterparts in the Middle East. Indonesian Islam has long enjoyed a reputation for being pluralist and tolerant, some would say heterodox, for it was spread and preached to the indigenous people not by means of war or conquest. Islam in Indonesia is often said to have coexisted peacefully with pre-Islamic indigenous cultures such as animistic cultures or Hindu-Buddhist cultures. Islam came to Indonesia mostly as a cultural force and not as a conquering political one, as happened in many other countries. In this respect, what made Islam so acceptable to the indigenous community may be its egalitarianism. M.C. Ricklefs argues, on the basis of a close examination of the two major historical manuscripts found in Java, namely *Primbon* and a manuscript attributed by G.W.J Drewes to a teacher named Seh Bari, that "The Islam of Indonesia has been full of heterodoxy and heresy, a fact which later encouraged major reformist movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries".[27]

This heterodox nature of Indonesian Islam may have helped to create a "local genius" that shows its flexibility in accommodating a huge variety of different cultures. This "pluricentric" trait, in Hefner's argument, served as a strong cultural basis for the subsequent development of Muslim politics and culture.[28] It functions as a source of strength for Islam, enabling it to act as a trustworthy interlocutor in cultural dialogues such as those concerning the idea of civil society and democracy in contemporary Indonesia, even though

cultural tensions were also prevalent.[29] Hefner is one of several scholars who associates the idea of democracy in Indonesia with its political culture.[30] By criticizing the Weberian link between the Western type of democracy and the legacy of the past, Hefner turns to what Robert Putnam[31] and Alexis de Tocqueville[32] have investigated in Italy and the United States respectively, using their analysis as a point of departure in investigating the roots of Indonesia's democracy. While acknowledging that Putnam's associational explanations of what makes democracy work are inherently "incomplete", Hefner still deploys this framework to trace the socio-cultural capital of Indonesia's democracy. In his view, Indonesia in general and its Muslim society in particular have been blessed with an abundance of civic resources that may be used as the basis for building a flourishing democratic culture.[33] Nevertheless, Indonesia has failed to make the most of these resources and this is in large part due to the failure of the ruling elite. Instead of consolidating these precedents for developing an authentic democracy and civil society, they ignored or abused them for the sake of pursuing their own interests.[34]

For Hefner, tracing the cultural and historical lineage of democracy in a given society means to trace the lineage of its civic culture. He maintains that the process of democratization depends not just on the role of the state — that is, formal elections and constitutions — but also on cultures and organizations in a society as a whole. Relying heavily on Putnam's theoretical constructs, he assumes that the development of democracy is primarily determined by the degree to the work of which a civic organization characterized by volunteerism and independent associations may be amplified, such that a balance of power between state and society as well as among civil organizations may be achieved.[35] But these activities are still inadequate if they remain the work of isolated groupings alone. Democracy ultimately requires a public culture that draws on separate experiences to promote universal habits of participation and tolerance.

It is in such a delicate interaction between the state and society that Islam has come to be a significant intervening variable in this long and strenuous process. Hefner seems to be confident that the process of democratization in Indonesia will take a different shape from that in most of the Western democratic countries, where there is a firm separation of church and state. Citing the axiom "there is no one-size-fits-all democracy", he further argues that Indonesia's democratization will have to be inseparable from Islam's involvement as a predominant cultural force.[36] In post-New Order Indonesia, Hefner sees an effort reinvigorating the old paradigm of the state with a new spirit of Public Islam.[37] Despite thirty years of authoritarian rule, he goes on to argue,

> Indonesia today is a witness to a remarkable effort to recover and amplify a Muslim and Indonesian culture of tolerance, equality and civility. The proponents of civil Islam are a key part of this renaissance. Civil Muslims renounce the mythology of an Islamic state. Rather than relegating Islam to the realm of the private, however, they insist that there is a middle path between liberalism's privatization and conservative Islam's bully state. The path passes by way of public religion that makes itself heard through independent associations, spirited public dialogue, and the demonstrated decency of believers.[38]

Lumping the terms "Civil Islam" together with "Public Islam", Hefner definitely emphasizes that Indonesia can develop a democracy of its own, not a secular and liberal one as is commonly understood in the Western literature.[39] In other words, Indonesia's democracy will be characterized by the integrality of religion and public life. Secular democracy assumes the retreat of religion from the public stage to the privacy of personal belief. Therefore, the political discourse Muslims are forging is not identical to that of Western liberalism. One reason why this is so is because Muslims have perceived that their religion provides some of the terms for this new public ethics. Hefner appears to accept the oft-cited observation that Islam is *din wa al-dawla*, "religion and state", despite the huge variation in the understanding of this phrase among Muslims. Muslim democrats like those in Indonesia, in Hefner's argument, tend to be more civil or Tocquevillian than liberal in spirit. Even though they deny the need for an Islamic state, they insist on society more than on autonomous individuals.[40]

Hefner's intention to demonstrate the distinctiveness of Indonesia's democracy is understandable given his view that the discourses and practices of democracy outside the Western hemisphere might take different roads, given the fact of global diversity. What is clear is that there is no civilizational malady that is peculiar to Indonesia in particular and the Muslim world in general with regard to the development of democracy.[41] What remains unclear from Hefner's analysis, however, is how or in what ways Islam might be promoted as a source for ethical values in public life. It seems that what Hefner expounds is similar to the idea of semi-liberal democracy based on "soft secularism". Equally important, on the basis of his Civil Islam, is the question of the extent to which Indonesia's democracy is comparable to Western liberal democracy. Last but not least, we need to ask how "uncivil precedents" such as the ethno-religious conflicts and social riots that followed Soeharto's resignation and terrorism might be explained in the light of this civic democracy.

Viewed from a cultural perspective, Hefner's Civil Islam is no doubt an invaluable theoretical contribution to the understanding of Indonesia's democracy. Relying heavily on Putnamian and de Tocquevillian theoretical approaches, Hefner believes that Indonesia has arrived at its current level of democracy simply because it has abundant cultural modalities, just like Italy and the United States had. What seems to be absent in his work, however, is a closer theoretical examination of the significance of Islam in forging good governance or democracy at state level. It is simply inadequate to attribute democracy merely to the presence of civic engagement in building such intangibles as pluralism, tolerance, and social trust. The social capital possessed by a certain community will not automatically lead to democratization at state level. This means that in order for a society to democratize itself, democracy must be implemented at state level, even though civic culture must also be there. Democracy necessitates law enforcement and ceaseless attempts at fighting against corruption, in addition to civic culture at the societal level.[42] It is difficult for Hefner's Civil Islam to answer the phenomenon of rampant corruption and the low commitment to law enforcement that may sink the dream of Indonesia's democracy in the near future.

INDONESIA'S DEMOCRACY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Dutch Colonial Period

In the first half of the twentieth century, especially prior to Indonesia's independence, Islam entered a new period of dynamism in the discourse and practice of democracy. This period witnessed the blossoming of democracy in a broad sense and it occurred at both the cultural and the political level. At the cultural level, the blossoming of democracy was characterized by the birth of an awareness among Muslims of being independent or autonomous. In the face of the Dutch colonial policy of keeping Islam out of formal state affairs, the emergence of such awareness was like a "blessing in disguise" for indigenous Muslims (*Muslim pribumi*).[43] Moreover, the growing cultural awareness was further facilitated by the modernization of the education system, which turned out to be an important vehicle for introducing the ideas of Western-style democracy to the consciousness of the educated Indonesia's elites.

At the political level, the establishment of the first Muslim organization, called Sarekat Dagang Islam (Association of Muslim Traders), or SDI, in Surakarta by H. Samanhudi (1868–1956) on 11 November 1911 was a major stepping stone in the rise of public awareness of democratic discourse.[44]

This organization was established as a response to the marginalization of Muslim traders by the Dutch, who preferred trade to be dominated by the ethnic Chinese. SDI became Sarekat Islam (Association of Islam), or SI, on 10 September 1912 under the leadership of H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto (1882–1934).[45] The main purpose of this organization was threefold: (1) to challenge the domination of the Chinese in commerce; (2) to show off native potential in business so that Muslims would be able to avoid the humiliation they had experienced in the past; and (3) to respond to the Christianization promoted by missionaries and to stand up against exploitation by Dutch colonialists.[46] Nevertheless, Ricklefs argues that "the Islamic and commercial origins of the organization were soon obscured, and the term Islam in its title now reflected more than a general awareness that its Indonesian members were Muslims while the Chinese and Dutch were not".[47]

Within the SI, therefore, there were accumulated and aggregated elements ranging from religious sentiments to political ideology and pragmatic political interests. Indeed, the use of religion might have been necessary as technique for seizing space in the public sphere.[48] Attracting public attention on the basis of religious sentiment. By using a religious reference in its name, an organization may accumulate social and economic capital. It is no wonder that some were suspicious that SI was not only a religious organization but also a commercial and a political organization as well. Some others considered this organization the first Islamic political party in Indonesia, in spite of the purely social and religious mission at the time of its founding. Yet, this social and religious façade may have been used to conceal its true purpose in the face of Dutch restrictions against native people founding a political party.[49]

The establishment of SI may be perceived as a stepping stone for "Public Islam" to emerge, especially in response to the Dutch secularization policy. It was an indication of growing demand for Muslims to participate publicly in politics. In one way or another, it was a matter of representation in public affairs. In responding to the proposal for the creation of a militia to defend colonial rule after the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914, SI was of the opinion that the Indonesian people could be expected to defend the Dutch rule only if they were represented in its government.[50] One year later, in 1915, Budi Utomo, another social organization that had been established as early as 1908, endorsed this opinion. In fact, this issue turned into a nationwide issue of participation in politics, and in December 1916 the bill to establish the *Volksraad* (People's Council) was approved by the colonial government.[51]

By 1917, SI was increasingly infiltrated by leftist elements. Unable to cope with the escalating differences in ideological and theological orientations, the

threat of disintegration grew day by day. In 1921 tensions reached a climax when Islam-oriented leaders such as Tjokroaminoto, Agus Salim, and Abdoel Moeis pushed through the expulsion of leftist members such as Semaun and Darsono of the Semarang branch at the sixth SI congress in Surabaya.[52] In the following years SI suffered from further internal power contests and schisms. Disputes over policies and personal interests resulted in the withdrawal and dismissal of a number of important party leaders and activists. Abdoel Moeis withdrew from the leadership following his inability to come to terms with Tjokroaminoto in relation to the pawnshop employees' union (Persatuan Pegawai Pegadaian Bumiputera, or PPPB), of which the former had been acting chairman. Similar disputes over ethical issues led to the dismissals of Sukiman and Surjopranoto from the SI. In addition, the growing friction between SI and Muhammadiyah persuaded the former to take disciplinary measures resulting in the expulsion of all Muhammadiyah members from the party. This series of expulsions and dismissals resulted in the devastation of the organization as a mass movement.[53]

At the social and cultural levels, the Dutch colonial period also witnessed the birth of non-political or social organizations such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Matla'ul Anwar (MA),[54] al-Irsyad,[55] and so forth. These organizations are said to have had an important role in "making democracy work" at a practical level, although they did not have an explicit agenda of democracy. Due mainly to their ability to adapt to the needs of the Indonesian Islamic context, Muhammadiyah and NU grew steadily in terms of numbers of followers and members. Muhammadiyah was established in 1912 by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan,[56] whereas the NU was founded by K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari in 1926.[57]

The Japanese Occupation

Under the Japanese occupation, another Muslim federation called Masyumi (Majlis Syura Muslimin Indonesia, or the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) was established by the Japanese on 22 November 1943, under the collective leadership of several existing Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU.[58] Compared to the Dutch, the Japanese gave many more concessions to Muslims, so that most Muslim leaders took a cooperative attitude towards the Japanese rulers. However, the struggle of the Muslim leaders to achieve Indonesia's independence continued. The Japanese established a paramilitary force called Hizbullah (Allah's Army or Allah's party) that obtained military training from the Japanese. The Japanese, on the other hand, "skillfully timed their promised gift of freedom so as to

use it as a major spur in mobilizing Indonesian enthusiasm in support of their own defence effort. This not only broadened the organizational scope of the intelligentsia politicians, it also infused Muslim groups, especially Hizbullah, with the anticipatory fever of waging a 'Holy War' against the 'infidel' Western powers".[59]

Soon after that, in fulfilment of their promise to support Indonesia's independence, the Japanese set up the BPUPKI (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, or the Investigation Committee for Preparation of Indonesian Independence) — which soon became PPKI (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, or the Investigatory Committee for Indonesia's Independence) — on 9 April 1945. Headed by Dr Radjiman Wedyodiningrat, this committee consisted of sixty-eight members, but only fifteen (22 per cent) had an Islamic political orientation. The minority of Muslims in this committee seems to indicate the lack of outstanding leaders among them, a fact that may have been caused by their lack of modern education. In addition, the Japanese might not have been keen to see a large number of Muslim leaders on the committee.[60] The first meeting was held from 29 May to 1 June 1945; the principal matters discussed were (a) the form of the government of the future state, (b) the extent of territory, (c) the philosophical foundation of the state, and so on. The discussion seems to have gone smoothly except concerning one topic: the philosophical foundation of the state.[61]

The discussion on the state philosophy resulted in two political streams. The first was the idea of making Islam the basis of the state. This was supported by Muslim leaders from both modernist (Muhammadiyah) and traditionalist organizations (NU), such as K.H. Ahmad Sanusi, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, A. Wahid Hasjim, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, and Agus Salim. The second was the idea of a secular state which was supported by nationalist leaders such as Dr Radjiman, Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, Professor Soepomo, and Muhammad Yamin.[62] In his speech in front of the BPUPKI members on 1 June 1945, Sukarno proposed Pancasila (literally "five principles") as the foundation of Indonesia's ideology (that is, nationalism, humanity, popular sovereignty, social justice, and faith in one God). The discussion about the basis of the state was most energy-consuming, but in the end the subcommittee under the BPUPKI arrived at a compromise in the form of the Jakarta Charter, on 22 June 1945. The Jakarta Charter was formulated by the following nine prominent leaders: Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Agus Salim, A. Wahid Hasjim (all Islamists), Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, Achmad Subardjo, Mohammad Yamin (all nationalists), and A.A. Maramis (a Christian).[63]

The Jakarta Charter was the first real test in the formative period of Indonesia's democracy of what kind of role Islam would play not only in the state structure but also in giving a sense of democratic practices and values to society at large. Basically, this charter was proposed as a preamble to the Indonesian Constitution, in which the Pancasila was approved as the foundation of the state. Its first principle, "Belief in God", was followed by a clause "with the obligation to carry out Islamic Shari'ah for its adherents". Complementing this charter, Wahid Hasjim specified that "only Muslims could be elected as President or Vice-President of the Republic". He also suggested that Islam be adopted as the state religion.[64] Pushing further towards the direction of Islamic statehood, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo demanded that the theological principle be stated as "Belief in God with the obligation to carry out Islamic Shari'ah", with no condition that it was applicable only to Muslims.[65]

However, this compromise was objected to by the nationalist groups, particularly those members with non-Islamic origins. Afraid of possible discrimination against other religions and of the growth of religious fanaticism, they demanded that the state must be unequivocally non-aligned.[66] It was only after Sukarno's appeal to both sides to make great sacrifices that the debate came to an end. The Investigatory Committee arrived at an agreement that the future independent state would be based on the principle of "Belief in God with the obligation to carry out Islamic Shari'ah for its adherents". It also accepted that Islam would be the state religion and that the president of the Republic must be a Muslim.[67]

However, it soon became obvious that the compromise was founded on unstable ground. On 18 August 1945, one day after the declaration of independence, the Jakarta Charter was invalidated. It was reported that a Japanese navy officer came to Hatta informing him that the Christians, the majority of those resided in the archipelago's eastern regions, would not join the republic unless several elements of the Jakarta Charter (that is, the obligation to carry out Islamic Shari'ah for its adherents, Islam as the state religion, and the requirement for an Islamic president) be deleted. Even though they realized that the implementation of the Jakarta Charter would not pose any threat whatsoever towards their socio-religious and political activities, in their view such a constitutional arrangement implied discriminatory measures.[68]

It might seem a cliché to argue that the struggle against colonialism was also partly a struggle for democracy. Nevertheless, colonial rule meant authoritarian rule. The injustice of the colonial system gave birth not only to demands for national independence but also to demands for individual freedom.[69] During the colonial period, democracy was seen as a means of

liberating the native people from the colonial regime as well as a means to bring about self-governance. In this regard, it should be noted that the struggle for Indonesia's independence necessitated the mobilization of religious, cultural, ethnic, and political elements all together. These elements served as a force for amplifing the outcome of the struggle. It is within this framework that Islam as a political factor, together with the above-mentioned elements, contributed to the birth of nationalism, which in turn paved the way for the embryonic formation of democracy in a broader sense. At the same time, however, Islam served as a divisive factor that undermined the amplification of democracy. This indicates that Islam is a double-edged sword, which can strengthen and weaken democracy at the same time.

Sukarno's "Demokrasi Terpimpin"

After independence Indonesia witnessed an experience with democracy that was as bitter as it was experimental, as neither the infrastructure nor the political culture had yet been firmly enough established to be conducive to the building of democracy. Even though Huntington's "second wave of democratization" presumably reached Indonesia, democracy there was established on shaky ground.[70] As a new nation-state, Indonesia in the 1950s was embroiled in factional infighting among the major ideologies such as nationalism, capitalism, socialism, and pan-Islamism. The country reportedly became the battleground for those ideologies that were backed up by major international powers. Analyses of Indonesian politics in the 1950s seem to indicate that just as democracy had begin to take root in this country, Sukarno and the army ruined it.[71] This argument was clearly formulated in many contributions to the "Democracy in Indonesia" conference at Monash University in December 1992.[72]

The 1950s may be defined as the highly critical and formative period of Indonesia's democracy. Having emerged as a hotly contested concept, democracy in the 1950s created more schism than social harmony, which made it difficult for Indonesian citizens to manage a stable period of discourse on democracy. Comprising the majority of the country, Indonesian Muslims were at the forefront of this debate. By and large, the Indonesian Muslims' struggle in establishing democracy followed the pattern of an ideological battle created by the existing world ideologies: Western-style nationalism, socialism/Marxism, and Islamic ideology. Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, the founding fathers of the republic, were classified as Muslim proponents of democracy who leaned towards a European-style democracy as they were the students of the Dutch. Basically, they were committed to democratic values

although they did not accept all features of democracy. In particular, Hatta, the first vice-president, is often described as a committed democrat who elaborated his view of democracy in many speeches and writings.[73]

Masyumi, a modernist Muslim party, is often regarded as a defender of democracy in this period, mainly because of its consistency in advocating constitutionalism and its strong resistance to Sukarno's authoritarianism.[74] In the 1955 general election, the party obtained 20.9 per cent of the vote and finished as runner-up to the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, or Nationalist Indonesian Party). However, Masyumi did not do much to strengthen the foundations of democracy, since it was weakened by the dynamics of the stream politics (*politik aliran*) brought about by the elections. In addition, its contribution to building a democratic infrastructure is also open to question on the grounds that Mohammad Natsir, one of Masyumi's outstanding leaders, seems to have embraced the meliorist approach to democracy. A close examination on his ideas of the ideal state reveal that Natsir was an "Islamic-state-idealist" who stood in between two positions: he was neither a fully committed democrat nor a loyal theocrat.

During the 1950s, all the Islamic parties basically supported Islam as the ideological basis of the state. However, their aspirations to make Islam the ideological basis of the state were unsuccessful due to the fact that their votes added up to only 48 per cent in the Constituent Assembly. Taking the rest of the votes with 52 per cent, the nationalist parties overpowered the Islamic parties by supporting Pancasila as the ideological basis of the state. Votes on the Constitution required a two-thirds majority to pass.[75] As a result, the matter of the ideological basis of the state was in gridlock. The leaders of both camps wanted to overcome this gridlock by making a compromise as they had done in the BPUPKI session, but Sukarno, who was a vigorous defender of Pancasila, and the Armed Forces promulgated the decree of 5 July 1959 on the "return to the 1945 Constitution". This political measure was followed by his announcement of the concept of "Guided Democracy", which he had actually planned since 1957.[76] Following these two political decisions, Sukarno banned Masyumi on 13 September 1960 because its opposition to his policy as well as its refusal to denounce the rebellious PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, or the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia), in which several Masyumi leaders were involved. These three political decisions were perceived by many as a clear indication of Sukarno's authoritarian and megalomaniacal native as ruler.

The period of Guided Democracy (1959–65) was ushered in by Sukarno's one-man show. He made use of this concept as a strategy to mask his inability to deal with schisms and political gridlock among the various

political streams. During this period, all political decisions, including the appointment of parliamentary members, were determined by Sukarno himself. In response to this system, Masyumi (until it was banned) and other parties such as PSI and other political leaders showed their strong opposition to all Sukarno's authoritarian policies, which were considered contradictory to the Constitution. This political resistance reached its climax when a regional rebellion of PRRI was led by those Masyumi and PSI leaders who were unsatisfied with the president's policies. Some other leaders took part in setting up the Democratic League (Liga Demokrasi).[77] Many of those involved in the rebellion or in the democratic movement were arrested and sent to jail. Among the Muslim leaders of the rebellion were Mohammad Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, and Burhanuddin Harahap, while Prawoto Mangkusasmito, the Chairman of Masyumi (1958–60), Mohammad Roem, M. Yunan Nasution, E.Z. Muttaqin, Hamka, Kasman Singodimedjo, and others were jailed simply because of their opposition to Sukarno's system. In outmanoeuvring these people, Sukarno gave a golden opportunity to the Communist Party and declared his policy of Nasakom (Nasionalis-Agama-Komunis, or the Unity of Nationalists, Religion, and Communists).

Other Islamic parties such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) participated in this Guided Democracy and some of their leaders were appointed as ministers. However, they could not avoid tensions with the Communists who attempted to turn Indonesia into a Communist state. This effort reached its climax with the abortive coup on 30 September 1965.[78] NU, instead of fostering Islamic principles of democracy, supported the authoritarian leadership of Sukarno by giving him the title of *al-waliyyu al-amr bi al-daruri al-shawkah* (the de facto interim holder of power); they did not try to defend the democratic system of the 1960s. Much of NU's energy seems to have been consumed with managing the ideological contest with the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or Indonesian Communist Party) and Masyumi.[79] In addition, NU opted to serve as a defender of orthodox Islam, not of democracy.[80]

Soeharto's New Order

During Soeharto's New Order, there was no further effort to democratize Indonesia in any substantial way. Soeharto was indeed fairly successful in transforming Indonesia from a severely economically challenged notion into a more stable country.[81] Nevertheless, Soeharto is considered to have failed in building the infrastructures of democracy and he certainly abused democracy through his authoritarian powers. He masked his authoritarianism by means of what his regime called Demokrasi Pancasila, presenting a full-

fledged combination between democracy and Indonesian values as embedded in Pancasila principles.[82] Pancasila became the single, lethal mantra of this regime, used to crush any type of political resistance and opposition. Through this concept, Soeharto introduced the principle of "mono-loyalty" (*asas mono-loyalitas*) among Indonesian citizens. Soeharto never hesitated to arrest and send to jail those who showed unwillingness to accept his regime. He stigmatized all his political opponents as being anti-Pancasila, or not *Pancasilais*. Demokrasi Pancasila was constructed to curtail — and discard — true democratic values.

Be that as it may, outside the circles of power there emerged a positive awareness of democracy. As Hefner aptly noted, "there were always Muslim intellectuals who took a less pessimistic view of the New Order government".[83] Some Muslim intellectuals tried to formulate a theological basis for democratic civility based on their normative roots. Amien Rais deserves special mention for his open statement that there is no such thing as an Islamic state.[84] This blunt statement was further buttressed by some leading Muslim intellectuals such as Mohammad Roem and Nurcholish Madjid who confirmed, when Rais was away in the United States pursuing his Ph.D., that there is no Islamic state.[85] Rais' statement triggered a new awareness among young Muslims that the Islamic Golden Age was not to be romanticized. Rais' statement laid a crucial foundation for a more positive discourse on democracy among his contemporaries. Since that time, ideas of democracy have flourished very rapidly among Muslim intellectuals such as Abdurrahman Wahid, Johan Effendi, Ahmad Wahib, Dawam Rahardjo, Aswab Mahasin, and many others.[86]

During his power, Soeharto tried to domesticate "political Islam" through the incorporation of Muslims into his political circle by sponsoring the establishment of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia, or Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals), formed in December 1990.[87] ICMI quickly became a bandwagon for a huge flock of Muslim bureaucrats and technocrats rather than intellectuals. Led by Habibie, an enigmatic technocrat and Soeharto's most trusted right-hand person, ICMI became one of the main elements of Soeharto's centralized and corporatist regime, in addition to the military and Golkar. For this reason, the establishment of ICMI was severely criticized by some leading intellectuals such as Deliar Noer, Ridwan Saidi, Djohan Effendi, and Abdurrahman Wahid as being sectarian, exclusivist, elitist, and abusive the noble values of Islam.[88] Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that Habibie contributed significantly to the institutionalization of democracy in the transition period through the passing of democratic laws that allow free political participation in public spheres

through free elections, freedom of opinion, freedom of the press, respect for human rights, and the like.

Post-Soeharto Era

Indonesia in the post-Soeharto era has witnessed the germination of those democratic seeds that were painstakingly sown by Muslim intellectuals during the New Order regime. The political situation following the ouster of Soeharto has been uncertain, with the instability exacerbated by the violent acts perpetrated by those who are presumably unsatisfied with the alterations in the power structure. The progress towards democratization was stalled for some time with the outbreak of bitter factional squabbles among political elites and ethno-religious conflicts in several parts of the country.[89] The elite factionalism and communal conflicts of this era have complex genealogies, but they are rooted in Soeharto's mismanagement of the diverse and heterogeneous elements of Indonesian society. According to Hefner, instead of building a consensus in terms of citizenship, "Soeharto's New Order regime kept contenders for power off balance by playing rival ethnic, religious, and ideological groups against each other".[90] As a result, there were enormous divergences of identify among the various groups, which later on stimulated those horizontal tensions.[91]

It was widely hoped that the two consecutive general elections (1999 and 2004) would provide solutions for the multidimensional crisis and a smooth starting point for the democratization process. And indeed, although progress has been slow, there have been a number of positive changes. Baswedan, for example, identifies four significant changes in the political environment of Indonesia, especially since the 1999 election. First, there is a greater tendency among Muslim voters not to cast their vote on the basis of ideological preferences but rather on pragmatic basis. Second, there is the impact of the introduction of what he calls "staggered elections" in the new electoral laws allowing for the presidential and parliamentary elections to be held separately. Third, the comprehensive decentralization programme, launched in 1999, has significantly reshaped local politics. And fourth, Muslim voters' attitudes towards the general idea of an Islamic government and the introduction of Shari'ah are subject to changing dynamics. According to a survey conducted in 2002 by the PPIM (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat, or Centre for the Study of Islam and Society), there seems to be a certain ambivalence within the Muslim community as respondents on the one hand support the general idea of adopting Shari'ah but at the same time dispute how it should be implemented.[92]

In the post-Soeharto era, the orientation of political Islam is not represented just by parties that support the formalization of the Shari'ah in the structure of the state but more strikingly also by those that support a non-religion-based state but who welcome the incorporation of Islamic values and "Muslim" aspirations into government policy.[93] Baswedan's general depiction of the current political Islam may be used to estimate the potential, the actuality, and the trajectory of democracy in Indonesia. The results lead to a preliminary conclusion that the political pendulum in the post-Soeharto era may have swung in a different direction compared to that in the 1950s and the New Order regime. As we have seen, the concept of democracy in those two eras was very much subject to the manipulation of the ruling elites, leaving the masses with no choice but to accept whatever political decisions were made by these elites. Since the ouster of Soeharto, the situation has changed significantly and the face of political Islam in Indonesia has been diversified. Political liberalization has not only resulted in free and fair elections, but also in the freedom of expression and political participation in a broader context.

INDONESIAN MUSLIMS' APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY: A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION

The extent to which democracy is regarded as a legitimate concept to adopt in Islam has been at the centre of very heated debate among Indonesian Muslims, ever since independence in 1945.[94] Muslims' views on democracy may be seen in their responses to the question whether or not Indonesia should become an Islamic state or a secular one. In other words, to explain Muslims' approaches to democracy is, among other things, to trace their views of the relationship between Islam and the state. For almost six decades, the relationship between Islam and the state has been a major prism through which observers have examined Muslim conceptions of democracy. However, another variable has been missing in their discussion: democracy through the prism of the public realm. In this regard, Hefner's Civil Islam must be appreciated as a pioneering study that tries to examine Indonesia's democracy through this prism, despite the fact that his main focus is the concept of civil society and not democracy itself.

Since the independence of Indonesia, democracy has meant many things for Muslims. Given the large variety of Indonesian Muslims' cultural and educational backgrounds, it is no wonder that we find an enormous diversity of views about democracy. With reference to the categories introduced in the previous part, we can identify a number of key adherents

to (1) the liberal approach; (2) the meliorist approach; and (3) the utopian approach.

The liberal approach basically argues that Islam contains in itself the elements of democracy. The late Nurcholish Madjid (Cak Nur) is one of the most vigorous proponents of this view.[95] He has stood firm in constructing a theological basis for showing the compatibility of Islam with democracy.[96] He views democracy not only at the level of the structure of the state (that is, democracy as a constitutional habit), but also at the level of public life. He maintains that democracy is the most invaluable inheritance of humankind and that there is no alternative superior to it.[97] At the level of state structure, Madjid proposes the application of democracy in its liberal sense, where the mechanism of checks and balances is maintained to avoid the abuse of power by the rulers and to safeguard the rights of minorities. In his view, democracy necessitates a legal opposition in a positive sense: not only to oppose, but also to counterbalance and support the ruling government.[98] At a cultural level, Madjid further argues, democracy is no longer just a noun but also a verb that indicates the process of making politics democratic. Most likely inspired by Robert N. Bellah's *Beyond Belief*, Madjid maintains that democracy must be put into practice as a habitual act of the heart. In this sense, democracy is considered as a civilized way of life featuring, among others, the principle of pluralistic awareness, public deliberation, the principle of "the means can justify the ends", honest agreement, economic fulfilment and well-targeted social planning, pure freedom, and civic education.[99]

In formulating the theological basis of democracy, Madjid refers to the textual sources of Islam, both normative and historical. One of Madjid's most often cited references is Muhammad's exemplary model of the Madinah covenant (*al-mithaq al-madinah*), which Robert N. Bellah actually considers too advanced for Muhammad's era.[100] This political practice is viewed as the highest manifestation of commitment to mass involvement and participation for all members of society; it also included the evaluation of leaders based on universal standards of achievement. Muhammad himself, Ibn Taymiyya argues, is only ma'sum (infallible) in his position as God's messenger and not as an individual, as manifested in the succession of his leadership on the basis of public deliberation, not family lineage.[101]

This practice, Bellah argues, is not an ahistorical ideological fabrication, because its roots may be traced down to the present through the Qur'an and the Hadith as well as the Madinah covenant. Bellah claims that the Madinah covenant is the first document in the history of humankind to have laid the foundations for pluralism and tolerance. In this covenant it is acknowledged that all citizens of Madinah are treated equally before the law, regardless of

religion and race, and they are united in one community and have the same rights and responsibilities such as freedom of religion and the responsibility of defending the state. What Nurcholish Madjid means by pluralism is the principle of heterogeneity which he regards as a given (*sunnah Allah*, or divine order) and which has positive values (Q.S. 2:251). By tolerance he means not only inner, but also outer tolerance, with its more positive outlook towards those who follow other religions (Q.S. 3:113).[102]

On the basis of the Madinah covenant, Madjid is convinced that there is no need to establish an Islamic state, because the purpose of the state is to uphold justice by preserving the rights of individuals and at the same time respecting the freedom of others.[103] In his view, the crux of the concept of participation lies in the notion that sovereignty belongs to the people. It is within this framework that participation contains the very meaning of freedom and liberty, as mandated by the 1945 Constitution. The importance of people's sovereignty indicates that it is only through the participation of the people that the state's ideals can be accomplished. Without people's participation, all the state's ideals would mean nothing. Madjid argues that while the sovereignty of the state is on the same continuum as the sovereignty of the people, the sovereignty of the people is on the same continuum as the sovereignty of individuals in fulfilling their own decisions in all aspects of life.[104]

In supporting his arguments, Madjid refers to Ibn Taymiyya's concept of justice, which says that God endorses a just government even if it is un-Islamic; he does not endorse a corrupt government that calls itself Islamic. For Madjid, the most important aspect of upholding justice is the economic aspect, where each individual has access to evenly distributed wealth. At times, Madjid sounds like a proponent of a Western-style democratic welfare state.[105] Yet he also bases his arguments of democracy on the Qur'an, for example at 1:6 where God says: *Ihdina al-sirat al-mustaqim* (Show us the straight way). In Madjid's opinion, Islam considers Man as having a fundamentally positive and optimistic nature (*fitrah*), while at the same time possessing potential shortcomings. The Qur'an and Hadith guide Man, but only in a rather general form, not in specific matters, and neither gives a detailed explanation of how to implement this guide. For specific and practical matters, Man is required to conduct *ijtihad* (independent reasoning). As a social mechanism, *ijtihad* can produce democracy, which certainly implies deliberation and argument. Because of Man's limitations, *ijtihad* must be conducted collectively and democratically, especially in matters pertaining to public affairs, and by asking God to guide the participants to the "straight way".[106]

Another important Muslim figure who argues for the viability of Islam and democracy in its liberal sense is Abdurrahman Wahid, the fourth president of Indonesia.[107] His understanding of Islam often invites controversy among Muslims and some would classify him, like Madjid, as a neo-modernist thinker.[108] Wahid wishes to make non-Muslims equal to Muslims in responsibilities and rights, including the right to become president in a Muslim-majority country such as Indonesia. He disagrees with those who use the Qur'an (Q.S. 3:38) as the basis of their rejection of non-Muslims as head of state, because God says *awliya* in this verse, which means "friend" or "protector", and not *umara*, which means "the ruling people". In this regard, he compares the situation of Indonesian politics to that of the United States, where everybody, including coloured people, are treated equally in having the right to become president.[109]

With regard to gender issues, Wahid maintains that men and women are equal. He claims that men and women have the same portion in the inheritance law on the grounds that the Qur'an 4:11 (*li al-dhakari mithlu hazz al-unthayayn*, "to the male, a portion equal to that of two females") uses the word *hazz*, which means "destiny" or "fate", indicating a qualitative meaning that encompasses rights and duties. It does not use the word *nasb*, which has a quantitative sense. With such an interpretation, Wahid would redefine the inheritance law in Islam to promote equality between men and women. He also reinterprets the Qur'an at verse 4.3 on polygamy (*fa'in khiftum an la ta'dilu fawahidatan*, "but if ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly [with them], then only one"), where justice (*al-'adalah*) must be decided upon in relation to the object, in this case a woman, and the woman's view is not an individual but a general one. Formerly, in earlier periods of Islam, Wahid believes, women may have allowed their husbands to take another wife, but now most women do not allow such a practice.[110]

As far as the relationship between Islam and the state is concerned, Wahid argues that Islam should act as a complementary factor to the state in developing a socio-economic and political system, not as an alternative factor that could have a disintegrative impact on the life of a nation as a whole. He notes that the Muslim community has come to accept the Indonesian state philosophy Pancasila, while at the same time still maintaining its "Islamic" way of life in local and individual variants. Wahid, therefore, does not agree with the idealization of Islam as a political system. Instead, he suggests a functional view for integrating the universal perception of Islam with the national perception of a state. He rejects the formalization of Islam by the state, flowning on religious activities initiated and sponsored by the

government. He suggests the application of a secularization process, in which religion must be treated outside the state authority.[111]

At the cultural level, Wahid proposes his very own notion of *pribumisasi Islam* ("indigenizing Islam"), which has provoked criticism from the Muslim community, because he proposes replacing the Muslim greeting *al-salam 'alaykum* ("peace be upon you") with Indonesian greetings such as *selamat pagi* ("good morning") or *selamat sore* ("good evening"), and the like.[112] This does not mean that the Muslim community does not have the right to contribute to the life of the nation-state, but Wahid proposes that local contexts should be the determining factors in understanding Islam. For Wahid, democracy is all about give-and-take, so that the heterogeneity of Indonesia and the protection of minorities may be maintained. He was one of the most persistent critics of Soeharto's New Order regime. For example, he severely criticized ICMI as sectarian and accused it of being Soeharto's Trojan horse, that is, a veiled attempt to gain political support from Muslims.[113]

Wahid's real endeavour during the New Order was obviously to develop an open discourse on democracy. He established Fordem (Forum Demokrasi, or Forum for Democracy)[114] as a response to the hegemony of ICMI in the state and public structures. According to Wahid, "the struggle for democracy and justice must take precedence over less inclusive concerns, including those of the Muslim community".[115] Islam, he goes on to argue, should not be idealized so that it is regarded as the only ground for democracy, law, or economic justice. Rather, Islam should serve as an inspirational base for the national framework of a democratic society. Even though Forum Demokrasi was not banned, the government showed its displeasure with Wahid's initiative and ideas on democracy. As a consequence, the government refused to reappoint him as an MPR (Majlis Permusyawarahan Rakyat or People's Constituent Assembly) member in October 1992.[116]

In the middle of spectrum is meliorist approach. This approach perceives and approaches the relationship between Islam and democracy in a somewhat ambiguous manner: it neither rejects nor accepts democracy. Mohammad Natsir, one of the most outstanding leaders of Masyumi, may be classified as a representative of this camp.[117] With regard to the relationship between religion and state, for instance, Natsir is of the opinion that Islam must be referred to as the sole foundation of the state and must be implemented in the form of Islamic democracy, not theocracy.[118] He disagrees with the idea of theocracy since there is no priesthood (*rahbaniyyah*) in Islam upon which to base a theocracy. In a speech delivered to the Indonesian Constituent Assembly in the 1950s, he asserted that:

> Theocracy is a system in which the government is controlled by hierarchical priesthood and serves as the vicegerent of God on earth. Islam does not acknowledge such a government system. The Islam-based state is certainly not *theocracy*. It is democracy. It is not secular as I have explained earlier. It is an Islamic democracy. And if one has to give it a religiously neutral name, the Islam-based state can be called 'theistic democracy.'[119]

Despite the fact that he accepts the notion of democracy, Natsir's view of democracy is ambiguous. On the one hand, he accepts democracy in the negative sense that Islam is anti-*istibdad* (despotism), anti-absolutist, and anti-authoritarian, thus conforming to the basic elements of democracy. On the other hand, he sees that democracy has many shortcomings as well. In Natsir's words, "Islam is neither democracy 100 per cent nor autocracy 100 per cent, Islam is … 'Islam'".[120] This is mainly because Islamic politics is not subject to public deliberation in accordance with a majority vote taken in parliament, as is common practice in democratic regimes. Political decisions must not violate the *hudud* (boundaries) revealed by God. Therefore, not all definite matters in Islam can be given over to the political deliberation of a majority vote.[121] Natsir's ambiguous position towards democracy can be further seen in his argument that the status of democracy in Islam is vital so as to give the people freedom of expression and criticism so that power abuses by the government might be avoided. Democracy is also vital so that Muslims have the opportunity to make laws that are in line with Islamic teachings.[122] On one occasion he asserted that "… as far as Islam is concerned, democracy is the first priority, because Islam is likely to succeed in a democratic system".[123]

In Natsir's view, the notion of democracy in Islam constitutes the basic right of citizens to criticize, reprimand, and depose despotic regimes. If the criticism or reprimand is ineffective, the ruled are allowed to seek power violently as a last resort to topple the reigning regime.[124] He bases this argument on a saying of the Prophet, who was asked by one of his Companions "What is the best form of *jihad*?" The Prophet replied: "to say the truth to despotic rulers".[125] Natsir also cites another Hadith narrated by Abu Dawud and Tirmidhi, which said: "Whoever sees others undertaking tyranny while the former does nothing to prevent it, the sin goes to all, either to the doer or the rest who witness but condone the tyranny".[126] In his opinion, Islamic democracy covers the inseparability of Islam and the state. In other words, Natsir is a pioneering proponent of an integral relationship between religion and the state; his notion of Islamic democracy

was formulated to oppose Sukarno, then president of the country and a belligerent proponent of a secular state.

Not until 1957, in his speech delivered to the Constituent Assembly, did Natsir introduce his "Theistic Democracy", by which he meant a democracy based on divine values.[127] This notion is reminiscent of Mawdudi's theory of "theo-democracy", which acknowledges only the sovereignty of God.[128] What makes Natsir different from Mawdudi is that the former has never claimed that democracy contains *shirk* (polytheism) as the latter had done.[129] In Theistic Democracy, the majority vote must be based on religious values. Any public decision must be framed by those values and it may be regarded as *ijma'* ('consensus'), which is binding to Muslims at any particular time and place. Natsir came to the conclusion that the Islamic principle of *shura* was closer to that of modern democracy, with the implementation of *hudud* and religious ethics as the main reference in the process of public deliberation.

Unlike Mawdudi, who repudiated a particular form of Western-imported democracy, Natsir's repudiation of democracy resulted from his disagreement with the notion of secularism, which he referred to as *la diniyyah* (literally "no religion").[130] Even though he disagreed with secularism, he did not make any explicit claim that secularism is embedded in democracy. In addition, his rejection of secularism was not addressed to its practice in the West, but as an immediate response to the discourse of secularism propagated by his nationalist opponents, especially Sukarno and the communists who hid behind their acceptance of Pancasila while at the same time negating the notion of God. He argued that secularism endangered the life of the nation because the neutrality of Pancasila might be exploited by wicked ideologies, such as Nazism, to bring the life of the nation to an end. He argued that the rise of Nazism was inseparable from the widespread adoption of secularism in Europe during the nineteenth century. For this reason, he was convinced that there was no point in sticking with Pancasila since it did not have any strong historical roots at the heart of the nation and no particular inclination towards religion. It is within this context that he called for the implementation of Islam as the sole basis for the nation through an "Islamic state".[131]

Natsir's political vision may be categorized as meliorist in the sense that he was optimistic about working out the "sorry condition" of this world by strengthening the foundation of a polity on the basis of Islamic values. It is undeniable that Natsir saw his world as in a state of "terrible chaos and deadly peril".[132] Nevertheless, he was hopeful that the solution for such a condition might be found by putting the ideals of an "Islamic state" into practice, within which might lie the seeds of peace and liberty.

> As a matter of fact, there is nothing in Islamic teachings that would clash against any ethical or moral precepts of any other religion. Like the earlier religions in their original purity, Islam too has brought the message of peace and liberty. For the preservation or restoration of peace Islam has thought that there is not one sure way under all kinds of circumstances or conditions. But a few general directions are given to the effect that we 'invite to the ways of our Lord with prudence and friendly admonition,' and that 'not alike are the evil and the good; ward off evil is antagonism, you will see him become a true companion'.[133]

Natsir was convinced that Islam provides a clear blueprint for "making the world better" — the key concept of a meliorist vision — through the virtues of justice, peace, liberty, and freedom of religion. In his opinion, the existence of evils such as corruption and deprivation in the Muslim community was caused, among other things, by the neglect of these virtues. Because of this the Islamic state he championed served only one as of the ways of putting these virtues into practice. Most Muslims and non-Muslims alike, he argued, often unfortunately misunderstood the virtues of Islam. For this misfortune he blamed the centuries of Western hegemony over the Muslim world:

> If the Muslims hope to cooperate successfully with other peoples of the world in the interest of peace, we shall have to realize that an appreciation of the virtues of Islam is greatly lacking outside the Islamic world, and that even amongst Muslims there are many misconceptions of the true aims and purposes of the Islamic teachings. Centuries of abject submission to foreign rulers have destroyed the prestige of the Muslims the world over as well as their sense of self respect.[134]

In the course of "making the world better", Natsir argued that Muslims should remedy this misconception by persistently endeavouring to make the West know and understand how Muslims had achieved golden civilizations in which non-Muslim minorities had peacefully coexist with Muslims. Muslims must show that they have good faith in the United Nations and that they are ready to be actively involved in the peacemaking processes of the world.[135]

Another advocate of the meliorist approach is Jalaluddin Rakhmat, a vigorous promulgator of Shi'ah Islam in Indonesia.[136] For Rakhmat, democracy is a system of politics based on two principles: political participation and human rights.[137] These principles allow citizens to participate in public deliberation and to protect human rights. This concept of democracy is not only identical with Islam, but also with the highest representation of Islamic teachings in the life of a nation-state. Nevertheless, Rakhmat argues

that the system of politics in Islam is incompatible with democracy on the following two points: first, democracy is a secular political system that presumes the sovereignty of the people, while Islam acknowledges only the sovereignty of God. It is simply impossible for the majority vote to alter God's decisions as conveyed through Islamic Shari'ah. Second, in practice the people's may can be manipulated, either by means of intimidation or persuasion. Democracy's *vox populi vox Dei* is theologically unfounded in Islam. Islam is a unique system that develops the principle of *shura* and human rights at once.[138]

When Islam first encountered the modern world, Rakhmat argues, it claimed to be democratic. However, according to his argument, democracy was deployed only as a strategic tool of deception to help Islam in its struggle against the oppression of the West. Nowadays, Rakhmat insists, the context is totally different. Democracy has been widely criticized for its shortcomings. Democracy is no longer a universally revered concept. Instead of relying on democracy, Muslims can now trust the concept of *tawhid* (the Oneness of God) in overcoming their daily problems, since it encompasses more than democracy does. "In *tawhid*", Rakhmat goes on to argue, "there is freedom of humans, and each Muslim individual is not allowed to oppress one another".[139] In conrast to democracy, *tawhid* implies a sense of divine justice. More importantly, "the concept of democracy cannot be found in any *mu'tabar* (accepted) classical Islamic text-books".[140] Thus, Rakhmat is a proponent of democratic ideals, but democracy as a political concept is considered unnecessary, since the concept of *tawhid* is all-encompassing and more authentic as it is derived from God.

The last approach to democracy is the utopian, which firmly rejects democracy on the grounds that it is derived from the unbelievers' (*kafir*) system and is therefore not allowed (*haram*) to be adopted by Muslims. As explained in the previous part, this approach assumes that a truly Islamic society can be established only on the basis of the tenets of the Shari'ah which alone can guarantee freedom and justice to all believers. In Indonesia, this stance is well represented by Islamist organizations such as MMI (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia, or Indonesian Council of Muslim Holy Warriors Indonesia) and HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, or Indonesian Islamic Party of Liberation). Among the most outspoken individual proponents are Farid Wadjdi and Muhammad Shiddiq Al-Jawi.

Farid Wadjdi is one of the most respected but also of the most belligerent activists of HTI. In one of his articles he criticizes democracy as being actually undemocratic. The freedom guaranteed by democracy is more myth than reality. In his view, there is no real freedom as such in democracy. The system

of democracy allows freedom only as long as it does not contradict the core values of secularism that can threaten democracy itself. In this regard, Wadjdi refers to such comtemporary examples as the ban on the *hijab* (headscarf) for Muslim schoolgirls and women in France.[141]

Muhammad Shiddiq Al-Jawi is another fervent rejecter of democracy. He confronts democracy with his faith in Islam, because faith in his view must be used as the standard in approaching everything in this world.[142] He compares democracy with the Islamic faith in light of the following five points: First, while democracy is a man-made entity and a creation of the human intellect, in Islam it is the Shari'ah, not the intellect, that must be used as the single reference in rendering final judgement or examination. Al-Jawi cites a verse (Q.S. 6:57)of the Qur'an:

> *al-hakimiyya* (the right of lawmaking) belongs to Allah alone" (*la hukma illa li Allah*).

Second, democracy separates religion from the state, while in Islam both are inseparable and all duties must be conducted based on Allah's rules. Man does not have the right to rule himself. Third, while democracy means that the sovereignty belongs to people, in Islam the sovereignty belongs to *shara'* (Allah as the lawmaker), not the people. Fourth, while in democracy the principle of majority vote is paramount, in Islam this principle is applicable only in technical matters where specific expertise is unnecessary. Fifth, the four types of freedom specific to democracy (freedom of faith, expression, possession, and behaviour) are in themselves contradictory to the concept of freedom in Islam. Al-Jawi comes to the conclusion that "it is fatally erroneous to assert that democracy is a part of Islam … Democracy is not Shari'ah law; it is humankind's invention which is just subject to change and exploitation".[143]

CONCLUSION

The extent to which Indonesia is democratic has become a difficult question to answer. If a minimal standard is used, that is, the shading of general elections, one may categorize Indonesia today as a democratic country and Indonesian Islam as compatible with democracy. It is a matter of fact that general elections, one of the most salient characteristics of democracy, have been used as a mechanism of electing the country's leaders. However, many have argued that the country still seems to suffer from a lack of democratic values. The outbreak of horizontal conflicts and social chaos following the ouster of Soeharto in May 1998 seem to justify such a conclusion.

Nevertheless, the process of democratization has reached the point of no return, even though some weaknesses and imperfections remain.

The discourse on democracy was initiated in Indonesia at the beginning of the twentieth century, along with the rise of Western-educated elites in the country. Indeed, Indonesia was already practising democracy in the 1950s when it held what is, arguably its most democratic elections to date. Over time, the understanding and practice of democracy in the country has increased significantly, thanks partly to the revival of Islamic thought (*gerakan pembaruan pemikiran Islam*) which was laboriously pioneered by some of the younger generation of Muslims such as Amien Rais, Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Munawir Sjadzali. These are the Muslim intellectuals who first attempted to lay the theological foundations for arguing the compatibility of Islam and democracy. They basically argue that Islam is in itself democratic. They have paved the way for the reception of democracy among Muslims in contemporary Indonesia, not only in the sense of electoral procedure but also in terms of values. As a result, it is not surprising that the compatibility of Islam and democracy has been accepted by some members of the contemporary generation of Muslims.

However, as in other places in the Muslim world, resistance to democracy has also been rife among some Indonesian Muslims. This is particularly obvious among Islamists, who maintain that democracy is alien to Islam, that it is a system of *kafir* (unbelievers), that it reflects the revolt against God or negates the concept of God's sovereignty. This view is particularly represented by the last two approaches discussed above, that is, the meliorist and the utopian streams, which are the main subjects of this book.

Notes

1 Ghassan Salamé, "Introduction: Where are the Democrats?" in *Democracy without Democrats: The Renewal of Muslim Politics?* edited by Ghassan Salamé (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), p. 3.

2 See, for example, R.W. Liddle, "Indonesia's Democratic Transition: Playing by the Rules", in *The Architecture of Democracy*, edited by A. Reynolds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 373–99; Damien Kingsbury and Arief Budiman, eds., *Indonesia: The Uncertain Transition* (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2001); and Abubakar E. Hara, "The Difficult Journey of Democratization in Indonesia", *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 23, no. 2 (August 2001): 307–26; Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, eds., *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

3 According to Dankwart Rustow, there are four phases a given country should pass through before a democracy comes into being. The first is the phase of national

unity, which is the time when the concept of a nation-state is being formed or revisited. Second, there is the phase of an inconclusive political struggle that can sometimes be so intense that it can tear apart national unity or cause one group to become so powerful that it overwhelms the opposition, conclude the (inconclusive) political struggle, and close off the route to democracy. The third phase is the first transition or decision phase, a historical moment when the parties to the inconclusive political struggle decide to compromise and adopt democratic rules that give each a certain share in the polity. Fourth, there is the second transition or habituation phase when a democratic regime may be said to be firmly established. For further discussion on this issue see, Dankwart Rustow, "Transition to Democracy", *Comparative Politics* 2 (April 1970): 337–63.

4 Baladas Ghoshal, "Democratic Transition and Political Development in Post-Soeharto Indonesia", *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 26, no. 3 (2004): 506–29.

5 See Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley, and Damien Kingsbury, eds., *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia* (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1999).

6 The successful 2004 general elections were described as a "shining example" in a headline of the respected British news magazine. See "Leaders: Indonesia's Shining Example", *The Economist*, 10 July 2004, p. 10.

7 Olle Törnquist, "Dynamics of Indonesian Democratisation", *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 3 (2000): 406.

8 For a succinct discussion on the legacy of the New Order in the transition era, see, for example, Vedi R. Hadiz, "Retrieving the Past for the Future? Indonesia and the New Order Legacy", *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 28, no. 2 (2000): 10–33.

9 Frédéric Volpi, "Pseudo-Democracy in the Muslim World", *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 6 (2004): 1061–78. For further details about Diamond's "pseudo-democracy" theory, see Larry Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes", *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 21–35.

10 Volpi, "Pseudo-Democracy in the Muslim World", p. 1063.

11 Ibid., p. 1075.

12 Larbi Sadiki, "Political Liberalization in Bin Ali's Tunisia: Façade Democracy", *Democratization* 9, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 122–41.

13 Mary Fearnley-Sander et al., "Political Learning during Reformasi", *Australian Journal of Political Science* 36, no. 2 (2001): 325–46, as cited in Volpi, "Pseudo-Democracy in the Muslim World", p. 1073.

14 For a helpful account of Demokrasi Pancasila, see, for instance, Hans Antlöv, "Demokrasi Pancasila and the Future of Ideology in Indonesia", in *The Cultural Construction of Politics in Asia*, edited by Hans Antlöv and Tak-Wing Ngo (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000), pp. 203–22.

15 Vedi R. Hadiz, "Reorganizing Political Power in Indonesia", *The Pacific Review* 16, no. 4 (2003): 607.

[16] Vedi R. Hadiz, "The Rise of Neo-Third Worldism? The Indonesian Trajectory and Consolidation of Illiberal Democracy", *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (2004): 55–71.

[17] Vali Nasr, "The Rise of 'Muslim Democracy'", *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 2 (April 2005): 13–27.

[18] Ibid., p. 15.

[19] Ibid., p. 17.

[20] Ibid., p. 26.

[21] Anies Rasyid Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory", *Asian Survey* 44, no. 5 (September/October 2004): 669–90.

[22] Such a paradigm shift has been acknowledged by R. William Liddle, "New Patterns of Islamic Politics in Democratic Indonesia", in *Piety and Pragmatism: Trends in Indonesian Islamic Politics*, edited by Amy McCreedy (Special Report, no. 110, Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson Center, April 2003), pp. 4–13.

[23] There are four categories used by Freedom House to measure the longevity of democratic stability in all countries around the world. Under the first category, "older democracies", are thirty-nine countries with at least twenty years' continuous experience of democracy from 1980 to 2000. These countries have Freedom House ratings of 5.5 to 7.0. The second category of countries is called "newer democracies", comprising forty-three countries with less than twenty years' experience of democracy, which have the most recent Freedom House rating of 5.5 to 7.0. The third group is "semi-democracies", consisting of forty-seven countries with less than twenty years' experience of democracy, which have the most recent Freedom House rating of 3.5 to 5.5. And the last category is called "non-democracies", consisting of the remaining sixty-two countries, with the Freedom House rating in 1999–2000 of 1.0 to 3.0. Under this category we find military-backed dictatorships, authoritarian countries, elitist oligarchies, and absolute monarchies. See Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 52.

[24] Societies are defined based on the annual ratings provided by Freedom House since 1972. The level of freedom is classified according to the combined mean score for political rights and civil liberties in its annual survey, *Freedom in the World*. The full report can be accessed at: <www.freedomhouse.org>.

[25] Anders Uhlin, *Indonesia and the "Third Wave of Democratization": The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 63; cf. Masykuri Abdillah, *Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy* (Hamburg: Abera Verlag Meyer & Co. KG, 1997); cf. Douglas Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995).

[26] Azyumardi Azra, "Indonesian Islam, Election Politics and Beyond", *NIAS Nytt* 4 (December 2004): 12–14; cf. Abdurrahman Wahid, "Indonesia's Mild Secularism", *SAIS Review* 21, no. 2 (Summer–Fall 2001): 25–27.

[27] M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200*, 3rd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 14.

[28] Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 14.

[29] This happened at an ideological-cultural level between the devout Muslims (*santri*) on the one hand and the nominal Muslims (*abangan*) on the other hand, particularly on several religious ceremonial occasions. For further discussion on this, see Clifford Geertz, "Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example", *American Anthropologist* 59, no. 1 (February 1957): 32–54.

[30] Hefner, *Civil Islam*, especially pp. 21– 26.

[31] Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[32] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. 1, translated by George Lawrence and edited by J.P. Mayer (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969).

[33] Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 25.

[34] Ibid., p. 25.

[35] Ibid., p. 215.

[36] Ibid., pp. 216–17.

[37] Hefner's understanding of Public Islam is drawn mainly from Casanova's Public Religion. See, José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

[38] Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 18.

[39] See also his article, "Islam and Democratization in Indonesia", in *Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia*, edited by Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatich (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), pp. 76–127.

[40] Hefner, *Civil Islam*, pp. 11–13.

[41] Robert W. Hefner, "Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization", *Sociology of Religion* 62, no. 4 (2001): 491–514.

[42] For a helpful account of what corruption means for democracy, see, among others, Mark E. Warren, "What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?" *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 2 (April 2004): 328–43. On the rule of law see, for instance, Guillermo O' Donnell, "The Quality of Democracy: Why the Rule of Law Matters", *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 4 (October 2004): 32–46.

[43] The Dutch policy towards Islam was mainly drawn from Snouck Hurgronje's views and advice. For further information, see, for instance, Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945* (The Hague and the Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1958).

[44] Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, p. 210.

[45] Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1942* (Singapore and New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

[46] For further discussion on SI, see, among others, A. Timur Jaylani, "The Sarekat Islam Movement: Its Contribution to Indonesian Nationalism" (M.A. thesis,

McGill University, 1959); George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952); Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 16–19; Fred R. von der Mehden, "Islam and the Rise of Nationalism in Indonesia" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California Berkeley, 1957); M. Rusli Karim, *Perjalanan Partai Politik Indonesia* (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 1983), p. 19.

47 Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, p. 210.

48 For a further theoretical discussion on Islam and the public sphere, see, among others, Miriam Hoexter, et al., eds., *The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2002).

49 Taufik Abdullah, *Islam dan Masyarakat: Pantulan Sejarah Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987), p. 1.

50 Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, p. 217.

51 Ibid.

52 For a good study of the Communist influence on SI, see, for instance, Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965), especially pp. 22–25.

53 Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia*, p. 18.

54 For further information about the Mathla'ul Anwar see, M. Irsjad Djuwaeli, *Membawa Mathla'ul Anwar ke Abad XXI* (Jakarta: PB Mathla'ul Anwar, 1996).

55 For helpful information on the Al-Irsyad movement in Java, see Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, "Islamic Modernism in Colonial Java: The al-Irshad Movement", in *Hadhrami Traders, Scholars, and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s–1960s*, edited by Ulrike Freitag and William G. Clarence-Smith (New York: Brill, 1997), pp. 231–48.

56 For further elaboration on Muhammadiyah and its role in democratization see, for example, Alfian, *Muhammadiyah: The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989); cf. Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadijah Movement in a Central Javanese Town* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1983); James L. Peacock, *Muslim Puritans: Reformist Psychology in Southeast Asian Islam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Din Syamsuddin, ed., *Muhammadiyah Kini dan Esok* (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1990); M. Rusli Karim, ed., *Muhammadiyah dalam Kritik dan Komentar* (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1986).

57 For further elaboration on NU, see, among others, Greg Fealy and Greg Barton, eds., *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia* (Clayton, Vic.: Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 1996); Hilmy Muhammadiyah and Sulthan Fatoni, eds., *NU: Identitas Islam Indonesia* (Jakarta: eLSAS, 2004); Robin L. Bush, "Redefining 'Political Islam' in Indonesia: Nahdlatul Ulama and Khittah '26", *Studia Islamika* 7, no. 2 (2000): 59–86.

58 For a comprehensive account of Masyumi, see, for example, Harun Nasution, "The Islamic State in Indonesia: The Rise of the Ideology, the Movement for Its

Creation and the Theory of Masjumi" (M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1965); Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional: Kisah dan Analisis Perkembangan Politik Indonesia 1945–1965* (Bandung: Mizan, 2000), pp. 49–76.

59 John Bastin and Harry J. Benda, *A History of Modern Southeast Asia: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Decolonization* (Sydney: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 130.

60 Bernard Dahm, *History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971), p. 40.

61 Abdillah, *Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals*, p. 33.

62 Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia*, p. 28. See also Abdillah, *Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals*, p. 33.

63 For more detailed information on the Jakarta Charter, see Endang Saifuddin Anshari, *The Jakarta Charter 1945: The Struggle for an Islamic Constitution in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia [ABIM], 1979).

64 B.J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 30.

65 Ibid., p. 31.

66 Ibid., p. 30.

67 Ibid., p. 33.

68 Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 1945–1965* (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1987), p. 40.

69 Syamsuddin Haris, *Demokrasi di Indonesia: Gagasan dan Pengalaman* (Jakarta: Center for the Study of Development and Democracy [CESDA], 1993), p. 42, as cited in Uhlin, *Indonesia and the "Third Wave of Democratization"*, pp. 31–32.

70 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

71 Uhlin, *Indonesia and the "Third Wave of Democratization"*, p. 37.

72 See Herbert Feith, "Constitutional Democracy: How Well Did It Function?" in *Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s*, edited by D. Bourchier and J. Legge (Clayton, Vic.: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994), pp.16–25; in the same volume, Daniel S. Lev, "On the Fall of The Parliamentary System", pp. 39–42.

73 See, for example, his speech delivered at Aligarh University, 29 October 1955, entitled "Islam Masjarakat Demokrasi dan Perdamaian" [Islam democratic society and peace], published by Tintamas, Jakarta, 1957.

74 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan: Studi tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), pp. 113–14.

75 Abdillah, *Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals*, p. 36.

76 Ibid.

77 Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, pp. 431–33.

78 Abdillah, *Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals*, p. 37.

79 For more on the ideological and political contestation among NU, PKI, and Masyumi, see Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, pp. 303–41.

[80] Greg Fealy, "'Rowing in a Typhoon': Nahdlatul Ulama and the Decline of Parliamentary Democracy", in *Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s*, edited by D. Bourchier and J. Legge (Clayton, Vic: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994), pp. 88–98.

[81] See, for instance, Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000).

[82] For a helpful account of the New Order's perception of Pancasila, see, among others, Michael Morfit, "Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government", *Asian Survey* 21, no. 8 (August 1981): 838–51.

[83] Robert W. Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia", in *Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia*, edited by Robert W. Hefner (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), p. 79.

[84] See Amien Rais, "Tidak Ada Negara Islam", *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 376/1982.

[85] Their *Tidak Ada Negara Islam* is basically a response to what Amien Rais had stated previously, that there is no Islamic state in Islam.

[86] Aswab Mahasin, *Menyemai Kultur Demokrasi* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2000).

[87] On the background of the establishment of ICMI, see Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia", especially pp. 94–102; cf. Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and The Struggle for The Indonesian Middle Class", *Indonesia* 56 (1993): 1–35.

[88] Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia", p. 100.

[89] For a discussion on ethno-religious conflicts in some of the eastern parts of Indonesia, see, among others, Gerry van Klinken, "The Maluku Wars: Bringing Society Back In", *Indonesia* 71 (April 2001): 1–26; cf. Jacques Bertrand, "Legacies of the Authoritarian Past: Religious Violence in Indonesia's Moluccan Islands", *Pacific Affairs* 75, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 57–85.

[90] Robert W. Hefner, "Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence in Post-Soeharto Indonesia", in *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization*, edited by Robert W. Hefner (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 276.

[91] The institutionalist approach deployed by Jacques Bertrand is particularly useful for remapping the anatomy of horizontal conflicts during and after the New Order. This study reveals that mass violence and horizontal conflicts during the New Order and after the ouster of Soeharto are state-sponsored crimes. For further details on this, see Jacques Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia* (Port Melbourne and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[92] For further information on this issue, see Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia", p. 683.

[93] Ibid., p. 679.

[94] The debate among Indonesian Muslims did not particularly concern the relationship of Islam and democracy, but of Islam and the state. Democracy was just one of the myriad aspects of the debate developed in the early phase of Indonesia's independence. For further debate on the relationship between

Islam and the state in general and democracy in particular since Indonesia's independence, see, among others, Luthfi Assyaukanie, "Muslim Models of Polity: Islamic Arguments for Political Change in Indonesia, 1945–2005" (Ph.D. thesis, The University of Melbourne, 2006).

95 Due to his progressive ideas on Islamic renewal, Madjid — together with Abdurrahman Wahid — is classified by many as a "neo-modernist" Muslim thinker. See Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy, *Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: Rekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam Masa Orde Baru* (Bandung: Mizan, 1986), pp. 176–77; cf. Abdullah Saeed, "Ijtihad and Innovation in Neo-Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia", *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 8, no. 2 (1997), pp. 279–95.

96 Nurcholish Madjid, "Kepemimpinan Demokrasi Lebih Dekat dengan Islam", *Tsaqafah* 2, no. 2 (2004): 78–81.

97 Nurcholish Madjid, "Demokrasi dan Demokratisasi di Indonesia: Beberapa Pandangan Dasar dan Prospek pelaksanaannya sebagai Kelanjutan Logis Pembangunan Nasional", in *Demokratisasi Politik, Budaya, dan Ekonomi: Pengalaman Indonesia Masa Orde Baru*, edited by Elza Peldi Taher (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994), p. 217.

98 Nurcholish Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998), pp. 5–59.

99 Nurcholish Madjid, "Transisi ke Demokrasi", in *Tekad* 16 (15–21 February 1999); cf. Madjid, "Demokrasi Dinamis", *Tekad* 2 (9–16 November 1999), as cited by Syukron Kamil, *Islam & Demokrasi: Telaah Konseptual & Historis* (Jakarta: Gaya Media Pratama, 2002), p. 83 (f. 39).

100 That is why the Arab community, led by Mu'awiyah, the first caliph of the Umayyad caliphate, ceased to subscribe to this political ethic, simply because it was too sophisticated for them. For further discussion on Bellah's view of Islam, see his book *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), especially pp. 146–67.

101 See his doctoral thesis on Ibn Taymiyya, "Ibn Taymiyya on *Kalam* and *Falsafa*" [A problem of reason and revelation in Islam] (Unpublished dissertation, University of Chicago, 1984).

102 Nurcholish Madjid, "Asas-asas Pluralisme dan Toleransi dalam Masyarakat Madani", a paper delivered at the seminar "Masyarakat Madani dalam Perspektif Agama dan Politik", Jakarta, 22 February 1999, as cited in Kamil, *Islam & Demokrasi*, p. 83.

103 Nurcholish Madjid and Mohamad Roem, *Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat-surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid-Mohamad Roem* (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 1997), especially pp. 12–43.

104 Nurcholish Madjid, *Cita-cita Politik Islam Era Reformasi* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999), p. 197.

105 Kamil, *Islam & Demokrasi*, p. 70.

106 Abdillah, *Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals*, p. 73.

107 For a more comprehensive account of Abdurrahman Wahid's political ideas and practices, see Mujiburrahman, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Political

Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid", *Islam and Christian Muslim Relations* 10, no. 3 (October 1999): 339–52; cf. Douglas Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995); cf. Abdurrahman Wahid, *Bunga Rampai dari Pesantren* (Jakarta: Dharma Bakti, 1979).

108 Ali and Effendy, *Merambah Jalan Baru Islam*, pp. 176–77.

109 Abdillah, *Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals*, p. 104.

110 Ibid., pp. 107–8.

111 Ibid., pp. 195–96.

112 Abdurrahman Wahid, "Pribumisasi Islam", in *Islam Menatap Masa Depan*, edited by Muntaha Azhari and Abdul Mun'im Saleh (Jakarta: P3M, 1989), p. 81.

113 For more on Wahid's criticism of ICMI, see Abdurrahman Wahid, "Intelektual di Tengah Eksklusifisme", in *ICMI: Antara Status Quo dan Demokratisasi*, edited by Nasrullah Ali-Fauzi (Bandung: Mizan, 1995).

114 Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), especially pp. 186–93.

115 Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia", pp. 100–1.

116 Abdurrahman Wahid, "Indonesia's Muslim Middle Class: An Imperative or a Choice?" in *The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia*, edited by Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (Clayton, Vic.: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990), p. 29.

117 Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Combining Activism and Intellectualism: The Biography of Mohammad Natsir (1908–1993)", *Studia Islamika* 2, no. 1 (1995): 117–31.

118 See, for instance, Mohammad Natsir, *Islam sebagai Dasar Negara* (Bandung: Pimpinan Fraksi Masyumi dalam Konstituante, 1957).

119 Ibid.

120 Mohammad Natsir, *Capita Selecta* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1973), p. 452.

121 Ibid.

122 Ahmad Suhelmi, *Polemik Negara Islam* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), p. 128.

123 Cited in George McTurnan Kahin, "Mohammad Natsir", in *Muhammad Natsir 70 Tahun: Kenang-kenangan dan Perjuangan*, edited by Yusuf Abdullah Puar (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1978), p. 333.

124 Natsir, *Islam sebagai Dasar Negara*, p. 7.

125 Hadith narrated by Nasa'i.

126 Hadith narrated by Abu Dawud and Tirmidhi.

127 Natsir, Islam *sebagai Dasar Negara*, pp. 87–104; Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Modernisme Islam dan Demokrasi: Pandangan Politik Mohammad Natsir", *Islamika* 3 (1994): 79.

128 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Studi tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante: Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), p. 130.

129 For more detailed information on Mawdudi, see, among others, Charles J. Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State", in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, edited by John L. Esposito (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983),

pp. 99–133; cf. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

130 The correct word for secularism in Arabic is actually 'ilmaniyyah. See Natsir, *Islam sebagai Dasar Negara*, p. 62.

131 Ibid., pp. 62–104. His speech, delivered in a series of debates in the Constituent Assembly, was mostly dominated by his resistance to the idea of secularism as promulgated by nationalists and communists.

132 Mohammad Natsir, *Some Observations Concerning the Role of Islam in National and International Affairs: An address originally made before the Pakistan Institute of World Affairs with subsequent elucidatory additions* (Ithaca, NY: Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1954), p. 1.

133 Ibid.

134 Ibid., p. 2.

135 Ibid., p. 13.

136 M. Syafi'i Anwar classifies Rakhmat as a formalistic Muslim intellectual who seeks a stringent devotion to God's law. See M. Syafi'i Anwar, *Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Politik tentang Cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), pp. 144–55.

137 Jalaluddin Rakhmat, "Islam dan Kekuasaan: Aktor atau Instrumen?" in *Agama, Demokrasi & Keadilan*, edited by M. Imam Aziz et al. (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1993), pp. 63–75.

138 Ibid., p. 65.

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid.

141 Farid Wadjdi, "Larangan Jilbab dan Mitos Demokrasi", *Pikiran Rakyat*, 19 January 2004.

142 Muhammad Shiddiq Al-Jawi, "Haruskah Islam Menerima Demokrasi?" an unpublished paper written at the end of 1994 or the beginning of 1995, as cited in Franz Magnis-Suseno SJ, *Mencari Sosok Demokrasi: Sebuah Telaah Filosofis* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1995), pp. 30–31.

143 Al-Jawi, "Haruskah Islam Menerima Demokrasi?" pp. 4–6.

4

ISLAMISM IN POST-NEW ORDER INDONESIA
Explaining the Contexts

DEFINING ISLAMISM IN THE INDONESIAN CONTEXT

For a long period of time Indonesian Islam has enjoyed the reputation of being a distinctive and tolerant variant of Islam compatible with democracy, human rights, civil society, pluralism, gender equality and other traits of modern civilization.[1] One of the main reasons for this positive reputation is that Islam was introduced to the country in a relatively peaceful way, even though it is undeniable that military expansion accompanied its institutionalization.[2] Sufism also played an important role in the expansion of the new faith.[3] In this region, Islam has flourished as an entity enriching a deep cultural web of local cultures and beliefs, converting the indigenous people without necessarily remaking them according to the Middle Eastern model of Muslims.

This rosy assumption is being challenged by the upsurge of Islamist activism in Indonesia, particularly since the resignation of Soeharto. The rapture accomppanying the rebirth of democracy, the withdrawal of anti-subversion laws and the *Azas Tunggal* regulation, which had prescribed Pancasila as the sole ideology for all mass and political organizations, and the release of political prisoners by then president B.J. Habibie all provided unprecedented and propitious ground for Islamists to openly exercise their activism. A large variety of radical Islamist groups came to the fore. While some focus on campaigning peacefully for the enforcement of the Islamic Shari'ah, others have resorted to violent methods such as conducting sporadic

raids on night spots and carrying out jihadist self-martyring operations. The crisis was employed as a rationale for the Islamists in promulgating the return to "pristine" Islam as the only solution.

Even though there has been an obvious decline in support for the establishment of an Islamic state in the country since 1945,[4] the shift to a more democratic regime paved the way for radical elements to express their Islamist views more blatantly in public. The rise of Islamist activism culminated in such violent acts as the Bali bombing in 2002, the Marriott Hotel blast in 2003, the car bombing in front of the Australian embassy in 2004, the second Bali bombing in 2005 and the second Marriot blast in 2009. Some observers have argued on the basis of these events that Indonesia has become a hotbed of Muslim terrorists.[5]

Nonetheless, the picture of Islamism in Indonesia cannot be dissociated from that of Muslimhood in general. Being a Muslim is not necessarily to be bounded by organizational links, but rather to be influenced by ideas. Islamism is not a discrete category dissociated from the socio-cultural web of Indonesian Islam in general. On the contrary, Islamism is a fluid and at times discontinuous category, the boundaries of which may both shrink and swell depending on the circumstances surrounding the Muslim community in general. There is a vast ideological array into which radical phenomena are being integrated and shared by many different segments of Muslims.

It is therefore not surprising that Indonesian Islam encompasses a vast spectrum ranging from non-confessional, tolerant, moderate, and liberal forms to extremely intolerant, radical, and thuggish forms. There is not one fault line dividing one segment of Muslim society from another. Rather, members of different segments of the Muslim community can share views over certain issues while being at odds on others. Similarly, while the brutal tactics used by some radical forces of Islam are widely condemned and rejected as morally wrong, the motives which give rise to such radical acts are shared more widely and at times enjoy tacit sympathy, particularly among Muslims who would have to be considered "moderate".[6]

As explained in the introduction, the term "Islamism" is used in this study because it represents the inner voice of Islamist movements in most of the Muslim world and in Indonesia in particular. However, the term "Islamism" is not in itself sufficient unless we further define it as follows. First, its proponents believe that Islam must be implemented in its literal sense as set out in the Qur'an and Hadith (Prophet's tradition), without compromise. They believe that Islam is the only solution for any type of crisis engulfing Muslims since it is believed to be complete and all-encompassing, applicable to all ages and places (*salih likulli zaman wa makan*).[7] Second, they tend to be

react against those versions of Islam that they perceive as corrupted, immoral, and deviationist and will seek to restore it by returning to their version of Islam. Some Islamists — particularly those of the meliorist variant — may not necessarily be hostile towards the status quo. They would see the corrupted Muslim community as the field for their call for a return to an "authentic" version of Islam on the basis of a peaceful and persuasive approach.

Given these characteristics, we cannot define a clear fault line dividing peaceful Islamism from radical and violent Islamism. In this context, Greg Fealy argues that Islamism cannot be placed in an isolated category and clearly demarcated from "moderate" or "liberal" Islam.[8] In reality, Islamism is on a borderless continuum where the boundary between it and so-called "moderate Islam" is blurred. In other words, Islamist ideas are contiguous for "moderate" ones on particular grounds and can gain broad resonance within some mainstream Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Despite their wide reputation as being "moderate" organizations, some segments of these organizations are surprisingly sympathetic to key points of the Islamists' agenda. That is why their rhetoric can at times be remarkably similar to that of Islamist groups.[9]

Islamism in post-New Order Indonesia takes two forms. The first form is manifested in structural struggles to gain power by means of electoral competition. To this end, several political parties with Islam as their foundation and spirit have been formed — their main agenda is to uphold Islamic causes. The mushrooming of Islamic political parties after 1998 — with PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, or Crescent and Star Party), PUI (Partai Umat Islam, or Islamic Community Party), and PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtong, or Prosperous/Justice Party) being the most prominent — reflects this particular form.[10] Members of these parties usually focus their struggles on reinserting the Jakarta Charter into the 1945 Constitution (UUD 1945) or to propose the implementation of Islamic Shari'ah at all state levels. The recent phenomenon of Shari'ah-based local bills supported by Islamic political parties in some provincial and district legislatures is a good example of how these parties operate on the local level.

The second form of Islamism manifests itself through social and cultural activism off the formal political stage. Islamist organizations such as MMI (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia, or The Council of Indonesian Muslim Holy Warriors), HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), FPI (Front Pembela Islam, or Front of the Defenders of Islam), FKAWJ (Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah) with its paramilitary wing, Laskar Jihad, HAMMAS (Himpunan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim antar-Kampus, or Collective Action of Inter-Campus Muslim Students), and many others represent this type of Islamism.[11] The

collapse of the New Order regime witnessed the unprecedented growth of organizations of this kind, as they utilized the weakness of the state to aggregate power. From the outset, the two forms of Islamism worked hand in hand to build a society based on Islamic precepts.

Despite differences in articulation, the two share a number of characteristics. Most importantly, they both use Islam as the spirit of their activism and thus call themselves "Islamic". Secondly, they also share with one another the purpose to promulgating Islam at all levels through the implementation of Islamic Shari'ah. While they agree on the idea of the Islamization of state and society, they differ with one another about how the Islamization process should be carried out at a practical level. Although antagonism between the two can sometimes be seen at the surface, this difference in method is usually understood as a minor difference in a common struggle towards the same objective.

For the purposes of this study, the Islamists will be divided into two main categories: utopian and meliorist. While the former represents the stream of Islamists whose political ideology is to reshape society based on Islamic precepts by means of radical and uncompromising but non-violent ways, the latter seeks to find the middle ground by immersing itself in the existing socio-political realm and imposing what is believed to be the "pristine" normative values of Islam onto society. At times the latter approaches the perceived corrupted society with optimism and the belief that the world can be made better by gradually making people more Islamic without necessarily devastating the already established social and political orders in it.

Utopian Islamism can include both pure Salafis and Salafi jihadists.[12] A careful distinction between the two made by the International Crisis Group (ICG) is helpful in classifying Islamist groups more carefully. While the former is defined as "a Muslim reformist movement aiming to return Islam to the purity of the religion as practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and the two generations that followed him by means of nonviolent methods", the latter is defined as "the radical fringe of salafism determined to target Islam's enemies through violence, aimed in particular at the United States and its allies".[13]

Meliorism, on the other hand, basically sees the existing world as in "a sorry state of affairs" and affirms with confident assurance the ability of human intelligence to improve on it. Its advocates have a practical motto: "Let us make a better world!" Militant but not necessarily radical in a pejorative sense, meliorists look at the reality of the world positively.[14] The PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), an Islamic political party established in post-New Order Indonesia, may be regarded as the best representative of this thread.

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF ISLAMISM

The origins of contemporary Islamism are not simply religious as such, since there are too many complex, intervening factors contributing to its birth. Some observers divide the factors behind the emergence of Islamism into two types: internal and external factors. Azyumardi Azra, for instance, maintains that while the root causes of Islamism in the past were mainly internal factors such as the decline of Muslim political entities and conflicts among Muslims, the root causes of contemporary Islamism has been a mixture of internal and external factors.[15] Many Muslims believe that the agony of Muslims during the pre-modern and colonial periods was caused by the moral decay that resulted from their deviant religious beliefs and practices. Put simply, Muslims lagged behind because they had abandoned the authentic and true version of Islam.

The crises engulfing the community motivated some other segments of Muslim society to bring Muslim society back to the authentic or pristine version of Islam. This purification process was achieved by means of *islah* (reformism) and *tajdid* (revivalism) in which the pious Muslim predecessors of the first generations of early Muslims (*salaf al-salih*) were promoted as the main reference points. For this reason, this movement is widely known as the salafi (or *salafiyyah*) movement. The Salafi movement employs various means, ranging from peaceful to antagonistic and violent. Fellow Muslims considered to have strayed from true Islam were the main targets of such movements. The Wahhabi movement that gained momentum in the late eighteenth century in Arabia and the Padri movement in West Sumatra are the most obvious cases in point. According to Azra, both of them can be categorized as classic and radical Salafism, because internal factors within the Muslim community served as the main driving force.[16]

External factors contributed to the rise of radical Islamism during the period of colonialism when almost all Muslim lands fell under the control of foreign powers, particularly Western countries. Many assumed that Western colonialism, with its exploitation of natural and economic resources, was responsible for the predicament of Muslim societies all over the world. As part of their resistance against Western colonialism, Muslims waged holy war (*jihad*) to expel the Western powers from their lands. As a result, religion-based extremism found fertile ground in Muslim countries. The outcry of *jihad* among Muslims during the colonial period was to liberate their land from Western hegemony.

The bitter history of colonialism penetrates the very heart of the psychosocial memory of today's Islamists: it is, and always will be, used in

blaming the West for the powerless situation of Muslims in the current process of globalization. For them, unjust power relations have been maintained by the West in the form of economic hegemony over the Muslim world. Islamists promote a sense of siege among Muslims by creating notions of neo-colonialism and "conspiracy theories" that aim to undermine Muslims. In other words, Islamists show symptoms of an inferiority complex along with an inability to cope with their crises. In this context, crisis theory can be applied to describe the psychological dimension of contemporary Islamism. As Dekmejian has pointed out, "a recurrent pattern of history is the cause-and-effect relationship between social crises and the rise of religious, revolutionary, or revivalist movements which seek to transform the established order to build a new society on the basis of their particular ideological perception".[17]

In the context of post-New Order Indonesia, crisis theories, to a large extent, explain the resurgence of Islamism. The 1997 economic crisis was deployed by some Islamist movements to attract a wider audience. HTI, for instance, came to the fore in the aftermath of the crisis with its well-known slogan *Selamatkan Indonesia dengan Syari'ah* (Save Indonesia with Shari'ah).[18] In Yusanto's view, the root of Indonesia's crisis is the neo-liberal/capitalist system adopted by the country. As he puts it,

> Since the economic crisis, the country's leadership has kept changing with four presidents, but the crisis has not changed. The crisis remains there. It is evident that the crisis is not only caused by the fact that the bureaucrats are not *amanah* (untrustworthy), corrupted and unskilful, but primarily resulted from the bad system adopted by the country as a basis of legalizing all societal and state matters. The capitalist economic system, combined with opportunistic behaviour, hedonistic culture, selfish and individualistic attitudes of society, syncretic religious understanding and a materialistic educational paradigm as well as other secular aspects have been the root causes of this long-lasting crisis.[19]

These assumptions are also shared by MMI with its argument that all crises are caused by human disloyalty to Islamic Shari'ah: "destruction will inflict a nation when they are away from the total implementation of Islamic Shari'ah".[20] In the view of HTI and MMI, there is no panacea to all crises but the upholding of an Islamic system of life based on Shari'ah.

In a somewhat different tone, PKS attempts to contextualize the crisis from a rational and religiously neutral standpoint, by arguing that not all human crises are caused only by the denial of God's bliss but also by *penjahat-penjahat terbesar* (*kaba'ir al-mujrimin*, "the biggest evil-doers") who

are adapt at cheating their fellow humans for the sake of their own interests. By *penjahat-penjahat terbesar* they mean those who are in power but abuse it for their own interests. In order to attract a wider audience, PKS not only employs hyperbolic language and phrases, but also textual justification from the verses of the Qur'an:

> It is clear that the complete and terrifying destruction inflicting this nation is not merely caused by the denial of God's bliss by the citizens of the country, but also by the interference of "the biggest evil-doers" who abuse their power to indulge in their own worldly desires. So much so that the unpleasant historical situation of this country is inextricably linked to the existence of these "biggest evil-doers" who occupy the fully corrupted and sinful positions of power and leadership.[21]

Unlike HTI and MMI activists who use textual justifications to blame their fellow citizens for the crisis and destruction, PKS activists seek to combine textual (Q.S. 6:6, 44–45, 123; 2:251; 17:16) and rational bases in justifying their standpoint, while at the same time blaming a very few people for having caused the damage. In this case, the method used to explain the crisis is not without political implications. As a political party, PKS definitely wants to maximize all its strategies in order to win as many votes as possible. That is why PKS used the slogan *Menyelamatkan Bangsa* ('saving the nation') as its platform prior to its campaign for the 2004 general elections. By this slogan, PKS seek to emphasize that there are no ideological boundaries whatsoever between PKS activists and the rest of society.

Blame is also directed at external powers such as the Western-Christian-Zionist conspiracy that allegedly undermines the largest Muslim country in the world. To explain the horizontal conflicts between Christians and Muslims in Maluku, for instance, HTI deployed a conspiracy theory. HTI argued that it was the American-led Western powers constituting the Judaeo-Christian tradition that must be responsible for those conflicts tearing Indonesia apart:[22]

> It is the US and other Western countries that have successfully propagated capitalism, democracy, freedom and the like so that some Muslims in this country lose their control. Some of our fellow citizens are now — in the name of democracy, liberalism and other similar jargon — able to collectively aspire to self-determination, even though it is against Islam. As a result, many citizens of this country demand freedom, to be independent from the unitary area of Muslims. Some others demand 'the autonomy of regions' in a broader sense. This is obvious in the cases

> of Aceh, Maluku, Irian Jaya, Riau, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, and other regions follow suit.[23]

The above quotation represents only the tip of the iceberg of utopian Islamism. Thanks to the media they own, such thinkers are able to transmit their ideas very rapidly into the wider community. One of the key assumptions widely promulgated is that democracy has been brought into Indonesia by foreign powers to destabilize the sociocultural tranquillity of the country.[24] To these Islamists, the existing mainstream socioreligious organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah, contribute nothing to solving the problem; rather, they exacerbate it. Therefore, it is not surprising that HTI called for the return to the pristine Islam in order to overcome the crises.

The relationship between crisis and radicalism is dialectical. Either might lead to the other, and the other might then reinforce the one. Thus, radical Islamism may contribute to the polarization and schismatization of society which would in turn lead to accumulated crises. This theoretical view has been supported by M.C. Ricklefs in his *Polarising Javanese Society* by arguing that "a pattern of reform and Puritanism within a given religious tradition leading to social polarization, political reification and violence is a wider, more common experience in human history. It is unique neither to Indonesia nor to Islam".[25] Instead of looking at the crises as the root cause of radical Islamism, Ricklefs tends to see the former as the effect of the latter. The social crises resulting from the movement towards radical Islamism may be seen in the interreligious conflicts in Maluku in the aftermath of the collapse of New Order regime. The active involvement of radical jihadists in this conflict is without question.[26]

The sociohistorical roots of Islamism in Indonesia can be described in three inter-related stages: (1) Sukarno's Old Order, where the formation of the nation-state took place; (2) Soeharto's New Order, where the emergence of Islamism cannot be disengaged from the fluctuating relations between Islam and the state; and (3) the post-New Order era, where Islamism has grown stronger as a result of the democratization process.

During Sukarno's Old Order, Islamism was closely associated with the story of the Darul Islam (DI) movement led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo.[27] This movement had its strongholds in three provinces: Aceh, West Java, and South Sulawesi. This movement initially came into existence in West Java, but then spread to Aceh and South Sulawesi for various reasons. What seems to have unified the movement in the three provinces, at least superficially, is the ideal of establishing an Islamic state with Shari'ah as its basis. In historical accounts of Indonesia, this movement

is often referred to as a "rebelling group" due to its resistance against the ruling government.

Initially, a number of people of West Java were attracted to and supported the rebellion of Darul Islam. However, their support decreased as the mainstream Islamic organizations in this region, such as NU, Muhammadiyah, and Persis, opposed DI's proclamation of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII). Opposition came from the leading Islamic party, Masyumi, as well. The lack of support from mainstream Islam, in turn, undermined the religious legitimacy of the movement. The holy war waged by the TII/NII was accordingly considered a *bughat* (rebellion) against the legitimate government. Discredited in the eyes of many nationalist Indonesians, Darul Islam's influence in West Java shrank to cover only some districts such as Garut, Tasikmalaya, Cianjur, Sukabumi, Majalengka, and Bogor.[28]

Despite the fact that the Darul Islam movement did not gain much support from mainstream Islamic organizations, they endured for thirteen years. The influence of Darul Islam extended well beyond West Java to places like Aceh, South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, and small areas of Central Java. By 1962, Kartosoewiryo was captured, tried, and executed by the Indonesian military. His capture affected significantly the viability of Darul Islam in West Java and henceforth the Indonesian Government took full control over most of DI's territory. Nevertheless, the demise of Darul Islam as a movement did not necessarily mean that their ideology also disappeared. On the contrary, the idea of an Islamic state has been proven to have survived ever since and has over and over again gained tacit support from particular segments of Indonesian society.

Apart from the emergence of Darul Islam, Sukarno's Old Order regime also witnessed a parliamentary struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state. It was Masyumi, the Islamic political party led by Mohammad Natsir, that led the struggle by legal and constitutional means. Their struggle, however, failed because of the fact that Masyumi and the other Islamic parties did not have a unified political viewpoint on what the Islamic state constituted. As their energies were consumed by internal conflicts and power struggles, they failed to win a majority vote in the 1955 election, the first democratic election in the history of Indonesia.

During Soeharto's New Order, the ideology of Islamism was to a certain extent a continuation of the DI movement; its existence was in one way or another condoned by the state to counter the influence of communism and other enemies of the state.[29] During the first half of the New Order period, several radical Islamist groups came to the fore. They carried different names, but they were all ideologically interconnected through the nucleus of the Darul

Islam movement. One of the most conspicuous phenomena was the *Komando Jihad*, later on referred to by other names including Teror Warman (named after one of its leaders, "Warman", a West Javanese Darul Islam veteran), a shadowy radical Islamist group ostensibly maintained as a "bad corps" by the state.[30] The clandestine TII/NII (The Islamic State, or Army of Indonesia) movement, which first appeared in 1978 in Bandung, was also inspired by the Darul Islam ideology. The latter spread into various cities under the guise of *Usroh* (literally, "nuclear family"), an underground movement first introduced by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.[31] Later, the *Usroh* movement was best identified by different names such as the Jema'ah Islamiyah in Solo, the Generasi 554 in Jakarta, and the NII Cirebon in Cirebon.[32]

The *Usroh* movement spread and transmitted Islamist ideas among young Muslim students at secular campuses during the 1980s; there were also limited study circles (*halaqah*). These places served as spawning grounds where Muslim students were introduced to revolutionary Islamist ideas derived not only from *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* ideologues such as Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, but also from such Shi'ite scholars as Mutahhari and Ali Shari'ati, a thinker behind the 1979 Iranian Revolution.[33] The idea of revolutionary Islam was of great appeal to young people, who characterized by "the curious combination of strong idealism and innocence, of optimism and hopefulness, but also by an inclination to be easily disillusioned".[34]

Later on, the *Usroh* and *halaqah* were combined with the *Tarbiyah* movement (literally, "education"), in which seniors acted as instructors (*murabbi*) in training and disciplining junior members with Islamic precepts. For this reason, these student activities were identified as part of the *Tarbiyah* movement which was later responsible for the establishment of Partai Keadilan (Justice Party). The *Tarbiyah* movement started with religious activities in Bandung's ITB (Institut Teknologi Bandung, or Bandung Institute of Technology) campus, at a mosque called "Salman". Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, there was a central figure in the activities of this mosque named Imaduddin Abdul Rahim — better known among the mosque activists as Bang Imad — who first introduced the concept of the Islamic religious gathering (*pengajian*) among Muslim student activists. This *pengajian* served as a model for similar Islamic gatherings at other campus mosques all over the country.[35]

The New Order era basically comprised two main phases of government measures on Islamism. During the first half of the New Order (1967–85) Islamism was generally under harsh surveillance and severe treatment by the government, whereas the second half (1986–97) signified a radical shift in the government's policies as it allowed Islam on the stage of politics. One

of the most obvious signs of this political shift was the establishment of the government-supported ICMI (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals) as a means for what Hefner calls "regimist Islam" to take an active part in the state structure.[36] Soeharto had made a strategic choice to gain political support from Muslims in order to counterbalance the declining support for him within the armed forces, even though both Soeharto and the Islamists maintained their respective political interests.[37]

The post-New Order era has witnessed the mushrooming of Islamist groups and organizations. The fall of Soeharto created an unprecedented and euphoric outburst of activity at the grass roots, bringing all ideologies, identities, and interests that had previously been suppressed by the state back on the political stage, where they found seemingly unregulated space for self-expression. In this context, Islamism came to the fore, exploiting the tumultuous socio-political chaos that filled the de facto power vacuum soon after Soeharto stepped down. It was a salient voice amid the polyphony, calling for the return to "pristine" Islam while multidimensional crises engulfed the country. Furthermore, the resignation of Soeharto marked a difficult period of transition from a repressive and authoritarian but stable regime to a more democratic but fairly unstable one. At the sociological level, it may be argued that Islamism was one of the emerging forces contesting for the newly liberated public sphere.

MAJLIS MUJAHIDIN INDONESIA (MMI)

The proponents of MMI define this organization as "an alliance of Muslim movements based on *ukhuwwah Islamiyah* (solidarity on Islam), resemblance in religious belief (*akidah* Islam) and programmes as well as purposes of struggle".[38] It was established on 7 August 2000 during the first national congress of *mujahidin* (Muslim warriors) held on 5–7 August 2000 in Yogyakarta. The congress was attended by no fewer than 1800 participants from twenty-four provinces; there were even participants who were said to be from overseas Muslim organizations.[39] The congress was attended by several prominent figures and Muslim activists such as the Cornell University doctoral graduate Deliar Noer, the charismatic Madurese *kyai* (religious cleric) Alawy Muhammad, the chairman of the Justice Party (PK) Hidayat Nur Wahid, ICMI chairman Fuad Amsyari, and a historian of Padjajaran University (UNPAD) Bandung, Ahmad Mansyur Suryanegara. In addition, Abdurrahman Basalamah, Mawardi Noor, Ohan Sujana, Abdul Qadir Baraja, Muhammad Thalib, Bardan Kindarto, Asep Maushul, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, and many others also attended the congress.[40] The entire congress focused on

prospects for the implementation of Shari'ah in Indonesia and the projection of an Islamic state. The congress elected Ba'asyir as *amir al-mujahidin*, the spiritual leader of the organization, and leader of *ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd* (AHWA, or the advisory board of the council). The congress also produced a document containing five important points that later became known as the *Piagam Yogyakarta* (Yogyakarta Charter) as follows:

1. It is obligatory to implement the Islamic Shari'ah for all Muslims in Indonesia and all over the world in general;
2. to reject all types of human-made ideologies contradictory to Islam which have led to *shirk* (polytheism) and *nifaq* (hypocrisy) as well as the violation of human rights;
3. to build a strong unified *saf* (line) of *mujahidin* (holy warriors) to implement the Islamic Shari'ah, either nationally, regionally or internationally;
4. to establish an institution of *mujahidin* towards an *imamah al-Islamiyah* (Islamic Imamate);
5. to call upon all Muslims to uphold the propagation (*dakwah*) and jihad (holy struggles, including physical war) all over the world for the sake of upholding Islam as *rahmatan li al-'alamin* (blessing for the entire universe).[41]

Six months after its declaration, the Yogyakarta Charter was disseminated across society and to government institutions. Among those targeted were Abdurrahman Wahid, then president of the Republic of Indonesia, Amien Rais, then chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), Akbar Tanjung, then chairman of the House of Representatives (DPR), various ministers, ambassadors of neighbouring and Muslim countries, as well as leaders of political parties, Islamic organizations, religious leaders and clerics, societal leaders, and the mass media.[42] In this letter, MMI called for the rampant national conflicts and multidimensional crises to be overcome. The core themes of the letter may be summarized as follows:

1. The root cause of Indonesia's multidimensional crisis is the implementation of secular laws at the state level. In MMI's view, Indonesians should place themselves as the slaves of God by obeying and upholding His laws, so that they can return to the truest human dignity.
2. The sovereignty of Indonesia since its independence has violated the guidance of God. For this reason, Indonesia has violated its sacred covenant as inscribed in its Constitution (UUD 1945), in which it is said that the independence of Indonesia was the result of God's blessing

and love. This has led to a never-ending national crisis, which has featured

a) political disasters such as quarrels between executive and legislative bodies, slander, terror, and conflicts among peoples as happened in Sampang-Madura;
b) economic disasters including massive poverty and displacement of people in several parts of the country;
c) humanitarian tragedies including ethnic and religious conflicts in some provinces, social riots and disturbances such as burning educational institutions, offices, markets, places of worship, and separatist threats;
d) as well as other damages which led to an almost complete self-destruction of Indonesia. As a result, distrust in society towards the government and vice versa are common and threaten the nation with disintegration.

3. A syncretistic frame of thinking and double standards adopted by the government in its attempts to overcome social conflicts proved to be unsuccessful at creating a peaceful, harmonious, and responsible coexistence among elements of society. For this reason, there must be courage to reorient the fundamental frameworks of thinking that guarantee the security of people collectively towards the existence of a just, prosperous, and heavenly blessed society. In accordance with the above-mentioned ends, MMI believes that there is no other way except the total implementation of Islamic Shari'ah at all levels of state structures.
4. The application of secular law in the judicial system and economy has brought about various types of long-lasting oppression, injustice, enmity, and social conflicts.
5. The total reformation (*Reformasi Total*) that guarantees the prosperity and restoration of interior matters can be done only within the framework of a total implementation of Islamic Shari'ah in the country, and a replacement of all figures or bureaucrats who are in charge of running the state.
6. Every citizen of Indonesian society must be given a constitutional right to determine what he or she aspires to. In this regard, every Muslim must be given the same right to implement the Islamic Shari'ah. The MMI believes that such an implementation will guarantee the safety of all elements of society, including non-Muslims as has been ordained in the Shari'ah, because Islam is *rahmatan li al-'alamin* (blessing for the entire universe).

7. Secular democracy, which is considered the best system of governance in the world, when applied to Indonesia has been proven to fail in giving a sense of justice and security to all from any type of terror and other threats to real life. On behalf of democracy, moral decay has even been deliberately ignored and has engulfed the very heart of the society. This is because democracy does not accommodate religion as the basis of its principles.
8. The anxiety of some people that as soon as the Islamic Shari'ah is implemented there will be chaos, injustice, racial and religious discrimination is not only unfounded, it even contradicts the verdicts of the Qur'an, the Prophet's Hadith, and historical facts. This anxiety is constructed by Zionist and Western imperialists, because they want to maintain their imperialism over the world.
9. The Islamic Shari'ah was revealed as the only explanation to human beings as it was revealed by Allah to His Messengers for cleansing humans from the influence of their own evil spirits and providing them with guidance by putting life in order for individuals, family, society, nation, and the state within the *fitra* (nature) outlined by Allah for the sake of happiness in this world and the world to come.
10. Therefore, the Majelis Mujahidin is calling for all Muslim leaders, clerics, and intellectuals, wherever they live and in whatever position they might take part, to be aware that their ignorance or negligence towards *tatbiq al-Shari'ah* (Shari'ah implementation) has provoked Allah's resentment, so that it results in various disasters in this country, since its independence up until today, and it will remain like this unless Muslims take lessons from this fact and repent to embrace the true way of Islam.[43]

In order to attract a wider audience, the organization defines its members and activists as *mujahidin* (plural form of *mujahid*, which means "holy warriors" or in this case "those who are committed to upholding the implementation of Islamic Shari'ah"). The leadership of the organization comprises two elements: (1) *ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd* (AHWA, or the advisory board of the council) led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, which serves as the supreme body; and (2) *lajnah tanfidhiah*, the executive committee led by Irfan S. Awwas, which is responsible for day-to-day administration.[44]

The purpose of this organization is to ensure the implementation of Islamic Shari'ah in all aspects of life, ranging from the individual to the family, society, and nation-state level.[45] That is why one of the first agendas was to lobby Muslim parliamentarians on the incorporation of the Shari'ah into the Constitution. At the same time, MMI activists began to be actively involved

in promulgating the enactment of the Shari'ah at the level of provinces and districts.

This organization uses two different methods to achieve its goals: *dakwah* (propagation) and *jihad* (struggle). If the former is needed to disseminate the ideas of Shari'ah implementation to the people, the latter is needed as a means to support the former in opposing all enemies of God.[46] The enemies of God are defined as those who obstruct attempts to impose the implementation of the Shari'ah, be they Muslims or non-Muslims. The enemies of God are perceived to be very strong structurally and to have an alliance with international powers.

As a part of its *dakwah* activities, MMI sent some letters of advice to various individuals and institutions. In these letters the organization calls for the total implementation of Islamic Shari'ah. In Awwas' opinion, such calls reflect two important points. First, they indicate that the call for Shari'ah implementation is addressed not only to society in general, but also to formal institutions such as the government, the DPR (The House of Representatives) and the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly).[47] Second, the struggle towards the implementation of the Shari'ah is undertaken in a persuasive, peaceful, and constitutional manner, not by means of violent acts, terror, and intimidation, which would be against the prevailing law. That is why, Awwas argues, the MMI is open to whoever who wants dialogue and public debate. To the organization, proposing the implementation of Shari'ah as an alternative solution to the current crisis is a part of its contribution towards the building of *baldatun tayyibatun wa rabbun ghafur* (a heavenly blessed prosperous state).[48]

According to Martin van Bruinessen, the activism of MMI is deeply rooted in the Islamic movements of the preceding decades such as the Darul Islam (DI) movement and Negara Islam Indonesia (NII).[49] Abu Bakar Ba'asyir is assumed to have been deeply sympathetic to DI, even though he was never part of the movement.[50] In this regard, ICG also asserts that Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo, the supreme leader of DI in West Java, "remains the primary political inspiration for Abu Bakar Ba'asyir".[51] Ba'asyir has been consistent in his call for establishing Islamic communities (*jama'ah Islamiyah*) as the necessary precondition of an Islamic state (*dawlah Islamiyyah*) and for *jihad* as a means towards that end. The speech he delivered at the first Mujahidin Congress in August 2000 were consistent with the themes he had expounded in the late 1970s.[52]

In his speech, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir addressed the importance of the expansion of *mujahidin* in order to be the consistent holders of religion (*muqim al-din*). In his opinion, the expansion of *mujahidin* can be undertaken

through two ways: Islamic organization (*tandhim jama'i*) and the *pondok pesantren* schools.[53] The first system is needed to aggregate the potential of Muslims by means of well-planned and systematic methods of training, so as to instil the true understanding of Islam as practised by the *salaf al-salih* (pious predecessors) and to cultivate the love of *jihad* and martyrdom (death in the cause of God) in the hearts of *mujahidin*. Under both systems, there are eight main teaching points: (1) knowledge of the unity of God (*tawhid*); (2) definition of two sentences of the profession of faith (*shahada*); (3) *Al-Wala' wa al-Barra'* (allegiance and dissociation); (4) understanding the true meaning of *taghut* (satanic character); (5) understanding the various types of *shirk* (polytheism); (6) understanding the pillars of Islam; (7) *fiqh al-jihad* (knowledge of struggle); and (8) *fiqh al-qital* (knowledge of war).[54]

Prior to becoming the leader of MMI, Ba'asyir had been in exile for about fifteen years in Malaysia, having fled from a second trial after his first prison term during the New Order. Together with Abdullah Sungkar and other militant Muslim activists, he had established a network in Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, usually referred to as JI (*Jemaah Islamiyah*).[55] Pesantren Al-Mukmin Ngruki, where he serves as a leader, has been regarded by many as having played a crucial role in disseminating radical Islamist ideas in the country. It was reported that many militant Muslim activists visited this boarding school regularly.[56] This allegation, however, has been countered by Irfan S. Awwas, who argues that such an allegation is unfounded and might damage the reputation of Pesantren Ngruki because it is untrustworthy, biased and subjective.[57]

At a glance, Pesantren Ngruki does not show any significant signs of having been the centre of the dissemination of radical ideas. This is because the educational system and curriculum are very similar to those of other Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia. The units of education are: *Madrasah Tsanawiyah* (MTs, or Junior Islamic High School), *Madrasah Aliyah* (MA, or Senior High School), *Kulliyat al-Mu'allimin al-Islamiyah* (KMI, or Islamic Institute of [Male] Teachers), *Kulliyat al-Mu'allimat al-Islamiyah* (KMI, or Islamic Institute of [Female] Teachers), *Ma'had Shighar* (MS, or Junior College), and *Ma'had 'Ali* (MA, or Senior College).[58] In addition, this *pesantren* still uses traditional methods of teaching such as *sorogan* (individual reading) and *bandongan* (public lecture), particularly to study materials that are not taught in the educational units mentioned above.

Nevertheless, as soon as the content of the materials taught is reviewed, one might notice the radical seeds contained in particular subjects. This is because the materials taught put a heavy emphasis on the significant role of *jihad*, the implementation of Shari'ah, and the purification of faith. In the

subject of '*aqidah* (faith in Islam), for instance, emphasis is put not only on the importance of *tawhid* (the oneness of God) and the description of other aspects of faith but, more importantly, on the rejection of all views and state institutions perceived of as in conflict with Islam. The following excerpts are taken from a book formally taught in the classrooms of the *pesantren*:

> To do duty for the sake of the fatherland is apostate and damaging the value of two sentences of *syahadat* (the profession of faith). Verily a Muslim is forbidden to defend his fatherland unless its constitution is based on Islam. If the constitution is truly based on Islam and committed to upholding Allah's law, then he is allowed to do duty and struggle for the sake of his fatherland, because by so doing he defends Islam. But if the duty is done for the fatherland which clearly shows disobedience to Islamic law it is considered apostate … Therefore to render the government's right to forbid, to allow, to create law and Shari'ah to other than Allah is apostate and damaging the value of two sentences of *syahadat*. Including in this deed is the so-called 'Paham Demokrasi' [the idea of democracy]. Because it means that the sovereignty to create the form and law of the state belongs fully to the people. This is clearly unjustified by Islam, because the sovereignty fully belongs to Allah alone, not to people and not to rulers (governments). So, the will of people must be controlled. If their will contradicts the will of Allah, it must not be followed because following the will contradictory to the will of Allah is apostate.[59]

This excerpt indicates clearly how some of the curricula taught at the Pesantren Ngruki provides a potential basis for students to resist at all costs whatever is perceived of as non-Islamic, including democracy. The version of Islam taught in this *pesantren* is constructed in such a way that might lead to antagonistic attitudes towards non-Islamic elements. For this reason, it is not surprising that the school is widely considered to spread Islamist radical ideas. Even more antagonistic materials may be found in the material for other subjects such as *fiqh al-jihad* (knowledge of struggle) and *fiqh al-qital* (knowledge of war), both of which were addressed by Ba'asyir in his speech to the first Congress of Mujahidin in Yogyakarta in 2000.[60] In this case, students are taught to be consistent in upholding the implementation of the Shari'ah. To achieve this end, it is imperative for them to believe in the doctrine of *al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar* (commanding good and forbidding evil) and *jihad fi sabil Allah* (struggle in the cause of Allah), which are considered inseparable from each other.[61]

Along with the above-mentioned ideals, it is crucial for the students to implement the following three important steps: (1) to organize the Muslim *jama'ah* (community) to oppose the *jama'ah* of *kafir* (unbelievers); (2) to coordinate and organize the rank and file into well-armed forces; and (3) to be equipped with ammunition.[62] In the text for '*aqidah* it is mentioned that:

> In so far as to fight against the barriers of *syetan manusia* (human devils), the power of praying and *al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar* alone are insufficient, since they organize rank-and-files well-equipped with ammunition so that they must be opposed in the same way, namely we as Muslim communities are obliged to prepare ourselves with well-organized rank-and-files and well-armed forces to wage jihad (war) against, and conquer, them … That is why Allah commands Muslim communities to fight against them until the slander (*fitnah*) caused by them can be annihilated entirely and all regulations implemented on earth are the law of Allah alone (Islamic Shari'ah).[63]

There are some reports that speculate that MMI serves as a unifying umbrella organization for Islamist groups in a broader sense, with the goal of establishing a pan-Islamic republic called *Negara Islam Nusantara* (Archipelagic Islamic State, or NIN).[64] More particularly, these reports associate MMI with clandestine terrorist groups operating in Southeast Asia, including JI and the Osama bin Laden-led terrorist organization Al-Qaeda. Such speculations are based on the fact that MMI comprises those who have allegedly been involved in clandestine JI activities. These include Abu Jibril (Irfan S. Awwas' older brother), Agus Dwikarna, Hambali, and the Philippine detainee Faturahman Al-Ghozi (Goci), to mention but a few. Moreover, the testimony of Nasir Abas, an ex-JI member, has confirmed the involvement of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir with his NIN and MMI in the JI activities.[65] In his testimony, Ba'asyir served as the spiritual leader of JI and was better known under his alias, Abdus Somad.[66] Lastly, MMI is believed to serve as an important financial conduit, receiving considerable amounts of money, especially from Al-Qaeda, although such accusations have been refuted by observers such as Harold Crouch and Sydney Jones.[67]

Regardless of the validity of such claims, it should at the very least be noted that radical Islamist ideas are not bound by organizational links but rather by ideology and sympathy among fellow Muslims. Islamist ideas are contagious and might easily influence certain Muslim individuals, provided that there is a rational justification to subscribe to them. The boundary between radical and moderate is extremely subtle and changeable, being contingent upon accidental circumstances surrounding the Muslim

community at large. Religious texts, combined with the consciousness of the plight and misery of Muslims, can inflame certain Muslim individuals to become radical without necessarily being involved in a particular Islamist organization.

HIZBUT TAHRIR INDONESIA (HTI)

Hizbut Tahrir means "Liberation Party". Originally, this movement was a transnational political party, established in 1952 in Jerusalem by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani.[68] He himself was born in Palestine. He had studied at Al-Azhar University and Dar al-'Ulum in Cairo, Egypt. In addition, this learned man was a judge and a lecturer in Palestine, Jordan, and Jerusalem. In 1948 he migrated to Beirut, Lebanon. From that time onwards, he did not have a permanent place to live, because he moved among Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. After he passed away, he was succeeded by 'Abd al-Qadim Zallum from Palestine.

Hizbut Tahrir's objective is stated on its website as being "to resume the Islamic way of life by establishing an Islamic State that executes the systems of Islam and carries its call to the world".[69] Hizbut Tahrir (HT) favours the establishment of a transnational Islamic caliphate (*al-Khilafah al-Islamiyah*).[70] In order to achieve its goals and ideals, HT claims to follow three steps of struggle (*marhalah*):

1. *Marhalah Tathqif* (character-building and cadre recruitment) which puts its emphasis on the establishment of the party's cadres, the framework for building the movement, and developing its followers with its organized and intensive character-building materials.
2. *Marhalah Tafa'ul ma'a al-Ummah* (interaction with communities) through which the organization hopes to make all elements of society aware that Islam is the only solution for their daily problems.
3. *Marhalah Istilam al-Hukm* (seizing power) through peaceful means. This is the culmination of the process where the final goals of HT, namely the implementation of the Islamic Shari'ah or the Islamic state, can be accomplished under its *al-Khilafah al-Islamiyah*.[71]

On the basis of these three steps, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) sets three missions as follows:

1. To resume the life of Islam. The mission of HTI is to ensure the continuity of Islam and its implementation at a practical level.
2. To establish *Khilafah Islamiyah* by extending networks among all elements of the Muslim world.

3. To provide education to the wider society in order to make them think and behave in an Islamic manner.[72]

In Indonesia, HTI was established in 1982 and was introduced by Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, the leader of Hizbut Tahrir in Australia who moved to Bogor, West Java, at the invitation of K.H. Abdullah bin Nuh, the principal of Pesantren Al-Ghazali and a lecturer at the Literature Faculty of the University of Indonesia (UI).[73] During his stay in this city, he interacted with many Muslim activists from the mosque Al-Ghifari, which was the headquarters of Muslim activists at the Institute of Agriculture Bogor (IPB).[74] Like the *Tarbiyah* movement, HTI spread rapidly among student circles through the network of *dakwah kampus*, which reached its peak when the Soeharto regime imposed a ban on all student political activities through the Campus Normalization Act in 1978. After that time, like many other Islamic activist groups, HTI became a clandestine movement until the fall of New Order regime.

The ideas and ideology of HTI were disseminated through learning circles known as *halaqah*. Through these *halaqah,* the participants read HTI publications such as *Shahshiyah Islamiyah* (Islamic Personality), *Fikr al-Islam* (Islamic Thought), and *Nizam al-Islam* (Islamic System). Starting from this point, HTI started to promulgate its ideology outside Bogor through campus networks known as *Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* (LDK, or Campus *Dakwah* Institute) in several university campuses such as UNPAD Bandung, UI Jakarta, UGM Yogyakarta, IKIP Malang, UNAIR Surabaya, IKIP Surabaya, UNHAS Makassar — all of which are notably secular campuses — until it eventually reached every province of the country.[75]

In 1987, K.H. Abdullah bin Nuh passed away and was succeeded by local activists such as Muhammad Al-Khaththath and Muhammad Ismail Yusanto. HTI has gradually increased its membership and claims to have more than 10,000 followers. Sadanand Dhume, a former Indonesia correspondent of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* and *The Asian Wall Street Journal* in Jakarta, observes that HTI has grown more rapidly than other Islamic radical groups, particularly in South Sulawesi, where neo-Salafi movements are also active.[76]

Unlike other Islamist groups and organizations that are usually fragmented and not very well run, HTI is one of the better organized Islamist groups in Indonesia, comprising mainly middle-class Muslims from relatively well-educated backgrounds. HTI is thus a typically modern organization. HTI serves middle-class Muslims with a strong longing for spiritual assistance. The organization offers a unique mixture of modernity and elements of

Salafism, even though at times it is unclear whether it represents a version of indigenous or Arabicized Islam.[77] This eclectic attitude in turn influences the stance it takes amidst the diverse Islamic movements in the country. As a result, it is not surprising that HTI tends to choose a moderate, intellectual stance as its means of *dakwah*. Most of its members are attracted to the ideas of HTI not because of coercive indoctrination, but because of the intelligibility of the narratives on Islam provided by its ideologues. HTI mostly deploys international issues affecting Islam and the Muslim world as the basis of its campaign towards the establishment of *Khilafah Islamiyah*, even though its activists are also very much concerned with domestic social and political issues.

As mentioned earlier, HTI considers itself to be a political party, even though it is not registered with the *Departemen Kehakiman dan HAM* (Ministry of Justice and Human Rights) and does not compete in general elections. HTI defines the term political party in a broader sense, as an organization that seeks to reform the existing political system and build it in the way it believes to be true. As a political party, HTI has three main characteristics:

1. This party bases itself on Islam as its ideology and rejects any man-made ideologies such as democracy and Pancasila.
2. It is a transnational organization in its scope due to the fact that HTI is a part of an international organization whose branches are spread all over the world.
3. Its activities are extra-parliamentary. That is why HTI does not want to be one of the existing political parties that compete with one another in general elections. Nevertheless, HTI does not have social and educational bodies such as NU and Muhammadiyah.[78]

HTI, according to Ismail Yusanto, offers a comprehensive solution to the problems faced by human beings. HTI establishes a Muslim community by developing two main programmes reflecting the elements of the community. The first programme is called *shakhshiyah Islamiyah* (Islamic personality), buttressed by two pillars of society empowerment, namely, politics and economy. These pillars give impetus to the rise of Islamic economics (including the Islamic interest-free banking system), Islamic politics, *Dawlah Islamiyah*, and eventually culminate in the *Khilafah Islamiyah*. In general, HTI is concerned with the attempt to develop an Islamic civilization (*thaqafah Islamiyah*) comprising Islamic thought and Islamic law. In HTI's terms, there are three interrelated, fundamental *A's* as points of departure: (1) *ara'* (viewpoint); (2) *afkar* (thought); and (3) *ahkam* (laws).[79]

It is clear that this organization shares ideas with other Islamist organizations, such as *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* (IM) in Egypt, even though Yusanto rejects this characterization.[80] In his opinion, IM differs from HTI in the approaches and strategies it adopts. IM puts prominent emphasis on the significance of individual nurture as a precondition of the Muslim community, as reflected in Dr Hasan Al-Hudaybi's statement, a leading figure of IM, that "establish *Dawlah Islamiyah* within yourself so that it can be erected on your earth".[81] In contrast, HTI believes that the establishment of Muslim individuals and communities must be accompanied by the establishment of *Dawlah Islamiyah* or *Khilafah Islamiyah*. This is so because society does not consist only of individuals but also of interactions among these individuals. The crowd of individuals cannot give rise to an integrated society — only to a collection of individuals (*jama'ah*). That is why a systemic approach, that is, *Khilafah Islamiyah*, is needed to establish a systemic community.

Like NII, HTI was a clandestine movement during the New Order regime.[82] The process of teaching and learning carried out in underground circles so as not to draw any suspicion from the government. It was not until Soeharto was ousted that HTI declared its existence openly to the public. The collapse of the New Order regime has led to a shift in its modus operandi from underground to public movement. In this sense, HTI denies that it disseminates its ideas to its members and the wider public through indoctrination. What is apparent, instead, is that *dakwah* is undertaken through a persuasive, open, and critical method. All segments of society are regarded as potential cadres of HTI.

From the perspective of social movement theory, the stages of development of HTI in Indonesia may be explained as follows. The first stage, *marhalah al-tathqif*, is parallel with the so-called "hibernation phase" (1980–99), where the movement operated clandestinely as a response to the harsh measures of the government. This is a phase during which cadres were nurtured and trained. This phase was consciously modelled after the strategy of the Prophet Muhammad in the early phrases of his efforts to convert the Meccan community to Islam. The second stage, *tafa'ul ma'a al-nas*, may also be called the "formative phase" (2000–01), where HT engaged and interacted with the public. This formative phase began with the mobilization of around 5,000 supporters to attend an international conference on the *Khilafah Islamiyah* in Jakarta on 28 May 2000. The third stage, *Marhalah Istilam al-Hukm*, or the "escalation phase" (2002–04), signifies the intense protest actions and demonstrations and collective actions such as the issuance of official statements, marches, conferences, and visits to government and press offices.[83]

In 2007, HTI held a relatively successful, first international conference on *Khilafah* at Gelora Bung Karno, the tenth largest stadium in the world, being equal to area to the Melbourne cricket ground.[84] The conference was held on 12 August 2007, corresponding to 28 Rajab 1428, which is the Hijri date of the destruction of the *Khilafah* system in Turkey on 12 Rajab 1342. Over 100,000 attendants were expected at the conference. It was attended by HT leaders from all around the world such as Shaikh Issam Ameera (HT Palestine), Shaikh Uthman Abu Khalil (HT Sudan), Professor Dr Hasan Ko Nakata (Japan), and others. Two of the HT leaders scheduled to speak at the conference, Dr Imran Waheed (HT Britain) and Shaikh Ismail Al-Wahwah (HT Australia), were deported by the government as soon as they arrived at the Soekarno-Hatta airport.[85] Other local prominent figures also attended the conference, such as Din Syamsuddin, the chairman of Muhammadiyah, Abdullah Gymnastiar, a famous cleric and the principal of Pesantren Darut Tauhid Bandung, and Amrullah Ahmad, the secretary-general of Majlis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, or Indonesia Religious Scholars Council).[86]

It should be emphasized that in disseminating its ideas, HTI relies heavily on its own publications. It has so far produced a massive amount of printed material in the form of leaflets, books, and journals, printed in part by its own publication company, called Pustaka Thariqul Izzah and located in Bogor. Dozens of books, mostly translations from Arabic, have been published by this press. Its bulletin, *al-Islam*, and its journal, *Al-Wa'ie*, help spread HTI's ideas. These printed materials are available to the public and sold in several well-known local bookstores, so that any individual outside the inner circle may have immediate access to them. The publications are made possible in part by the contributions of *Badan Wakaf al-Salam*, HTI's philanthropic body, which channels the distribution of *zakat* (alms-giving) and organizes fund-raising activities to fund the publication of its printed materials. This institution delegates HTI's outstanding preachers to public mosques, seminars, and conferences in Jakarta and its surrounding areas.[87]

The concept of *Khilafah Islamiyah* is not perceived as the end of HTI's journey, but rather as a means (*tariqah*) to realize the implementation of Islam at a practical level. In this context, HTI may be categorized as a bona fide partner of MMI, the main concern of which is *tatbiq al-Shari'ah*. The objective is to disseminate Islam as a blessing to the entire universe (*rahmatan li al-'alamin*). This objective, according to HTI, can be achieved only through systematic and planned steps by pious and committed Muslims who dedicate their life to God's cause. Nevertheless, the *Khilafah* has become one of the main concerns of HTI because the leadership of Muslims will determine the destiny of Islam in its future. Even though HTI does not agree

with the existing state system in Indonesia, a coup d'etat to overthrow the constitutional government of the country is regarded as unlawful. This view was also upheld during the presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri, despite calls from some Muslim groups to reject her simply because she was a woman. HTI is thus concerned with replacing the system, not individual persons. This stems from the belief that attempts to transform the public will be more effective with the replacement of the whole system.[88]

In contrast to other Islamist groups such as MMI, which are more easily trapped into excommunicating one another, HTI seems to be more moderate in the sense that it does not position itself as the only true representation of Islam. This organization takes differences in the interpretation of Islam for granted, an undeniable fact that should not lead to internal conflict among Muslims. HTI proponents view such differences as a matter of *ikhtilaf* (variation in religion), which is considered not as fundamental (*usuliyah*), but as derivative (*furu'iyah*). It is assumed that there can be no black-and-white views of religion. Rather, there may be shades of grey and no one can claim his understanding of Islam as the only true version of Islam. In any case, differences may be resolved by referring to the soundest argument.[89]

HTI tolerates differences in the understanding of religion insofar as they are not related to the fundamentals of religion, as in the issue of secularism in Islam promulgated by liberal Muslim activists. In HTI's view, a firm stance must be upheld with regards to the issue of secularism in religion and there are only two choices here: either right or wrong. HTI activists argue that it is inherent in the Islamic nature that politics must be integrated with religion (*din wa al-dawlah*). Notwithstanding HTI's firm stance on this issue, it does not excommunicate liberal Muslim activists as *kafir* (apostates). It considers them to be Muslims still, except that their thinking is in deviation from (true) Islam. This attitude is totally different from that of MMI, which excommunicates those who do not side with the implementation of the Islamic Shari'ah. In this regard, the official attitude of HTI is more similar to that of mainstream organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU.

HTI denounces liberal Muslim activists on the grounds that they do not support the implementation of Shari'ah. Nevertheless, the view is that HTI does not need to resort to rage or hostility, let alone physical violence, against them. HTI is of the view that deviant thinking cannot be opposed by violent acts, only by correct thinking. Only in this way, they believe, can the Muslim community at large reflect upon which viewpoint is most acceptable. Such a response is diametrically opposed to that of other Islamist groups that resist fiercely the thinking of Muslim liberals by means of terror and physical threats.[90]

PARTAI KEADILAN SEJAHTERA (PKS)

The Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, or Prosperous Justice Party), established on 20 April 2002 in Jakarta, is a newcomer to the landscape of political Islam in post-New Order Indonesia. Nevertheless, its performance on the political stage has been quite impressive as it has achieved massive gains very quickly among Muslim voters. Originally founded as the Partai Keadilan (PK, or Justice Party) on 20 July 1998, the party owes its support mainly to Muslim activists at secular university campuses all around the country. In the 1999 election, the party won 1.4 per cent of the vote and seven seats in the national House of Representatives (DPR). PK emerged from the *dakwah* movement, most notably from the Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI, or Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia) and the *Tarbiyah* movement.[91] Since PK did not meet the 2 per cent threshold that would allow it to take part in the next election, the party transformed itself into the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera. In the following general election in 2004, the party achieved a remarkable increase in its share of the vote to 7.34 per cent and won forty-five seats in the DPR, an unbelievable achievement for a new party. This means that the party had been chosen by as many as 8.3 million voters across the country during the 2004 elections.[92]

The PKS has two main missions. The first is a general mission, namely, "as a *dakwah* party [and] the upholder of justice and prosperity in the framework of the unity of *ummah* and nation". The second, rather specific, mission is to make the party "politically influential through participation and opinions, aimed at realizing Indonesia as a *madani* society".[93] The goals of the party are as follows:

1. Disseminating Islamic *dakwah* and creating its cadres as the element of change (*anasir taghyir*).
2. Developing Islamic societal institutions at all aspects as the centre of change (*markaz taghyir*) and solution.
3. Constructing an Islamic mindset and propitious circumstances for the implementation of Islamic teachings as a solution and as a blessing for entire universe (*rahmatan li al-'alamin*).
4. Building a political awareness among society, and carrying out the protection, service, and empowerment of their rights of citizenship.
5. Upholding consistently and continuously the "commanding right and forbidding wrong" (*amr al-ma'ruf wa nahy 'an al-munkar*) to the powers that be in the framework of Islamic law and ethics.
6. Being active in communicating, visiting (*silaturahim*), collaborating, and reforming (*islah*) various elements of society and the Muslim community

for the sake of establishing *ukhuwwah Islamiyah* (solidarity in Islam) and *wihdah al-ummah* (the unity of Muslim community), and other components of the nation to bolster togetherness in realizing the agenda of reformation.

7. Taking part in providing a positive contribution to upholding justice and rejecting despotism, particularly towards oppressed Muslim countries.[94]

The remarkable achievement of PKS in the 2004 elections is inseparable from its strategy in downplaying Islamic issues and instead articulating more popular and, importantly, more secular themes during the campaign. The theme *Bersih dan Peduli* (clean and caring)[95] was turned into the more eye-catching slogan "Clean National Leadership from Corruption and Care for People". This theme is related to PKS' so-called triple goal of economic development, namely an "Independent, Just, and Prosperous Economy" (abbreviated to *Prinsip EMAS = Ekonomi Mandiri, Adil dan Sejahtera*). Unlike other political parties, which tend to deploy bombastic slogans with no concrete actions, PKS tries to be consistent with its own mission as a *dakwah* party. It seems that PKS cadres and activists want to show society in general that their party has nothing to do with the implementation of Islamic Shari'ah, something they consider less important than dealing with the multidimensional crisis afflicting the country. On many occasions, they have seemed to avoid controversial issues such as the implementation of Shari'ah, which is not considered a marketable issue to the public.

Any analysis PKS must be directly linked to the analysis of its previous incarnation, the PK. According to the documents released by PK, there had been seven main characteristics of the party: (1) moralist, in that the party strove for the restoration of Indonesia by referring to the moral values of Islam; (2) professional, in that its cadres were well prepared to master modern science and technology before immersing themselves in the restoration of Indonesia; (3) patriotic, which was how PK's cadres defined the spirit of struggle for the sake of the betterment of the human condition and gaining God's mercy; (4) moderate, which the party defined as choosing an in-between position, even though this attitude was objected to by some other partys' more puritan activists; (5) democratic, defined as the capacity of human beings to determine their own destiny, which is believed to be deeply rooted in the Islamic tradition of *Shura*; (6) reformist, by which the party referred to any attitude towards the betterment and restoration of society, and not the opposite; and (7) independent, defined by the party as freedom from any form of oppression and colonialism.[96]

The manifesto (*Anggaran Dasar*, or AD) and programme of PK differ from those of PKS. While PK's manifesto and programme do not mention Pancasila at all, the PKS' manifesto does mention it explicitly, not as the foundation (which is Islam) of the party, but under the article of purpose: "Partai Keadilan Sejahtera adalah Partai Dakwah yang bertujuan mewujudkan masyarakat yang adil dan sejahtera yang diridlai Allah Subhanahu Wata'ala, dalam Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia yang berdasarkan Pancasila" (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera is a *dakwah* party that aims to realize a just and prosperous society under God's mercy, within the framework of the Unitary State of Indonesia with Pancasila as its foundation).[97] This statement seems to indicate that the party wishes to compromise on the two words that have stood in diametric opposition to each other throughout Indonesia's history: Islam and Pancasila.

As soon as PK was established, the party launched a number of public-oriented programmes dealing with (1) the economy; (2) politics; (3) law; (4) education; (5) science and technology; (6) local governance; (7) society; and (8) woman's issues.[98] Basically, there was no fundamental difference between these programmes and those offered by other political parties. However, as its activists claimed, the programmes were given an Islamist flavour. In the field of the economy, for instance, developing a non-interest economic system was considered as the solution for the economic crisis. In the field of politics, moral values were given more prominence at a practical level by promoting good, clean governance and public accountability based on Islamic precepts. It seems that this strong Islamist flavour was considered by PKS as imperative for lifting Indonesia out of the multidimensional crisis.

Soon after the party changed into PKS, the various programmes were broken down into nine priorities as a solution to the problems afflicting the country. Later on these programmes became known as the Nine "K"s:

1. *Korupsi dan Penyalahgunaan Kewenangan* (corruption and the abuse of power);
2. *Kemiskinan dan Pengangguran* (poverty and unemployment);
3. *Kebodohan* (illiteracy or ignorance as a result of the low quality of education and science and technology);
4. *Kriminalitas dan Kerawanan Sosial* (crime and social insecurity);
5. *Konflik dan Kekerasan* (conflict and violence);
6. *Keretakan Nasional dan Ancaman Disintegrasi Bangsa* (national break-up and the threat of national disintegration);
7. *Ketergantungan pada dominasi asing* (dependence on foreign domination);

8. *Kelemahan Kepemimpinan* (leadership weaknesses);
9. *Kerusakan etika dan budaya* (ethics and culture damages).[99]

Despite its status as a newcomer, the existence of PKS cannot be dissociated from previously established Muslim activists and organizations. However, PKS activists are not linked to any group previously involved in formal politics. Unlike other existing Islamic political parties such as PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, or Crescent and Star Party), Partai Masyumi Baru, PPII (Partai Politik Islam Indonesia, or Islamic Political Party of Indonesia) — all of which claim to be, to various degrees, reincarnations of Masyumi — or indeed Masyumi itself, PK inhabits its own world as a result of twenty years of non-political activities.[100] It represents a new genre in Islamist politics, comprising politically inexperienced actors and young Muslim activists. Nevertheless, the genealogy of PKS may be traced back to several non-political Muslim organizations such as DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, or Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia) and KISDI (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam, or The Indonesian Committee for World Muslim Solidarity), or even Masyumi. These organizations directly or indirectly inspired the establishment of PK. Some assume that the establishment of PK marked a formal split with DDII and KISDI.[101]

CONCLUSION

To sum up, Islamism in an Indonesian context cannot easily be defined due to its complexity and multifaceted character amid the dynamic social and political fabric of Indonesian society. This means that Islamism cannot be placed in any watertight category — rather, it is a fluid and porous category where radical ideas might be easily transmitted and widely shared by particular segments of Indonesian Muslims. As explained earlier, being an Islamist is therefore not necessarily to be bound by organizational links, but to be influenced ideas as well. This fluidity allows for an easy transmutation of identity even within individual Muslims, going from "moderate" to "Islamist" or vice versa — whatever the situation favours.

In addition, the emergence of Islamism in post-New Order Indonesia cannot be dissociated from those Islamist movements that had existed before — the Islamism of today is a continuation and expansion of the preceding one. Thus, the idea of an Islamic state or the implementation of the Islamic Shari'ah recalls the notion propounded by the DI movement in the 1950s. This does not mean that the manifestation of contemporary Islamism merely replicates its antecedents. To contemporary Islamists, history is and

always will be the mirror in which they can read both the successes and the failures of their counterparts in the past. Only by means of historic criticism can Islamism avoid the weaknesses of the past and improve its quality and performance in the future.

Despite the fact that Islamism cannot easily be identified or categorized, it is obvious that two types of Islamism have come to the fore reflecting different approaches to the ideology of Islamism and how it should be implemented at a practical level. The first type of Islamism is engaged in a structural struggle through political party system. Islamic parties represent one form of the struggle to make the country more "Islamic" and to overcome the enduring crisis and corruption by infusing the public sphere with the moral values of Islam. The Islamist attempts to restore society through the electoral system may invite various interpretations, but I tend to argue that it shows not just the Islamists' willingness to contest their religion-based political visions in public, but also their readiness to be involved in dialogues that concern public matters. As a result, they are presumably ready to negotiate and compromise with the rest of the society with regard to public issues, despite their unwillingness to change their fundamental beliefs. Now that they have decided to participate in the electoral system, they do not have any choice but to be faithful to all its principles and rules, which are the hallmarks of democracy.

In contrast to the first type of Islamism, the second type has opted for struggle outside the electoral system. The Islamists of this camp use social and cultural activism off the formal political stage to spread their ideology in establishing Islamist organizations such as MMI and HTI. Their choice does not merely reflect their different interpretation of religious precepts, but also reflects their strategic awareness where cost-and-benefit decisions have been rationally calculated. They have chosen this path because they are convinced that the electoral system will not only ruin their religious standpoint — they believe that their participation in the existing, corrupt political system is *haram* (forbidden) — but that it will also not give them more space for self-expression. For them, to participate in the current political system is to justify its corruption and moral decay.

Despite differences of articulation, however, these two manifestations of Islamism have a common denominator — their emphasis on the importance of Islam in the public sphere. While they agree with one another on the idea of making society and the state more "Islamic", they differ with one another as to how the Islamization process should be carried out at a practical level. Although antagonism between the two can sometimes be seen on the surface, their differences are usually understood as negligible in the face of

their common struggle towards the same objective: the implementation of Islamic Shari'ah law at all levels.

Notes

1 See, for instance, Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

2 For a more detailed account of the introduction of Islam to the archipelago, especially Java, see, among others, M.C. Ricklefs, "Six Centuries of Islamization in Java", in *Conversion to Islam*, edited by Nehemia Levtzion (New York: Holmes and Meir, 1979), pp. 100–28. cf. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200*, 3rd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), especially pp. 3–17; cf. C.C. Berg, "The Islamization of Java", *Studia Islamica* 4 (1955): 111–42; cf. G.W.J. Drewes, "New Light on the Coming of Islam to Indonesia?" *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 122 (1966): 433–59.

3 See, among others, Julia Day Howell, "Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival", *The Journal of Asian Studies* 60, no. 3 (August 2001): 701–29.

4 The support for an Islamic state has generally declined significantly since 1955, as can be seen in the waning support in general elections for Islamic parties aspiring to the establishment of an Islamic state. As an illustration, the support for all Islamic parties (Masyumi, NU, PSII, and PERTI) during the 1955 general election reached 43.5 per cent of the total vote. This number declined significantly in the general elections during the New Order regime. In the 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992 general elections, for instance, the accumulation of the support for all Islamic parties — from 1977 onwards merged as one party, the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) — reached 27 per cent, 29.3 per cent, 27.2 per cent, 16.0 per cent, and 17.1 per cent respectively. For further information on the 1955 general election, see, among others, Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955* (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asian Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1957), especially pp. 58–59. For information on general elections during the New Order regime, see R. William Liddle, *Pemilu-pemilu Orde Baru: Pasang Surut Kekuasaan Politik* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1992); Hans Antlöv and Sven Cederroth, eds., *Elections in Indonesia: The New Order and Beyond* (London: Routledge, 2004).

5 See, among others, Zachary Abuza, "Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network", *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24, no. 3 (December 2002): 427–65.

6 Erich Kolig, "Radical Islam, Islamic Fervour, and Political Sentiments in Central Java, Indonesia", *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 4, no. 1 (2005): 57.

7 Masdar Hilmy, "Looking into God's Heaven: Theological Constructs of Islamic Radicalism in Post-New Order Indonesia", *Asian Cultural Studies* 15 (2006): 11–23.

[8] Greg Fealy, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?" in *Southeast Asian Affairs 2004*, edited by Daljit Singh and Chin Kin Wah (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), pp. 104–21.

[9] Ibid., p. 105.

[10] Of thirty-five Islamic or Muslim-supported political parties registered with the KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, or Commission of General Election) prior to the 1999 election, only twenty eventually participated in the election. There were five criteria for determining whether a certain political party could be classified as an Islamic party: (1) name; (2) foundation; (3) objectives/programmes; and (4) constituents. For further information on this, see, for instance, Arskal Salim, *Partai Islam dan Relasi Agama-Negara* (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian IAIN Jakarta, 1999).

[11] For a more authoritative account of the Laskar Jihad, see Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2006). See also Michael Davis, "Laskar Jihad and the Political Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia", *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24, no. 1 (April 2002): 12–32.

[12] Hilmy, "Looking into God's Heaven", pp. 11–23.

[13] International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Briefing, *Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix*, Asia Report no. 83, 13 September 2004, p. 32.

[14] I am referring to the classic conceptual framework by Daniel Sommer Robinson as outlined in his article, "A Critique of Meliorism", *International Journal of Ethics* 34, no. 2 (January 1924): 175–94.

[15] Azyumardi Azra, "Contemporary Islamic Militant Movements in Indonesia", *Asian Cultural Studies* 15 (2006): 1–10.

[16] Ibid., p. 3.

[17] R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985), p. 25.

[18] Ismail Yusanto, "Selamatkan Indonesia dengan Syari'at", in *Syariat Islam: Pandangan Muslim Liberal*, edited by Burhanuddin (Jakarta: Jaringan Islam Liberal in collaboration with The Asia Foundation, 2003), pp. 139–71.

[19] Interview with Ismail Yusanto (HTI), Jakarta, 11 May 2005.

[20] Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), *Pedoman Umum & Pelaksanaan Majelis Mujahidin untuk Penegakan Syari'at Islam* (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2004), p. 32.

[21] Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), *Menyelamatkan Bangsa: Platform Kebijakan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Jakarta: Al-I'tishom Cahaya Ummat, 2004), pp. 3–4.

[22] "Konspirasi Kafir Barat Menyerang Ummat Islam", *Buletin al-Islam* 23, 13 September 2000 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alislam&id=23> (accessed 2 February 2007).

[23] Ibid.

[24] "Harga Mahal Demokratisasi", *Buletin al-Islam* 43, 21 February 2001 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alislam&id=43> (accessed 2 February 2007).

[25] M.C. Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions c. 1830–1930* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2007), particularly the concluding part.

[26] See Hasan, *Laskar Jihad*, especially Part 7.

[27] An authoritative account of the DI movement can be found in, among others, C. van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981); cf. Hiroko Horikoshi, "The Dar-ul-Islam Movement of West Java (1942–62): An Experience in the Historical Process", *Indonesia* 20 (1975): 59–86; Holk H. Dengel, *Darul Islam dan Kartosuwirjo: "Angan-angan yang Gagal"* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995). See also Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia S.M. Kartosoewirjo: Fakta dan Data Sejarah Darul Islam* (Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1999).

[28] Karel D. Jackson, *Kewibawaan Tradisional, Islam, dan Pemberontakan: Kasus Darul Islam Jawa Barat* (Jakarta: Grafiti, 1990), p. 22.

[29] Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia", *South East Asia Research* 10, no. 2 (2002): 128.

[30] ICG Asia Briefing, "Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia", Jakarta/Brussels, 8 August 2002, p. 8.

[31] June Chandra Santosa, "Modernization, Utopia, and the Rise of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia" (Ph.D. thesis, Boston University, 1996), pp. 335–36. See also van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia", p. 129.

[32] Santosa, "Modernization, Utopia, and the Rise of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia", Appendix 3.

[33] Van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia", pp. 131–34.

[34] Santosa, "Modernization, Utopia, and the Rise of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia", p. 389.

[35] Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), pp. 69–70.

[36] Hefner, *Civil Islam*, especially pp. 128–43.

[37] Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), p. 176.

[38] Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), *Mengenal Majlis Mujahidin* (Yogyakarta: Markaz Pusat Majelis Mujahidin, 1999), p. 16.

[39] Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, eds., *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 2004), p. 48.

[40] Endang Turmudi and Riza Sihbudi, eds., *Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia* (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2005), p. 248.

41 Fauzan Al-Anshari, *Saya Teroris? (Sebuah Pledoi)* (Jakarta: Penerbit Republika, 2002), pp. 65–67. See also S. Yunanto et al., *Gerakan Militan Islam di Indonesia dan di Asia Tenggara* (Jakarta: Friedrich-Elbert-Stiftung in collaboration with The Ridep Institute, 2003), pp. 37–38.

42 Al-Anshari, *Saya Teroris? (Sebuah Pledoi)*, p. 68.

43 Ibid., pp. 68–74.

44 As for the organizational structure of the MMI, see Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, *Mengenal Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia: Untuk Penegakan Syari'ah Islam* (Yogyakarta: Markaz Pusat Majelis Mujahidin, 2001).

45 MMI, *Pedoman Umum & Pelaksanaan Majelis Mujahidin untuk Penegakan Syari'at Islam*, p. 34.

46 Al-Anshari, *Saya Teroris? (Sebuah Pledoi)*, p. 57.

47 As of February 2003, there had been nineteen letters sent by either MMI or Abu Bakar Ba'ashir himself to individuals such as Saddam Hussein, then president of Iraq, George W. Bush, the president of the United States — inviting him to embrace Islam — the Indonesian president and vice-president, police institutions, as well as the DPR and MPR. See Irfan S. Awwas, *Dakwah & Jihad Abu Bakar Ba'asyir* (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2003), pp. 303–60.

48 Ibid., p. 11.

49 Van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia", p. 144.

50 ICG Asia Briefing, "Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia", p. 7.

51 Ibid., p. 3.

52 All speeches and proceedings have been compiled in Irfan S. Awwas, *Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syari'ah Islam* (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001). Ba'asyir's speech was entitled, "Sistem Kaderisasi Mujahidin dalam Mewujudkan Masyarakat Islam", pp. 79–90.

53 Ba'asyir, "Sistem Kaderisasi Mujahidin dalam Mewujudkan Masyarakat Islam", especially pp. 86–90.

54 Ibid.

55 Van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia", p. 147.

56 Jamhari and Jahroni, eds., *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia*, p. 60. cf. ICG Asia Briefing, "Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia", pp. 1–2.

57 Awwas, *Dakwah & Jihad Abu Bakar Ba'asyir*, pp. 46–47.

58 Jamhari and Jahroni, eds., *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia*, p. 61.

59 "Materi Pelajaran Aqidah IB" (Surakarta: Pondok Pesantren Islam al-Mukmin, n.d., 17), as cited in Jamhari and Jahroni, eds., *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia*, p. 61.

60 Ba'asyir, "Sistem Kaderisasi Mujahidin dalam Mewujudkan Masyarakat Islam", pp. 88–89. This short article has been translated by Tim Behrend of New

Zealand University as "A System for the Caderisation of Mujahidin in Creating an Islamic Society", unpublished.

61 Jamhari and Jahroni, eds., *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia*, p. 63.

62 Ibid., p. 64.

63 "Materi Pelajaran Aqidah IB", p. 34.

64 See, among others, Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), especially pp. 141–42; cf. Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (London: Hurst and Company, 2002), pp. 198–203; A.L. Smith, "The Politics of Negotiating the Terrorist Problem in Indonesia", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28, no. 1 (January–February 2005): 41. Barry Desker, "Islam in Southeast Asia: The Challenge of Radical Interpretations", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 16, no. 3 (October 2003): 7–11.

65 Nasir Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI* (Jakarta: Grafindo, 2005), especially pp. 81–137.

66 Ibid., p. 91.

67 Harold Crouch, "Qaida in Indonesia? The Evidence Doesn't Support Worries", *International Herald Tribune*, 23 October 2001; cf. ICG, "The Ngruki Network".

68 See <http://www.hizbuttahrir.org.uk>.

69 Ibid.

70 For more detailed information on the doctrine of *Khilafah Islamiyah*, see, among others, Suha Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate* (London: Grey Seal, 1996). See also Hizbut Tahrir, *The Methodology of Hizbut-Tahrir for Change* (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, n.d.).

71 "Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Dakwah Masjid yang Menggurita", *Sabili* 9 (2003): 143; cf. Taqi al-Nabhani, *Pembentukan Partai Politik Islam* (Bogor: Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 2002), p. 34.

72 Turmudi and Riza Sihbudi, eds., *Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia*, p. 277.

73 See Agus Salim, "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982–2004): Its Political Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilization, and Collective Action Frames" (M.A. thesis, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2005), p. 5.

74 "Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Dakwah Masjid yang Menggurita", pp. 142–43.

75 Elizabeth Fuller Collins, "Islam is the Solution: Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia", paper presented at Ohio University, 20 June 2004 <http://www.classics.ohiou.edu/faculty/collins/islamsolution.pdf>.

76 Sadanand Dhume, "Hizbut Tahrir Using War in Iraq to Seek Converts", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 3 April 2003, as cited in Collins, "Islam is the Solution: Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia", p. 14.

77 What struck me was that Ismail Yusanto, the spokesman of HTI, is fashionably modern and intellectually articulate. When I asked him for an interview, he proposed a high-class hotel restaurant in Kuningan, a bustling business district in South Jakarta. This amazed me because in this restaurant all kinds of people

can be found, from local, high-class businessmen to expatriate foreigners whose taste in food is very different from that of a Muslim activist such as Yusanto.

78 Turmudi and Sihbudi, *Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia*, p. 273.

79 Interview with Ismail Yusanto, Jakarta, 11 May 2005.

80 Ibid.

81 Jamhari and Jahroni, eds., *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia*, p. 175.

82 Ibid., pp. 172–73. See also Salim, "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia", pp. 37–39.

83 Ibid., pp. 39–57.

84 See <http://www.khilafah.com/kcom/activism/asia/international-khilafah-conference-2007.html> (accessed 9 January 2008). See also <http://www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/global-photos/in-pictures-hti-international-khilafah-conference.html> (accessed 9 January 2008).

85 "Hizbut Tahrir Siap Gandeng Parpol", *Sindo*, 13 August 2007.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid., pp. 142–43.

88 Turmudi and Sihbudi, *Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia*, pp. 277–78.

89 Ibid., pp. 278–79. Interview with Ismail Yusanto, Jakarta, 11 May 2005.

90 Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, a liberal Muslim activist, was given a death sentence by MUI Bandung for his controversial column in a national newspaper. He was also threatened by a clandestine JI activist with murder but released after the activist found that a death penalty must be executed by an authoritative body.

91 On the transformation of Muslim student movements at secular campuses into PK/PKS, see, among others, Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia*; cf. Yon Machmudi, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Wajah Baru Islam Politik Indonesia* (Bandung: Harakatuna Publishing, 2005).

92 See "Jajak Pendapat 'Kompas': PKS, Menuai Buah Konsistensi", *Kompas*, 25 June 2005.

93 See <http://www.pk-sejahtera.org>. The term *madani* is commonly translated as "civil society", but this term is also used to evoke an image of the ideal state led by the Prophet Muhammad in Madinah.

94 See <http://www.pk-sejahtera.org>.

95 Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (Central Leadership Board/DPP) PKS, *Menyelamatkan Bangsa: Platform Kebijakan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Jakarta: Al-I'tisom Cahaya Ummat, 2004), p. ix.

96 DPP Partai Keadilan, *Sekilas Partai Keadilan* (Jakarta: DPP Partai Keadilan, 1998), pp. 27–39. These characteristics have been explained by Damanik. See Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, pp. 239–56.

97 See <http://www.pk-sejahtera.org>.

98 Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, pp. 258–60.

99 DPP PKS, *Menyelamatkan Bangsa*, pp. 17–32.

100 Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, p. 221.

[101] Ibid., p. 339; cf. Elizabeth Fuller Collins, "Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS): Justice and Welfare Party or Prosperous Justice Party", unpublished paper, footnote 1 <http://www.ohiou.edu/pols/faculty/malley/collins3.html>. The information about the influence of preceding organizations and Islamic political parties on PKS will be discussed in Chapter 6.

5

THEOLOGY OF RESISTANCE
On the Utopian Islamist Rejection of Democracy

THE ISLAMISTS' CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY

The Islamists' conception and understanding of democracy cannot be separated from the tightly knit, dialectical relationship between what they presume to be "pure Islam" and its supposedly external elements. Historical experience and the imagination of the past play a crucial part in the ceaseless forging of an Islamic identity.[1] The sanctification of the pious deeds of their predecessors is recalled with a great deal of intensity in Islamists' memories. Islamists would undoubtedly regard their pious predecessors (*salaf al-salih*) as normative models for their own beliefs and actions in the future.[2] Nevertheless, this condition leads to the intermingling of normative texts with normative historical deeds, each of which occupies the Islamists' minds as supreme references in generating discourses on democracy. In other words, Islamists are preoccupied with the idea of an imagined identity derived from the imagined combination of sacred texts and their historical past. This in turn feeds into the process of their identification of "self" and "other". In this context, it is not surprising that democracy tends to be defined by utopian Islamists within this Manichaean conceptual framework. As a result, democracy will never mean merely the "self" without also implicitly mirroring the "other". This bipolar frame of thinking is adopted by Islamist groups in order that the purity of the "self" might be preserved from the ceaselessly corrupt, wicked, and evil "other".[3]

Thus, it is understandable that the Islamists feel themselves enmeshed in a never-ending battle to defend what they claim as the authentic self and to repudiate what they refer to as the inauthentic other.[4] They are at times caught up in overwhelmingly xenophobic attitudes towards anything outwardly new. As a result, Islamists are tremendously selective, if not overly protective, in their cultural, political, and social encounters with anything perceived as "strange" or "alien". This is because they are afraid that their sanctified identity will be torn apart.[5] This is why Islamists are always quick to say "no" to democracy, particularly as this word is derived from the "un-Islamic" West and is not explicitly spelled out in their sacred texts. Nevertheless, this negative response is usually followed by a fairly prudential consideration of democracy. However, Islamists argue that the precise meaning of democracy cannot be grasped unless one refers to the Western tradition as its origin.[6] According to the Islamists' point of view, this is important so that no one will confuse democracy with the concept of *shura* (consultation, deliberation) in the Islamic tradition. Although they admit that to some extent democracy entails *mushawarah* (an Arabic derivation of *shura*), it would be fatally erroneous to assume that both Islam and democracy are analogous or identical in meaning. Islamists recognize *shura* as an institution of politics whose meaning is never as exact as that of democracy, because the first embodies the sanctity of God as the Supreme Lawmaker whereas the latter leaves it up to human beings to produce laws.[7]

Unlike liberal Muslims who tend to identify *shura* as the seed of democracy, the utopian Islamists argue that this word simply means to consult or ask for an opinion (*talab al-ra'y*), which is essentially different from democracy.[8] According to Zallum, one of the founding fathers of the Hizbut Tahrir movement and an ideological mentor of HTI, democracy, is a secular world-view consisting of sets of regulations that apply to the whole constitution, laws, and governmental system.[9] He argues that it is absolutely unlawful for Muslims to accept, advocate, or implement it. Given the simplicity of its meaning, *shura* is part of the Islamic Shari'ah in which God and His Prophet are the only legitimate Lawmakers for all human beings. The doctrine of *shura* is taken from a verse of the Qur'an (Q.S. 3:159) which says "and consult them in the matter" (*wa shawirhum fi al-'amr*). Despite this clear position, Zallum regards *shura* as commendable (*sunnah*) and not compulsory (*wajib*), since the word *amr* in this verse is designated to worldly matters. This accordingly means that *shura* does not apply to religious matters as explicitly stated by the Shari'ah, which is based on the Qur'an and Hadith. In order to support his argument, he refers to the policy-making processes carried out by the Prophet Muhammad. In fact,

most policies were issued by the Prophet without asking the opinions of his companions in advance. These policies concerned bureaucratic matters like choosing governors (*wali*), judges (*qadi*), secretaries (*kuttab*), and military generals, or other posts.[10] Based on this reference, Zallum states boldly that the institutionalization of *shura* in the Prophet's era did not mean that the lawmaking process should be based on the majority decision as practiced in democracies.[11]

Following Zallum's argument against democracy, HTI asserts that democracy differs from *shura* in terms of sovereignty: while the former acknowledges the people as the absolute holder of sovereignty, the latter insists that sovereignty belongs to Allah and the Prophet alone, even though power still lies in the hands of the people.[12] Unlike democracy, *shura* does not entail the idea of *vox populi* or the voice of the majority; rather, it manifests itself in three interrelated steps of cautious consideration. First, in the process of legislation (*al-tashri'*), the decision cannot be established on the basis of majority opinion; rather, it should be based upon legal texts (the Qur'an and Sunnah), since the only legitimate Lawmaker (*musharri'*) is Allah, and not the people who are created by Him. In this way, a caliph serves merely as an interpreter and adapter of particular, given laws and he does not need to consult the board of *ummah*[13] to arrive at a final conclusion on religious matters. The function of a caliph, as HTI suggests, is similar to the role played by the Prophet in decision-making processes where the final decision is not always based on the majority view. In negotiating the Hudaybiyah treaty, for instance, the Prophet did not take into account the opinions of his companions and other Muslims who disagreed with the treaty the Prophet had made, despite the fact that they comprised the majority at that time.[14]

Second, in matters that require expertise, professionalism, and in-depth scrutiny, the decision must be decided on the basis of expert knowledge, not by voting. As a consequence, any matters that require expertise should be left to real experts. For instance, military affairs should be managed by military officials, medical problems can only be dealt with by doctors, and issues pertaining to Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) must be solved by *fuqaha'* (experts in Islamic jurisprudence). HTI contends that such a model of decision-making was carried out by the Prophet in the war of Badr. Following the suggestion of Hubab bin al-Mundzir, who was an expert in the strategy of war at that time, the Prophet dropped his own preferred strategy and followed the one suggested by Hubab. Hubab argued that the Prophet's strategy was not a good one, and since it was not based on divine revelation, he proposed that the Prophet change it.

Third, on practical matters that do not require expertise and in-depth scrutiny, HTI asserts that the principle of majority rule prevails insofar as the issues involved may be discerned by common sense and thus deliberated by the majority. For example, the majority of people can participate in deciding whether A or B deserves to be elected as caliph. Likewise, it is a matter of common sense as to which transport system should be used: airplane, ship, or bus. Put simply, the Prophet initiated this model and HTI reproduces it. In the case of the Uhud war, for example, the issue was raised as to whether Muslims should remain in Madinah or go outside the city to defend it from an attack of the Quraysh tribe. The Prophet and certain senior companions preferred to stay in Madinah, while the majority of the younger companions opted to go to the outskirts of the city. The Prophet then decided to follow the opinion of the majority and waived his companions' considerations. On the basis of this example, HTI is convinced that *shura* entails consultation with people for advisory matters (*mubahat*) only, but not for crucial ones (*daruriyat*).[15]

For Islamists, self-definition is important so that their immediate repudiation of democracy might carry greater weight with a wider audience. Nevertheless, careful analysis would reveal that the meaning of democracy is polymorphous and ambiguous to them. This phenomenon is of course not exclusive to the Islamists. Even in the West, democracy is an essentially contested concept.[16] In addition, Indonesian Islamists understand democracy mainly from their counterparts in the Middle East. It is not surprising that the Islamists frequently confuse democracy with secularism, capitalism, and the principle of majoritarianism. Nonetheless, there are some key terms from which the Islamists draw their assumptions and, perceptions about democracy. The first key phrase is the idea of sovereignty of the people. To them, the concept of sovereignty of the people contradicts their belief that sovereignty belongs to God alone.

It seems evident to me that one of the ways Islamists repudiate democracy is by producing binary oppositions such as "quantity versus quality", "good versus evil", "virtuous versus wicked", "pious versus impious", "the sacred versus the profane", "the world and the world to come", "the guided versus the stray", and so on.[17] Valuing quality more than quantity has been one of the major arguments used by Islamists against the majority principle of democracy. The majority voice does not necessarily signify the truth, nor does the minority voice signify the absence of truth. The majority principle cannot therefore be used as a yardstick to define the truth. Indeed, Islamists believe that the truth very often lies with the minority.[18] One of the rhetorical questions often posed by Islamists is whether the truth relied upon by nine

wicked people is the same as the truth relied upon by one pious person. Nine wicked prostitutes, for instance, will fight against pious *ulama* (religious scholars) who defend God's law on the prohibition of prostitution in Islam.[19] In this regard, Islamists argue for the totalitarian nature of religion, where truth is depicted as the preserve of a pure minority. In this context, the minority represents the purity of heavenly guidance. On the contrary, the majority is denounced as morally wicked. This is because Islam excels over all man-made creations, including democracy.[20]

Islamists base their position on certain texts of the Qur'an. Despite the fact that the Qur'an does not explicitly mention democracy, certain verses depict the majority as "ignorant", "perplexed", "bewildered", and the like. The following are the verses of the Qur'an employed by Islamists to support their argument: (1) "Wert thou to follow the common run of those on earth, they will lead thee away from the Way of God. They follow nothing but conjecture: they do nothing but lie" (Q.S. 6:116); (2) "Yet no faith will the greater part of mankind have, however ardently thou dost desire it" (Q.S. 12:103); (3) "That is the right religion, but most men understand not" (Q.S. 12:40); (4) "And most of them believe not in God without associating [other as partners] with Him!" (Q.S. 12:106); (5) "For God is full of bounty, but most of them are ungrateful" (Q.S. 2:243); (6) "And We have explained to men, in this Qur'an, every kind of similitude: yet the greater part of men refuse [to receive it] except with ingratitude!" (Q.S. 17:89); (7) "Verily We have brought the Truth to you: but most of you have a hatred for Truth" (Q.S. 43:78); (8) "Say, Praise be to God! But most of them understand not" (Q.S. 29:63) and so on.[21] In addition, the principle of equality in democracy contradicts the very tenet of Islam: '*ulama* and prostitutes are not equal in status. This difference is important for refuting the idea that Islam is in itself democratic or contains democratic elements.[22]

HTI perceives democracy as something different from an Islamic type of governance, that is, *Khilafah Islamiyah*. What HTI perceives as democracy is the governance of a secular-capitalist system. According to Al-Khaththath, one of HTI's leaders, democracy means:

> the same thing as disposing of the absolute authority of Allah and His Messenger as *Musharri'* (Lawmaker), and replacing it with people as the sovereign. This is in line with the principle of secularism or the separation of religion from public life; the separation of religion from politics; the separation of religion from worldly matters as having been campaigned and implemented by the unbelieving Western civilization. It is not surprising that the West always backs the jargons of democracy and encourages democratic general elections.[23]

He argues further that capitalism and Islam are built upon different, if not diametrically opposed, philosophical foundations. While the first system relies heavily on human sovereignty, the latter rests on the idea that sovereignty belongs to God alone.[24]

The antagonistic attitude of the Islamists towards democracy is partly driven by the ideology of hatred directed towards the United States and its allies, who themselves claim to be paragons of democracy. In this case, there is some oversimplification among Islamists where democracy is depicted as anything Western in which liberalism, secularism, capitalism, individualism, and multiculturalism encroach on public life.[25] Some Islamists even consider democracy as a conspiracy of Christians and Jews represented by the United States and its allies, whose intention is to destroy Islam and Muslim communities all around the world.[26] Because democracy is a part of the unbelievers' system of life, the Islamists denounce it on the basis of their prejudice that anything "un-Islamic" is the enemy of God and therefore must be resisted.

Democracy, according to Awwas, is one of the most ancient systems of governance, developed by the Greeks.[27] Compared to the Islamic system of government, democracy is outdated in the sense that Islam was revealed to humankind much later on for the restoration of the governmental system practised by the society of that time. Athenian democracy, the basis of which is majority rule, was one of the targets of criticism that Islam was meant to address:

> What does democracy actually mean? In its place of origin, i.e., in ancient Greece, democracy denoted the political system of dealing with public matters where the government was run by selected elites of society. Its members were chosen selectively from upper-class society or aristocracy. Thus, not everybody could become a member of the representative body. As time went by, this concept has progressed to cover not only aristocrats but also all members of society. The concept of democracy has culminated in meaning that the vote of a noble man equals the vote of one common man. In today's era, the vote of one venerated *ulama*' equals the vote of one prostitute. On behalf of democracy, all men are equal; even though it is not the case.[28]

Democracy of this sort, as developed and practised in the West, does not recognize the difference between the pious and impious, the virtuous and the bad, the good and the evil. This type of government, in Awwas' view, is different from the Islamic government system. He argues that the Islamic government system includes public deliberation (*mushawarah*) as

does democracy. However, they are not comparable to each other. While public deliberation in democracy aims to produce laws on the basis of consensus, public deliberation in Islam deals only with matters that are not explicitly mentioned in the Qur'an and Sunnah or Hadith. While public deliberation in democracy is value-free, public deliberation in Islam is value-laden. In Islam, public deliberation is not carried out to legalize things that are forbidden (*haram*) or prohibit things that are legal (*halal*) according to Shari'ah. Therefore, an Islamic government system would never produce laws in support of prostitution, gambling, liquor, and the like.

ISLAMIST EXCEPTIONALISM

The core foundation of the utopian approach to democracy involves the exceptionalist argument that Islam is not only essentially different from other cultures and religions, but superior to them. It is no wonder that this approach takes the rejection of democracy for granted, particularly on theological grounds; democracy, after all, is the unbelievers' system of governance, a revolt against God, and *bid'a* (human innovation), which is *haram* for Muslims to adopt.[29] Central to this notion is the return to the purity of Islam as represented by its pristine sources of the Qur'an and Sunnah, and by the practice or method (*manhaj*) of pious predecessors (*salaf al-salih*).[30] Islam is considered as the supreme religion over other religions and Muslims are the chosen community whose duty is to command that is good and to prohibit that is abominable (Q.S. 3:110).[31]

At the doctrinal level, the Islamists' exceptionalist approach is thus inextricably associated with the notion that Islam is the most superior religion and it cannot be rivalled by other religions (*al-Islam ya'lu wa la yu'la 'alayh*). That Islam is the most supreme religion is said to have been stated in the Qur'an: "God sent down His peace upon him, and strengthened him with forces which ye saw not, and humbled to the depths the word of Unbelievers. But the word of God is exalted to the heights: for God is exalted in might, Wise". (Q.S. 9:40). Accordingly, the notion that Islam is the only true religion revealed by God to His last Messenger Muhammad as the successor to all previous religions is accepted without reserve by the Islamists. Islam is not only different from, but also a correction to, other entities outside Islam.[32] Islamists also believe in the principle of *shumul* (all-encompassing principle) that Islam is *salih likulli zaman wa makan* (Islam is the all-encompassing truth to all ages and places). The obligation to uphold the supremacy of Islam rests upon every Islamist.

From a sociological perspective, there is self-glorification on the one hand and demonization of others on the other. This attitude may be derived from the excessive and schizophrenic inferiority complex engulfing Islamists, in such a way that they feel it necessary to glorify themselves before others. This attitude results in defensiveness towards anything outside, a sort of xenophobic religiosity that tends to safeguard its own belief system and treat others with caution. It is likely that this type of religiosity would regard other communities as astray and bewildered and treat them as a target of proselytization (*dakwah*).[33] Islamistis feel that they have a moral responsibility to save these other communities. They view their version of Islam as the only legitimate reference for their proselytization activities. This belief is taken from a verse of the Qur'an: "The religion before God is Islam [submission to His Will]" (Q.S. 3:19). As mentioned earlier, Islamists also claim that Muslims are the best community, sent by God to command good and forbid evil (*amr al-ma'ruf wa nahy 'an al-munkar*).[34] Commanding good and forbidding wrong is a holy and obligatory duty for the selected people of the Muslim community. In one verse of the Qur'an, God calls for unity among the believers and addresses them as follows: "Let there be one community (*umma*) of you, calling to good, and commanding right and forbidding wrong; those are the prosperers" (Q.S. 3:104). In another verse God avers: "You are the best community (*umma*) ever brought forth to mankind, commanding good and forbidding wrong" (Q.S. 3:110). And again: "And the believers, the men and the women, are friends one of the other; they command right, and forbid wrong" (Q.S. 9:71). In one of the Prophetic sayings (Hadith), Muhammad stated: "Whoever sees a wrong, and is able to put it right with his hand, let him do so; if he can't, then with his tongue; if he can't, then in his heart, and that is the bare minimum of faith".[35] The Islamists are, above all, fulfilling their obligations as the chosen community.

In Indonesia, this sense of self-glorification is manifested in the Islamists' affirmation that Islam is the only solution for Indonesia's long-lasting, multi-dimensional crises.[36] They suggest that Indonesian people turn to Islam, not democracy, to right the situation.[37] They strongly believe that those crises will not be solved unless all Muslims agree to implement Islam as the sole basis of the state. A crisis, whatever it may be, must be perceived as God's punishment for Muslims' neglect of His law, that is, Shari'ah. This is precisely what Ismail Yusanto confidently believes. In his view, every political decision not based on the Shari'ah will lead to decay (*fasad*). In this context, he blames the Indonesian Government for producing policies not based on, even contradictory to, the Shari'ah and thus calling destruction upon the country. Indonesia has too many problems — poverty, corruption, massive

unemployment, criminality, communal depression, etc. — due to its neglect of Shari'ah law. In Jakarta alone, the rates of mental illness, according to Yusanto, have increased significantly by 300 per cent.[38] In Yusanto's point of view, this is because Indonesia keeps executing *kebijakan maksiat* (sinful policies) as a capitalist economic system that contradicts the Shari'ah system. The capitalist system is derived from the principle of pragmatism and materialism in which interest or usury forms the backbone. As long as the interest system is at the foundation of the economy, Indonesia will be eternally caught up in a sin that will lead to self-destruction. Yet, in Yusanto's view, all of Indonesia's crises can be traced back to its adoption of democracy. The problem lies in the fact that Indonesia holds the principle of the sovereignty of the people, not the sovereignty of the Shari'ah. An elected leader is supposed to base his policies on majority opinion. Both representatives and executives may draw inspiration for their policies either from the Shari'ah or from majority opinion. As a result, the Shari'ah is treated as an option, not an obligation. If Muslims want to show full obedience to Allah, they will have to treat the Shari'ah as an obligation. By doing so, Yusanto believes that all types of social maladies and hardships would be cured.[39]

Irfan S. Awwas harshly denounces those who equate democracy with Islam. Islam, as a revealed religion sent by God to Muhammad, is too supreme to be compared to democracy, which is considered as a product of human creation.[40] Whether or not Muslims uphold the supremacy of Islam may be seen from the treatment of "words" in public life. Citing a verse of the Qur'an mentioned earlier, he argues that God has exalted His word sent to humankind and has degraded the "word" of unbelievers: "God sent down His peace upon him, and strengthened him with forces which ye saw not, and humbled to the depths the word of the Unbelievers. But the word of God is exalted to the heights: for God is exalted in might, Wise" (Q.S. 9:40). Awwas further comments that

> What is happening today is the other way around; Muslims are exalting the "word" of unbelievers and degrading the "word" of God. The prevalent use of non-Islam-derived "words" such as democracy, pluralism, human rights, gender equity, and the like represents the fact that Muslims respect the words brought by the unbelievers more than the words of God. It is ironic that the words of unbelievers overwhelmingly occupy the universe of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals, whereas the words of God such as Shari'ah, *jihad*, *mujahidin*, and the like are undervalued and those who use the words of God are often considered as outdated, backward, even terrorists. Muslims in general are not aware that this situation represents a self-mockery and self-disdain.[41]

Furthermore, even though Awwas admits that Islam includes democracy, the revealed texts — the Qur'an and Sunnah — must be referred to as the main sources of any public deliberation or consultation (*mushawarah*, *shura*). The Islamists generally argue that *shura* in Islam plays the complementary role of explaining matters that are not clearly stated in the Qur'an and Sunnah (*dhanni al-dilalah*). Thus, the Islamist attitude towards the principle of *shura* is clear-cut: there is no deliberation in matters where clear religious edicts (*qat'i al-dilalah*) can be found, for example on gambling, alcoholic drink, and prostitution.[42]

As typical in a vision, the cultural essentialist Shari'ah is considered eternal. Changes of place and time do not lead to changes in the Shari'ah law. On the contrary, the times must comply with the framework of Shari'ah, since Shari'ah is eternally unchangeable. In other words, Shari'ah must be the power to regulate all types of public law. The prohibition of gambling, usury, prostitution, and liquor in Islam is, therefore, unconditional and it can never be subject to change. Public deliberation is for deciding how Shari'ah law can be maximally enforced, and not for changing it. Therefore, the Shari'ah law does not need progress or renewal since it is in itself always germane to every season. As far as the Shari'ah is concerned, those changes concern only how the Shari'ah is implemented at a practical level.

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ANTI-DEMOCRACY DISCOURSE

The antagonistic attitude of Indonesian Islamists towards democracy is sociopolitically constructed.[43] Despite the fact that normative texts such as the Qur'an and Hadith do not explicitly mention democracy, the Islamists show their knack for arguing on textual and normative points. They also like to supply grand narratives of the current socio-political circumstances as well as of historical Islam. Indonesian Islamists tend to exaggerate the agony of Muslims all over the world and imagine them to be under siege and oppression by God's enemies. They deplore the moral decay rampant on Indonesia's current political stage as well as the corruption and political conflicts among elites, assuming that these stem from the blind adoption of democracy. The single solution to this problem, in their point of view, is Islam.

To the Islamists, language plays a crucial role in the production and reproduction of discourses and counter-discourses.[44] The discourses on democracy developed by the Islamists are of course political, as in any other language. Shapiro, following Foucault, observes that the use of language is

determined by discourse.[45] That Islamists, for instance, prefer the use of their own heritage language (Arabic) over the language of those who invented or were influenced by Western world-views is a fact with political import. That they speak a language with few loans from English or Dutch is also very political. Language in this context is deployed not only as a matter of preserving cultural identity or simply of exchanging ideas, but as a means for maintaining and preserving the purity of Islamic culture. This means that for the Islamists culture really does matter for their "inner" identity, through which the soul of Islam may be transmitted without corruption and innovation. It is not surprising that in order to keep their Muslimhood pure the Islamists are concerned with using idioms and words that are derived directly from sacred texts that just happen to be in Arabic. Maintaining normative Islam in Arabic is also a part of power aggregation. Within this context, anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism are among the most exploited sentiments in Islamists' discourses on democracy, especially in the depiction of democracy as an un-Islamic, corrupt, and unholy political system.

Warriors need enemies: without an "other" the "self" will mean nothing. The entity of the enemy is not something constructed in a social and political vacuum. This means that "if an enemy is not ontologically present in the nature of things, one must be manufactured".[46] To the Islamists, the "enemy" can take different forms from time to time, depending on the context. Berger and Luckmann itemize the steps through which social construction proceeds: naming, legitimation, myth-making, sedimentation, and ritual.[47] The conception of an enemy begins with naming or "labelling", a crucial step in the early process of social construction. Defamatory labels are imposed onto persons, entities, acts, or situations that might not precisely represent reality. This step is followed by "legitimation", whereby the labels are validated through public degradation. The next step is "myth-making", where narrative are built to support the construction of an enemy. Throughout, authoritative jargon must be used to document how the enemy's behaviour fits the official "theological" theory of evil.[48] The next step is "sedimentation", where the transmission of constructed knowledge takes place from person to person, agent to agent. The culminating step in the social construction of an enemy is the "ritual", where a process of self-fulfilling prophecy occurs. Combat against perceived internal and external enemies endlessly generates the very evildoers warned about.

Likewise, the social construction of an enemy is neither peculiar to Islamists in Indonesia nor a new development in the politics of Islamism more generally.[49] In this regard, religious language is an integral part of the construction of evil. Despite their different contexts, religious texts provide

a plethora of names, labels, and symbols that can readily be deployed by Islamists against their enemies. Taghut, Ya'juj and Ma'juj, Dajjal, *jahiliyyah* (ignorance), *satan* (devil), *kafir* (unbeliever), *munkar* (evil), and many others are among the most popular labels found in the Qur'an and made use of by the Islamists.[50] These names and labels are used to describe bad characters supposed to be in opposition to God. Any idea that emerges from the non-Muslim world, especially the West and its allies, is identified as evil; the creator of that idea deserves to be treated as enemy. Capitalism, socialism, communism, secularism, democracy, liberalism, pluralism, and individualism are clear examples of the Islamists' enemies from outside. Islamists believe that combatting these enemies is in the Path of God (*sabilillah* or *Sabil Allah* in Arabic), necessitating struggle (*jihad*) both in a physical sense, that is, war, and a non-physical sense, that is, intellectual (*ghazw al-fikr*) and spiritual refutation. The images of God's enemies is reinforced through negative accounts, for example, of the United States' invasions of Muslim lands, bad treatment towards Muslim prisoners accused of being terrorists, Zionist campaigns in support of Israel, and religious discrimination towards Muslims at home and abroad.[51]

Although anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism is not a feature mainstream Indonesian Islam, they still contribute to a wider social atmosphere that is conducive to the longer-term political survival of Islamist groups. In other words, when uttered by ostensibly respectable mainstream politicians, anti-American sentiments are afforded a degree of social legitimacy. This in turn creates a space for militant and terrorist groups whose agendas rest on the belief that the United States poses a direct threat to Muslims in general and to Indonesian Muslims in particular. These anti-American discourses can therefore help such groups to recruit adherents from those small pockets of Indonesian society that have lost faith in the promises of secular democracy.[52] This mindset risks creating an atmosphere that tolerates fund-raising and recruitment for anti-American violence elsewhere in the world. However we understand this potential, there is also a need to understand how culture and identity, especially Islamic identity, have been instrumentalized within Indonesian politics.

Conspiracy theories are complementary to the anti-democratic discourses, developed by Indonesian Islamists. The conspiracy theories may be traced back to numerous anti-Western, anti-capitalist, anti-bourgeois, or anti-liberal discourses that provide more or less coherent ideological terms: the "West", "Liberalism", "Capitalism", "Modernity", "Christianity-Zionism", and so forth.[53] It is likely that the demonization of the United States and the West in general, to a large extent, was created by the Islamists as a response to

the demonization of Islamists created by the United States, particularly in the post-September 11 era.[54] They perceived that the demonization of Islam by the United States occurred in tandem with the global project of the war on terror, which projected a notoriously bad image of radical Islamists and jihadists.[55] Interestingly enough, Islamists in Indonesia do not deny the existence of global jihadists. They also admit that jihadists such as Imam Samudra, Dr Azahari Husin, Noordin Mohd. Top, and others were behind several violent attacks in Indonesia. However, to the Islamists, conspiracy theories are more compelling than the pure ideology of jihadism as explanations for the terrorist attacks. Yusanto, for instance, believes that a well-planned intelligence operation was behind those attacks. He claims that Islamist groups were infiltrated so that the false doctrine of *jihad* and *istishhad* (martyrdom) could be instilled. The purpose was to create the image of Indonesia as a hotbed of terrorism. In his view it is strange that there was little damage inflicted on the actual target, that is, the United States and its allies.[56] Rather, the attacks damaged local people and Indonesia in general. He further argues that

> Terrorist acts in Indonesia are nothing more than *terorisme jadi-jadian* (fabricated terrorism). They're based on an order, they're a fake. There was a strong sense of infiltration, provocation, and radicalization among the Muslims, to create a certain stigma. Azhari is dead already. The logic is that the terrorism threats should be over now because the performer is already dead. But he is only a *wayang* (puppet), not a *dalang* (performer). If the performer is still alive, there will be other plots and other actors. I believe in this scenario.[57]

In short, the Islamists argue that the United States and its allies are the great masterminds behind these jihadist operations, with the aim of undermining the power of Islam. This is because the United States and the West, rather than Islam and the Muslims (perceived to be in a weak position), dominate the world by means of capitalism. The Islamists depict Muslims as the victims of globalization and they point the finger of blame at the United States and the West in general.[58]

The Islamist anti-discourses are wrapped within modern arguments and narratives. Even though there is a sense of simplification, generalization, and exaggeration, the demonization of the West is constructed in advanced arguments and narratives that sound logical and are thought-provoking. The Islamists use sophisticated structural analyses, especially conspiracy theories, that are in line with the arguments of post-colonial critics of the West.

Thus they share arguments with post-colonial and post-modernist critics of modernity, which is considered morally wicked and corrupt.[59]

The Islamists are also convinced that Muslims are under siege from God's enemies, who are destroying Islam step by step. They construct the enemy in self-fulfilling terms on the basis of sacred texts that are used as a mirror to define themselves and their enemies.[60] The construction of the enemy is thus very much influenced by prejudice and the ideology of hatred. In order to strengthen the differences between their own identity and that of the enemy, Islamists use the logic of binary opposition, erecting a wall of virtues that separates them from others. They describe themselves as the pious and chosen community, mandated by sacred texts to give heavenly guidance and salvation to others. These others are defined as whatever they themselves are not.

In line with these tendencies, Irfan S. Awwas mentions the brutality of the United States as a clear reason to resist Western democracy.[61] He maintains that the despotic, arrogant, and unjust treatment of Muslims by the United States must be resisted. He quotes an old Arabic saying that while "in the hands of a despotic government [such as the United States], power is truth, in the hands of the *mujahidin* (Muslim Holy Warriors) the truth is power, and everybody, Muslim or not, must be subject to the truth".[62] Awwas is convinced that with democracy, the United States and its allies are trying to subjugate Muslims.

In an article written by Denny Kodrat, the chief of *Lajnah Siyasiyah* (the Commission of Politics) of HTI in West Java, the construction of the West as enemy is raised partly as a reply or a kind of self-defense in response to George W. Bush's paradigm of the "axis of evil", a phrase perceived to be directed against Islam and Muslims.[63] In this article, the writer denounces the Bush administration's demonization of Islam and Muslims with a rhetorical question: "Who is ideologically evil?" In his opinion, when the United States points its finger to Islam and Muslims as the axis of evil, it identifies itself as the real Satan of the world. Kodrat refers to Noam Chomsky's allegory about the United States: "Alexander the Great captured a pirate and asked, "Why do you make a terror in the sea?" The pirate replied, "Why do you make a chaos in the world? Because I use a small ship, you call me a terrorist; and you? Because you do with a huge ship you are called a Caesar!"[64]

In his article, Kodrat lists the historical sins inflicted by the United States on the world. He accuses the United States of being responsible for numerous conflicts and civil wars after World War II, including conflicts in Greece (1947–49), Italy (1948), Korea (1950–53), Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Zaire (1960), Cuba (1961), Vietnam (1961–75), Dominica (1965), Kampuchea (1969–71), Chile (1973), Grenada (1983), Lebanon (1958 and

1983), Libya (1986), Panama (1989), Iraq (1991, 1993, 1998–99, and 2003 present), Somalia (1991–92), Afghanistan (1998–2002), and Serbia (1999).[65] Many of the United States military operations in these conflicts indicate that the United States is too ambitious in its desire to control the world in order to maintain its hegemony and defend its economic interests. This, in Kodrat's opinion, also shows how ugly the face of capitalist ideology is as practised by the United States through its vulgar imperialism, wrapped in false slogans such as "pre-emptive strike", "internal security", "world order", and "international peace".

In Kodrat's opinion, the West's accusation that Islam represents a satanic ideology that is against human rights, democracy, and freedom, that it is prone to the use of terror, conflict, and physical violence as a means of achieving its ideological purposes deserves to be questioned further. If these accusations are used as standards for demonizing a certain ideologies, then it is the West that should be accused first of having a satanic ideology, for several reasons. First, in terms of human rights, the capitalist ideology tends to side with wealthy elites whose huge economic capital creates unfavourable conditions for the deprived. For example, when the world became aware of the problem of global warming caused by the greenhouse gas emissions produced by industrial countries, these countries tried to address the problem through the Treaty of Kyoto (Kyoto Protocol). Despite the conflict of interests among some of the developed countries, the treaty was eventually ratified by most of the world's nations, except the United States and Australia, countries with extremely high amounts of greenhouse gas emissions.[66]

Another lucid example given by Kodrat concerns the legality of abortion.[67] The industrialized countries legalize abortion as a consequence of the acceptance of free sex, but this policy contradicts the notion of the right to live, because abortion represents the violation of an infant's right to life. Kodrat refers to statistical data released by Henshaw and Morrow (1990), which show that the largest numbers of abortions in the world were performed in the following industrialized countries: the United States, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Norway, Finland, Canada, Netherlands, France, United Kingdom, and New Zealand.[68] The high level of abortions suggests that killing is legal in these countries, an ironic fact given these countries' insistence as the notion of human rights. When a state legalizes abortion for utilitarian reasons, it is clear that the state is unable to protect human rights, which includes an infant's right to life. This reflects the inability of the state to safeguard one of the most elementary human rights.[69]

Second, with regard to the Bush administration's war on terrorism, Kodrat argues that the greatest terrorist causing the highest number of

casualties throughout the history of mankind is the West, not Islam. Kodrat refers to some events throughout the history of Western civilization that resulted in bloodshed, particularly the chaotic turmoil of the Middle Ages, the Crusades, and the First and Second World Wars. For the West, Kodrat argues, massacre is a ritual to perform in forcing its ideology upon others. In the case of the Crusades, for instance, while Saladin freed al-Quds without bloodshed, the Crusade warriors did the opposite. The blood of Muslims was spilled in the atrocities perpetrated by the Crusaders. The same thing happened when United States military forces invaded Muslim lands such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The maltreatment of Muslim prisoners and the desecration of the Qur'an in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prisons have notoriously confirmed the satanic character of the United States, with its capitalism and democracy. With the principle of "the end justifies the means", the Machiavellian ideology of capitalism is that anything is permitted that is necessary for the sake of preserving its own interests, including agitation, violence, and anarchism, regardless of its destructive impacts on others.

Third, the idea of freedom promoted by Western capitalist countries is no more than an illusion and a myth.[70] As soon as freedom is shown to be counter-productive to its ideology, the state will consequently amputate it. This was the case in France, where the government banned all types of religious symbols in public life, including the headscarf for Muslim women, even though this country claims to practise the democratic freedom of expression and religion.[71] Why is Hizbut Tahrir considered illegal in Germany although this country claims to espouse the freedom of expression? Why is Iran not allowed to advance its nuclear energy project when many Western countries have nuclear energy? These are the questions posed by Kodrat to expose the moral wickedness of capitalism and democracy. So, when the West pinpoints Islam as a satanic ideology, it identifies itself as the real satanic ideology, he argues. It is the double standard of the West in implementing democracy that he criticizes.

In Awwas' view, democracy should necessitate a free and fair contestation among ideologies, and Islamic Shari'ah should have an equal portion in this contestation.[72] Democracy should welcome the participation of any ideology, man-made or heaven-made. The room for public debate about the Shari'ah must be opened as wide as possible. Democracy, in his conception, means that if the majority of Muslims agree to the implementation of the Shari'ah, then Shari'ah law should be practised by Muslims. However, in reality, democracy shows its unwillingness to allow Muslims with a high commitment to implement Shari'ah and contest with other ideologies.

Significantly, the notion of enemy does not apply only to external enemies. Enemies can threaten from within as well, that is, from co-religionists who practise a "deviant" Islam.[73] The construction of the enemy within is to evoke the sense of being under constant siege both externally and internally. Islamists denounce their co-religionists — especially those working in NGOs and the intellectual activists funded by international agencies — who campaign for democratization, human rights, gender equality, pluralism, and liberalism, as agents of the West who seek only to destroy Islam from within. Ulil Abshar-Abdalla with his JIL team (Jaringan Islam Liberal, or Liberal Islam Network) has been denounced as such as enemy from within:[74]

> Even though the U.S. has done quite a lot to deal with the issue of terrorism under the project of "War on Terror" — such as military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, providing a great deal of funds to support the bills of anti-terrorism in many Muslim countries, persuading the regimes of countries serving as its agents to arrest "Muslim hard-liners", provoking Muslims through the tongues of leaders of its proxy countries such as John Howard, the Prime Minister of Australia, Lee Kuan Yew, the Senior Minister of Singapore, and Goh Chok Tong, the Prime Minister of Singapore, and so forth — the U.S. seems to need other hands taken from within to fight against Islam and Muslims, namely secularized liberal activists such as Ulil Abshar-Abdalla and his colleagues of Liberal Islam Network (JIL).[75]

Since the collapse of Soeharto's New Order regime, the same pattern of constructing an enemy has been established to denounce the current government as pro-Western and "un-Islamic". Abdurrahman Wahid, previously a respected leader of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and former Indonesian president, has been targeted by the Islamists' resentment due to his support for democracy. Likewise, the last two presidents — Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono — have also been criticized as being controlled by capitalist powers as a result of their support for democracy.

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

How are discourses of democracy and anti-democracy among Islamists sociopolitically constructed? Islamists are aware that their struggle in the way of God needs power. Power is important in order to appeal more quickly and easily to an audience in the public sphere. Islam is portrayed as the Divine Imperative that must assume power, and the media is one of the most important means of power struggle.[76] The open political atmosphere

of post-New Order Indonesia has allowed all elements of society to take part in public discourse. The Islamists have capitalized on this new openness by promoting their political visions and agendas to the public. The media is undoubtedly an important sine qua non.[77]

More specifically, the ideology of hatred and anti-democratic discourses have been widely disseminated through the mass media all over Indonesia, especially Java. The mass media, especially the internet and print media, are most effective means in the process of construction.[78] *Sabili*, a fortnightly journal, has become a forum for Islamists, particularly those of MMI and HTI, as well as FPI members and supporters. *Al-Wa'ie*, a monthly journal, supported by a weekly bulletin called *al-Islam*, is an effective platform for the Islamists of HTI. There are many other printed papers, leaflets, pamphlets, and periodicals, including *Salafy* [*Sic*], *As-Sunnah*, *Hidayatullah*, and *Hayatul Islam*, all of which serve the Islamist movement outside of HTI and MMI.[79]

What is striking is that the messages delivered through the media are wrapped in modern vocabulary and jargon, even though they are not supported by reliable data. Most of the spokesmen of Islamist groups are well-educated people. In addition to Ismail Yusanto — the spokesperson of HTI — and M. Shiddiq Al-Jawi — another respected leader of HTI — Irfan S. Awwas and Fauzan Al-Anshari, both from MMI, are among the most prolific contributors to the *Salafy* periodical. More specifically, both Ismail Yusanto and Muhammad Shiddiq Al-Jawi are highly active contributors to the HTI periodical *Al-Wa'ie*. In addition to these periodicals, the Islamist organizations have their own publications with which to promulgate their agendas and views on current politics. MMI, for instance, has its own publisher based in Yogyakarta called Pustaka al-Wihdah. More than forty books have been published by this press, ranging from translated versions of Arabic books to those written by local MMI activists. HTI has also published a lot through its own press called Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, based in Bogor. This indicates that they are intellectually well-armed with modern ways of propagation.

An early book deployed by HTI to disseminate its anti-democratic discourses is 'Abd al-Qadim Zallum's *Al-Dimuqratiyah Nizam Kufr* [Democracy, the Unbeliever's System], translated into Indonesian as *Demokrasi Sistem Kufur*, and published by Pustaka Thariqul Izzah in 2001.[80] This book was initially written as an intellectual response to Yusuf Qardawi's book, *Min Fiqh al-Dawlah fi al-Islam* from the fiqh of state in Islam, in which he supported the idea that democracy is part of the Islamic system of governance. In Qardawi's opinion, the spirit of modern democracy is *shura* as institutionalized in the West. Relying on arguments in Zallum's book, the Islamists of HTI

argue against Qardawi's opinion by saying that, in terms of their origins, *shura* is totally unrelated to democracy. In democracy, the process of public deliberation is left to the majority. In Islam, public deliberation must be ceded to those Muslim scholars and *ulamas'* who have the capacity for logical reasoning (*ijitihad*) in dealing with strategic and public matters. In the Islamic state system, these scholars have a highly venerated position called *ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd* (the advisory board of the council).

In addition to traditional media, online publications are of key importance in constructing and disseminating Islamist ideas and agendas, since cyberspace is no longer confined to the elite in many Muslim societies all over the world.[81] In fact, many Islamists are technologically literate. Despite their uncompromising rejection of Western culture, they strongly encourage their fellow Muslims to master high technology for the purpose of promoting Islam's interests. Communication among them is largely via the internet. Websites, e-mails, and chat rooms are highly important in creating cohesive identities in cyberspace for Islamist political and ideological agendas.[82]

In Indonesia, the two utopian Islamist groups utilize the new media to propagate and disseminate their Islamist ideas.[83] The website of HTI, for example, is among the most productive cyber media forums where topical information about national and global politics is constantly updated. The website has proven to be an effective means of spreading Islamist sermons, views, and propaganda to a wider audience. The HTI website serves as a massive storehouse of information of both offline publications such as the *Al-Wa'ie* journal and the bulletin *al-Islam* and povety online information. It also provides a wide-ranging collection of typical piety-related topics such as *muhasabah* (self-introspection), focus, analysis, *afkar* (thoughts), questions and answers, critics, *hiwar* (debate), *tafsir* (exegesis), *siyasah-dakwah* (political promulgation), *ta'rifat* (definitions), *telaah kitab* (classical book learning), the world of Islam, and *sirah-keteladanan* (exemplary religious deeds and qualities).[84]

RESISTING DEMOCRACY WITH THE ARGUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY

That the Islamists reject democracy is nothing new. However, their use of the arguments of democracy to reject democracy is a new tendency widespread in every corner of the Muslim world. Indeed, Islamism has entered a new phase in its discourse: fighting democracy from within. As Olivier Roy has aptly argued, Islamists will not hesitate to defend themselves against the arguments of democracy.[85] They demand to be treated in the same way as other religious

communities in the public domain. In their view, democracy does not have the right to triumph simply because of its tendency to side with the interests of the West. Islamists agree with the principle of egalitarianism in democracy. In practice, however, democracy tends to be fascist and discriminatory towards Islam and Muslims.

In general, there are five arguments used by the Islamists to deconstruct democracy. The first argument concerns the claim to truth. The proponents of democracy often stigmatize Islamists as claiming themselves to be the only holders of the truth. But in fact, the proponents of democracy are basically caught in the same trap, as they themselves also claim to be the only legitimate holders of the truth. Those who want to struggle for the implementation of the Shari'ah or *Khilafah* are described as radicals, militants, or terrorists simply because they do not agree with democracy, which is based on secularism.[86] In Indonesia, the Islamists often refer to liberal Muslim activists as failing in this regard.

> Too often the liberals accuse us of being arrogant, as being the only holder of the truth. But what they do not realize is the fact that they are also doing the same thing, particularly when they propose their version of Islam. They criticize us for being the only holder of the key to paradise; the paradise only belongs to us. But what is the real fact? By arguing against us, they are in fact claiming themselves to be the best and only Muslims, while negating us from the possibility of having the same position as theirs. It's ridiculous![87]

The second argument concerns the freedom of expression. The Islamists argue that the proponents of democracy, especially Western countries such as the United States and its allies, are inconsistent in implementing the principle of freedom of expression in public life. They refer to the ban of religious symbols in France as a blatant example of the undemocratic nature of democracy. Freedom of expression, according to the Islamists' point of view, is considered to be at the very heart of liberal democracy.[88] It is ironic that the ban on Muslim headscarves in state schools should emerge in the heart of democracy, France, where the foundations of modern democracy were established. Indeed, it is not only the headscarf that is forbidden, but other religious symbols as well such as the cross and the skullcap.[89] It is from this country that the three principles of democracy, *liberté* (freedom), *egalité* (egalitarianism), and *fraternité* (solidarity), once emerged.

What the Islamists object to is that the reason behind the ban had nothing to do with the threat of violence and terrorism but with the

difference in religious belief and ideology from the those held in mainstream of the West. The headscarf for Muslim women is perceived by the West as a symbol of resistance in the struggle between cultures. As Farid Wadjdi argues,

> The ban of veiling for Muslim students in France represents the weakness of the argument of secular democracy. By banning the veiling, France violates its own principles of secular democracy they have been proud of. On the one hand they acknowledge freedom of religion, on the other hand they ban the obligation of veiling for Muslim women; on the one hand they claim that the state does not interfere in religion since it is a private matter, yet they interfere in religious life by banning veiling as the right for Muslim women.[90]

In the view of the Islamists, democracy should allow the expression of religious identity as long as it does not pose a real threat of violence. Democracy means to let anybody believe and practise whatever he or she likes. Unfortunately, democracy proves otherwise. Instead of safeguarding the freedom of expression, it curtails it for undemocratic reasons. There is no true freedom in democracy, but only limited freedom, as long as it supports secularism. It is on the basis of secularism that any Islamic state wanting to implement the Shari'ah is despised and marginalized.[91]

In the Islamists' conception, it is fair for Western democratic countries to safeguard their own interests from political and ideological threats by forbidding the development of certain ideologies that might endanger them.[92] In Kodrat's opinion, behind all the negative allegations and stereotypings of Islam by the West lies its interests in preserving economic hegemony:

> It must be fully understood from the outset that there is a Western interest to make the face of Islam look horrible and scary. Because, otherwise, it is certain that the system of Islamic *Khilafah*, with all its honours, could come into existence. There are many Western interests, be they economic or ideological, that will be under threat by this *Khilafah* system. The West is fully aware that it will lose a lot under such a circumstance. Due to this reason, the West has been struggling since the beginning to make various propagandas and stereotyping designed systematically to obstruct the mounting stream of awareness of Muslims about their ideological importance. The target is clear: to abate the Muslim struggle of establishing *Khilafah* and Shari'ah; in order for Muslims to reject the notion of *Khilafah* and Shari'ah; so that Muslims stay away from political Islam; as well as to champion secularism.[93]

By doing so, in the Islamist argument, the West and other proponents of democracy are in fact killing their credentials as paragons of freedom and democracy for the rest of the world. Western countries are campaigning for something that contradicts their own soul and spirit. On the basis of this false idea, the West denounces countries that do not agree with it as the "axis of evil".[94] It points to countries such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as curtailing the freedom of the people. Yet they invade Iraq and Afghanistan and support Israel, claiming to give freedom to the citizens of each country. This fact, according to the Islamists, is one of the most glaring shortcomings of Western democracy. The freedom which is in fact a lie and a myth has taken millions of Muslim lives:[95]

> As a result, Muslims should hold the burden. The evil propaganda attacking the Islamic Shari'ah has been carried out massively on the grounds that it violates basic human rights and humans' basic freedom. The West feels agitated when Muslim clerics [MUI] released religious rulings [*fatwas*] to maintain the purity of Muslim belief concerning the deviation of a particular religious group [that is, Ahmadiyah]. The West, by the extension of its agents in the Muslim world, asserts that this is against human rights and humans' basic freedom. The truth is that they are obliterating Islamic *dakwah* and prohibiting Muslims from practising what they believe. On the grounds of human rights, the Islamic Shari'ah that applies capital punishment is despised, whereas the West legalizes mass killing of Muslims by invading Iraq and Afghanistan.[96]

In line with this argument, Irfan S. Awwas condemns what the United States has been doing to Islam and the Muslim world, saying that the United States no longer deserves to be called the most democratic country in the world, due to its undemocratic, repressive, and unilateral policies towards Muslims. He does not believe in democracy because it does not accommodate people with different beliefs. If the United States is consistent with the principle of democracy, it should let a person such as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir be free to uphold whatever he believes. Democracy, in Awwas' conception, must tolerate whatever people believe. What the United States promulgates as democracy is nothing more than the "law of the jungle" (*hukum rimba*), in the fight against others who are not willing to side with the United States' political interests.[97] Awwas questions the moral integrity of scholars who are said to have sided unjustly with the United States, by arguing that

> All the U.S.'s atrocities and injustices to Muslim countries are untouchable by the international law. How come a foreign Indonesianist such as

> Prof. Martin and those who are provoked by the U.S. propaganda can understand the rationale behind the U.S.'s brutality and discrimination, but no one understands why Abu Bakar Ba'asyir is opposing ill treatment towards him and his attempts to implement the Shari'ah.[98]

The third argument of democracy is the principle of multiculturalism. Islamists criticize the way acculturation is forced in some Western countries. They argue that in these countries, the Muslim minority is urged to give up its cultural identity and assimilate to the mainstream culture which they perceive as Christian. If the same kind of assimilation were to be expected from Christians living in Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia, the West would raise objections, arguing that minority rights are not respected. According to Awwas, this is simply not fair.[99]

> Is there any such thing as multiculturalism? If there is any, just show me what it looks like. Multiculturalism is just a Western strategy to subjugate Islam. It sounds beautiful because it endorses coexistence among different groups of people. But what happens in reality? It is nothing less than a Western deceit to control Muslims. It's not different from other Western words such as democracy and gender equality. If a country calls itself multicultural, you as a Muslim have to adapt to them. You do not have any choice other than accepting all rules they produce. Do you think multiculturalism can guarantee Muslims in the West to do what they like? I don't think so! Look at what the president Chirac has done to Muslims! It's not fair that Muslims have been treated in such a way which is different from the way non-Muslims have been treated in Indonesia.[100]

The fourth argument concerns the approach to electoral politics. In the Islamists' argument, the proponents of democracy, especially the United States and its allies, use a double standard in advocating the establishment of democracy in the Muslim world. The establishment of democracy is characterized by the institutionalization of electoral politics, that is, the holding of general elections. In the Islamists' view, the West is not yet ready to witness the conduct of electoral politics in the Muslim world. They seem to be afraid that Islamists will rise to power as a result of fair and democratic general elections. They feel threatened if the winner of a general election is an Islamist party. As a result, they feel obliged to intervene in the electoral politics of many countries in the Muslim world. If the result of the election does not endanger them, they approve. But as soon as there is a possibility that radical Islamists might win the contest, they nullify the result of the

election, as happened with the near-victory of Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the early 1990s.[101]

The fifth criticism of the Islamists concerns the consistency in implementing the principle of secularism where religion and the state cannot interfere with one another. The Islamists argue that democracy should act only as a neutral referee between religion and the state. The fact is that the West and its allies are not consistent in promoting such a principle. There are many secular countries that intervene in the religious lives of their people. The Islamists assert that the intervention of the state in people's religious affairs has gone too far. As Wadjdi argues,

> Democracy necessitates the separation of religion and the state. Religion becomes a matter of private life; nobody has the right to intervene in the religious life of other people. The ban of veiling for Muslim women contradicts the very principle of secular democracy because this represents the intervention of the state in a religious matter. As a matter of fact, there are many cases in which secular countries have intervened in the religious life of Muslim countries, particularly when the latter endangers the secular system. As a result, it is not surprising that in several Muslim countries Islamic movements that want to implement Shari'ah are obstructed and considered illegal.[102]

From the five arguments mentioned above it seems evident to me that the Islamist rejection of democracy is based not only on normative and textual grounds, but also on a form of criticism that has been developed with reference to contemporary global politics. They also blame secular democracy for the economic crisis engulfing Indonesia since secular democracy does not fit the nature of Islam and Muslims. In arguing for the replacement of the current secular democratic regime, the Islamists propose something that is utopian in nature and does not have any precedent in their era: the implementation of Shari'ah and the *Khilafah* system. Without acknowledging the complexities of the present era, they refer to the Golden Age of Islam as the blueprint for building the new triumph of Islam and a Muslim civilization.

ISLAMISTS AND THE BALLOT BOX

There is a certain ambivalence that characterizes Indonesian Islamists' attitude to democracy in a procedural sense. At the formal, organizational level, the Islamists undoubtedly say "no" to democracy. At the individual level, however, the Islamists may cast their votes for acceptable candidates or parties as long

as that strategy might lead to power. The utopian Islamists tend to adopt a double standard in dealing with political and public matters.[103] Despite their anti-democratic stance, they are not opposed to electoral or party politics because these are not forbidden (*haram*) if they are employed to serve God's religion.[104] As long as their interests can be accommodated in a political party and that party is not secular or non-Islamic, Islamists will cast their votes for this party during a general election.

Indeed, a research project undertaken in 2004 by the PPIM (Centre for the Study of Islam and Society) at the State Islamic University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, in collaboration with the Freedom Institute and the Liberal Islam Network (JIL), found that the only aspect of democracy considered positive by Islamists is electoral politics.[105] According to the study, Indonesian Islamists perceive electoral democracy as a legitimate power contestation for public position. Moreover, this study also revealed that Islamists are likely to deploy electoral democracy as a means of implementing their agendas in the public sphere. The findings of this study are of course subject to criticism, particularly with regard to the fact that the respondents in this study were not from Islamist organizations such as HTI, MMI, FPI, and the like, but rather randomly selected. Nevertheless, the study gives a preliminary indication that Islamism can coexist with electoral democracy as it provides a means through which Islamists can seize power and implement their agendas.[106]

HTI tries to be consistent with its position of neutrality in politics.[107] Its rejection of democracy is manifested in its organizational policies, which forbid its activists from involvement in party politics as active organizers or campaigners, whether the party be Islamic or secular. However, this organization does not prevent its activists from going to the ballot box. At the organizational level — and not the individual level — HTI keeps its distance from party politics because it considers the fundamentals of Indonesian politics to be un-Islamic, wicked, and in the process of moral decay. Involvement in electoral politics would mean tacitly condoning the sinful and unIslamic nature of Indonesian politics; thus, participation is forbidden until such time as the political situation has been totally "Islamized". Indonesian politics is thus sinful, unless the political reality has been totally "Islamized". HTI keeps its image as an extra-parliamentary organization that gives moral advice to society at large. As a result, this organization does not have any formal affiliation with any Islamic political party nor does it urge its members to vote for any political party. During the 2004 presidential elections, for instance, HTI did not encourage its activists to cast their votes for any particular presidential candidate.

According to Maghfur Wahid, a member of the national board of HTI, activists of the organization were given the freedom to cast their votes for whomever they wished.[108] HTI itself did not issue a formal announcement regarding the 2004 presidential election. However, the HTI branch of Lampung encouraged its members and supporters not to cast their votes at all or to *golput* (an abbreviation of *golongan putih*, literally, white group or to abstain), due to the fact that none of the candidates met the requirements set by HTI.[109] To some extent, HTI was practising an ambiguous policy that showed its double standard to politics. From information gathered during fieldwork, it seems likely that some HTI activists, members, and supporters in some regions did give their votes to certain political parties and presidential candidates.[110] Some HTI activists may have adopted the politics of camouflage (*taqiyya*), quietly making their choices and planning to make their move at a more appropriate time.[111] Thus, the Islamists might be concerned more with strategy than with results.

Even as they claim that the general elections as practised in Indonesia today are un-Islamic, Islamists still propose an Islamic approach to the elections. According to HTI, Islam regards general elections as a technical matter (*uslub*), a way to elect the representatives or true leaders of the people.[112] HTI suggests that general elections are lawful as long as they are undertaken in a moral, Islamic manner. The reason for rejecting democracy is that it is too costly, particularly considering the multidimensional crises facing Indonesia; thus, the holding of elections contradictory to the Islamic principle of parsimony. The high cost of general elections is unjustifiable insofar as other important matters facing the community such as poverty, corruption, and injustice will be neglected. Electoral politics are meaningful only to the extent that are guided by the Islamic Shari'ah and reflect the following three fundamentals: (1) individual piety (*ketakwaan*); (2) a social control mechanism between the rulers and the ruled; and (3) a just system that is based on the Shari'ah and that is implemented by a trusted government.[113]

M. Shiddiq Al-Jawi, another respected leader of HTI, tries to quibble when he argues that Islam has its own tradition of general elections (*al-intikhab*) that is different from that in democracy.[114] He says that while in Islam general elections function as a "way" (*uslub*), in democracy general elections serve as a "method" (*tariqah*), something that is in practice indistinguishable. Referring to Al-Nabhani, Al-Jawi argues that "way" differs significantly from "method" insofar as the first denotes anything that is not permanent and thus subject to change, while the latter signifies a permanent and unchangeable pattern.[115] With regard to the caliphate (*khilafah*) system,

he argues that a *khalifah* may be elected by means of a general election that serves merely as a way of electing leaders. What is permanent is the method, the *bay'ah* (oath of allegiance) taken by an elected leader. This assumption is based on a Hadith that says "whoever dies while there is no *bay'ah* on his neck he then dies in the condition of *jahiliyah* (ignorant)".[116] In addition to electing a *khalifah*, general elections in the *Khilafah* system may also be used to elect people's representatives (*Majlis al-Ummah*), which would exemplify the notion of *wakalah* (representativeness) in the process of public deliberation.[117]

From a technical point of view, the general elections in an Islamic Caliphate might be similar to, or even the same as, general elections in a democratic system.[118] Nonetheless, in HTI's view, they are different in terms of philosophical foundation, principles, and purposes.[119] First, while general elections in a democracy are based on the philosophical foundation of democracy itself, that is, secularism, general elections in Islam are based on the Islamic belief (*akidah*) that could never accommodate secularism. Second, general elections in a democracy are based on the principle that sovereignty belongs to people so that they, in addition to holding the right to elect leaders, might also make laws. Conversely, general elections in Islam are based on the notion that sovereignty is in the hand of God, not the people. In effect, despite the fact that people have the right to elect their leaders, they have to be subject to the rules and laws of the Shari'ah. Third, whereas the purpose of general elections in democratic regimes is to elect a leader in order to exercise laws and rules made by the people, general elections in a Caliphate aim to elect a leader who will uphold the laws made by the Shari'ah.[120] Table 5.1 describes in more detail the differences between general elections in a Caliphate and in a democratic system.[121]

MMI has a similar regarding the participation of Muslims in general elections. This organization, according to Fauzan Al-Anshari, neither endorsed nor forbade its activists to abstain (*golput*) in the 2004 general elections.[122] Generally speaking, MMI believes that there is no single political party, in particular no Islamic party, that deserves to be elected as their visions and programmes do not reflect a commitment to implementing the Shari'ah as the sole basis for overcoming Indonesia's multidimensional crises. Nevertheless, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir urged Muslims to participate, not to abstain in the 2004 general elections.[123] The abstention of Muslim voters, in Ba'asyir's view, might allow the enemies of Islam (that is, non-Muslims) to take power. This would bring about a great loss for Muslims. This is why he recommends the '*ulama* and *haba'ib* Arab Muslim who are descendants of Muhammad to be careful that their *ummah* elect the candidate least likely to do the cause damage. According to him, the criteria for those who deserve to be elected

TABLE 5.1
The Differences between General Elections in a Caliphate and in a Democracy, according to HTI

No.	Criteria	Democracy System	Islamic System
1.	Position and Function	As a method (*tariqah*)	As a technical matter (*uslub*)
2.	Purpose	1) To elect people's representatives whose function is to produce laws; 2) To elect leaders whose function is to execute the law produced by the body of representatives.	1) To elect people's representatives (*Majlis al-Ummah*) whose function is to monitor the leader of the state (*khalifah*), not to produce laws, which is the authority of the Shari'ah; 2) To elect the supreme leader of the state (*khalifah*), the executor of God's laws.
3.	Involvement of the People	All people are involved based on majority decisions.	All people, either Muslims or non-Muslims alike, are involved in electing the representatives. Non-Muslims are entitled to elect representatives from their own group to represent their interests, as do Muslims. It is the right of Muslims only, however, to elect the *khalifah*, who must also be a Muslim.
4.	Who Deserves to be Elected	The criteria depend on the majority decision.	Muslims must be represented by Muslims; as non-Muslims are represented by non-Muslims. A Caliph, however, must fulfil the following criteria: (1) a Muslim; (2) male; (3) mature according to Islam; (4) intellectually well; (5) just; (6) free, not a slave; and (7) capable. These criteria may be supplemented by these advisory (not obligatory) criteria: (1) *Mujtahid* (experts in religious matters); (2) from the Quraish tribe; (3) valiant; and (4) faithful.

TABLE 5.1 (*Cont'd*)

No.	Criteria	Democracy System	Islamic System
5.	Head of Government	Presidents or prime ministers with terms and conditions based on majority decision. In most democratic countries, heads of state are usually non-Muslims (Protestant or Catholic).	A Muslim Caliph who is bound by an oath of allegiance (*bay'ah*) to uphold the Shari'ah.
6.	Function and Task of Representatives	To produce laws based on the interests of the majority and which will be executed by the head of government.	To monitor whether or not the Caliph has fulfilled his responsibility as the head of government. Representatives are not the lawmaker because the sovereignty lies in the hands of the Shari'ah.
7.	Period Limitation	The period of governance is often limited based on the majority decision, usually four or five years and the leader can then be reelected for the second time.	No period limitation applies to a Caliph or representatives and it can be lifelong as in the cases of Abu Bakar, Umar, and Utsman. He ceases to be a Caliph if he is considered unable to continue his job or contravenes the Qur'an and Hadith/Sunnah.
8.	The Dismissal of the Head of Government	People have the right to remove the head of government from his office based on the law made by the representatives.	People cannot dismiss a Caliph, except under one condition: if he violates the Qur'an and Hadith/Sunnah. This is done within a specific body called *Mahkamah Mazalim* (The body of Inquisition) to examine whether or not a Caliph is faithful to the Qur'an and Hadith/Sunnah. If this is impossible, people are entitled to remove an unfaithful Caliph by force.

as president are: (1) Muslim and male; (2) showing understanding of the Qur'an and Sunnah, even if imperfect; (3) supportive of Islamic *dakwah*; (4) *zuhd* (ascetic); (5) clean in terms of KKN (*Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme*, "corruption, collusion, nepotism"); (6) never been involved in political events that sacrifice lives; (7) ready to be guided by the '*ulama* and *haba'ib* in undertaking leadership (this requires some sort of written contract); and (8) never been involved in hunting and capturing Muslim activists.[124] Politics, in Ba'asyir's opinion, is closely associated with the struggle to glorify Islam and Muslims.

Similarly, Awwas suggests that Muslims elect a candidate who has committed the fewest political sins and is pro-Shari'ah in his political vision. He is of the opinion that it would hardly be strategic for MMI to campaign for the implementation of the Shari'ah from within the corrupt political party system of Indonesia.[125] If the struggle were carried out from within, all ideals and moral commitments to the Shari'ah would easily melt away, owing to pragmatic and political considerations. Thus, an extra-parliamentary option is the most effective method of resisting democracy and implementing the Shari'ah. In the context of the nation-state, the most important aspects of social Shari'ah that need to be prioritized are the following: First, to elect formal leaders on a national and regional scale from amongst those devout Muslims whose orientation and commitment are towards applying Shari'ah law. As a consequence, Muslims are forbidden from electing leaders who are non-Muslims. Not only might this be detrimental to the Muslims, but it has also been forbidden by the Qur'an. Second, the law implemented should comprise the core aspects of the Shari'ah, namely, *hudud* (boundaries), *qisas* (sentence), and *ta'zir* (penalty), all of which are guided by the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and which lead to social harmony and peace. Third, the national economic system must be replaced by a non *ribawi* (usury) system. Fourth, the culture of the community must be controlled in light of the prohibitious adultery, pornography, liquor, and gambling.[126]

In terms of the struggle for power, the utopian Islamists tend to prefer an extra-parliamentary approach. This strategy is not without a rationale. Transforming the power structure into an ideal Islamic policy from within would be an impossible mission, given the pragmatic compromises and conflicts of interest that would inevitably involve them. Strategically speaking, the centre of the political system is occupied by those who are opposed to the implementation of the Shari'ah.[127] The political system is thus an area where the level of Islamic morality is reduced and the struggle to implement Shari'ah meets strong resistance from contestants within the power structure. In Indonesia, a real-life example is provided by the PKS (Partai Keadilan

Sejahtera, or Prosperous Justice Party). Prior to the 2004 election, this party was well known for its commitment to implementing Islam as the basis of its agenda. But what happened after the party's first success? Many utopian Islamists were upset with the performance of this party, especially in terms of its lack of consistency in upholding its Islamic agenda. They felt betrayed by the party and its pragmatic compromises.

The performance of PKS on the political stage provided a bitter lesson for the utopian Islamists. It only confirmed the utopian Islamists' suspicion that the parliamentary stage was nothing more than a political trap for morally committed Islamists. The experience has caused them to become more confident in their extra-parliamentary approach to politics. Many utopian Islamists will not be bothered with attempting to transform the state structure into an Islamic entity. Rather, they are concerned more with society at large as the target of their Islamization efforts. Olivier Roy may have been right when he argued that the target of the Islamists' *dakwah* (missionary activity) has shifted from the state to society as a whole due to their failure in Islamizing the state.[128]

ANATHEMA TO THE ISLAMISTS: SECULARISM, LIBERALISM, AND PLURALISM

At the heart of the utopian Islamists' rejection of democracy is their assumption that democracy encompasses three interrelated and endogenous values: secularism, liberalism, and pluralism. They reject these values because they are based on the typical historical experience of the West, which is not only essentially different from that of Islam but also jeopardizes the latter.[129] Islamists view the three as inseparable from one another. Secularism is rejected because it is built upon the separation of church and state, which is contrary to the doctrine of the inseparability of the state and religion (Islam as *din wa dawlah*). Adopting secularism means negating the very role of religion in public life, discarding thousands of verses of the Qur'an and the Prophet's Sunnah, which regulate all aspects of human life such as the economy, politics, military strategy, social conduct, and education.[130]

The utopian Islamists' rejection of secularism may be seen as a direct response to the ideas developed by several Muslim leaders, including Abdurrahman Wahid and young progressive activists from the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) who campaign for secularism as the basis of a Muslim polity in Indonesia.[131] The utopian Islamists argue that the rampant corruption and the inter-communal conflicts in some parts of the country are a result of Muslims' neglect of the truth of the Qur'an and Hadith. They strongly

believe that it is because Islam has been abused by its believers that they risk God's punishment. Secularism, in their view, does not acknowledge the role of religion in the state structure. They ask: Are the ethno-religious conflicts and moral decay of many bureaucrats a result of adopting secular law or religious law? As Awwas has put it,

> Let's have a talk and agree on how to deal with Indonesia's crisis, to make the Indonesian people prosperous. What is your idea for making Indonesia prosperous? Through Pancasila! Has Pancasila been successful [in making Indonesia prosperous]? Since the time of Soekarno, Soeharto, Gus Dur [Abdurrahman Wahid], and then Habibie, Megawati? It has definitely never been so [successful]. Why don't we have another try to look at other alternatives? Such as what? Islam, for example. Is the Indonesian crisis due to the application of Shari'ah? Definitely not! The crisis is caused by the application of a secular philosophical foundation such as Pancasila. Don't get it wrong, the crisis is caused by putting religious laws aside and secular laws are used, instead. Give us a chance to convince people that implementing Shari'ah would make them better. Let's try Shari'ah, then. That is exactly the purpose of MMI. But the government will never give us any chance [of doing that] because they are aware that they will lose.[132]

Liberalism is no less dangerous than secularism. The Islamists accuse liberal Muslim activists of abusing the sound guidance of the Qur'an and Hadith. On behalf of freedom, as they see it liberals challenge the soundness of revelation. To adopt liberalism means to question the authenticity of the Qur'an and Hadith. Islamists believe that uncontrolled freedom leads to an excess of reasoning, which may in turn undermine the fundamentals of Islamic belief (*akidah*). Uncontrolled freedom is a fruit of the liberalism promulgated in Western civilization. This can be read in Wadjdi's comment as follows.

> Liberalism is also dangerous. On behalf of free thinking, for instance, they [the proponents of liberalism] feel free to question the authenticity of soundly indicated religious texts, such as the Qur'an as Allah's revelation. On behalf of freedom of speech, no kind of thinking can be prohibited even if it is in contradiction to Islamic belief ['*aqidah*] and Shari'ah. Then on behalf of freedom of expression, adultery, homosexuality, and lesbianism must be tolerated; prostitution is supported and considered as a profession; pornography and pornographic actions are accordingly defended. This is really dangerous because it can lead humankind to destruction, putting humans at the level of animals, even lower than that.[133]

Freedom is believed to have a detrimental effect on behaviour, which can in turn lead to the transgression of Islamic norms and values. Moral sins such as homosexuality, gay and inter-religious marriage must be accepted as a normal part of reality on behalf of freedom. The utopian Islamists perceive that the real danger of uncontrolled freedom is that human beings might be brought to the condition of animals.[134] To the utopian Islamists, there is no freedom in violating God's law.[135] It is within the spirit of rejecting liberalism that they fully supported bills such as the UUAPP (*Undang-undang Antipornografi dan Pornoaksi*, or Anti-pornography and anti-porn-action bills).[136] They feel under siege by liberalism in the media, especially television programmes, magazines, and newspapers that tend to represent an un-Islamic spirit.

Pluralism is understood by the utopian Islamists as a doctrine that assumes that the truth of all religions is relative, so truth claims by the believers of any one religion are unacceptable.[137] This doctrine endangers the truth of Islam since it threatens the supremacy of this religion, which might eventually lead to the denial of the role of Shari'ah in public life. The utopian Islamists' rejection of the word "pluralism" has been stimulated by the rampant use of the term among young Indonesian activists. For example, *Komunitas Muslim Utan Kayu* (Muslim Community of Utan Kayu), the headquarters of JIL, issued an advertisement in 2002 on two television channels — RCTI and SCTV — campaigning for pluralism under the slogan *Islam warna-warni* (Islam of many hues).[138] This advertisement was, however, unilaterally called off by both stations after they received protest notes from Fauzan Al-Anshari. On behalf of MMI, Fauzan faxed a letter of objection to the two television stations on 4 August 2002.[139] In Fauzan's view, the content of the advertisement was misleading and was deliberately designed to facilitate the disintegration of the Muslim community.[140]

In the utopian Islamists' view, secularism, liberalism, and pluralism have infiltrated the hearts of Indonesian Muslims by way of young liberal activists.[141] The utopian Islamists denounce the liberals for being overwhelmingly obsessed with Western ideas of democracy, liberalism, secularism, and the like. They accuse the latter of being trapped in the sanctification of secular ideas (*taqdis al-afkar al-'ilmaniyah*). Furthermore, these alien concepts are closely associated with the design of the West to destroy Muslims and Islam.[142] They accuse those who support secularism, liberalism, and pluralism of being financially supported by the West, who allegedly pours unlimited funding to non-government organizations (NGOs), in the eyes of utopian Islamists, are anti-Islam Compradors.[143] This accusation was directed at the controversial Counter Legal Draft of Islamic Law Compilation (CLD-KHI), headed by

Siti Musdah Mulia, a staff members in the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The project reportedly received an amount of around six million U.S. dollars from the Asia Foundation.[144] As Al-Jawi has commented,

> But actually the case is that the draft — which claimed to have used alternative *fiqh* — has created some articles that contradict Islam severely; for example, the prohibition of polygamy (article 3 verse 2), the equation of inheritance between men and women (article 8 verse 3), the legalization of contractual marriage (article 28), the legalization of inter-religious marriage (article 54), and still many others. This all happens due to the fact that the authors of the CLD-KHI have placed *usul al-fiqh* below the values of Western civilization, human rights and democracy. Why did all this happen? Because the liberals' *usul al-fiqh* is a false *usul al-fiqh*, which is based on a secular paradigm, following the unbelieving colonizers.[145]

The same charge has been thrown at some other liberal Muslim groups and NGOs such as ICIP (International Conference on Islam and Pluralism) and of course JIL. The utopian Islamists argue that understanding Islamic values and the Shari'ah by the yardstick of the West is absolutely unacceptable because Islam is assumed to have its own unique and never-changing belief system that is in conflict with that of the West.[146] They refer to the *fatwa* (legal opinions) on the prohibition of secularism, liberalism, and pluralism issued by MUI (Majlis Ulama Indonesia, or Indonesia Religious Scholars Council) on 28 July 2005.[147] One of the eleven *fatwa* released by MUI deals specifically with the prohibition of pluralism (the idea that all religions are the same), secularism, and liberalism.[148]

CONCLUSION

In summary, it may be safe to argue that the utopian approach of Indonesian Islamists relies on extra-parliamentary struggles as the path to the ideal Muslim polity. The utopian Islamists' arguments are based on several points. First, the Islamic government proposed by the utopian Islamists is all-encompassing and excels over all types of human-made systems, including democracy. Accordingly, the utopian Islamists denounce the various, secular systems of governance, both in Indonesia and all over the world, as un-Islamic models of polity that must be rejected. Second, as a corollary they regard the way of a parliamentary struggle, that is, through political engagement with the electoral system, as nothing but a vindication of the existing political order. To them, the parliamentary or political party system is a "political grave"

for morally true Muslim activists. Third, toppling the existing government must be undertaken through gradual and evolutionary means by arming society and culture with Islamic values and practices. They believe it is only a matter of time before, the current un-Islamic system is transformed into an Islamic one.

Despite the resistant attitudes towards democracy, the utopian Islamists do not try to determine their activists' attitudes towards electoral politics. There is a sense of ambivalence between vision and practice that seems to indicate that there are very pragmatic considerations behind this attitude. Repeatedly, the utopian Islamists have declared their inclination to give support to anyone whose visions reflect the aspirations of the Shari'ah. Thus, the utopian Islamists are likely to cast their votes in general elections to those candidates whose visions are appealing to them. The question as to whether or not these attitudes are merely driven by pragmatism, however, needs further investigation. What seems clear is that they are concerned very much with the issue of Shari'ah. In this context, they tend to employ a wait-and-see strategy to seizing power. They would of course be happy to be in power because one of the main purposes of their activism is to seize the public sphere in a wider sense. They would also be happy to affiliate themselves in a non-formal way with existing political parties — especially the Islamic ones — as long as the latter could accommodate their interests. This is because their main concern is to transplant Islamic values into the existing order.

The utopian approach assumes that power is an integral part of the struggle. The utopian Islamists have established efficient and powerful organizational structures to this end and mastered modern strategies of communication. In particular, they use various media to socially construct their enemy and to disseminate discourses (and anti-discourses) on democracy. Despite the fact that their arguments are based on theological foundations, their rejection of democracy is never a matter of theology per se. The political utopia of victorious Islam seems to be a strong driving force behind their resistance. They have also proven able to refute the arguments for democracy on the basis of the gap between its own values and actions. In addition, democracy is portrayed as being synonymous with the typically Western values of capitalism, liberalism, secularism, individualism, and pluralism.

Notes

[1] R. Scott Appleby, "History in the Fundamentalist Imagination", *The Journal of American History* 89, no. 2 (September 2002): 498–511; cf. Eric Davis, "The

Uses of Historical Memories", *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 3 (July 2005): pp. 54–68.

2 Interview with Wahyuddin, Solo, 26 April 2005; cf. interview with Irfan S. Awwas, Yogyakarta, 27 April 2005.

3 See, for instance, Riaz Hasan, "Muslim Perceptions of The Other", in *Muslims and the West: Encounter and Dialogue*, edited by Zafar Ishaq Ansari and John L. Esposito (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, 2001), pp. 196–215.

4 Robert D. Lee, *Overcoming Tradition and Modernity: The Search for Islamic Authenticity* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).

5 Lori Peek, "Becoming Muslim, The Development of a Religious Identity", *Sociology of Religion* 66, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 215–42.

6 Fauzan Al-Anshari, "Hakekat Demokrasi", <http://majelis.mujahidin.or.id/kolom/opini_dan_artikel/hakekat_demokrasi> (accessed 28 November 2005).

7 Ahmad S. Moussalli, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992).

8 'Abd al-Qadim Zallum, *Nizam al-Hukm fi al-Islam* (n.p.: Min Mansurat Hizb al-Tahrir, 2002), p. 216.

9 Ibid., p. 5.

10 Ibid., pp. 217–18.

11 'Abd al-Qadim Zallum, *Al-Dimuqratiyah Nizam Kufr*, pp. 10–11.

12 HTI, "Ironi Demokrasi", *Buletin al-Islam* 166, 13 August 2003 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alislam&id=166> (accessed 23 January 2006).

13 The board of *ummah* (*Majlis al-Ummah*) consists of representatives elected by the people in the caliphate system.

14 HTI, "Ironi Demokrasi".

15 Ibid. See also Agus Salim, "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982–2004): Its Political Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilization, and Collective Action Frames" (Masters thesis, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2005), pp. 205–8.

16 John O. Voll, "Islam and Democracy: Is Modernization a Barrier?" in *Modernization, Democracy and Islam*, edited by Shireen T. Hunter and Huma Malik (London: Praeger in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 2005), p. 86.

17 Emmanuel Sivan, "The Enclave Culture", in *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, edited by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).

18 In repudiating democracy, the utopian Islamists feel it is necessary to refer to the *fatwas* of the Middle Eastern *salafi* scholars to give their attitudes a sense of the sacred or religiously legitimate. To some extent, therefore, it can be said that the discourse of anti-democracy in Indonesia is influenced by the same discourses that happened in the Middle East, which draw attention of Muslims all around the world. The accessibility of materials from the Middle East is one of the important factors making the same discourses in Indonesia possible,

partly due to the translation efforts of some Muslim students and activists. These materials are then uploaded onto internet websites in order to spread them more widely. One of the websites that provides an ardent debate between proponents and opponents of democracy is the *salafy* homepage which can be accessed at <http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=262>.

19 Interview with Irfan S. Awwas, Yogyakarta, 27 April 2005; cf. interview with Fauzan Al-Anshari, Jakarta, 10 May 2005.

20 Interview with Irfan S. Awwas, Yogyakarta, 27 April 2005.

21 Some of the textual arguments of the utopian Islamists' rejection of democracy can be found at a *Salafi* website <http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=262> (accessed 6 August 2005).

22 "Islam, Demokrasi, dan Modernisasi?" *Buletin al-Islam*, 20 May 2005 <http//www.hayatulislam.net/comments.php?id=P591_0_1_0_C> (accessed 10 July 2005).

23 Personal communication with Al-Khaththath, May 2005.

24 Ibid.

25 Interview with Irfan S. Awwas, Yogyakarta, 27 April 2005.

26 Interview with Hasyim Yahya, an MMI activist, Surabaya, 23 May 2005; cf. interview with Wahyuddin, an MMI activist and director of Ngruki Pesantren, Solo, 26 April 2005; cf. "Penghancuran Islam secara Sistematis", *Buletin al-Islam* 167, 20 August 2003 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alislam&id=167> (accessed 16 December 2005).

27 Interview with Irfan S. Awwas, Yogyakarta, 27 April 2005.

28 Ibid.

29 Sivan, "The Enclave Culture", p. 45.

30 Interview with Irfan S. Awwas, Yogyakarta, 27 April 2005.

31 This is clear, especially in the vision of the FPI (Front of Defenders of Islam).

32 Irfan S. Awwas, *Dakwah & Jihad Abu Bakar Ba'asyir*, 3rd ed. (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2003), p. 230.

33 M.R. Kurnia, "Tiga Isu Utama Dakwah Islam", *Al-Wa'ie* 57, 1 May 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=19> (accessed 19 December 2005).

34 For a succinct discussion of this doctrine, see, for instance, Michael Cook, *Forbidding Wrong in Islam: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

35 Hadith narrated by Bukhari and Muslim.

36 Hasan A. Hasan, "Kemajuan dan Stabilitas Kaum Muslimin Ada pada Islam, Bukan pada Demokrasi", *Al-Wa'ie* 61, September 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=71> (accessed 19 December 2005); cf. HTI, "Islam Menawarkan Solusi, Bukan Janji", *Buletin al-Islam* 197, 24 March 2004 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alislam&id=197> (accessed 19 December 2005).

37 "Harga Mahal Demokratisasi", *Buletin al-Islam* 43, 21 February 2001 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alislam&id=43>.

[38] Yusanto did not refer to a specific period of time and source for this number so it is not confirmed.

[39] Interview between Ismail Yusanto and *Sabili*, 14 November 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=jubir&id=21> (accessed 13 December 2005).

[40] Interview with Irfan S. Awwas, Yogyakarta, 27 April 2005.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.; cf. interview with Fauzan Al-Anshari, Jakarta, 10 May 2005.

[43] This paradigm is in line with constructivist perspectives of social reality. For further discussion about this, see, for instance, Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin, 1971); see also Peter L. Berger, *The Social Reality of Religion* (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin, 1973).

[44] For more information on Wittgenstein's "language game theory", see Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958).

[45] Michael Shapiro, *Language and Political Understanding* (Michigan: UMI Out-Of-Print Books on Demand, 1981), p. 24.

[46] James A. Aho, *This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1994), p. 26.

[47] Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction of Reality*.

[48] Aho, *This Thing of Darkness*, p. 30.

[49] Constructing Muslims as the new enemy has been a hotly debated issue since the September 11 tragedy. One of the debates has been discussed in Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells, eds., *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

[50] Such labels, easily found in the Qur'an, can lead to a sense of self-fulfilling prophecy, particularly in a negative sense. Most Islamists deploy such labels to portray the contemporary situation of their time and to predict the trajectory of themselves and their enemies in the future.

[51] David Wright-Neville, "Anti-Westernism, Indonesian Democracy and the 'Politics of Dashed Expectations'", in *The Year of Voting Frequently: Politics and Artists in Indonesia's 2004 Elections*, edited by Margaret Kartomi (Clayton, Vic.: Monash Asia Institute, 2005), pp. 115–16.

[52] Ibid., p. 116.

[53] For further discussion on conspiracy theories, see, among others, Leonidas Donskis, "The Conspiracy Theory, Demonization of the Other", *Innovation* 11, no. 3 (1998): 349–60.

[54] For a discussion on how the United States constructs its enemies particularly in the post-September 11 era, see, among others, Eleanor Stein, "Construction of an Enemy", *Monthly Review* 55, no. 3 (July/August 2003): 125–29. For the socio-political construction of the enemy among Indonesian Islamists, see, for instance, Farid Wadjdi, "Propaganda Jahat Bush terhadap Islam dan Khilafah", under the rubric *Opini Anda* <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=opini&id=21> (accessed 14 December 2005). See also "Bush Perjelas Permusuhannya terhadap

Islam dan Sistem Khilafah", weekly editorial, 25 October 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=editorial&id=16> (accessed 14 December 2005); cf. "Mewaspadai Upaya Penghancuran Islam", *Buletin al-Islam* 254, 14 May 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alislam&id=254> (accessed 15 December 2005).

55 M. Ramdhan Adhi, "Strategi AS di Dunia Islam Pasca 11/9", *Al-Wa'ie* 61, September 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=81> (accessed 14 December 2005).

56 HTI, "Islam Jadi Korban Terorisme, padahal korban bom di Indonesia kebanyakan beragama Islam", <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=news&id=279> (accessed 12 February 2007).

57 Ibid.

58 See HTI, "Konspirasi Kafir Barat Menyerang Ummat Islam", *Buletin al-Islam* 23, 13 September 2000 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alislam&id=23>.

59 For an interesting account of the Islamists' view of modernity see, for instance, Roxanne L. Euben, "Premodern, Antimodern or Postmodern? Islamic and Western Critiques of Modernity", *The Review of Politics* 59, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 429–59.

60 Aho, *This Thing of Darkness*, especially pp. 23–34.

61 Irfan S. Awwas, "Mujahid Militan Melawan Amerika", *Sabili* 20, 23 April 2004, pp. 94–95.

62 Ibid., p. 95.

63 Denny Kodrat, "Barat dan 'Ideologi Setan'", *Al-Wa'ie* 61 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=70> (accessed 13 December 2005).

64 Chomsky's criticisms of the United States have been widely shared by HTI activists in expounding their conspiracy theories about the United States undermining the power of Islam. Chomsky's book, *Maling Teriak Maling: Amerika Sang Teroris?,* a translation version of his book *September 11* published by Mizan Press in 2001, was among the bestsellers widely read after the September 11 tragedy. See Noam Chomsky, *September 11* (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2001).

65 Kodrat, "Barat dan 'Ideologi Setan'".

66 This statement was made before the United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Bali, 3–14 December 2007, where the configuration of the countries changed and where the majority of the participants of the conference, except the United States, Canada, Japan, and Russia, came to an agreement to reduce 25–40 per cent of their emissions by 2020. For a complete report of the conference, see <http://unfccc.int/2860.php> (accessed 13 January 2008).

67 A formal statement has recently been released by HTI regarding its rejection of abortion. See Kantor Jubir HTI, "Pernyataan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Menolak Legalisasi Aborsi", issued on 14 September 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/ver/lowres/main.php?page=jubir&id=15> (accessed 17 December 2005).

[68] The book Kodrat refers to is S.K. Henshaw and E. Morrow, *Induced Abortion: A World Review*, 1990 Supplement (Geneva: Alan Guttmacher Institute, 1990).

[69] Kodrat, "Barat dan 'Ideologi Setan'".

[70] This opinion is also shared by Farid Wajdi, "Larangan Jilbab dan Mitos Demokrasi", *Pikiran Rakyat*, Opinion Column, 19 January 2004; cf. his "Motif Sesungguhnya Pelarangan Hijab", <http://swaramuslim.net/more.php?id=1661_0_0_1_0_M> (accessed 17 July 2005).

[71] This claim shows that Kodrat was not familiar with this law. The law bans all conspicuous religious symbols — Muslim, Jewish, and Catholic — in French public primary and secondary schools.

[72] Interview with Irfan S. Awwas, Yogyakarta, 27 April 2005.

[73] M. Shiddiq Al-Jawi, "Ushul Fiqh Palsu Kaum Liberal", *Al-Wa'ie* 56 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=7> (accessed 16 December 2005); cf. M. Shiddiq Al-Jawi, "Kelompok Liberal itu Agen Penjajah", *Al-Wa'ie* 58 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=34> (accessed 16 December 2005).

[74] Farid Wadjdi, "Tiga Agenda Menghadapi Pemikiran Liberal", *Hayatulislam.com*, 26 May 2005.

[75] HTI, "Islam Liberal: Liberalisme Berbaju Islam", *Buletin al-Islam,* 1 January 2003.

[76] See, among others, Sayyid Qutb, *Hadha al-Din* (Cairo: Dar al-Qalam, 1962).

[77] Jon Anderson, "New Media, New Publics: Reconfiguring the Public Sphere of Islam", *Social Research* 70, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 887–906.

[78] Further information on the role of the internet in the process of identity construction among Indonesian Islamists, see, among others, Birgit Bräuchler, "Islamic Radicalism Online: The Moluccan Mission of the Laskar Jihad in Cyberspace", *Australian Journal of Anthropology* 15, no. 3 (2004): 267–85.

[79] For more on this, see, Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2006), pp. 81–84.

[80] 'Abd al-Qadim Zallum, *Demokrasi Sistem Kufur* (Jakarta: Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 2001). The Arabic version, *Al-Dimuqratiyah Nizam Kufr*, was published in 1991.

[81] G. Bunt, *Virtually Islamic: Computer-mediated Communication and Cyber Islamic Environments* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000), pp. 102–3. See also Bräuchler, "Islamic Radicalism Online".

[82] The Bali bombing and other Islamist-related atrocities have shown how Islamist operations in Indonesia were well controlled by Jihadist Islamists. Imam Samudra, the mastermind of the first Bali bombing, claims to have mastered some elementary programmes of the internet such as Linux, Unix, Perl, Delphi, Pascal, CGI, and so on. In order to disseminate his Jihadist ideas, he created

a website called "istimata" <http://www.istimata.com>, an Arabic-derived word that literally means "looking for death". He was suspected of carrying out his Jihadist operations by means of this technology. For further information on Samudra's skills in high technology, see Imam Samudra, *Aku Melawan Teroris!* (Solo: Jazera, 2004), especially pp. 259–66.

83 See HTI's website at <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id> and MMI's website at <http://majelis.mujahidin.or.id>.

84 See <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id>.

85 Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: The Season for a New Ummah* (London: Hurst, 2004), pp. 77–79.

86 HTI, "Kekerasan, Terorisme, dan Dialog Antarumat Beragama", *Buletin al-Islam*, 16 December 2004.

87 Interview with Ismail Yusanto, Jakarta, 11 May 2005.

88 Wadjdi, "Larangan Jilbab dan Mitos Demokrasi" and "Motif Sesungguhnya Pelarangan Hijab".

89 As I mentioned earlier, the utopian Islamists do not seem to be well informed about the ban. President Jacques Chirac of France was of course not undermining Muslims when he proposed the ban in parliament, since he referred to all religious symbols — be it the Islamic veil, the Jewish skullcap, Christian cross — that were "of plainly excessive dimensions". See, "Ban Religious Attire in School, French Panel Says", *New York Times*, 12 December 2003.

90 Wadjdi, "Motif Sesungguhnya Pelarangan Hijab".

91 Wadjdi, "Larangan Jilbab dan Mitos Demokrasi".

92 See, among others, Farid Wadjdi, "Kediktatoran Sistem Demokrasi", weekly editorial, 30 August 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=editorial&id=10> (accessed 14 December 2005).

93 Denny Kodrat, "Syari'ah, Khilafah, dan Jihad: Target Barat dalam Perang Melawan Terorisme", *Al-Wa'ie* 65, 1 January 2006 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=135> (accessed 22 December 2006).

94 HTI, "Penjelasan dan Peringatan Bagi Masyarakat, Bersekutu dengan Amerika: Tindakan Kriminal yang diharamkan", *Buletin al-Islam* 76, 10 October 2001 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/ver/lowres/main.php?page=alislam&id=76> (accessed 21 December 2005).

95 HTI, "Kediktatoran Sistem Demokrasi", *Buletin al-Islam*, 30 August 2005.

96 Ibid.

97 Irfan S. Awwas, "Mujahid Militan Melawan Amerika", *Sabili* 20, 23 April 2004, p. 94.

98 Ibid., p. 95.

99 Interview with Irfan S. Awwas, Yogyakarta, 27 April 2005.

100 Ibid.

101 Jillian Schwedler, "A Paradox of Democracy? Islamist Participation in Elections", *Middle East Report* 209 (Winter 1998): 25–29.

102 Wadjdi, "Larangan Jilbab dan Mitos Demokrasi".

[103] M.R. Kurnia, "Meraih Kekuasaan", *Al-Wa'ie* 62, 1 October 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=92> (accessed 19 December 2005).

[104] HTI, "Merumuskan Kembali Parpol Islam", *Buletin al-Islam* 159, 25 June 2003 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alislam&id=159> (accessed 19 December 2005).

[105] The result of this research has been summarized by Saiful Mujani, a member of the research group, in three articles published by *Media Indonesia*, 12 November 2004. The three articles are: (1) "Fenomena Demokrat Islamis" [The phenomenon of Islamist democrats]; (2) "Alienasi Islamis, Modal Kultural bagi Aktivis Islamis" [Islamist alienation, cultural capital for Islamist activists]; and (3) "Agenda-agenda Islamis, Sumber Parokialisme Politik" [Islamist agendas, source of political parochialism].

[106] For further discussion this issue, see, among others, François Burgat, "Ballot Boxes, Militaries, and Islamic Movements", in *The Islamism Debate*, edited by Martin Kramer (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1997), pp. 35–42.

[107] Interview with Ismail Yusanto, Jakarta, 11 May 2005.

[108] "Anggota Hizbut Tahrir Bebas Pilih Capres", *Suara Merdeka*, 24 July 2004 <http://suaramerdeka.com/cybernews/harian/0407/24/nas18.htm> (accessed 18 July 2005).

[109] "Aktivis Hizbut Tahrir Pilih Golput", *Gatra,* 26 April 2004 <http://www.gatra.com/artikel.php?pil=23&id=36473> (accessed 12 August 2005).

[110] This information was given by a non-HTI informant during fieldwork. The informant's reliability is questionable.

[111] Vickie Langohr, "Of Islamists and Ballot Boxes: Rethinking the Relationship between Islamisms and Electoral Politics", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33 (2001): 591–610.

[112] HTI, "KPU, Pemilu, dan Korupsi", *Buletin al-Islam* 253, 4 May 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alislam&id=253> (accessed 12 August 2005).

[113] Ibid.

[114] Mohammad Shiddiq Al-Jawi, "Pemilu dalam Islam: Hakikat dan Hukumnya", *Al-Wa'ie* 41 (January 2004): 14.

[115] Taqi Al-Nabhani, *Al-Tafkir* (n.p.: 1973), p. 92.

[116] Hadith narrated by Muslim.

[117] Al-Jawi, "Pemilu dalam Islam", p. 15.

[118] This point has been made clear by Al-Nabhani himself. See Al-Nabhani, *Al-Tafkir*, pp. 91–92.

[119] Al-Jawi, "Pemilu dalam Islam", p. 18.

[120] See also 'Abd al-Qadim Zallum, *Al-Dimuqratiyah Nizam Kufr,* p. 1; cf. his *Afkar Siyasiyah* (Beirut: Dar al-Ummah, 1994), pp. 139–40.

[121] For more detailed information on the difference between the two systems, see Abu Zaid, "Membandingkan Pemilu dalam Sistem Islam dan Sistem Demokrasi", *Al-Wa'ie* 41 (January 2004): 19–22.

122 "Majlis Mujahidin tidak Larang Warganya Pilih Golput", *Eramuslim*, 1 April 2004 <http://www.eramoslem.com/br/pm/44/9734,1,v.html> (accessed 14 December 2004).

123 "Kriteria Capres dari Ustadz Ba'asyir", *Sabili* 25, 2 July 2004, pp. 29–30.

124 Ibid., p. 30.

125 Interview with Irfan S. Awwas, Yogyakarta, 27 April 2005.

126 Irfan S. Awwas, "Mujahidin Militan", p. 95.

127 See Dj. Saputra, "Mengkaji Ulang Perjuangan Intraparlemen", *Hayatul Islam* <www.hayatulislam.net/comments.php?id=591_0_1_0_C> (accessed 15 December 2005).

128 Roy, *Globalised Islam*, p. 3.

129 Farid Wadjdi, "Sekularisme, Liberalisme, dan Pluralisme (Ide-ide Barat-Kapitalis yang Berbahaya", *Al-Wa'ie* 61 (1 September 2005). The issue of despising and fighting against secularism is a popular topic easily found in almost every single article or sermon developed by the Islamists.

130 See HTI, "Islam dan Negara Tak Bisa Dipisahkan", *Buletin al-Islam* 22, 6 September 2000 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alislam&id=22> (accessed 21 December 2005).

131 HTI, "Bahaya Kebebasan yang Diusung Sekularisme", *Buletin al-Islam* 262, 6 July 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alislam&id=262> (accessed 21 December 2005).

132 Interview with Irfan S. Awwas, Yogyakarta, 27 April 2005.

133 Wadjdi, "Sekularisme, Liberalisme, dan Pluralisme".

134 HTI, "Bahaya Kebebasan yang Diusung Sekularisme".

135 HTI, "Tidak Ada Kebebasan Mengekspresikan Kemaksiatan", *Buletin al-Islam*, 14 May 2003.

136 Regarding the Islamists' full support of the regulation of RUU-APP, see Muhammad Al-Khaththath, "RUU-APP Demi Melindungi Akhlak Bangsa", *Al-Wa'ie* 69, 1 May 2006 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=202> (accessed 25 October 2006).

137 Wadjdi, "Sekularisme, Liberalisme, dan Pluralisme". See also HTI, "Sekularisme; Pemasungan Ajaran Islam", *Buletin al-Islam* 39, 3 January 2001 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alislam&id=39> (accessed 21 December 2005).

138 The theological underpinning of "Islam warna-warni" has been explicated by Luthfi Assyaukanie, one of the activists of the Muslim Community of Utan Kayu, in his article, "Islam Warna-warni", *Koran Tempo,* 13 August 2002. This article was republished on the JIL website under the same title on the same date.

139 Burhanuddin, "'Inflasi Somasi: Kasus Iklan Islam Warna-warni", *Jaringan Islam Liberal*, 28 September 2002 <http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=158> (accessed 25 October 2006).

140 "Komunitas Utan Kayu Gugat MMI ke Polda Metro Jaya", *Tempointeraktif*, 24 September 2002 <http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/jakarta/2002/09/24/brk,20020924-07,id.html> (accessed 26 October 2006).

[141] The word pluralism is widely used in writings and articles published in the Liberal Islam Network (JIL), such as Luthfi Assyaukanie, "Berkah Sekularisme", *Jaringan Islam Liberal*, 11 April 2005 <http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=799>; cf. Assyaukanie, "Kapitalisme Religius?" *Jaringan Islam Liberal*, 8 April 2005 <http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=796>, to name but two. For further information on this, see <http://islamlib.com/>.

[142] "Bahaya Westernisasi di Dunia Islam", *Al-Wa'ie* 56, 1 April 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=4> (accessed 24 October 2006). See also "Mewaspadai Upaya Penghancuran Islam", *Buletin al-Islam* 254, 14 May 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alislam&id=254> (accessed 15 December 2005).

[143] Farid Wadjdi, "LSM Komprador dan Propaganda Anti-Islam", *Republika*, 24 June 2004.

[144] Rivai Hutapea, "Pikiran Sesat Kuasai Departemen Agama", *Sabili* 8, 5 November 2004, pp. 17–20.

[145] Al-Jawi, "Ushul Fiqh Palsu Kaum Liberal".

[146] Yahya Abdurrahman, "Kesalahan Metodologi Kelompok Liberal", *Al-Wa'ie* 58, 1 June 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=35> (accessed 21 December 2005).

[147] Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, "Absurditas Penolak Fatwa MUI", *Republika*, 15 August 2005. On the controversy of MUI's *fatwas*, see M.C. Ricklefs, "Islam on the March", *Australian Financial Review*, 2 September 2005.

[148] "11 Fatwa MUI, Mulai Imam Perempuan hingga Liberalisme", *Detikcom*, 29 July 2005 <www.detiknews.com/index.php/detik.read/tahun/2005/bulan/07/tgl/29/time/102255/idnews/412287/idkanal/10> (accessed 5 February 2007).

6

TOWARDS A HOME-GROWN DEMOCRACY? On the Meliorist Islamist Acceptance of Democracy

CRAFTING ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY: THE NEW ERA OF POLITICAL ISLAM

It must be emphasized from the outset that although PKS does not explicitly refer to Islam in its name, it claims to be an Islamic party. PKS was established in 1998 under the original name Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, or PK) by university-based *dakwah* activists from the so-called *Tarbiyah* (literally, "religious education") movement.[1] At the time the party was established, *Tarbiyah* was a closed movement whose members were carefully selected and inducted into a programme designed to inculcate religious pietism. PK was founded by some of the leaders of the *Tarbiyah* movement following the downfall of Soeharto's New Order regime in 1998.[2] Much of its support came from campus-based Islamist groups and young graduates who had been active in *Tarbiyah* circles.

According to Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, the decision of some *Tarbiyah* leaders in 1998 to form PK(S) was as a reaction to the post-Soeharto lifting of politically repressive measures and the belief that it was now time to move into a new stage focused on formal politics and popular appeal.[3] The exclusivity of *Tarbiyah* thus gave way to a more inclusive and outward-looking approach. By the time of the 1999 election, PK claimed to have about 60,000 members. When the party announced its re-formation under the name PKS in mid-2003, it already had more than 300,000 members.

The party consciously recruited members from a non-*Tarbiyah* background to broaden its appeal and, in the 2004 election, fielded more than thirty non-Muslim legislative candidates.[4]

While *Tarbiyah* members regarded the Islamization of society, the economy, and the state as a cornerstone of their struggle, PKS downplayed these issues in the 1999 and 2004 elections, emphasizing instead "secular" and popular themes such as fighting corruption, socio-economic equality, and the need for clean and good governance.[5] Party leaders made clear that their stance on these issues was informed by Islamic norms, but they usually conveyed their electoral messages in religiously neutral rhetoric. This is not to say that PKS leaders had abandoned their earlier commitment to Islamist causes; rather, they argued that it was premature and ultimately counter-productive to take such issues to the broader electorate.[6] Most voters, they believed, had a poor understanding of Brotherhood principles and PKS did not want to risk being labelled sectarian or radical if it promoted such an agenda. Thus, PKS' constitution and manifesto made no explicit mention of establishing an Islamic state.[7]

To a certain degree, a democratic element was behind the establishment of PKS, since it was founded on the basis of a democratic poll of over 6,000 students and alumni of the LDK/KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, or Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union) network.[8] However, the extent to which the idea of democracy is appreciated by the party's cadres and activists is another question. There are of course disagreements within PKS as a result of the tension between Islamist causes and the commitment to democracy. For some PKS leaders, such as Fachry Hamzah, a former KAMMI leader and now PKS member of the national parliament, the party's true political objective is a state based on Islamic law. He maintains, "Today democracy is our playing field, but we cannot abandon our religious ambitions",[9] On the other hand, this party can be seen as a bridge between radical Islamists and Muslim organizations that are committed to democracy. Elizabeth F. Collins and Ihsan Ali Fauzi, for instance, characterize the party as being "a moderate alternative to radical Islamism".[10] This can be seen by the fact that the founders of PKS support democracy, though ironically because democracy provides a way to establish an Islamic government. They say time and again that there is no necessary contradiction between Islam and democracy. Hidayat Nur Wahid, then party chairman and now the chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly (Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or MPR), has tried to position PKS as a "centrist Islamist party" that occupies the middle ground between radical Islamist groups that reject democracy on the one hand and Muslim organizations committed to democracy on the

other.[11] In his view, there is a broad variety of Islamist groups, ranging from radical Salafi groups that are open to the use of violence and old Masyumi activists, including those who support the Jakarta Charter and who would impose Islamic law on Muslims, to moderate civil society groups committed to democratic values such as the mass organizations Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).[12]

In the party's formal constitution, democracy is mentioned as one of its values.[13] What PKS means by democracy is its acceptance of the universal and basic values of democracy that the capacity of mankind as *khalifatullah* (God's vicegerent) on earth to determine its own destiny.[14] The opportunity in democracy to freely express an argument leads to the aggregation of societal potentialities so that the strength of togetherness may be formed. The people's participation in electoral politics should be appreciated but must not go against the basic principle of *shura* (deliberation, consultation). *Shura* is a system dealing with how power is managed and distributed in states or societies whose values are derived from the Qur'an.[15]

Some observers are positive about the performance of PKS. Bubalo and Fealy, for instance, give credit to PKS for its positive contribution to the process of democratization in Indonesia.[16] The party is said to have offered a new paradigm of political behaviour and greater electoral choice, generating an alternative to the oligarchic structures that tend to underpin autocratic regimes. In this regard, the role that PKS has played demonstrates how Islamists and/or Islamism can sometimes assist in a process of democratization. According to Bubalo and Fealy, not all types of Islamism have a destructive effect on political life. In their evaluation, the party's distinctiveness is a direct consequence of its Brotherhood-derived ideology and norms. Although the party has adapted its ideology to fit Indonesian political conditions, its core frame of reference, in the opinion of Bubalo and Fealy, remains that of the Brotherhood. Viewed from this perspective, it may be argued that this particular form of Middle Eastern influence has by and large had a positive impact on Indonesian political life.[17]

R. William Liddle has also appreciated the positive contribution made by PKS to the process of democratization in Indonesia, following its success in the 2004 elections. In his opinion, one of the factors that made PKS successful on the political stage is the fact that the party used double standards in its campaigns.[18] As a cadre-based party, PKS imposed stringent religious values and a set of moral standards on its members. Interestingly, the members and activists of this party were so buoyed by their enthusiasm for Islamic ideology that they showed a strong commitment to high moral standards. The same enthusiasm cannot be found in other Islamic or Muslim-based parties such as

PKB, PAN, and PBB. In other words, PKS used religion for "indoor" purposes only. Outwardly, however, this party employed religiously neutral language, focusing on issues such as overcoming poverty, anti-corruption, clean governance, and distribution of justice, in order to appeal to a wider electorate.

PKS was fully aware that the use of Islamic issues such as the application of Shari'ah would be counter-productive and would be rejected by large portions of society. What the people needed was real action to deal with the plight of the common people (*wong cilik*). It took the neglected *wong cilik* as the main theme of its political campaign. In reality, it could attract the public's attention by presenting itself as a moral reform party that distinguished itself from the political status quo. In 2003 PKS had issued a campaign statement entitled "*24 Alasan PKS sebagai Musuh Wong Licik*" (Twenty-four reasons why PKS is the enemy of slippery characters) and "*15 Alasan PKS sebagai Sahabat Wong Cilik*" (Fifteen reasons why PKS is the friend of ordinary people), based on newspaper clippings about PKS representatives who refused to be involved in corruption. To cite just one example, in 2003 the South Sumatra provincial legislature voted to disburse RP 7.5 billion (US$900,000) from the provincial operating budget to the seventy-five members of the provincial legislature. Only the PKS representative refused to take his cut. When newspapers picked up the story, the resulting scandal forced the other legislators to return the money.[19] This strategy proved to be successful during PKS' campaign. In the 2004 elections, PKS increased its share of the vote to

TABLE 6.1
Total Votes of Islamic and/or Muslim-Based Parties in the 1999 election

No.	Party	Votes	%	Seats in DPR
1.	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	13,336,823	12.62	51
2.	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	11,329,905	10.72	58
3.	Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)	7,488,956	7.12	34
4.	Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)	2,069,708	1.94	13
5.	Partai Keadilan (PK) (forerunner of PKS)	1,436,563	1.36	7
6.	PPNUI	679,178	0.64	5
7.	Others	3,417,592	3.21	4
	TOTAL	39,758,725	37.61	172

Source: Final results of the 1999 election by the KPU. Total vote of the election was 105,846,000.

TABLE 6.2
Total Votes of Islamic and/or Muslim-Based Parties in the 2004 election

No.	Party	Votes	%	Seats in DPR
1.	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	11,989,564	10.57	52
2.	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	9,248,764	8.15	58
3.	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)	8,325,020	7.34	45
4.	Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)	7,303,324	6.44	52
5.	Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)	2,970,487	2.62	11
6.	Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR)	2,764,998	2.44	13
7.	Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ulama (PPNU)	895,610	0.79	—
	TOTAL	43,497,767	38.35	231

Source: KPU's final announcement of legislative election results, released on 5 May 2004. The total number of legal votes was 113,462,414 of a total 124,449,038 votes. The total number of short-listed voters in the 2004 elections were 148,000,369 of the total Indonesian population, which stood at 214,187,047.

7.34 per cent, or 8.3 million votes, from 1.36 per cent, or 679.178 voters, in 1999 (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2). In Jakarta, PKS actually had the strongest showing of any party.[20] The number of party cadres increased steeply, from 5,000 core cadres and 42,000 supporting cadres in 1999 to 25,000 core cadres and 400,000 supporting cadres.[21]

Saiful Mujani, a researcher of the Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, or LSI) and the Freedom Institute, complimented the performance of PKS in the 2004 election and described it as one of Indonesia's most promising parties.[22] Although it had not reached the minimum electoral vote in the 1999 elections, its cadres and activists had remained energetic and worked hard to consolidate the party internally. They were actively involved in spreading of party's programmes to a wider audience through numerous social activities. PKS cadres and activists, notably those with high educational qualifications, were able to show their competency in dealing with economic problems. These factors may all have contributed to attracting a wider audience from various social and religious backgrounds. In fact, despite the image of PKS as an Islamist party whose commitment is to implement the Shari'ah in Indonesia, Hidayat Nur Wahid, then chairman of the party, was able to cultivate and transform the party's commitment to Shari'ah by means of substantive and inclusive themes during his campaign.

Martin van Bruinessen is another scholar who has been impressed by the performance of PKS. Indeed, he considers it the most rational and rationalized party in the Indonesian political system — in a Weberian sense.[23] The party does not depend on primordial loyalties but on merit and political ideas; moreover, its leaders are refreshingly uncharismatic — an important characteristic of a modern party. Van Bruinessen also praises the party as "imperfect democrats but perhaps Indonesia's strongest force for democratization".[24] He further argues that PKS is

> One of the very few forces in the political arena that may seriously contribute to a gradual democratization of the country. One of the most obvious reasons is that the party believes in participation in the existing political system and in changing society through persuasion of individuals rather than through grabbing power … It is not the party's theoretical ideas about divine versus human sovereignty that will determine its democratic performance but its acceptance of the rules of the game and the fact that it is rational and rationalized organization".[25]

In practice — if not in discourse — PKS is relatively moderate and patient, and it accepts pluralism as a given. PKS' political manifesto endorses democracy based on popular sovereignty in principle, except where this is explicitly in conflict with divine command. Van Bruinessen also acknowledges PKS' openness to the equal participation of women in public life, since the manifesto explicitly endorses equality for women.

Despite its achievements, however, PKS has also drawn criticism. The double-standard strategy adopted by the party is singled out by Bubalo and Fealy.[26] In their opinion, PKS has frequently cultivated a public image of itself that is basically at odds with its internal discourse.[27] While its spokespersons have stressed the party's commitment to pluralism and tolerance, PKS training documents and websites indicate a far more militant stream of thinking among many of its branches. Bubalo and Fealy also criticize PKS' choice of legislative candidates in the 2004 election. The most controversial of these was Tamsil Linrung who was nominated by PKS to stand in South Sulawesi despite his alleged connections with several violent Islamic organizations, including *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI), and his reputation for financial mismanagement. Another notorious PKS representative is the member of parliament, Soeripto, a former senior intelligence officer, who was under investigation for corruption during Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency and who has gained a high profile by promulgating clumsy conspiracy theories about Western involvement in contemporary terrorist acts.[28]

Anti-Zionist rhetoric is commonplace among many PKS members, as are various theories regarding global schemes to subjugate Muslims. A careful investigation of the curriculum used in *Tarbiyah* training would underline this assumption.[29] In this curriculum, there are at least four subjects taught that could lead to such an attitude: (1) *ghazw al-fikr* (war of thought); (2) International Zionism; (3) Disguised movements that oppose Islam; and (4) Institutions that fight Islam.[30] Such a destructive attitude is mainly derived from the essentialist approach developed within *Tarbiyah* circles that uncritically exploit certain Qur'anic verses. The oft-cited textual reference in anti-Zionist arguments is taken from the Qur'an verse 2:120: "Never will the Jews or the Christians be satisfied with thee unless follow their form of religion". This verse is then arbitrarily deployed as the framework for reading current global politics, with particular reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the unilateral policies of the United States.

Conspiracy theories also preoccupy the minds of some of the party's activists. For example, Hidayat Nur Wahid's comment on the second Bali bombing in 2005 was an absurd case in point. Instead of considering the possibility of Islamic terrorist involvement, he blamed the bombings on rivalries within the local tourism industry.[31] It is also alleged that some of PKS' activists (or supporters) were involved in several vandalistic and anarchic raids on the headquarters and mosques of Ahmadiyah, a sect accused of deviating from "true Islam" by the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majlis Ulama Indonesia, or MUI) in October 2005.[32] These attacks are due largely to the ongoing appeal of the ideology of physical *jihad* against God's enemies, identified as non-Muslims fighting against fellow Muslims. Many cadres and activists argue that *jihad* against non-Muslims is a part of their religious duty if it is undertaken appropriately, for instance, for defensive purposes. Abdullah Daeng Matta, the branch leader of PKS in Ambon, for example, was killed in a religious conflict in April 2004 and is considered by his fellow party members as a *shahid* (martyr).[33]

Saiful Mujani is another critic of the party. In his evaluation, the transformation of PKS from an exclusive to an inclusive party did not represent a genuine paradigm shift. What happened is instead a change at the practical level or outer structure, but not at an institutional level or the deep structure. According to Mujani, "Their political manifesto and statutes still explicitly state that the purpose of PKS is to make Indonesian society better on the basis of Islam".[34] In Mujani's opinion, a fundamental transformation can take place only when the party is willing to change its manifesto and statutes, for instance by declaring that the purpose of the party is to make Indonesia more democratic and more inclusive. The party's inclusiveness is

considered by Mujani as a strategy to swell its votes in the run-up to the 2009 election. To a certain extent, there is nothing wrong with this strategy. In the 1999 election, when the face of the party looked "scary", it could only gain an insignificant number of votes. A marked increase in support occurred in the 2004 election when the party revised its image into that of an inclusive party.

In a similar vein, Collins criticizes PKS as a cadre-based, closed party that has no interest in recruiting a mass following ignorant of Islamic principles.[35] The most appropriate tag is Sayyid Qutb's *nakhtalitun walakin natamayyazun* (we are engaged in society but not immersed in or polluted by bad practices of the society).[36] The succession process is also conducted in a closed and authoritarian manner, being controlled by the Advisory Council (Majlis Shura), a supreme body consisting of several unelected figures. Collins further argues that the structure of the party is not fully democratic because the Majlis Shura plays a central role in directing the party. The separation of powers within PKS into Majlis Shura and Tanfidhiyah is reminiscent of the political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in which the executive is controlled by a supreme body called *vilayat-e-faqih* (body of religious clerics). This undemocratic system can sometimes undermine relations between the superior body and the inferior one. It can lead to the absence of checks and balances in executing state policies.

Van Bruinessen has also expressed his concern some PKS leaders, belief in anti-Islamic conspiracies.[37] In his opinion, PKS is clearly not a liberal party and its vision of society clashes at some points with liberal democratic values. He also points to the gaps noted in party documents between the Shari'ah and democracy, something that may indicate that the party's embrace of democracy is limited to procedural elements only. Doubts may also linger as the real views of PKS on the position of non-Muslim minorities and the party's views on *hudud* punishments: will non-Muslim minorities be accepted as fully equal citizens or will they be protected but essentially treated unequally? Does the party aspire to have *hudud* punishments enacted in a distant future? Last but not least, van Bruinessen predicts the party is unlikely ever to grow large, due particularly to its insistence on the quality rather than the quantity of its members.[38]

Having said all of that, van Bruinessen acknowledges that PKS contributes to the process of democratization in the country.[39] One obvious reason behind this is that, unlike other Islamist groups, the party believes in electoral politics and in social transformation through gradual methods such as dialogue and persuasion. In addition to being moderate in practice, if not in discourse, the party also accepts pluralism as a given. The party's

acceptance of democracy can also be seen from its manifesto, which mentions explicitly the word "democracy" as one of the principles it embraces, except where this is explicitly in conflict with divine command.[40] This stance shows clearly that the party is at odds with its counterparts from the utopian wing who would always place the divine will above the will of the people and thus consider democracy a form of sinful hubris.

A far harsher is expounded by Sadanand Dhume, a former Jakarta-based correspondent of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* and *The Asian Wall Street Journal*. In one of his columns, he stigmatized PKS as "Indonesian Democracy's Enemy Within".[41] In an article published in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, he lumped PKS together with Jemaah Islamiyah in terms of "having subscribed to the same fundamentally anti-modern worldview", an argument which is conceptually reckless and empirically unfounded.[42] Dhume maintains that the moderate stance of PKS is no more than a strategy to avoid the backlash experienced by its Egyptian counterpart, the Brotherhood. He says that "the party's leaders tend to couch their statements in ambiguity designed to calm Western and secular Indonesian fears while at the same time reassuring the party's base about its goals — the Islamization of Indonesian society with the ultimate goal of imposing a state based on Shari'ah law".[43] He believes that the implementation of the cruel, seventh-century punishments of the Islamic Shari'ah would follow in a matter of time if this party came to power. "Sooner or later," he argues, "Indonesia's cultural pluralism — a cheerful acceptance of Taiwanese pop groups, Japanese Hello Kitty dolls and Bollywood movies — will run up against the Justice Party's drab fidelity to Arab culture alone".[44]

FROM POLITICAL ISLAM TO ISLAMIC POLITICS: TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM

> For Muslims, political activity is not to gain power but to serve the people. Power is not an end in itself. So we aim not to twist arms or stab in the back those who aspire to serve, but to cooperate … We do not aim to lead the nation to poverty and backwardness. Good causes are achieved through good means … We will continue to campaign on a platform of fighting corruption, violence and injustice, and to uphold Islamic values — the values that have been abused — within a framework of national unity and integrity.[45]

The above statement perhaps reflects the very spirit of PKS. The party wishes to prove to the public that politics is not necessarily a dirty area in which the Machiavellian slogan "ends justify means" becomes the only

mode of conduct. PKS wants to relieve the negative image of politics as an arena of the morally wicked and slippery. In addition, PKS wants "to speak out boldly in defense of moderate Islam — an Islam that upholds the sanctity of human life, reaches out to the oppressed, respects men and women alike, and insists on the fellowship of all humankind".[46] It should be emphasized that such political platforms are not without precedence. They try to draw lessons from — borrowing Olivier Roy's term — the "failure of political Islam".[47] In this formula, there is a sense of the "politicization of Islam" through the abuse of religious symbols for the sake of certain people's interests.[48] By this formula, PKS wishes to represent itself as an antithesis to some previous Islamic parties that were unable to perform genuine and "true" Islamic politics. This inability prompted constituents to withdraw their trust from these parties.

What PKS seems to display on the political stage is something different from the usual phenomenon mentioned above — this something is "Islamic politics".[49] For some PKS cadres, "Islamic politics" differs significantly from "political Islam" in that the latter makes power the end of politics, whereas the former views politics as the field of *dakwah* (missionary activity), the purpose of which is serving the people and empowering them by virtue of religious values.[50] For PKS cadres, "Islamic politics" should take precedence over "political Islam". The politicization of Islam must be replaced by the Islamization of politics. Thus, the problem is not over whether or not it is allowable to bring religion into politics, but whether or not it is allowable to politicize religion. PKS wants to go beyond religious symbols and place more emphasis on the substance behind them. The party's cadres believe that Islamic tradition provides such a model in building this paradigm. They strongly believe that this is what the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions had done throughout his prophecy in Mecca and Medina. They also believe that the Golden Age of Islam under the Abbasid dynasty was inspired by this prophetic paradigm. It is this paradigm that the party's cadres time and again want to reinforce in their messages to the public.

Nevertheless, Nur Wahid and Zulkieflimansyah agree that this ideal requires a serious and dedicated effort, to borrow Confucius' formula, "the journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step".[51] In this paradigm, building a strong and convincing track record as a moral and *dakwah* party is the priority of PKS.[52] It can be said therefore that PKS is a revised edition of the old paradigm adopted by preceding Islamic parties, especially Masyumi, which might be considered as "unfaithful" to the restoration of the state and the empowerment of the weak. It has indeed been most often the case that when these parties were in power, they utilized the symbols of religion to

gain as many votes as possible, while later failing to remember the plight of their constituents. It can be said that these parties took advantage of religious symbols as a *dagangan politik* (political stock-in-trade) and positioned their constituents as the victims of exploitation. Composed to such precedents, the reputation of PKS as a clean and caring party is unrivalled.

PKS has benefited from its image as a party morally committed to end corruption and poverty. The party won support from the grass roots by means of its down-to-earth programmes and activities. The increase in support between 1999 and 2004 may have come from those unaligned voters who shifted their support from one party to another. There are at least two main reasons why they gave their votes to PKS in 2004. First, they felt disillusioned by the factionalism and internal conflicts of interest within the parties for which they had voted in 1999. Second, they were disillusioned by the poor performance of the established parties that had failed to enhance the level of their prosperity. It seems that the constituents were very concerned about their daily problems and they were fully aware that rampant corruption and nepotism had brought about the crisis of the country. Their disillusionment with the old, established parties led them to shift their votes to another party that promised the change they had been wishing for. So, giving their votes to PKS does not necessarily mean that they supported the party's Islamist ideology. Rather, they were motivated by pragmatic considerations. The people's longing for a better life could be an explanations of why PKS increased its share of the vote in the 2004 election.

What PKS has been attempting to do is to convince the public that it is not the same sort of party as the previous Islamic parties. Instead, it seeks to become a new genre of Islamic party that represents morality. Rhetorically, that may be plausible. In reality, however, it is a challenge since Indonesia's political system has been overwhelmingly mired in corruption. The main question is: How can PKS maintain its "moral obstinacy" if the system is not conducive to it? To this question, there are only two possible answers. First, PKS keeps up its idealism but risks being left alone by other parties. Second, PKS can loosen its moral standards in return for pragmatic compromises while at the same time remaining strict with its cadres. This is of course one of the most challenging dilemmas the party is facing.[53] Looking at the current situation, however, it is very likely that PKS will be trapped in a situation where the second choice is inevitable. The party's decision to enter into a coalition with other parties in the second round of the 2004 presidential election to nominate Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and M. Jusuf Kalla — instead of staying neutral after their preferred candidates Amien Rais

and Siswono Yudhohusodo had been eliminated in the first round — is a compelling case in point.[54] Many assumed that this coalition epitomized the pragmatic approach of PKS as the party foresaw the likelihood of its survival given an SBY-Jusuf Kalla win.[55] Clearly, the party could benefit from the ascendancy of this pair.

As Vali Nasr argues, Muslim democracy will emerge from the political circle, not from a scholarly circle.[56] "Muslim Democrats", he points out, "can begin from an Islamist point of departure, as is the case with Turkey's AKP …"[57] What PKS has achieved so far seems to confirm Nasr's theoretical assumption, provided that this party keeps going on the right track of democracy. The party does not have a highly sophisticated notion of what Islamic politics comprises, but it does have a set of practical guidelines, taken from numerous and various sources, of how Islamic politics could be put into practice. PKS is to a certain degree practising what one may call "eclectic politics", a pragmatic attitude based on selection from any source as long as it is considered morally — and religiously — praiseworthy. Although its main reference is al-Banna, PKS is adept at using respected Islamic scholars, both international and domestic ones, as its references, for instance Yusuf al-Qardhawi, Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb,[58] Mohammad Natsir, Amien Rais, Nurcholish Madjid, and so forth. The party's cadres are eager to learn from what they consider to be the pristine heirs of outstanding Muslim personalities. Religiously, PKS has learned a lot from puritanical reformist visions. Politically, it benefits a great deal from modernist groups. It is an entity based on translated ideas from and discourses of modernist and neo-modernist politics.

It seems that what lingers in the minds and hearts of PKS activists is the idea of "glory", more specifically, the glory of Islam as it was in the past. The party has a road map to success to realize this idea of glory. If the party had a chance to lead the country, it would launch the so-called "grand design of Indonesia". According to this vision, the year 2014 marks the departure point for the country's resurgence. This grand design was deliberated in the party's first *Munas* (Musyawarah Nasional, or National Congress), held in Jakarta in July 2005. By 2019 it is hoped that Indonesia would be a leading country in the world.[59] This Grand Design was inspired by Malaysia's "Grand Design 2020". Tifatul Sembiring, the current chairman of PKS, maintains that the party's Grand Design was launched to overcome the current problems caused by the inferiority complex from which Indonesia suffers. More particularly, the country lags far behind other developed countries, economically and technologically, even neighbouring countries such as Malaysia and Thailand.[60]

THE ISLAMIC STATE RECONSIDERED

The extent to which the idea of the Islamic state proposed by PKS is welcomed shows a degree of inconsistency among Indonesian Muslims in general. In early 2000, for instance, the views of PKS coincided with that of Muslims who favoured an Islamic state over a secular state. National opinion surveys conducted in 2001–02 by the PPIM (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat, or Centre for the Study of Islam and Society) at the State Islamic University in Jakarta shows that a significant majority of Indonesian Muslims supported the idea that the state should be based on Islam. Sixty-one per cent of respondents surveyed in 2001 and 71 per cent of respondents in 2002 agreed "that the state should require all Muslim men and women to abide by the Shari'ah". Fifty-eight per cent in 2001 and 67 per cent in 2002 agreed that "Islamic government … under the leadership of Islamic authorities, such as '*ulama*' or *kyai*, is best for a country like ours".[61] Perhaps most disturbing is that 46 per cent in 2001 and 54 per cent in 2002 agreed "that the ideals and struggle of Islamic movements or organizations (like Islamic Defender Front, Laskar Jihad, Darul Islam, and others) to implement the Shari'ah in the government and society must be supported".[62]

The above findings, however, directly contradict the results of another survey undertaken by LSI (Lembaga Survey Indonesia, or Indonesian Survey Institute) in 2006.[63] This survey found that the majority of Muslims (82 per cent) are in support of democracy and that they are (83 per cent) in favour of Pancasila and the 1945 constitution.[64] Furthermore, it is quite surprising to find that while a significant portion of respondents (78.4 per cent) agreed with the opinion that "democracy is congruent with Islam", only 8.4 per cent argued that "democracy is contradictory to Islam" and 3.5 per cent were of the opinion that "Pancasila and UUD 45 are contradictory to Islam".[65] The survey also showed decreasing support for PKS among Muslim voters, with only 4.1 per cent ready to choose this party if the general election were held on that day. The ups and downs in support for PKS seem to indicate that the party has to struggle with the changing moods of Muslim voters and, given the LSI's survey findings above, that it would be quite hard for PKS to achieve an increase of power since the party's support is derived mainly from Muslim voters, at least until it shows willingness to adapt its policies to popular trends.

The extent to which opinion polls may be used as a point of reference for periodic evaluation of the party's policies needs further investigation and is beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that the issue of an Islamic state is widely associated with PKS. Although it has been inspired by respected

figures of the Muslim Brotherhood, PKS has been undergoing a necessary process of moderation and adaptation to the Indonesian context. The cadres of the party are well aware that the issue of an Islamic state, based on the history of Islamic parties in Indonesia, is a sensitive issue that can undermine its capacity to win the hearts and minds of a wider group of constituents. Because of this, PKS does not mention explicitly in its manifesto or statutes that an Islamic state is on its agenda, although it does mention Islam as the basis of the envisioned state.[66] The cadres of the party believe that Islam and the state are inseparable, but founding an Islamic state is another matter. The same applies to the issue of Shari'ah law. The substance of Islam, for PKS, is much more important than the crust. That is why expounding the substance of Islam, that is, in terms of values and norms, receives more attention from the party than bearing the name of Islam in its political visions.

For Hidayat Nur Wahid, the preference of substance over image has been exemplified by the Muslim polity of the past, particularly by the Prophet, the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs (*al-Khulafa' al-Rashidun*), the Umayyad dynasty, and the Abbasid dynasty.[67] However, Nur Wahid does not agree with the idea of secularism in a Muslim polity, since the inseparability of religion and the state is believed to be non-negotiable. What matters, in his view, is that the transfusion of Islamic values in to the public sphere can be effected without wasting time and energy in never-ending debates about matters (*ikhtilaf*) such as the form of the state. In principle, PKS was founded "to realize a just nation-state in line with God's consent".[68] In modern terms, PKS is to create a state based on justice and welfare.

Nur Wahid's view is confirmed by Anis Matta, another key figure in PKS. In his view, if the substance has been enough to represent the name, then there is no point for the name to represent the substance. In his argument, as soon as the Prophet became the state leader of the Madinah community, the state was not given some label of Islam such as *Al-Madinah al-Islamiyah al-Munawwarah*. Therefore, he argues, it is simply a waste of time debating whether or not Indonesia as the largest Muslim country in the world needs to be given the label of Islam. In other words, it does not really matter whether Muslims explicitly proclaim the state Islamic, because this country is comprised of a Muslim majority. What needs to be done is not to force the use of the label of Islam, but to transform the state management with Islamic values. "If our predecessors managed the country with secular principles, we in PKS wish to manage it under Islamic principles".[69] That is why, according to Matta, PKS will never campaign on the issue of an Islamic state nor Shari'ah as its main agenda. He further argues that:

> What we need to do is to present Islam in public life. We are now in the process of building the *fiqh* of statehood in a broad sense, which is not textually minded. We achieve these political ways with a more substantial spirit. For instance, how to manage an educational institution under Islamic principles, how to deal with economic matters based on Islamic norms; that is what matters more. And not all of those issues can be accommodated at the level of the debate. Rather, most of them are at the level of application.[70]

It is nevertheless clear that Indonesia with Islam as its basis is a long-term political goal of PKS. It is also clear that the meliorist character of the party continues to preoccupy the minds of its activists. This is precisely the juncture at which PKS takes a different route from that of utopian Islamists. For PKS, the substantial understanding of the Islamic state does matter more than its literal understanding. PKS activists argue that giving concrete proof that an Islamic state will benefit Indonesia is more critical than just debating it. Therefore, long before the label of Islam is attached to the state, it is important to prove that PKS cadres are capable of managing the state professionally and that the public will feel comfortable with their ascent to power. This is far more important than beaming the label of Islam, especially if at the same time the state is bankrupt or corrupt. Institutionally speaking, the label does not really matter as long as the practice and goal of the justice and welfare state are there. Likewise, it does not really matter whether the Islamic Shari'ah is formalized in the state structure as long as the core elements of it are well represented in public life. This means that a strong foundation in the community must take precedence over the application of Islamic Shari'ah. Islamic measures will mean nothing if they are not accompanied by a well-prepared community. In the Indonesian context, according to Hidayat Nur Wahid, the issue of Shari'ah law has been often misunderstood. What is more crucial, in his view, is to make the Shari'ah a promising solution that many can appreciate, something practically feasible for the real condition of Indonesia. "That is precisely what we have been struggling for", stares Nur Wahid.[71]

One should be mindful that phrases such as "based on Islam" or "Islamic state", when used in PKS circles, tend to connote diversity and complexity. What an Islamic state means for the party's cadres, for instance, is and never will be monolithic. In this context, some of the PKS' cadres have repeatedly referred to al-Banna's construct of an Islamic state. Al-Banna used two terms to refer to an Islamic state. The first term is *Dawlah Islamiyah*, which simply means "Islamic state", and the second one is *islah al-dawlah*, reformation of

the state.[72] Both terms were used interchangeably by al-Banna in referring to an ideal state for Muslims. Each term has different implications though: while the first term implies a system like that implemented in Iran since the revolution in 1979, that is, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the second term implies a situation more akin to that in modern Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia. The urgent need to reform the state is motivated by economic and political crises as well as the moral decay in Indonesia. Overall, it seems that the activists of PKS are motivated primarily by the second option of *Shari'ah al-dawlah*. They argue that the crisis needs to be overcome by Islamic formulas as reflected in the Shari'ah, not in terms of its punitive, judiciary character but in terms of its constructive and curative moral values. For this reason, they generally agree that it is not necessarily urgent to establish an Islamic state like Iran. It is *islah al-dawlah* that Anis Matta believes fits with the current condition of Indonesia. He puts more emphasis on the management of the state based on Islamic values than on the formalization of the Shari'ah. The reformation of the state needs to be done step by step, from the lowest level of the individual and family to the highest one, that is, the surrounding community and the state.[73]

As mentioned earlier, PKS is concerned with establishing an Islamic state from the meliorist perspective. This approach allows the party to incorporate some Islamic elements into the public sphere. In this context, it may be said that the idea of an Islamic state in the minds of PKS cadres is not only a continuation of but also an advance on what some modernist activists such as Zaenal Abidin Ahmad and Mohammad Natsir had proposed following the constitutional debate in the 1950s.[74] These thinkers were proponents of a holistic view of the relationship between Islam and the state; against secularism as proposed by they were secular nationalists such as Sukarno, Hatta, Supomo, and others who argued that Islam should be permeated as the spirit of politics as manifested in *politik garam* (the politics of salt), and not *politik gincu* (the politics of lipstick). While the first refers to how the substance of Islam, and not the symbol, is presented in the world of politics as values, the latter refers to the opposite situation in which symbols matter more than substance. Interestingly, PKS activists today seem to support the argument of *politik garam*, as proposed by the 1950s secular nationalists who argued that Islamic values colour all activities and policies of the state as a whole. What remains of the meliorist attitude is that the area of politics should be given a sense of sacred: life should be treated as a field for the observation of God's law and, therefore, secularism must be rejected. Nevertheless, the idea of an Islamic state is not a matter of formalism but a matter of substance.[75]

It is worth noting that a key word in understanding the political character of PKS is "evolution". In attempts to implement Islamic values and Shari'ah law, PKS considers the existing condition of the community and the state as an important factor.[76] It would never advocate the application of Islam in the state structure as long as there was no well-established precondition for it. Hidayat Nur Wahid, for instance, citing Hartono Mardjono's statement,[77] argues that 95 per cent of the elements of Islamic law can be applied at the present time. The rest, comprising miscellaneous matters such as the application of *hudud* punishment (cutting off the hands of thieves, stoning adulterers, and other types of punishment in Islamic law), is considered a lower priority until the 95 per cent element is upheld consistently in public life.[78] In the application of Islamic law, therefore, the readiness of the society must be considered.

The word "evolution" indicates that PKS intends to apply Islamic law gradually, based on the capacity of the Muslim community. This implies that there are two other key terms: the "minimal Shari'ah" and the "maximal Shari'ah". The application of Shari'ah must evolve gradually from the minimal Shari'ah to the maximal or 100 per cent Shari'ah, even though what the latter stands for in details is still vague. This policy may mean one of two things. First, PKS considers that the movement towards the application of maximal Shari'ah is without compromise. If this is the case, PKS is now heading towards the application of 100 per cent Islamic law, even though the 5 per cent of miscellaneous matters in the Shari'ah are not important for the Indonesia of today. The second possibility is that the application of maximal Shari'ah is not necessary insofar as 95 per cent of it has already been established. This 5 per cent can be left for further discussion and negotiation with the wider public as to whether it is still necessary to implement the complete version of Shari'ah. The question of which one of the two possibilities applies to the current condition of PKS, however, needs further investigation.

Mutammimul Ula, another PKS activist who was elected to the national parliament in 2004, argues that Islamic law is a reasonable choice to adopt into the structure of a national legal system, with Western law and *adat* (litary custom) law as complements. The development of a national law could take Islamic law as its main inspiration while *adat* law would give a sense of locality and Western law would function as a complement, especially on matters such as the adoption of science and technology on a practical level.[79] He makes three arguments: First, philosophically, Islamic law contains in itself the spirit of justice. In addition to being a value system, Islam, he believes, is a methodology (*minhaj*) for achieving it. Other nations may have the same values as Islam such as justice, harmony, discipline, and peace, but they do

not have the same methodology as Islam to achieve it. What he means by methodology is a sub-value system that underpins the value system.[80] Second, he also claims that Islamic law is the most detailed judicial system of any in the world. Third, sociologically, the majority of Indonesians choose Islam as their religion. Islamic law, in his opinion, has for a long time been a living law at the heart of this society.[81]

In order for Islamic law to be successfully put into effect, it is important for PKS to disseminate and promulgate ideal Islamic values to society. Consistent with its reputation as a *dakwah* party, PKS is well known for its enthusiasm in approaching society and engaging it in civic activities. In their *dakwah*, the party's cadres tend to avoid or withdraw themselves from issues that might stimulate public debate over religious matters (*khilafiyah*). They have gained a high profile for their quick response to human disasters in several areas of Indonesia. They were, for example, first on the spot in disasters such as the 2004 tsunami in Aceh and North Sumatra, when they sent an expedition called Operasi Uhud — a name taken from the Uhud war waged by the Prophet Muhammad.[82] They were also quick in sending out humanitarian assistance for the earthquake victims in Jogjakarta in May 2006. With activities like these they try to ensure that the party can maintain its profile as a working and non-partisan organization. Given this strategy, they believe that there is no *khilafiyah* in God's law.

Nevertheless, it remains unclear as to whether or not PKS would someday endorse the application of maximal Shari'ah in criminal law, for example cutting hands off for theft, a punishment spelled out explicitly in the Qur'an. What seems to be clear is that PKS does not want to force itself to be involved in a public debate over whether or not this type of punishment should be applied in the context of present-day Indonesia. The positive image of the party might be undermined thereby. It should also be acknowledged that within PKS there are basically two camps: that agrees with the application of Islamic law in its very literal sense and another that advocates the application of Islamic law in substance only. It seems that the idea of the compatibility of Islam and democracy is promulgated by the second camp.

The issue of Shari'ah implementation is a hotly contested concept within PKS. A careful analysis of the viewpoints proposed by some of the party's top cadres and activists seems to confirm the diversity of interpretation of the Shari'ah and how it should be implemented at a practical level.[83] This is a direct reflection of the rich and heterogeneous nature of Islamic legal thinking, even though the majority of Indonesian Muslims embrace the Shafi'ite legal school. As a consequence, it is no wonder that the meaning and scope of Shari'ah is very broad. All PKS cadres advise that Islamic law be

applied in all aspects of life, from the individual level to state level. However, they disagree over the question in what forms and ways the Shari'ah should be applied. For this reason, the leadership of the party — not only in the Tanfidhiyah (executive body) but also in the Majlis Shura — is a crucial factor in determining in which direction the issue is likely to go.[84] If the party's rank-and-file members understood the implementation of Islamic law in all its complexity, they might be more prudential in disseminating and advocating the issue. Hidayat Nur Wahid can be included in this group of leaders that will determine the future of this issue. Under Nur Wahid's leadership, PKS tended to emphasize pragmatic issues — as repeatedly mentioned above — rather than the Shari'ah issue. He realized that putting more emphasis on the latter issue would be counter-productive for the purposes of widening the party's constituency.

THE LEGACY OF MASYUMI

Most PKS activists and cadres are relatively well educated and use secular campuses as their headquarters and breeding grounds of activism.[85] Even though most of them are not deeply "learned" in Islamic knowledge, they are fully committed to searching for and implementing what they believe to be an authentic Islam, a version of religion that is presumably inherited from pious predecessors. It may be said that PKS is a continuation of previous Islamic political parties such as Masyumi.[86] Nonetheless, PKS is not a replica of Masyumi; rather, it is a revised version of Masyumi.[87] In the spirit of learning from the past, PKS activists want to improve on the performance of Masyumi by, among other things, making more compromises on their way to the centre of power. This attitude was proven by its willingness to form a coalition with other political parties and the ruling government, regardless of prevailing differences in ideology.

Viewed from a historical perspective, Masyumi was an Islamic party that was often antagonistic towards the strongest party of that time, the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, or Indonesian Nationalist Party). It was also very anti-PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or Indonesian Communist Party).[88] Despite its Islamic orientation, Masyumi was, especially in the 1950s, one of the few Indonesian parties that adhered to Western ideas of democracy. Today, its leader Natsir may be seen as one of the most influential figures in the forging of PKS' brand of Islamism. Many of the founders of PK(S) were disciples of Natsir and Buya Malik Ahmad, another influential figure within Masyumi.[89] To these activists, the legacy of Natsir is in the intellectual character of PKS. Natsir, through his Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia

(DDII), made considerable effects to translate the thoughts and ideas of *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*; these translations are now readily accessible to PKS cadres and activists on secular campuses.[90]

Basically, PKS activists are the reborn and reinvigorated next generation of Masyumi, at least on a symbolic level.[91] Nevertheless, the better political environment today leads PKS to hold different political viewpoints from those of Masyumi. As is well known, Masyumi activists had to put up with political repression and marginalization by the government. Conversely, PKS activists can engage in political activities freely. In fact, they are part of the Yudhoyono-Kalla government. The political activism of PKS began when the New Order government shut down campus activism in the early 1980s. Many Muslim students tried to adopt the Muslim Brotherhood's methods of spreading Islamic moral values by using cells (*usroh*) led by a trainer (*murabbi*). When the New Order regime collapsed, they started to rethink their strategy and made their activism accessible to a wider audience by establishing Partai Keadilan (PK). To a certain degree, the entrance of PKS activists into the prevailing political system may be seen as a form of political participation by educated Muslims who had previously been marginalized by the New Order regime. The phenomenon of PKS thus represents a process of social mobilization among young, educated Muslims into the public sphere, rather than merely the continuation of an ideological struggle.

Although PKS leaders readily pay homage to the role of DDII and former Masyumi leaders, that does not mean that they are not critical of some religious standpoints promulgated by the latter. Some of them even question the relevance of the Masyumi legacy for modern-day Indonesia by arguing that the approaches of Masyumi and DDII are outdated. Mutammimul Ula, for instance, argues that the Masyumi is no longer feasible in approaching present-day context because of the irreversible progression of history and political models.[92] Fachry Hamzah, another PKS leader, argues in a similar vein that PKS is not Masyumi in its thinking. He even goes a step further, belittling PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, or Crescent Moon and Star Party) as a symptom of "Masyumi nostalgia".[93] Many in PKS feel that the DDII's heavy emphasis on "external threats" to the Islamic community such as Christian campaigns to convert Muslims and American-Jewish conspiracy theories to undermine Islam and the Muslim *ummah* should not be regarded as important priorities in PKS' political struggle. While such views would be shared by many in PKS, they are not prominent in the party's discourses in general. PKS activists prefer to place greater emphasis upon the development of personal piety in Muslims and are more responsive to issues such as inter-religious respect than their counterparts in DDII.[94]

BETWEEN MADINAH CHARTER AND JAKARTA CHARTER

The PKS' subscription to the Madinah Charter (*Mithaq al-Madinah*), instead of the Jakarta Charter, has been one of the most important but controversial breakthroughs in the development of Islamic political ideas in Indonesia.[95] It was an important departure because most Islamist groups classically favour the insertion of the seven legendary words of the Jakarta Charter ("with the obligation of the Muslims to practise the Islamic Shari'ah") into the preamble of the 1945 Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar [UUD] 1945).[96] It was a controversial move because the utopian Islamists accused the party of having betrayed its commitment to implementing the Shari'ah. In response, some PKS leaders asserted repeatedly that the party's formal policy of rejecting the Jakarta Charter reflected the party's commitment to pluralism. As far as its formal manifesto was concerned, the party did not have any intention of establishing an "Islamic state" in a conventional sense. In Hidayat Nur Wahid's opinion, the Madinah Charter was the basis upon which a modern *masyarakat madani* (civil society order) would be established.[97] Under the Charter, he argued, all elements of Madinah society were able to coexist peacefully under a "tacit" Islamic state. He went on to argue that the Prophet had never labelled what he achieved in Madinah as an "Islamic state".[98] Nevertheless, the Prophet did establish the foundations of a modern nation-state, which some have even considered too modern for his era.[99] It is no wonder that three out of four of the Guided Caliphs were later on assassinated as the price they had to pay for placing the state under modern governance.

To a certain extent, the PKS' subscription to the Madinah Charter may be criticized, in part on the basis that it is not spelled out explicitly in its statutes. One may argue that the Charter has been omitted for tactical reasons as there is basically no point in mentioning it specifically if it can be used whenever necessary without actually spelling it out. The party's cadres seem to be aware that an inclusion of the Madinah Charter in the party constitution could put the party at risk of losing support from those who aspire to the Jakarta Charter. At the same time it is also noteworthy that the current party statutes feature words like Pancasila that were not mentioned initially when the party was still called PK. This refusal to commit to Islamist terms may be regarded as a tactical manoeuvre, but it can also be seen as a sign of the party's appreciation of pluralism in a broader sense.

From its statutes, it seems that PKS wishes to integrate religious values and Indonesian cultural norms into a single coherent national identity. As explained above, its political vision has been inspired mainly by the

integrative, holistic school of political thought in Islam as exemplified by Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al-Banna, Yusuf al-Qardhawi, and Mohammad Natsir.[100] According to these Muslim activists, Islam is a holistic religion dealing not only with worldly matters, but also with the life hereafter; Islam is a religion (*din*) and a state (*dawlah*) in one, although the various thinkers differ as to how this paradigm should be implemented. This paradigm may influence — either directly or indirectly — the party's political world-views, that is, how PKS approaches politics from the perspective of this holistic paradigm. Its general vision, for example, says that PKS serves "as a *dakwah* party to uphold justice and prosperity in the framework of Muslim unity and state".[101] By and large, PKS is morally self-sufficient in terms of religious values and is prepared to transform the surrounding society in accordance with these values. In its mission, for example, it is clear that the word *taghyir* (change, transformation) receives a particular emphasis in the guidelines on social encounters and interaction with the society. Its basic principle is that they are ready to involve themselves in social interactions but they do not want to lose anything thereby. This is in line with the legendary motto borrowed from Sayyid Qutb: *nakhtalitun walakin natamayyazun* ("we are engaged in society, but not immersed in or polluted by bad practices of the society").[102]

With regard to pluralism, PKS stands firmly in defending and defining what constitutes the "authentic self". PKS activists are not interested in the idea of the "melting pot"[103] or "salad bowl"[104] society where religious identity is concerned. While "salad bowl" suggests the integration of the many different cultures of Indonesia while the distinct qualities of each culture are kept, "melting pot" implies the assimilation of cultures and intermarriage of ethnicities into a whole entry. To PKS activists, the public sphere is a "cultural battle ground" where Islamic values are expected to win over other cultures. In this battle, the PKS activists — like the utopian Islamists — do not want to lose anything. The party's cadres usually have a confidence that they are projecting an "Islamic personality", which is believed superior to others.

Despite the fact that the PKS statutes clearly state that the party is based on Islam, Pancasila is mentioned in Chapter 2, "Purpose and Effort", and Article 5, "Purpose" which says: "Partai Keadilan Sejahtera is a Dakwah Party whose purpose is to realize a just and prosperous society under the consent of Allah within the framework of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia which is based on Pancasila."[105] There is a sense of compromise, even ambiguity, between the party's foundation on the one hand and the widely accepted platform of Pancasila on the other. Nonetheless, Tifatul Sembiring, as chairman of the party, argues that the reign of Pancasila as

the sole philosophical foundation for the state is over, as it was a part of the Soeharto's New Order. However, he points out that the formulation of Pancasila is not clear enough.[106]

For the above reason, PKS wants to break the idea of pluralism down into a more concrete concept by referring to the spirit of the Madinah Charter, something which is not alien to so-called neo-modernist Muslim intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid. If the party is given a chance to lead the country, he says, it will enable all elements of society to prosper without exception. All citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, are equal before the law. This is inspired by the Prophet's saying, "Whoever oppresses non-Muslims without any due reason, he or she will be my enemy in the hereafter".[107] As a party that claims to be faithful to democracy, PKS wishes to give equal opportunities to everybody, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, in national elections to elect and to be elected. In theory, it is possible for a non-Muslim to be elected as president of the country provided that he or she is elected democratically by the society. The party's cadres, argues Sembiring, are ready to accept the result of such an election, as they are committed to the idea of the people's sovereignty.[108] A direct election allows every member of society to participate in the process of candidacy. This reflects the self-confidence in the hearts of the party's cadres. But one should bear in mind that this confidence is borne by a recognition that Indonesia is a Muslim-majority country and that the chances of non-Muslims getting elected as political leaders are very slim indeed.

That the attitude of PKS towards democracy is somewhat ambiguous and controversial became apparent for the first time in 2000 when the party's MPR faction, which at that time was aligned with Amien Rais' PAN in the so-called *Fraksi Reformasi* (Reformation Fraction), voted against the amendment of Article 29 of the Constitution.[109] The amendment was proposed by several Islamic parties including PBB and PPP, who aspired to the formalization of Shari'ah through the incorporation of the Jakarta Charter into UUD 1945.[110] As PKS rejected the Jakarta Charter, the party was accused by the other Islamic parties of having betrayed its commitment to the implementation of Shari'ah. To the other parties, it was simply incomprehensible that an Islamic political party whose reputation was that of a *dakwah* party committed to the totality of Islam as a way of life in practice would not endorse a policy that would guarantee what the party had actually been struggling for. The accusations were, however, refuted by Mutammimul Ula, one of the party's cadres.[111]

Hidayat Nur Wahid also raised the issue of the Madinah Charter as part of the PKS' political platform, as the *International Herald Tribune* reported.[112]

Basically, the Charter contains, among other things, a declaration that the whole Madinah community, regardless of the religious beliefs of its individual members, was regarded as a single community (*ummah wahidah*). Therefore, each member of the community was obliged to help, protect, and respect one another and was given freedom to observe his or her religion. Despite the pluralist appearance of the Charter, however, some critics have accused PKS of employing it as a tactical means of "back-door politics".[113] They charge that Nur Wahid hides behind the universal values of the Charter to mask PKS' real ambition to establish an "Islamic state". This means that while PKS has displayed on the political stage it concern for universal issues, the party ultimately wishes to achieve particular issues related only to its own interests such as the establishment of an "Islamic state" or to position Muslims as the exclusive citizens of the country.

This accusation, however, has been rebutted by Untung Wahono, one of the party's foremost leaders.[114] In his column published by the leading Indonesian daily *Kompas*, Wahono asserted that such an accusation is theoretically and empirically unfounded. The charge itself was appreciated as an example of free speech, but according to Wahono, Burhani — the author of the critique — used some inaccurate data to justify his charges. As Wahono explained, during the debate there emerged three positions the issue of amending Article 29 of the UUD 1945. The first was represented by those who did not want the article to be amended. The second position was held by those who wanted the Jakarta Charter to be inserted into the article with the additional phrase, "The Oneness of God with the Obligation of every Muslim to practise Shari'ah". The third was formulated by those who aspired to amend the article with the additional phrase, "The Oneness of God with the obligation of every citizen to observe his or her own religion". The second group included the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or United Development Party) and PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, or The Crescent Moon and Star Party). It was simply not true, according to Wahono, that PKS was in the same camp as these two Islamic parties, championing the insertion of the Jakarta Charter during the debate in the MPR. He maintained that the policy of PKS had been achieved through a long process of internal debate and deliberation. The result was that PK, as the party was still called at that time, was a proponent of the third position, together with PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, or the National Mandate Party).[115]

There were reasons why PKS proposed the Madinah Charter, instead of the Jakarta Charter, as the main inspiration of any amendment to the state Constitution. First, to uphold the religious values espoused by the preamble of the UUD 1945. Second, to emphasize the equal position of religions in

Indonesia. In a *bayanat* (explanation) leaflet disseminated by the party at that time, PKS illustrated how the Torah and the Bible had been practised by the Jews and Christians respectively.[116] By proposing the additional phrase, "with obligation of every citizen to observe his or her own religion", PKS felt that the spiritual life should be properly appreciated in a religious country such as Indonesia. It was also obvious that PKS had never proposed the Jakarta Charter during the process of amending of the UUD 1945, argued Wahono.[117]

The reference made by PKS to the Madinah Charter should, in Wahono's view, be respected not only as a rational process, but also as a democratic choice guaranteed by the Constitution. "Democratization of reference", as Wahono called it, had been a product of the reformation process in Indonesia since 1998, as signified by the nullification of the Pancasila as the sole foundation of the country. The old tradition of politics that took a totally uniform and naive attitude towards different ideas and struggles was, in his view, outdated. Therefore, the accusation that PKS had been practising a "back-door strategy" was historically, politically, and ethically baseless. As Wahono convincingly argued, PKS was ready to take part in the democratization process on the normal political stage, where it would interact with any kind of societal element, in any form.[118]

CONCLUSION

PKS is one of the very few Islamic parties that seek to craft their own tradition of democracy based on day-to-day politics and down-to-earth programmes. The party's leaders and activists unceasingly attempt to convince the public that Islamism is not necessarily radical or at all times hostile towards democracy. As a variant of the meliorist approach, what they are trying to exhibit is something that seems peculiar to the minds of many: pietism or Salafism on the one hand coupled with political pragmatism on the other. While this is nothing new in discourses of sociology, its existence in Indonesia deserves extra appreciation as it gives rise to a "new brand" of Islamic politics. PKS seeks to challenge the mainstream view — held especially by the utopian Islamists — that politics is a dirty area and that it is a grave for religious values. In PKS' holistic, meliorist conception, what needs to be done is the creation of a sense of the sacred in the territory of politics. They also wish to argue against the utopian Islamists' belief that Islam is, by definition, incompatible with democracy. They believe that there is no reason that the idea of Islam is contradicted by democracy, because Islam is in itself democratic. Hence, there is no reason to separate religion from politics.[119]

PKS represents a new juncture, a sort of intersection of different outlooks. It serves as a bridge between Islamic social organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU, whose commitment to democratic values is unquestionable, and other more extreme Islamist organizations such as HTI and MMI, who firmly reject democracy. Eclecticism in politics is an inevitable choice within such a context. The party adopts many intellectual viewpoints from various sources as long as they help enhance the soft power of the party. Therefore, it is not surprising that its meliorist mode is coupled with elements drawn from Sayyid Qutb, Yusuf Qardhawi, Hasan al-Banna, as well as some nationally respected figures such as Mohammad Natsir of Masyumi and DDII, Nurcholish Madjid, and Amien Rais, to name but a few.[120] What is certain is the fact that these figures, except Qutb, are all proponents of the compatibility of Islam and democracy. It seems clear that the party wants to invigorate the old paradigm with a new one, representing a synthesis between the traditional view on Islamic politics and the revised, modern one. Like many other religion-based organizations, PKS is enmeshed in a never-ending battle in the process of finding its own identity. Theologically speaking, the world-views of PKS are drawn mainly from the teachings of Salafism in such matters as keeping the purity of faith and moral values such as sincerity and the like. Politically speaking, it is obsessed with the idea of the glorification of Islam as in the Golden Age of Islam. PKS cadres mostly believe that Islam will assume power and, for this reason, they are preoccupied with the idea that they must be the leader of world civilization, rather than the follower.

Significantly, PKS comprises those activists who opt for the parliamentary way of struggle rather than the extra-parliamentary, especially on the grounds that the struggle from within might be more effective than the one from without. One of the most basic underlying assumptions is that any transformation process needs a power structure in order to be successful. Interestingly, however, PKS seems to believe that Islamic politics need not necessarily bear an Islamic label on it. Nevertheless, this could be a tactical choice in order to be able to attract a wider band of constituents. In doing so, the party employs double standards in its strategy. It imposes stringent Islamic moral standards on its cadres and activists, while deploying a religiously neutral and down-to-earth language in its external dealings, with a focus on anti-corruption and good governance, the war against poverty and injustice, simplicity in lifestyle and self-discipline, and pluralism.

When considered against other Islamic political parties in Indonesia, the party seems to occupy an in-between position. On the one hand, it represents the "moral stubbornness" of an Islamist movement whose aspiration is to make God's values available in the public sphere. On the other hand, the

party is entrenched in the modern aspects of life. As a result, democracy is inevitable as a way to signify that the party is modern by nature, just as Islam is believed to be as well. To be a true Muslim does not necessarily mean to reject democracy or vice versa. One can be a Muslim and a democrat at one.[121] Both are considered to be two sides of the same coin. Whether this promising rhetoric can be proven right, however, remains uncertain. It remains to be seen whether the party will really be able to produce a genuine identity for Islamic democracy. Doubts remain whether the party can accept democracy in a liberal sense as long as its cadres and activists argue that they are crafting a so-called "Islamic democracy", and not a "liberal democracy". As some observers have pointed out, PKS' acceptance of democracy is considered merely a strategy to win votes.[122] If they ever came to power, they might harness democracy as a mechanism to impose undemocratic elements of religion onto society. The question whether such scepticism is justified and whether they can really turn into true democrats will be assessed in the next part of the book.

Notes

1 For further information on the history and background of the establishment of PKS, see, for instance, Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), pp. 215–36. See also Aay Muhammad Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2004), pp. 149–65. See also Jordan Newton, "Dakwah in an Era of Democratic Consolidation: Explaining the Rise of the PKS" (unpublished honours thesis, University of New South Wales, 2005).

2 Regarding the fall of Soeharto, see, among others, Geoff Forrester and R.J. May, eds., *The Fall of Soeharto* (Singapore: Select Books, 1999); Donald K. Emmerson, "Exit and Aftermath: The Crisis of 1997–8", in *Indonesia Beyond Soeharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition*, edited by Donald K. Emmerson (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); Damien Kingsbury and Arief Budiman, eds., *Indonesia: The Uncertain Transition* (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2001).

3 Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia*, Lowy Institute Paper 5 (New South Wales: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005), p. 70.

4 Ibid.

5 See, for instance, Devi Asmarani, "PKS Wins by Downplaying Islamic Agenda", *Jakarta Post*, 12 April 2004.

6 Azyumardi Azra, "Indonesian Islam, Election Politics and Beyond", *NIAS Nytt* 4 (December 2004): 12–14.

[7] Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?*, p. 71.

[8] Around 5,800 questionnaires were returned with the result that the majority of respondents (over 68 per cent) aspired to the founding of an Islamic party, while 27 per cent wished to found a social organization, and the rest felt that they should remain where they were. On the basis of this poll, they proceeded to invite a range of prominent figures in the *dakwah* movement to discuss the establishment of a political party. In July 1998, the decision to form Partai Keadilan (PK) was announced by fifty-two *dakwah* leaders. Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, pp. 228–30; cf. Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. 151.

[9] Dini Djalal, "Indonesia's Powerful Student Movement Divided", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 22 March 2001, as cited by Elizabeth Fuller Collins, "'Islam is the Solution': Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia", paper presented at Ohio University, 20 June 2004 <http://www.classics.ohiou.edu/faculty/collins/islamsolution.pdf>.

[10] Elizabeth Fuller Collins and Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, "Islam and Democracy! The Successful New Party PKS is a Moderate Alternative to Radical Islamism", *Inside Indonesia* 81 (January–March 2005): 21–22; cf. Elizabeth Fuller Collins, "Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS): Justice and Welfare Party or Prosperous Justice Party", unpublished paper <http://www.ohiou.edu/pols/faculty/malley/collins3.html>.

[11] Hidayat Nur Wahid, public lecture and interview, Melbourne, June 2005.

[12] Collins, "Islam is the Solution", pp. 17–18.

[13] The party's statute can be accessed at <http://www.pk-sejahtera.de/download/ad_pks.pdf>.

[14] DPP Partai Keadilan, *Sekilas Partai Keadilan* (Jakarta: DPP Partai Keadilan, 1998), pp. 34–35; cf. Mathias Diederich, "A Closer Look at Dakwah and Politics in Indonesia: The Partai Keadilan, Some Insights into its History and an Analysis of its Programs and Statutes", *Archipel* 64 (2002): 101–15, especially pp 108–9.

[15] Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, p. 251.

[16] Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?*, p. 73; cf. Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, "Between the Global and the Local: Islamism, the Middle East, and Indonesia", Analysis Paper No. 9 (Washington, D.C.: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution, 2005).

[17] Ibid., p. 32.

[18] R. William Liddle, "Demokrasi Indonesia Sangat Berhasil", interview with Hamid Basyaib of Jaringan Islam Liberal (Network of Liberal Islam), 5 April 2004 <http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=544> (accessed 7 August 2005).

[19] "Terjadi Bagi-bagi Uang di DPRD Sumsel", *Media Indonesia Online*, 8 May 2003.

[20] See "Partai Islam dan Hasil Pemilu 2004", *Sabili* 23, 4 June 2004, pp. 109–11.

[21] This claim was made by Hilmi Aminuddin, the chairman of PKS' consultative assembly (Majlis Shura), as cited by "Partai Dakwah di Simpang Jalan", *Tempo* 23, 7 August 2005.

[22] Saiful Mujani, "Fenomena PKS", an editorial written for Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), 4 April 2004 <http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=536> (accessed 7 August 2005).

[23] Martin van Bruinessen, "Post-Suharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and Democracy", paper presented at the Third International Conference and Workshop, "Indonesia in Transition", organized by the KNAW and Labsosio, Universitas Indonesia, 24–28 August 2003. Its online version is also available at: <http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/Post_Soeharto_Islam_and_civil_society>.

[24] Ibid., p. 16.

[25] Ibid., especially pp. 17 and 19.

[26] Compare this with Liddle's opinion, which considers the party's double-standard strategy as one of its strengths. A similar opinion has also been expounded by Lili Romli, who says that PKS' success was inseparable from the dual political platform it had presented, that is, Islamism and good governance. See Liddle, "Demokrasi Indonesia Sangat Berhasil"; cf. Lili Romli, "Partai Islam dan Pemilih Islam di Indonesia", *Jurnal Penelitian Politik* 1, no. 1 (2004): 29–48.

[27] Bubalo and Fealy, "Between the Global and the Local", p. 31.

[28] This issue was reported by daily paper *Republika* under the title "Mengkaji Kasus Suripto", 28 November 2002; "Hegemoni AS dan Skenario Antiterorisme", 19 December 2002.

[29] See DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, *Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula* (Jakarta: DPP PK Sejahtera in collaboration with PT Syamil Cipta Media, 2004).

[30] Ibid., pp. 155–61.

[31] "Kalla Mengakui bahwa Indonesia Kecolongan: Peledakan Diduga Karena Persaingan Industri Pariwisata", *Kompas*, 24 October 2005.

[32] This information was given by a reliable source who witnessed the raid and who did not want to have his name publicized.

[33] "Kecupan Terakhir Menjelang Syahid", *Sabili* 22, 21 May 2004, pp. 100–1.

[34] "Partai Dakwah di Simpang Jalan", *Tempo* 23, 7 August 2005.

[35] Collins and Fauzi, "Islam and Democracy!".

[36] <http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/h/hidayat-nur-wahid/index.shtml> (accessed 3 January 2006).

[37] Van Bruinessen, "Post-Suharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and Democracy", pp. 17–18.

[38] Compare this viewpoint with that of Nurcholish Madjid, who predicted that it would not be too surprising if one day PKS became one of the important political parties in Indonesian politics. See Nurcholish Madjid, "Partai Keadilan Nanti Muncul Sebagai Partai Penting", in *Tujuh Mesin Pendulang Suara*, edited by Hairus Salim et al. (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999), pp. 193–94.

[39] Van Bruinessen, "Post-Suharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and Democracy", p. 18.

[40] See the party's statute at <http://www.pk-sejahtera.de/download/ad_pks.pdf>.

41 Sadanand Dhume, "Indonesian Democracy's Enemy Within", *The Asian Age* <http://www.asianage.com/main.asp?layout=2&cat1=1&cat2=153&newsid=196060&RF=Defau\1tMain> (accessed 25 January 2006); cf. his other column, "Indonesia: Democracy Wins, but Danger Remains", *The Asian Age*, 23 November 2004 <http://www.asianage.com/printarticle2.asp?newsid=66098> (accessed 25 January 2006).

42 Sadanand Dhume, "Radical March on Indonesia's Future", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 May 2005, p. 12.

43 Ibid., p. 15.

44 Ibid., p. 19.

45 Hidayat Nur Wahid and Zulkieflimansyah, "The Justice Party and Democracy: A Journey of a Thousand Miles Starts with a Single Step", in *Piety and Pragmatism: Trends in Indonesian Islamic Politics,* edited by Amy McCreedy (Special Report, no. 110, Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson Center, April 2003), pp. 20–22 <http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/asiarpt_110.pdf>.

46 Ibid., p. 20.

47 Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, translated by Carol Volk (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).

48 Bassam Tibi, *Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and The New World Disorder* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

49 Interviews with Yanyan Mulyana and Tarwadi, two PKS cadres who are studying their Ph.D. at the University of Melbourne and Monash University respectively, 9 November 2005.

50 Hidayat Nur Wahid, "Kedepankan Moral dan Dakwah", *Ensiklopedi Tokoh Indonesia* <http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/h/hidayat-nur-wahid/index.shtml> (accessed 3 January 2006).

51 Wahid and Zulkieflimansyah, "The Justice Party and Democracy", p. 20.

52 DPP Partai Keadilan, *Kebijakan Dasar Partai Keadilan 2000–2005* (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiyatuna, 2002), p. 18.

53 Aay Muhammad Furkon, "Partai Dakwah dalam Dilema", *Sabili* 26, 16 July 2004, pp. 32–33.

54 See, for instance, Untung Wahono, "Koalisi Kikuk", *Sabili* 4, 10 September 2004, pp. 32–33.

55 Andrew Steele, "The Decline of Political Islam in Indonesia", *Asia Times*, 28 March 2006 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HC28Ae03.html> (accessed 23 April 2006).

56 Vali Nasr, "The Rise of 'Muslim Democracy'", *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 2 (April 2005): 13–27.

57 Ibid., p. 15.

58 While Bubalo and Fealy have drawn an important analogy between PKS and the ideology of *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, they argue that the party has adjusted some of its ideas to the local context of Indonesia. This is, I would assume, inseparable from the basic characteristic of PKS which is eclectic politics. For more on this,

see Bubalo and Fealy, "Between the Global and the Local: Islamism, the Middle East, and Indonesia", especially pp. 26–32.

59 Hidayat Nur Wahid, "PKS Solusi Permasalahan Bangsa (1)", *Ensiklopedi Tokoh Indonesia* <http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/h/hidayat-nur-wahid/wawancara.shtml> (accessed 3 January 2006).

60 Tifatul Sembiring, "Grand Design Indonesia Versi PKS", *Ensiklopedi Tokoh Indonesia* <http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/t/tifatul-sembiring/berita/index.shtml> (accessed 3 January 2006).

61 R. William Liddle, "New Patterns of Islamic Politics in Democratic Indonesia", in *Piety and Pragmatism: Trends in Indonesian Islamic Politics,* edited by Amy McCreedy (Special Report, no. 110, Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson Center, April 2003), pp. 4–13. See also Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, "Politics, Islam, and Public Opinion", *Journal of Democracy* 15 (January 2004): 109–23.

62 Ibid.

63 The opinion survey was undertaken in all provinces of Indonesia between 23 September and 3 October 2006, with 1,092 Muslim respondents.

64 Lembaga Survey Indonesia (LSI), "Prospek Islam Politik", unpublished research report, Jakarta, October 2006 <http://www.lsi.or.id> (accessed 12 February 2006).

65 Ibid.

66 Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, pp. 235–36.

67 Ibid., p. 236.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid., p. 235.

70 Ibid.

71 Interview with Hidayat Nur Wahid, "PKS Solusi Permasalahan Bangsa (1)", *Ensiklopedi Tokoh Indonesia* <http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/h/hidayat-nur-wahid/wawancara.shtml> (accessed 3 January 2006).

72 As cited in Amien Rais, *Cakrawala Islam: Antara Cita dan Fakta* (Bandung: Mizan, 1999), p. 49.

73 Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. 240.

74 For further information on the kind of Islamic state proposed by Z.A. Ahmad and Mohammad Natsir following the 1959 constitutional debate, see, among others, Z.A. Ahmad, *Membentuk Negara Islam* (Jakarta: Penerbit Widjaya, 1956); cf. Mohammad Natsir, *Islam sebagai Dasar Negara* (Bandung: Pimpinan Fraksi Masyumi dalam Konstituante, 1957).

75 Compare the Islamic state proposed by some PKS cadres to that of Amien Rais. In Rais' point of view, a state can be considered "Islamic" as long as it has at least three characteristics: First, state and society must be established on the basis of the principle of justice. Second, the state follows the *shura* (public deliberation) principle. Third, it should be based on the principle of brotherhood and equality. See Rais, *Cakrawala Islam*, p. 47.

[76] For a helpful account of PKS' vision on the implementation of Shari'ah, see, among others, Nandang Burhanuddin, *Penegakan Syari'at Islam Menurut Partai Keadilan* (Jakarta: Al-Jannah, 2003).

[77] Hartono Mardjono is a cadre of the Crescent Moon and Star Party (PBB), an Islamic party led by Yusril Ihza Mahendra at that time.

[78] Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. 236.

[79] Mutammimul Ula, "Perspektif Penerapan Syariat Islam", in *Penerapan Syariat Islam di Indonesia: Antara Peluang dan Tantangan*, by Salim Segaf Al-Jufri et al. (Jakarta: Global Mediacipta in collaboration with Pusat Konsultasi Syariah, 2004), pp. 61–77.

[80] Ula gives an example of how justice, one of the key Islamic values, can be achieved. Islam, he argues, provides the methodology for achieving justice by means of several doctrines: (1) the command to do justice in all aspects of life; (2) to be just in governance and court; (3) to choose just leaders and judges; (4) to be just in politics; (5) to be just in the division of inheritance; (6) to be just in treating fellow humans, not only towards close relatives; (7) to be incessantly just, even towards those whom we dislike; (8) to be just in educating children; (9) to be just in economic distribution; (10) to be just in treating corpses; and (11) to be just in weighing, etc. See ibid.

[81] Ibid., pp. 69–70.

[82] Anis Matta, "Pesan dari Aceh: Reformasi Harus Dimulai dari Iman", *Sabili* 15, 10 February 2005, pp. 34–35.

[83] See, for instance, Hidayat Nur Wahid, "Menerapkan Syariat Islam di Bidang Sosial Budaya dan Pendidikan", in *Penerapan Syariat Islam di Indonesia*, pp. 139–52; cf. in the same volume, Salim Segaf Al-Jufri, "Pengantar", pp. 7–22; Daud Rasyid, "Peluang dan Tantangan Penerapan Syariat Islam di Indonesia", pp. 53–60; and Salim Segaf Al-Jufri, "Jarimah (Pidana/Kriminal)", pp. 167–91.

[84] In line with the constructivist theoretical approach, while values and norms are assumed to be secondary factors, political and/or religious leaders play a more crucial role in determining the direction in which institutions will go. In the context of the political trajectory of PKS, there are some key themes that can be harnessed interchangeably to boost the party, depending very much on the specific need or condition. For further accounts on the constructivist approach in politics and religion, see, among others, Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger, "Does Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical Approaches to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 3 (2000): 641–74.

[85] Of the fifty-two founders of PK (before it became PKS), eight have a Ph.D. degree, nine have a Masters degree, and twenty-four have an undergraduate degree. Even though they were not educated in formal institutions, many of the rest are learned autodidacts. See DPP Partai Keadilan, *Sekilas Partai Keadilan*, pp. 3–4.

[86] Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, pp. 281–84.
[87] Greg Fealy and Bernhard Platzdasch, "The Masyumi Legacy: Between Islamist Idealism and Political Exigency", *Studia Islamika* 12, no. 1 (2005): 94.
[88] See, among others, M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c.1300 to the Present* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), pp. 228–43. See also Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia", *South East Asia Research* 10, no. 2 (2002): 121–22.
[89] One of the most prominent founders of PK is Abu Ridho, who was also an important figure of DDII.
[90] Anis Matta, "Kata Pengantar", in Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. vii.
[91] See Fealy and Platzdasch, "The Masyumi Legacy", pp. 94–95.
[92] Interview with Mutammimul Ula, Jakarta, 15 May 2005.
[93] Interview with Fakhri Hamzah, Jakarta, 15 May 2005.
[94] Interview with Abu Ridho, Jakarta, 14 May 2005.
[95] However, it was reported that the party had actually demanded the reinsertion of the Jakarta Charter into UUD 1945 and for Islamic law to be established in Indonesia. See PK Sejahtera Online, "Sejarah PK Sejahtera" <http://pk-sejahtera.org/organisasi.php?op=sejarah&mn=3> (accessed 14 January 2006).
[96] See Chapter 3 for a discussion about the controversy surrounding the Jakarta Charter in the process of formulating the 1945 constitution.
[97] The idea of *masyarakat madani* (loosely translated as civil society) has been explicitly mentioned in the party's vision and mission <http://pk-sejahtera.org>. This term was first used by Anwar Ibrahim, a former Malaysian deputy prime minister, to depict an ideal Muslim community inspired by Muhammad's modern civilization in Madinah. In Indonesia, this term was frequently used by Nurcholish Madjid.
[98] Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. 234.
[99] This famous statement has been repeatedly made by Nurcholish Madjid, following Robert N. Bellah's theoretical construct. See Nurcholish Madjid et al., *Kehampaan Spiritual Masyarakat Modern: Respon dan Transformasi Nilai-nilai Islam menuju Masyarakat Madani* (Jakarta: Mediacita, 2000). See also Robert N. Bellah, *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).
[100] For the PKS' holistic, integrative vision of politics, see Tim Kaderisasi PK, *Syumuliyatul Islam* (Jakarta: Tarbiyatuna, 2002).
[101] See the party's vision and mission at <http://www.pk-sejahtera.org>.
[102] Hidayat Nur Wahid, "Kedepankan Moral dan Dakwah", *Ensiklopedi Tokoh Indonesia* <http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/h/hidayat-nur-wahid/index.shtml> (accessed 3 January 2006).
[103] This concept has been introduced by Horace Kallen in his *Cultural Pluralism and the American Idea: An Essay in Social Philosophy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1956).

[104] The concept of the melting pot society was introduced by J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, in his *Letters from an American Farmer* (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1926).

[105] See the party's statute at <http://www.pk-sejahtera.de/download/ad_pks.pdf>.

[106] Tifatul Sembiring, "Grand Design Indonesia Versi PKS", p. 3.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, pp. 247–51.

[110] In the 1955 election, the supporters of the Jakarta Charter gained 40 per cent of the parliamentary seats. In the 1999 election, however, the share of the vote for proponents of the Charter decreased significantly to only 12 per cent. In the 2004 election, PPP and PBB — two Islamic parties that supported the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter into the 1945 Constitution — obtained 8.2 per cent and 2.6 per cent of the vote respectively. The two parties together received 10.8 per cent of the vote, a slight decrease from the 12 per cent of the 1999 election. See Nadirsyah Hosen, "Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 36, no. 3 (October 2005): 427.

[111] Interview with Mutammimul Ula, PKS representatives in the DPR, "Persoalannya Bukan Teks Piagam Jakarta An Sich, Tapi …", *Suara Keadilan*, 1–15 September 2000, pp. 4–5, as cited in Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, pp. 248–50.

[112] *International Herald Tribune*, 21 October 2004.

[113] See, among others, Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Piagam Jakarta dan Piagam Madinah", *Kompas*, 30 November 2004, p. 4.

[114] Untung Wahono, "Piagam Jakarta, PKS, dan Demokratisasi Referensi", *Kompas*, 14 December 2004, p. 4.

[115] Ibid.

[116] This historical event had been recorded in the Qur'an 5:4–45.

[117] Wahono, "Piagam Jakarta, PKS, dan Demokratisasi Referensi".

[118] Ibid.

[119] Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 80.

[120] It is assumed that the centrist nature of the PKS is inspired by such moderate leaders of the Ikhwan al-Muslimun as Yusuf al-Qardhawi, and not by al-Banna. See Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, pp. 245–46.

[121] Nonetheless, Ghassan Salamé questions the extent to which Islamists can turn into democrats. See Ghassan Salamé, "Introduction: Where are the Democrats?" in *Democracy without Democrats: The Renewal of Muslim Politics?*, edited by Ghassan Salamé (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995).

[122] Larry Diamond et al., eds., *Islam and Democracy in the Middle East* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003).

7

INTERSECTION AND RUPTURE
Piety, Pragmatism, and Power Contests among the Islamists

THE EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC ISLAM

The emergence of Islamism in post-New Order Indonesia in one way or another signifies the emergence of public Islam. In contrast to what Hefner categorizes as "Civil Islam", which tends to denote civil society,[1] "public Islam" in the context of Islamism refers to the Islamist struggles to put Islam at the centre of the public domain.[2] Central to the notion of "public Islam" is the Islamists' quest for the implementation of Shari'ah law, believed to be the quintessence of Islam, in the public sphere, either by means of existing political structures, namely the state and its apparatus, or non-political structures, that is, society at large. As far as Indonesian Islamists are concerned, there will always be deliberate efforts by the Islamists to champion Islam as the only blueprint for the whole society amid the various public discourses over what constitutes the common good.

Following Eickelman and Salvatore, the term public sphere refers to "the site where contests take place over the definition of the obligations, rights and especially notions of justice that members of society require for the common good to be realized".[3] This definition assumes the participation of all segments of society, including Islamists, along with the process of defining the common good. However, the concept of the public sphere has commonly been conflated with the concept of civil society. According to Shmuel N. Eisenstadt,

> Civil society entails a public sphere, but not every public sphere entails a civil society, whether of the economic or political variety, as defined in the contemporary discourse, or as it has developed in early modern Europe through direct participation in the political process of corporate bodies or a more or less restricted body of citizens in which private interests play a very important role. We do indeed expect that in every civilization of some complexity and literacy a public sphere will emerge, though not necessarily of the civil society type.[4]

In an attempt to delineate the difference between public sphere and civil society, Simon Chambers maintains that the public sphere provides a broad arena for action, while civil society provides the "site of resistance and emancipation".[5] It can be said that the public sphere is an extension of civil society, "where the ideas, interests, values, and ideologies formed within the relations of civil society are voiced and made politically efficacious".[6] Under these circumstances, democratic participation becomes necessary for all elements of society to negotiate and interact with one another concerning the definition of the public good. In this context, civil society can serve as a watchdog element in democratic societies, to give checks and balances and to see that public matters in the public sphere are properly dealt with by the government.

The question is whether or not Islamist groups can be categorized as a part of civil society. For Simon Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein, the answer to this question is "no", at least if the existence of Islamist groups does not strengthen the institution of democracy. However, it can be "yes", if they form an integral part or are in full support of a democratic society. This is so because a healthy, strong, and vibrant civil society strengthens and enhances democracy. The civil society that is full of hatred, bigotry, and anti-democracy would not perform this function; rather, it would function as "bad civil society".[7] As Chambers and Kopstein succinctly put it:

> Hate groups are the ideological nurseries of ideas that can form the core of much more pernicious larger associations. It is not unreasonable to say that the Freemen and the Christian Identity movement provide the theory and that people like Timothy McVeigh provide the practice. But even when this does not occur, even when hate groups do not grow in size or carry out violent acts, their ideas often infect the political mainstream and diminish the reservoir of good will between citizens that is essential to any healthy democracy.[8]

As has been explained in previous chapters, the Islamists — particularly those of the utopian wing — construct anti-democracy discourses in

tandem with the ideology of hatred with the purpose of weakening the institutionalization of democracy. The process of public deliberation (*shura*) provided by these Islamists does not have sufficient strength to go hand in hand with democratic principles. In areas where the sacred texts have been spelled out clearly, there is no room for public deliberation. Clearly, Islamism could lead to totalitarianism if its values do not support democracy.[9]

The extent to which Islamism can disentangle itself from totalitarian characteristics and become a part of democratic society is a serious puzzle that needs further investigation, even though today's versions of Islamism does not seem to support or engender democracy. Viewed from the theoretical perspective used by Chambers and Kopstein above, it is evident that utopian Islamists cannot be categorized as an element of "civil society", even "bad civil society". The anti-democratic discourses and the ideology of hatred, coupled with "non-rational" public deliberation are, as this study has demonstrated, among the obvious reasons why these Islamists cannot be called members of "civil society". However, the meliorist Islamists, even though they participate actively in the democratic system of Indonesia and contribute towards the creation of a democratic society, are beyond the reach of civil society analysis because they are actors in the political sphere.

Having said all of that, both utopian and meliorist Islamists are deeply concerned with presenting Islam at the centre of the public sphere. The doctrine of the indivisibility of Islam as "three Ds" (Islam as *al-din*, *dunya wa al-dawlah*, or "Islam as religion, worldly matter, and politics") is behind this aspiration. For this reason, the Islamists feel obliged to control the public sphere in order to pursue what they believe is mandated by religion. The Islamists employ the antithetical notion of secularism — where religion becomes a matter of private life and thus must be separated from politics — as their point of departure. In the Islamist conception, religion must be made public, since there is no reason to hide it from the public sphere. When religion is hidden away from the public, there is no heavenly guidance for all the members of society. For the Islamists, public Islam refers to the way in which Islam must function as the blueprint for the actuality of Muslim minds and attitudes. In accordance with this assumption, Islam must be understood in its entirety: as spiritual guidance for individuals as well as a political order. This is precisely what Mawdudi has said:

> The Shari'ah thus prescribes directives for the regulation of our individual as well as collective lives. These directives affect varied subjects such as religious rituals, personal character, morals, habits, family relationships, social and economic affairs, administration, the rights and duties of

> citizens, the judicial system, the laws of war and peace and international relations. They tell us what is good and bad; what is beneficial and useful and what is injurious and harmful; what are the virtues which we have to cultivate and encourage and what are the evils which we have to suppress and guard against; what is the sphere of our voluntary, personal and social action and what are our limits; and, finally, what methods we can adopt to establish a dynamic order of society and what methods we should avoid. The Shari'ah is a complete way of life and an all-embracing social order.[10]

This quotation indicates that the Shari'ah is regarded as a paramount system guiding Muslims at both individual and societal levels and it should therefore be instituted at the heart of the public sphere. For the Islamists, religion-based regulations are essential for creating a heavenly-spirited public sphere. Nevertheless, conscience (*taqwa*) outweighs the judicial system. As Sayyid Qutb puts it,

> So far we have dealt with the "legal" aspect of government in Islam, but beyond this is the "voluntary" aspect in which moral guidance goes beyond what the legislation requires, after the manner of Islam in all its requirements and systems. Thus government in Islam is based more on conscience than on legislation. It is based the fact that God is present at every moment with both the ruler and the ruled, watching over both. "Any servant to whom God puts in charge a flock, if he fails to guide it well, he will never see a trace of Paradise" [Hadith]…"Consume not your goods between you in vanity; neither proffer it to the judges, that you may sinfully consume a portion of other men's goods, and that wittingly" [Q.S. 2:188–84].[11]

According to Eisenstadt, the analysis of the public sphere in Islamic societies is closely linked to the analysis of power and culture. The public sphere crystallizes out of the dialectical interaction of the *ulama*' (religious scholars), the Shari'ah, various sectors of the broader community such as socio-economic and culture bases, and the rulers. The basic framework within which such interaction takes place is the Shari'ah, the regulator of moral and religious vision, the cohesive and boundary-setting force of Muslim communities.[12] But the manner in which Shari'ah itself can serve as a foundation for the creation of a democratic society will depend on its potential strength in the bonds and bridges it forms across all elements of society. While bonding refers to the process of looking inward and reinforcing exclusive as well as homogenous identities, bridging involves making connections beyond the

Muslim community across social, ethnic, and political cleavages.[13] At this stage, therefore, Shari'ah can function as a double-edged sword: it has both bonding and bridging functions.

The idea of making the public sphere more Islamic is driven mainly by the basic nature of Islam as a communal religion. In contrast to some other major religions of the world, which tend to put more emphasis on individual pietism, the doctrine of communalism in Islam can be traced from the theological notion that all Muslims are brethren. A Muslim must serve as protector and helper to other Muslims. The most oft-cited example of the doctrine of communalism is "commanding which is good and forbidding which is abominable" (*al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa nahy 'an al-munkar*). In this context, the responsibility for restoring society rests upon every adult Muslim; all are responsible for whatever happens before them and they must give advice to their fellow Muslims to obey God. Nevertheless, the sense of communal responsibility varies from one community to another. What seems to be certain is that such a doctrinal principle receives more prominence among the Islamists due to their strong commitment to restore the rest of the community.

THE NOTION OF POWER: BETWEEN PIETISM AND PRAGMATISM

One of the foremost questions to be answered is whether it is the "theology of power" or the "power of theology" that is the more pervasive undercurrent in the general picture of Islamism in Indonesia today. Explaining the key factors behind religious movements has long been a classic problem for sociologists. Structuralists will of course point to factors outside theology or religion as yardsticks for evaluating the emergence of any religious movement. They will argue that the phenomenon of Islamism is a manifestation of the theology of power rather than the power of theology. In other words, power matters more than theology. To the essentialists or culturalists, however, Islamism may be best explained through the lens of the Islamist reference to normative and theological arguments. In this section, however, I will argue that neither of these two approaches alone can satisfactorily explain the current picture of Indonesian Islamism. Rather, each of the two contributes in part to an elucidation of Islamism. Indeed, this study argues that for the Islamist elites, the notion of power matters more than the notion of theology. At the grass roots level, however, theology is more important, partly because of the convincing arguments constructed by the elites.

Let us begin by considering Foucault's theoretical argument that religion constitutes power struggles.[14] Foucault is of the opinion that religion has always been a political force, a "superb instrument of power for itself; entirely woven through with elements that are imaginary, erotic, effective, corporal, sensual, and so on".[15] For Foucault, structure supersedes function (in religion-based culture). Foucault might be too simplistic when reducing religion into an entity merely of power for itself, since it comprises multifacious factors and possesses a high degree of complexity. He seems to observe religion from the prism of its surface structure and not from its deep structure. Nevertheless, one might immediately note the subversive character of religion when the political and ideological impulses of the religious elites are deeply engrained within the logic of normative textual arguments. As a result, such an ideologized religion tends to immerse itself in power contestations, either among members within a religion or among members of different religions. Foucault of course does not deal with religion from the perspective of the truth claims made by its adherents. Foucault instead implies that truth claims are made to justify political behaviours of religious elites and that this takes the form of power contestation over religious meanings and material resources.[16] Viewed from this perspective, Foucault's theoretical assumption seems justified.

From a Foucauldian perspective, religious meanings are thus contested, produced, and reproduced by means of socio-political structures. The history of religions has clearly shown us how communities of religion have been to a great extent immersed in power struggles over meanings. In Roxanne L. Euben's words, religion is "a site of contestation informed by the cultural, historical, geographical, and political context in which it is located".[17] It may be argued that the contestation of meaning in religion is a matter of winning over the community of believers by means of exercising religious authority and institutions. Analysing religion in the light of power contestation is therefore simply unavoidable, especially because the accomplishment of religious goals requires the application of power.

Foucault argues that power contestation must ultimately be analysed from the theory of "care of the self".[18] Religious authority must endeavour towards caring of the self, which involves "technologies of the self".[19] Islamists understand Islam as first of all a religion of salvation, that provides ample exemplar of pious predecessors (*salaf al-salih*) in dealing with matters of the world. Islam in the minds of Islamists is supposed to lead individuals from one reality to another, from a deprived condition to a state of well-being, both spiritual and material. They see individuals as hostages of evils symbolized by the *satan*. They regard selves as vulnerable to being led astray from the

heavenly guided path. That is why individuals are obliged to pray to God all the time for His guidance (*ihdina al-sirat al-mustaqim*) and pray for protection from the punishment of torture.

In line with this, the phenomenon of Islamism in response to democracy is inextricably linked to the power contestation among Islamic authorities over meanings and resources. This study argues that meanings are hardly separable from resources. In fact, the former are frequently harnessed by the Islamists to gain the latter. As Chapter 3 explains, religion is an open text mainly because of its multivocal nature. This multivocality has tremendous impacts on the sociological landscape of religion in that the face of religion manifests itself in a multitude of images. Nevertheless, it is difficult to measure which undercurrent is more prominent among the Islamists between meanings and resources at practical level.

As Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori have pointed out, the multi-facetedness of religion reflects the objectification of Muslims in implementing what they believe to be the truth.[20] Objectification can be defined as the process by which believers pose some basic questions regarding the meaningfulness of religion for their lives such as what religion stands for and why it matters to life. In anthropological studies, objectification is a perspective used to understand how religion or religion-based culture functions in society. Objectification is a theoretical perspective that assumes a linear shift of the epistemological mind-state of the community of religion from texts to contexts or the other way around, that is, that sociological fact is a reflection of religion par excellence.[21] However, this theory leaves wide gaps in the analysis of power relations in the community of religion — not all social phenomena can be understood from this theoretical perspective.

Subjectification, on the other hand, attempts to fill the gap by positing another dimension of religion with the argument that the subject matters more in making precepts of religion workable at a practical level. The subject is not less important than the object in the process of making and unmaking religious meaning. As has been described in previous chapters, this is because religion is an open, multivocal text for its adherents. Following the framework of constructivism, "actors" contribute to the process of the social construction of religion by echoing certain meanings over the others.[22] What I mean by "actors" in this context are the elites within the community of religion such as religious leaders, clerics, and the like, whose roles are critical in transmitting and creating religious awareness among ordinary people. The actors are the producers of meanings consumed by common adherents. Subjectification allows us to assume that the variety of subjective understandings of certain religious meanings is inescapable as a result of the religious elites' various

articulation of religion. This situations could be an advantage for those who are entrepreneurial in nature. This theory not only assumes that religion can be multivocal, but also points up the risk of subjugation of those whose interest is to establish socio-political hegemony by harnessing the multivocality of religion.[23]

In line with this, Armando Salvatore has observed that "the constitution of religion as an autonomous field within this world should be assessed as a crucial passage within longer-term processes of subjectification".[24] The process of subjectification, according to Salvatore, results in a paradigm shift within the body of religion from "beyond" to "behind", which makes obsolete the institutional mediation between the two opposing poles of this world and the hereafter, thus reducing reality to a dualism between privateness and publicness. The interwoven interaction between the politics of meaning and power forms a crucial part of the process of subjectification. The "behind" paradigm of the politics of true meaning is developed in the context of an increasing awareness of the contingent potentialities of discourse. Games of representation and misrepresentation, games of power, are required to preserve the inner truth and make it win.[25] According to Salvatore, while "the axial view of power was strictly dependant on meaning as its source and end, along a sequence meaning-power-meaning, the modern man has become conscious of the chance to convert this sequence into power-meaning-power. Power is at the beginning and at the end of any hermeneutic game".[26]

Such an analysis of power is very useful for analysis of contemporary Islamism in post-New Order Indonesia. In the minds of many Islamists, be they utopian or meliorist, the idea that Islam must be given power is principal. Within the entity of Islam lies the idea of glory and the Golden Age of Islam. As Appleby maintains, the imagination of the past gives meaning to the spirit of contemporary Islamism. In his opinion, "richly imagined and ingeniously documented versions of the past shape and sustain religious, social, and political movements".[27] Appleby goes on to argue that

> The mentality of the Islamists is shaped by a tortured vision of the past, a construction of history that casts the long and otherwise dispiriting record of humiliation, persecution, and exile of the true believers (punctuated by an occasional, atypical golden age of faith) as a necessary prelude to the decisive intervention of God and the final vanquishing of the apostates … A key to that mentality is found in the Islamists' appropriation of history. For them history is decidedly not just "one damn thing after another"; it is the arena in which the divine plan is enacted, in which souls gain or lose their salvation, in which God's elect take center stage.[28]

In accordance with this, historical events and sorrows in Muslim history play, unsurprising, a crucial role in forging the mindset and imagination of Islamists. The memory of the Islamists dates back to the period when Muslim civilization was destroyed by the Mongols with the downfall of Baghdad in 1258, followed by the *reconquista* of the Muslim land of Spain by Christian crusaders, the colonization of Muslim countries by Western powers, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I and the subsequent abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924, the occupation of Palestinian lands by Israel, the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States military and its allies, and other socio-economic deprivations suffered by Muslims under the conditions of global market capitalism. In Hrair Dekmejian's theoretical assumption, the Islamists are pervaded by the psychology of inferiority complex as a result of the multiple crises facing Muslims, in addition to feeling under siege by the superiority of Western civilization.[29]

Irfan S. Awwas, for instance, depicts the agony of the past as a period of humiliation, a condition that might lead to the extinction of Muslim civilization unless an entire and serious restoration is made.[30] In response to the alleged attempts at targeting Muslim radicals by Western media, he calls upon his readers to choose one of two options: self-dignity (*'izzah*) or extinction (*musnah*). He uses the *reconquista* of Spain as his chief argument for resisting the hegemony of the West. The history of Muslim Spain, in his view, should be referred to as an enduring lesson for today's Muslims if they are concerned with their survival. In his argument, the West is using, and will always use, the methods used in Spain in targeting Muslims. The Muslim societies of the past in Manila and Thailand are said to represent the historical glory of Muslims, before these regions were marginalized and wiped out by the power of Western colonialism.[31]

It should be admitted that the predicament of Muslims might provoke today's Islamists to take revenge over their history. Yet, the Islamists are also entrenched in their romanticization of past glories. The predicament and glory of Muslims in the past are two sides of the same coin. Both present an inexhaustible reference for today's Islamists. The three best generations of early Islam under the Prophet Muhammad and two generations of his Companions make up the pristine exemplars of Muslims. The three generations are usually identified as *al-salaf al-salih* (pious predecessors). The Islamists exploit the piety of the pious predecessors particularly as the standard for individual conduct in day-to-day life.

The Golden Age of Islam under the Abbasid caliphates continues to linger in the minds of the Islamists.[32] The Golden Age is perceived as the highest achievement of Muslim civilization. When Islamists talk about

the Golden Age, they are really talking about power contestation among different civilizations. They invoke past glories in assessing present day Muslim achievements in global civilizational contests. They are obsessed with using the Golden Age of Islam as a model for present-day Muslim civilization. They believe that it is only by resurrecting the Golden Age of Islam that the balance of world power can be maintained and the hegemony of Western capitalism challenged.

In this sense, the Islamists share the culturalist point of view that Islam is not only essentially different from Western Christian civilization but also that it is involved in a power contestation between the two.[33] To the Islamists, the history of human civilization consists of repeated power struggles.[34] Citing a verse from the Qur'an, they maintain that glory has been circulated by God to particular civilizations in alternation (Q.S. 3:140). The rise to and fall from power is as the rotation of the sun and the moon in shining on the earth in turn. As a result, the "clash of civilizations" theory is regarded as an undeniable fact that will guide the direction of human civilization in the future.[35] The cycle of war, conquest, and re-conquest is unavoidable as human history unfolds. It is imperative that Islam be well-armed to engage in global power struggles.

The world is thus perceived as an arena where history is constantly being repeated. Power alternates between two poles, East and West. In this context, the West had been in power for more than 700 years during the Roman Empire. Then the East — represented by Islam — took over and ruled large parts of the world while the West remained in an age of darkness. Following a long struggle through the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the industrial revolution, the West eventually returned as the dominating power of the world. Today the West is more powerful than the East in almost all aspects of life.

Although the colonization of Muslim countries came to an end after World War II, the hegemony of the West has continued to prevail in different patterns and forms. If the process colonization was openly violent, today's hegemony of the West is characterized by other, more sophisticated and subtle, methods of domination. The ideas of the West, for instance, are considered appropriate and normative. Countries of the East were freed by the West and given political freedom to express their local identities, but not in the global context. In the fields of the economy, information technology, military might, and culture, the West has produced an incomparable achievement. In the age of information, the media of the West, for instance, is more productive in dominating global discourse than the media of the East.[36]

For Islamists, the idea of glory in Islam is closely associated with the observance of religious duties (‘*ibadah*) as mandated by religious texts.[37] Glory must be achieved through total, devoted obedience to God. Conversely, glory achieved under the condition of disobedience to God is regarded as meaningless. Even though to be glorious in this world does not necessarily mean that one has to obey God’s law, the Islamists generally maintain that obeying God and achieving worldly success must be done together. There is no separation between ‘*ibadah* and worldly achievement, since the latter is the prerequisite for the former, and not the other way around. Only under supportive circumstances can Muslims perform their religious duties freely. As a consequence, dominating the public realm in order to safeguard Muslims’ capacity to observe their religious duties is as necessary as clearing all barriers from the path of God. The Islamists are fully aware that observing religious duties under enemy surveillance is not an ideal condition for Muslim life. This is especially the case when Muslims serve only as a minority under the hegemony of unbelievers, as in the case of Palestinian Muslims and other Muslim minorities in the West.[38]

The notion of glory in Islamists’ minds is characterized by an overwhelming romanticization of the past. There is a glorification of the self as reflected in the achievements of Muslim civilizations of the past. Islamists will not hesitate to mystify and exaggerate the real condition of a past in which Islam is usually depicted as the most perfect and supreme religion and civilization. To bolster their argument, they cite some dogmatic textual sources that are often referred to by Islamists to show that “the religion before God is Islam” (Q.S. 3:19); “Ye are the best peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God” (Q.S. 3:110); “Islam is the utmost religion and it will never be surpassed by other religions”, and the like.[39] They perceive Islam after all as a living organism that possesses the same dimensions as humans, including psychological and emotional dimensions. In this sense, Muslims are described as a unified body bounded by the same faith and the same fate. In a body, each organ should share the same feeling of pain as, for instance, another organ that feels pain. There is a sense of a calling for togetherness and unification among Muslims and Islamists in particular in general to respond to Western hegemony as well as to achieve the best community in the world.[40]

Islamists invoke the fourteen-centuries-long history of Islam as their main reference in their quest for self-glorification. In the course of that history, the Muslim community (*ummah*) is said to have accomplished a prophetic mission to bring humankind from the age of ignorance to the age of revelation. It is along with this history that the glory of Islam has been

represented in rapid expansion of Muslims outside the Arab peninsula to places such as Andalusia (Spain), Central Asia, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, and to some Southeast Asian countries. Under the rule of Islam, the Islamists argue, these regions were under stable governance. Muslims were unified, respected by other nations, and proud of what they possessed.[41]

The utopian Islamists believe that Islam and the West are incomparable to one another.[42] The condition of Islam is defined by the "truth" God has revealed to Muhammad, that it is the only panacea to all problems and ills faced by humankind. As long as Muslims consistently uphold the truth of Islam, they can achieve the ideal and best civilization. On the other hand, when Muslims follow other ideologies than Islam, they are set to stay in their backwardness. The Islamists believe that the 1924 downfall of the Ottoman Empire signified the demise of Muslims, hope to be the greatest civilization. The reason for their downfall, according to these Islamists, was because Muslims sought to replace Islamic law with secular law. Muslims have ever since been beset by backwardness, narrow-mindedness, and stagnation. Muslims have vacillated between the ideologies of socialism-communism-atheism on the one hand and capitalism-liberalism-secularism on the other; this has brought about the backwardness of Muslims. Caught in between these two ideologies, Muslims have been ruined by narrow-minded patriotism and misguided nationalism.[43]

On the basis of such a belief, the Islamists argue that the renaissance, development, and enlightenment of Islam depend very much on the way in which Islam is implemented in society. On the other hand, the main factor that caused Muslims to be left behind by Western civilization is that they totally put aside the implementation of Shari'ah law from their concerns. Muslims, for instance, disregard their own rights to properly elect their leaders by adopting a hereditary system of monarchy with no possibility of criticism from the ruled. This, according to the Islamists, caused Islam and Muslims to be plunged into long-lasting, painful misery. [44]

It is clear that there is a sense of utopianism and inconsistency in the logic of utopian Islamists' rejection of Western civilization. Firstly, while they acknowledge and adore the achievements of the West and even advise fellow Muslims to follow in the path of the West, they still claim to reject the West on ideological grounds. They are willing to adopt Western civilization only in terms of its scientific and technological achievements, while rejecting anything related to culture and theological beliefs. Secondly, while on the one hand these Islamists refer to the past as the ideal prototype of Muslim civilization, they reject certain aspects of Muslim history on the other, for example, the feudalistic pattern of Muslim kingdoms that allowed the process of succession

on the basis of family lineage, not on merit. In their opinion, such a system was similar to that of the Christian Middle Ages. Even though they denounce the West as morally ignorant (*jahiliyah*) and corrupt, they tacitly acknowledge the excellence of the West is something that must be emulated.

According to Hasan, a HTI activist, the reality of Islam as a source of renaissance and achievement of the Muslims of the past is contradictory to what happened to the Christians in Europe in the Middle Ages.[45] The hegemonic rule of the Church had led to the sorry plight of Europeans since the Church had only enriched itself through an illicit collaboration of rulers and religious authorities. Nevertheless, they acknowledge the fact that the situation of the Europeans in the Middle Ages is not much different from that in present-day Arab countries. They accuse most of the rulers of Muslim countries of being selfish and unable or unwilling to make sacrifices for the sake of their community. These rulers do not hesitate to use whatever means to preserve their power, including sacrificing the ruled, the Islamists charge.[46]

Being overwhelmingly concerned with the failure of Muslims, the utopian Islamists strongly believe that they do not need democracy. What they need is to make Islam the sole source of regulation for their daily life. By doing so, they wish to initiate a plan for recovering the glory of Islam. By embracing Islam totally and not half-heartedly, they believe, Muslims can achieve the same standard of living as in Western countries. Again, they refer to the past as their model for promulgating Islam as the solution. They add that when the Muslims of the past were at their peak of history, non-Muslim communities were said to seek help from them — an entirely different situation from that today.[47]

The idea of a glorious Islam also lingers in the minds of meliorist Islamists. Anis Matta and Ihsan A. Tandjung, two leading PKS figures, optimistically assume for instance that the renaissance of Islam is near.[48] This can be seen from the increase in the number of Muslim converts in some non-Muslim countries, the increase in the number of mosques, the rapid spread of books on Islam throughout the world, the reception of the global market system to Islamic banks and institutions, the increase in the number of those who wear Muslim dress, and so on. To Matta, the renaissance of Islam is accompanied by the steady regression of Western civilization at the same time. What has caused Western civilization to regress, in Matta's view, is the low quality of morals, the reduction of religion to the merely personal, and the glaring lack of spiritual power. Nevertheless, the Western civilization has many factors that bolster its chances of survival, such as the mastery of science and technology, as well as military power. On the other hand, Islam

has shown a significant increase in morality and spirituality, a condition for further development in hard power.

It goes without saying that power is understood by Islamists in a broader sense, not only in terms of formal power structures, but also in the sense of a civilizational global contest. The Islamists are inspired by the glory of Muslims in the past and are obsessed with Islam's rapid expansion outside the Arabian Peninsula. The Islamists believe that it is only by improving the quality of Muslims that the renaissance of Islam can be achieved to replace the declining Western civilization. The romanticization of the past plays a crucial part in the Islamists' dream of winning back power. They feel that they are now politically marginalized and underestimated by the West, because they are economically deprived, socially displaced, and educationally left far behind.

POWER MANIFESTATION: THE TRANSNATIONAL *KHILAFAH ISLAMIYAH*

The idea of a transnational Islamic State (*Khilafah* or *Dawlah Islamiyah*) has been the core tenet of Hizbut Tahrir all over the world.[49] It seeks a transnational government of Muslim countries under a single network of Muslim authority. Under this system, the executive position would be held by a Caliph (*Khalifah*) who exercises his authority on the basis of the Qur'an and Hadith. A Caliph is chosen through an electoral mechanism in the Constituent Assembly. A *Khilafah* can consist of several "Islamic sub-states" (*Dawlah Islamiyah*) led by governors, but all political decisions of the Caliph are constitutionally binding. To different degrees, most Indonesian Islamists agree with the idea of *Khilafah*, which they hope would unify and restore the power of all Muslim states in the world. To the activists of HTI, only with *Khilafah* can Islam counterbalance the power of Western capitalism under the hegemony of the United States and its allies.[50] The HTI activists also strongly believe that *Khilafah* is the only panacea for the multiple crises inflicting most Muslim countries.[51]

It has been repeatedly emphasized here that in HTI's view, the plight of Muslim societies today is caused mainly by the absence of *Khilafah* for more than eighty-two years since the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924.[52] HTI activists believe that Western power, represented by British colonial power, was behind the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. They assume that the British used their *divide et impera* strategy by distracting the Muslim Caliphate with the idea of nationalism in order to break apart and subjugate the power of Islam. Muslim communities ever since have supposedly been easily subdued

by the colonial power of Western capitalism and forced to apply non-Islamic principles in all aspects of life.[53] HTI protagonists reproduce this argument to counter the ideology of nationalism and to promote the importance of Islamic *dawlah Khilafah*.[54]

The ideology of *Khilafah* mainly originated from HTI's Middle Eastern forerunners and ideologues such as Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani,[55] the founder of HT, and 'Abd al-Qadim Zallum, his successor. To these ideologues, Yusanto approvingly explains, the ideology of nationalism represents the notion of '*asabiyah* (tribal fanaticism), one of the most primordial human characteristics that was considered part of the culture of ignorance (*jahiliyah*). In Yusanto's view, on the Caliph's shoulders lies the responsibility to protect the integrity of *Dawlah Islamiyah* from any external threat. He is also responsible for protecting every citizen within it, regardless of religion, ethnicity, and gender. As long as one pledges one's allegiance to the authority of the *Khilafah* government, one is entitled to the privilege of its services.[56]

Yusanto goes on to argue that in many respects the *Khilafah* system of government is similar to that of democracy, in that there is power-sharing among its elements. Both the Caliph and Majlis Shura (Constituent Assembly), for instance, are supposed to share power. While a Caliph serves as the executive, the Majlis Shura functions as the consultative body. A Caliph, together with Majlis Shura, has the right to appoint judges. Only in certain emergency situations is a Caliph entitled to make his own decisions over particular matters facing the society. A dispute must be deliberated by the Caliph's decision, which is supreme and legally binding, thus all citizens of *Dawlah Islamiyah* are obliged to uphold it. The difference between (secular) democracy and *Khilafah* system in Yusanto's view is that while the former is based on pure public agreement or opinion, the latter is based on religion. Yusanto further argues that all matters should be exposed to the public and be open to dispute, except those religion-related issues whose theological basis is fixed. This exposure is essential so that each citizen can have the same influence on public interests, particularly in a heterogeneous society with different interests that are often contradictory to one another. For this reason, he believes that *Khilafah* system, as a religion-based system of governance, is the most viable solution for resolving any dispute over public matters.[57]

It is evident that the ideology of *Khilafah* assumes power in a political sense to triumph over whatever is perceived of as entities not derived from Islam. In this context, Islam is understood in an ideological sense. Such an understanding is of course widely accepted by kinds of both Islamists, particularly as a consequence of the Islam-as-3Ds doctrine (*din* "religion", *dunya* "world", and *dawlah* "state"). By and large, there are two main

arguments underpinning the ideology of *Khilafah*. The first is a textual-normative argument; it is believed that the establishment of a transnational *Khilafah* is to be normatively founded. Second, it is also argued that the Muslim community is under siege and occupation by Western hegemony. Only by means of *Khilafah* can the Muslim community (*ummah*) be unified under one single authority that might then supposedly save the 60 per cent of the world's oil resources in the various Muslim countries in the world.[58] Subsequently, these countries would be able to free themselves from Western colonization. Interestingly, *Khilafah* is based on the assumption that Western power is in decline. At the end of the day, *Khilafah* is predicted by HTI activists to take over the leadership of the world.[59]

In addition to the utopian dream of reviving the glory of the past, the strong enthusiasm for the return of the *Khilafah* is attributed to the availability of religious texts projecting this return.[60] These texts, usually taken from Hadith, are understood to foretell the return of *Khilafah* state.[61] To bolster their convictions, the utopian Islamists seek empirical justification in contemporary political analysis of current global developments formulated by Western sources, even though at times it is not constructed on the basis of accurate and reliable data. Farid Wadjdi, for instance, points to the release of the National Intelligence Council's (NIC) December 2004 report entitled "Mapping the Global Future" as a basis for fulfilling his prophecies of return of the *Khilafah*.[62] This report predicted that the world in 2020 will be characterized by one of four scenarios: (1) China and India will emerge as new political and economic powers replacing the United States; (2) Pax Americana, with the United States as the single actor; (3) A New Caliphate system or a global government based on Islamic precepts; and (4) Cycle of Fear, the emergence of massive global fear as a result of a chaotic and uncontrolled situation. This situation would result primarily from the aggressive response towards the threat of terrorism which in turn might lead to a transgression of international regulations and security arrangements. Subsequently, this would give rise to an "Orwellian" world in which humans became the slaves of an existing authoritarian and hegemonic country.[63]

The utopian Islamists believe that Muslims have all the requirements to become an excellent community and to lead the world. Muslims have an abundance of highly qualified people and a pristine ideology. As evidenced the history of human civilization, a particular ideology might gain respect for its adherents as long as they were fully committed to implementing and developing that ideology at the level of state institutions. They argue that this holds true for Islamic ideology. They refer to the thirteen-century history of the Caliphate (*Khilafah*) state as proof. The Islamic Caliphate, with its Islamic

ideology, is the key to the renaissance of Muslims. The Islamic Caliphate with its just, prospering, and safeguarding law enforcement is believed capable of toppling Western capitalism and the United States hegemony.[64]

The *Khilafah* is also believed to be able to unify all Muslims all over the world. This is so because the *Khilafah* maintains pristine regulations, transnational states that are not obstructed by narrow-minded nationalism, and a just system of governance with no discriminatory and racist treatment. Only the *Khilafah* could have unified and dissolved the states occupying the areas from Xinjiang (West China) in the East, across over the Middle East, Egypt, and North Africa to Morocco and Spain in the West, from India in the South across South Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus to the Iberian peninsula in the North.[65]

It is also believed that the *Khilafah* could bring the communities under it to prosperity, bringing about the renaissance of science and technology and the development of Muslim society in general. The *Khilafah* had made its citizens to be wealthy communities so that nobody was said to take up almsgivings. No other system is so far believed to be better than — or on the same level with — Islam; not Greece, Roman, ancient Egypt, the Persian Empire, the Roman Empire, Europe of the Middle Ages, nor Western capitalism can compare with the achievements of Islam in history. When under Muslim rulers, Andalusia was at the height of its civilization. Its universities were the centres of excellence for students all over Europe. The achievements of Muslims were far above those of Europe at that time. To the Islamists, therefore, it is logical to assume that the backwardness of present-day Muslims in science and technology may be attributed to the absence of the *Khilafah* institution. The return of the *Khilafah* would bring a return of multidimensional achievements of Muslims.

APPROACHES TO POWER STRUCTURES

Power, as Giddens defines it, is generated in and by means of the reproduction of structures of domination.[66] Power is exercised through resources and thus power is not itself a resource. The exercise of power follows what Giddens describes as the "dialectic of control", in which individuals can influence others to maintain regularized relations of autonomy and dependence between them in terms of social interaction. In Giddens' view, there are two types of resources that constitute structures of domination: "allocative" and "authoritative". While the first consists of material features of the environment such as raw materials or material power sources, the second comprises the organization of social time-space or temporal-spatial constitutions of paths

TABLE 7.1
Giddens' Scheme of Power Resources

No.	Allocative Resources	Authoritative Resources
1.	Material features of the environment (raw materials, material power sources)	Organization of social time-space (temporal-spatial constitution of paths and regions)
2.	Means of material production/ reproduction (instruments of production, technology)	Production/reproduction of the body (organization and relation of human beings in mutual association)
3.	Produced goods (artefacts created by the interaction of 1 and 2	Organization of life chances (constitution of chances for self-development and self-expression)

Source: Giddens' *The Constitution of Society*.

and regions.[67] He goes on to argue that any coordination of social systems across time and space necessarily involves a definite combination of these two types of resources, which can be classified as shown in Table 7.1.

On the basis of the scheme, it seems that even though both sources are complementary to one another, the authoritative sources serve merely an intermediate stage to having control over the allocative sources. Giddens' scheme of power gives a useful theoretical perspective for analysing Indonesian Islamists' thoughts and movements in the post-New Order era. In line with this perspective, I tend to argue that dominating the authoritative resources for the Islamists is of the same importance as dominating the allocative resources. Having control over the authoritative resources is a sine qua non for pursuing the domination over the allocative resources.

In what follows, I will break down the authoritative sources into two types: formal power structures and non-formal ones. To the Islamists, there is a sense of a reciprocal relationship between allocative sources and authoritative sources in that taking control the second serves as a means of capturing the first.

As far as the Islamist movement is concerned, two approaches are commonly employed by Islamists in the process of power struggles. First, formal institutions such as bureaucratic and government structures have become significant targets for Islamists as well as a means of executing their ideology. In this case, it is worth noting that ideology in this context never

functions by itself as the end of the Islamists' venture. More than that, it can also serve as an intermediate means of achieving something else beyond it, that is, allocative resources.[68] In this approach, formal institutions are as important as the ideology of Islamism in that while the former will ensure the continuity and perpetuity of the latter, the latter will bind the Muslim community in a uniform homogeneity. This stems from the fact that all types of Islamism — whether utopian or meliorist — will always assume the inseparability of *din* (religion) from *dawlah* (state). Thus, there is a sense of reciprocity between the ideology of Islamism on the one hand and allocative resources on the other in terms of "who utilizes what".

Despite the fact that formal institutions are instrumental for all Islamists, it is only the meliorist Islamists that have direct access to formal institutions, at both the national and regional level as a consequence of their acceptance of the political party system. By participating they believe that Islam can play an important role in the process of social transformation at state level. On the other hand, utopian Islamists have to live with the consequences of subscribing to extra-parliamentary means of politics as their method. They do indeed keep their distance from the system. Nevertheless, the ultimate goal would be more or less the same for both: seizing formal power structures. This is so because they share a similar understanding of the theology of power, that the most effective means of social transformation is by means of formal power structures. Through this power, they can carry out the project of the Islamization of the public by commanding what is good and forbidding what is wrong (*al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa nahy 'an al-munkar*).

As for the meliorist approach, there is a sense of moderation in that PKS activists tend to compromise with other elements of society over certain matters as long as this is the best choice for them.[69] Unlike MMI and HTI, the issue of Shari'ah implementation for PKS seems to be a negotiable concept in that they will not launch the project of Shari'ah implementation unless the rest of the society is prepared to accept it. This is a pragmatic attitude in that the party does not want to lose its ground among the masses by being accused of having a hidden agenda. The most frequently cited justification for this attitude is that the Shari'ah cannot be reduced to *hudud* (literally, "boundaries", meaning punishment) such as hand amputation for theft and stoning to death for adulterers. The Shari'ah is wider than that: it encompasses all values that are virtuous in nature.[70] This means that there is a process of negotiation over what constitutes "Islamic" or Shari'ah, even though they internally adopt a stringent standard of pietism. PKS activists have their own internal code of conduct as to what and how piety should be implemented in their own daily life.

Moreover, PKS activists argue that the issue of Shari'ah implementation must be understood in its proper context as a continuing and gradual process, not a one-shot deal. The most obvious case in point is the debate over the RUU/APP (*Rancangan Undang-Undang Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi*, or Anti-pornography and porn action bills), which stimulated a heated debate in the public sphere. The final drafting of the bill went through a series of open public debates for the purpose of refining the bills.[71] As is well known, PKS was one of the main actors behind the bill. Following strong resistance from particular segments of the public, PKS seemed to "loosen" its stringent standard of morality by accommodating some input from the public. Along the course of the public debate, the bills eventually underwent significant revisions. The involvement of the party in the existing political system has pushed it into a position where moderation is inevitable. What constitutes "good" as well as "bad" for the party's activists depends on the direction of the socio-political pendulum. They have no choice but to negotiate with other elements of the society when aspiring to certain Islam-based bills, even though they have to be faithful to their own choices.

Having reviewed PKS' approach to power structures, the question would be: does the pragmatism of the party's attitude represent its genuine identity? Can it be guaranteed that such an attitude will be consistent in the future? We have learned in previous chapters that it is difficult to capture the quintessence of PKS' political ideology due mainly to its double standards. This strategy allows the party to hide its deeper structure for political gain (*taqiyah*, the politics of "hiding").[72] As a political manoeuvre, this strategy deceives the public. Based on this assumption, one might infer that the flexibility of PKS' attitudes does not represent its genuine identity. That the party does have such a strategy seems to be indicated by the slogan, popular among its activists, of "we are engaged in society, but not immersed in or polluted by bad practices of the society" (*nakhtalithun walakin natamayyazun*).[73] This indicates that on a superficial level they can compromise with other elements but on a deeper level they remain consistent in their own beliefs.

As far as religious matters are concerned, this attitude may be understood as a private preference that is justified and respected in human rights and democracy. Human rights and democracy will have to protect private preferences when it comes to issues such as dress (wearing the *hijab* or headscarf for Muslim women), drinking habits, gambling, or free sex. A problem, however, arises when such beliefs are forcibly implemented in the public sphere. What seems to surface is that the Islamists wish to impose laws about private matters upon the public, as they believe that there is no such thing as binary opposition of private versus public. It is not surprising

because this belief stems from the doctrine that Islam is both religion and politics at once.[74]

In this context, it must be noted that the party's subscription to such a belief could result in a collision between private preference and public law. Many assume that the party's acceptance of democracy is nothing more than pretence. This criticism is rooted in the belief that the party is faithful to democracy only in its electoral sense, but not in any substantial sense. If the party came to power, it would kill substantial democracy by means of electoral democracy. The religiously derived moral precepts would be put into effect in public. As a consequence, there would be no freedom for individuals to do whatever they wanted.

PKS activists believe that there is no room for negotiation regarding God's law as explicitly spelled out in the Qur'an and Hadith on such matters as the prohibition on liquor, gambling, theft, and free sex. Power structures are needed to ensure that God's law is imposed upon Muslims. Political parties are but one vehicle to take control over those power structures. It is of course much easier to impose God's law on the public by means of power structures, because one of the ways of "commanding good and forbidding wrong" is by means of power (the state).[75] This is why the party is very much concerned with taking control of as many positions as possible in formal power structures, both at the national and local (provincial and regency) levels. As soon as the party has a significant share of power within the ruling government or parliament, it will initiate public debates on Shari'ah through regulations such as *Rancangan Undang-Undang* (anti-pornography bills) at the national level and Peraturan Daerah (PERDA, or Regional Regulation) at the local level.

There are several cases in point where PKS is the actor behind the growing number of Shari'ah-based regulations. At the national level, the anti-pornography bill is the most conspicuous example. At the provincial level, several regions seem to be the party's "guinea pigs", especially regions in Java (Banten, Jakarta, Garut, Cianjur, Tasikmalaya, Indramayu, Kota Depok and Kota Cianjur, Tegal), and South Sulawesi (Maros, Bulukumba, Enrekang, Gowa, Sinjai, and Takalar), but also in Madura (Pamekasan) and Aceh.[76] Tangerang, just at the outskirts of Jakarta, was the pioneering region that implemented the so-called "PERDA *anti-pelacuran*" (anti-prostitution regulation).[77] Even though at the level of implementation there had been much chaos, the precedent still pushed other regions to implement similar regulations.[78] One of the easiest ways to adopt such a regulation is simply to emulate the contents of the regulation implemented in the City of Tangerang. In addition to anti-prostitution regulations, similar regulations

have also been applied to the prohibition of liquor.[79] It should be noted that in some of the above regions, PKSs is not the only actor behind the imposition of Shari'ah-based regulations. There are other Muslim parties such as PPP, PKB, and PAN that also took part in the process.

Be that as it may, the engagement of PKS in the political party system has had tremendous impacts on the transformation of the party towards a positive trajectory of democracy discourses among its activists and potential recruits. In addition, its engagement in real politics indicates that transforming society is impossible without perpetual and empathetic negotiation, compromises and positive attitudes towards society at large. There is a strong tendency towards moderation among its activists so that all its programmes and agendas may be achievable. For this reason, it is not surprising that PKS downplayed the issue of the implementation of Shari'ah and instead deployed the issue of clean governance during the 2004 general elections. And indeed, this strategy proved to be successful. It is within this context that PKS tries to strike a balance between two seemingly irreconcilable values: pietism and pragmatism. The call for pietism must be carried out in tandem with the development of economic security for the society. This is so because the party's activists believe that the increase of economic prosperity can pave the way for the increase of individual piety. This is precisely the meliorist character of the PKS.

The second type of Islamist approach is by means of non-formal power structures that are likewise instrumental for establishing the foundations of Shari'ah implementation. What I mean by non-formal structures are institutions and resources beyond the state structures, including private and traditional institutions such as family, religion, mass organizations, and society at large. In a Habermasian theoretical construct, these non-formal power structures may be categorized as civil society as long as they form an integral part of the democratization process and the rationalization of the public sphere.[80] This theory would be problematic if it were applied to analysing the Islamists' thoughts and activism; Islamists tend to circumscribe the democratization process and/or the rationalization of the public sphere. As has been explained, the utopian Islamists' preference for non-formal structures over formal ones has to do with their inability to get direct access to the latter. Interestingly, they are able to wrap their argument with theological rhetoric that basically says that involving themselves in the current corrupt political system is considered sinful.

What seems to be the case for both kinds of Islamists is that relying on support from those in power (*ahl al-quwwah*) is believed to be essential. The support can be derived from any source, including the military, either at the formal, institutional level for the meliorists or the non-formal, individual one

for the utopians. Sooner or later, if support from these sources is secured, public opinion on the glory of Islam can be constructed in order to gain power. It is imperative that the both kinds of Islamists collaborate with available institutional and social as well as political structures, particularly with those in power. If such support is secured, the process of power succession (*istilam al-hukm*) by those who may be trusted to implement Islamic law is matter of time.[81] This is merely a matter of strategic priority, between the blatant strategy and the hidden one.

The Islamists under study here argue that the method of power transfer must be peaceful. The most often cited example of a peaceful hand-over of power is the Prophet's bloodless conquest of Makkah (*fath makkah*). This indicates, they argue, that power succession through bloodshed has no precedence in Muhammad's life. With regard to the Islamic conquests of Persia, Spain, and Constantinople, however, the Islamists seem to employ a double standard.[82] They acknowledge that at times Muslims simply could not avoid the use of military force for certain reasons. But this must be seen in perspective, as peaceful means must always be prioritized over military force. Only in emergency situations can military force be used for defensive purposes, as in the cases of Palestine, Afghanistan, or Iraq. Instead of taking part in elections designed by Western capitalists, the utopian Islamists argue, the *istilam al-hukm* exemplified by the Prophet is more civilized and thus suitable for contemporary Muslims.[83]

Although the process of *istilam al-hukm* can be executed through direct involvement in the current political party system, this is not the only method. The utopian Islamists argue that recent history in fact suggests the opposite: a parliamentary struggle cannot result in significant changes to society. From the Old Order to the present era, the various regimes have adopted manifold non-Islam-derived ideologies such as secular capitalism, yet no significant changes for Islam and Muslim society have occurred, even though regimes have been replaced several times. Muslims are still said to remain marginalized, both economically and politically. So, what seems to be at stake is the extent to which the current political system provides opportunities for the betterment of Muslims.

As mentioned previously, it is only PKS that has direct access to formal power structures such as the bureaucracy and government institutions, both at national and local levels. The Islamists of MMI and HTI, on the other hand, have only society as a target for their anti-democracy campaign and their calls for the implementation of Shari'ah and the establishment of an Islamic state (*Dawlah Islamiyah*). Despite the similarities in ideology, all Islamists together form a multifaceted and complex configuration at a practical level. At times

they seem to go hand in hand harmoniously with one another, but just as often their paths diverge. By and large, they share the same commitment to implementing Shari'ah law or Islamic values through proposed bills such as the anti-pornography bill. At the implementation level, however, they are at odds as to how Shari'ah should actually be defined. Soon after PKS had been pushed further into the existing political configuration, many Islamists of MMI and HTI started to doubt the party's commitment to implementing Shari'ah law. To some extent, the Islamists of MMI and HTI shared the same criticisms of PKS' performance.[84]

At this juncture, the utopian Islamists have a long-term objective that is basically not different from that of their meliorist counterparts: dominating all power structures at all levels. The strategy adopted by the utopian Islamists is also not different from that of their meliorist counterparts: they, too, apply double standards to politics. On the one hand, they openly denounce democracy as something un-Islamic, on the other they have benefited a great deal from the room given in democratic life to gain a higher profile in public. Thanks to democratic freedom, Ba'asyir, for instance, felt obliged to acknowledge that Indonesia is the most democratic country in the world where he could enjoy the freedom of expression, however radical his views on religion were. He stated that he might not be able to enjoy the same freedom in the United States, which claims to be the champion of democracy, or even in Saudi Arabia, where Islam is used as the formal basis of the state.[85] This is obvious from his statement in court when he faced charges over his involvement in JI and terrorist activities:

> What the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and of course the US have been doing in arresting their enemies with terrorism charges and by utilizing Internal Security Acts (ISA) as the weapon of terror indicates the undeniable proof of their decline. How can the US be regarded as the pioneer of democratization while its hands and face are smeared with blood as a result of their anarchic actions along with its attempts at dismantling their political opponents? Whereas, Indonesia, a country that just gained its independence in 1945, has learnt that forcing the will of its citizens will only lead to state terrorism. On the contrary, the unaccommodated aspirations of citizens by the state will result in disillusionment that will trigger terrorism acts that endanger all state infrastructures that have been developed so far. Based on this fact it is not exaggerated to say that Indonesia is the most democratic country in the world. I could not even enjoy the same freedom in some of the Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia. Due to this reason, it is not surprising that Yusuf Qardawi has once predicted upon his arrival

> to Indonesia some time ago that the renaissance of Islam will come into being from Indonesia. *Subhanallah*![86]

One should treat the Islamists' acknowledgement of democracy with care. If seems to represent the Islamist strategy in dealing with politics that I have mentioned earlier, that is, that of the double standard. Islamists feel it is justifiable to embrace democracy whenever it is expendient to do so.[87] Ba'asyir's praise of Indonesia as the most democratic country in the world is not without motive. It might be interpreted as a strategy to flatter the government into freeing him without charges. After all, the end justifies the means. Included within this strategy is giving false witness to law officers in court in order to win the release of fellow Islamists, as has been admitted by Nasir Abas, an ex-JI member:

> Almost all the members of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah would tell a lie and tend to avoid admitting that they are members of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah on various grounds. One of the reasons is because they are afraid of being arrested and charged with terrorist activities and this can ruin the reputation of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah itself … This strategy in Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah is usually called "*Tanzim Sirri*", namely keeping secret to each other any information that can plunge this organization into misery, even towards fellow members.[88]

Considering their weak position in facing the state, the Islamists — of the utopian variant — will not hesitate to opt for the safest strategy to avoid harsh repercussions for their actions, which include terrorist acts. As a result, the utopian Islamists are willing to play it safe by following the rules of the game.[89] In the case of Ba'asyir's trial, for example, MMI proved to be faithful to all legal procedures throughout the process of his trial.[90] Likewise, they have shown their willingness to be involved in social and cultural dialogues either with fellow Muslims or with non-Muslim elements of the society. Since the establishment of MMI in 2000, there have been more than ten public dialogues undertaken by this organization in its campaign for Shari'ah implementation.[91] The dialogues take various forms, including seminars and public debates.[92]

Basically, MMI proponents are keen to develop rational arguments as a way of convincing the public of what they are struggling for. Nevertheless, their rationality is ultimately tainted by the irrational and dogmatic mode of their religiosity. Logical arguments are employed to buttress the dogmatic nature of their beliefs. In these dialogues with other elements of the society, MMI activists are usually preoccupied with admonishing those who they

consider to have strayed from the truth. They are very well armed with arguments so that their opponents usually find themselves ensnared. It is therefore understandable that these dialogue are usually quickly terminated because of the uncompromising attitude of MMI towards its opponents. What their follows is a recommendation for revising that they consider to be erroneous beliefs. Or, they demand the retraction of published materials considered to be contrary to their beliefs. This is exactly what happened in the aftermath of three separate public debates: between an MMI team with the writers of *Paramadina* in 2004; between MMI and Professor Amin Abdullah and Dr Hamim Ilyas, two proponents of Muhammadiyah, on "Thematic Exegesis of the Qur'an" in 2001; and between MMI and a team of CLD-KHI (Counter Legal Draft of Islamic Law Compilation) from the Department of Religious Affairs.

EXPANDING POWER STRUCTURES: SHARI'AH-BASED PROPOSED BY-LAWS

In the eyes of Islamists, there are two key conditions that must be upheld in the process of power transfer (*istilam al-hukm*). First, power must be handed over by the ruled, as authentic stakeholder. However, the Islamists do not have a firm agreement over whether Muslims and non-Muslims alike have equal rights in the process of power transfer. What is certain is that such a power transfer must be exercised in a peaceful manner. Nevertheless, they argue that power bestowed by non-Muslim countries to Muslim rulers is considered an un-Islamic *istilam al-hukm*, as in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan where the power was endowed by the United States. To the Islamists, general elections must be held to elect a leader of the community. This indicates that the Islamists indirectly acknowledge at least the procedural elements of democracy.

Second, the delegated power must be fully dedicated to upholding Shari'ah law. However, the Islamists differ considerably with one another over the practical definition of Shari'ah and how it should be implemented. While representatives of MMI and HTI are of the opinion that Shari'ah implementation must be upheld at all costs, PKS activists favour gradual and evolutionary steps towards the implementation of Shari'ah.[93] For MMI and HTI, it is imperative that every Muslim vote for those candidates whose aspiration it is to impose the Shari'ah in the public sphere. PKS activists, on the other hand, try to be faithful to *Tarbiyah* methods, whose main emphasis is on instilling the importance of Shari'ah into the people's consciousness. This means that educating people on the importance of Shari'ah is critical prior to

implementing it. For PKS activists, as mentioned earlier, the Shari'ah is not only a matter of cutting off hands and stoning to death (*hudud*).[94] Tifatul Sembiring, the president of PKS, argues that *hudud* comprises less than five per cent of the Islamic Shari'ah. Honesty, trust, justice, and prosperity are also integral parts of the Shari'ah.[95] For PKS, Shari'ah should be understood in a broader sense as establishing the substance or values of Islamic law in public. Whether or not PKS activists agree with the idea of replacing *hudud* with prison terms, however, needs further investigation.

The only problem the Islamists face in their struggle to impose Shari'ah-minded by-laws is the political resistance from social and political elements outside their own familiar Islamist circles. At the national level, the failure to insert the legendary seven words of the Jakarta Charter into the preamble of the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia has been an enduring thorn in the side of Islamists. To the utopian Islamists, this failure is among the bitterest disappointments for Indonesian Muslims. The meliorist Islamists, however, try to deal with this failure with equanimity. At a rhetorical level, PKS seems not to be bothered with this political defeat and instead focuses its attention on developing a more acceptable political platform, namely, the Madinah Charter.[96] Yet, at a practical level, PKS does explore employing more subtle ways of imposing Shari'ah law in all aspects of life, as can be seen in the case of the anti-pornography bills.

Having repeatedly failed to captive formal power structures at the national level, the Islamists have begun to reorient their struggles to the local level. The question, however, is what the immediate target at the local level is. The area of regulations is a major target for implementing as many Shari'ah-minded by-laws as possible. It should also be stressed that at the local level, PKS activists are not alone in their attempts to impose Shari'ah-minded by-laws. They work hand in hand with other elements of society such as bureaucrats and political parties, most notably from ruling parties such as Golkar. The most obvious case in point is the widespread application of the Shari'ah-based PERDA regulations in South Sulawesi. Therefore, when accused of being the driving force behind the PERDA Shari'ah, Soeripto, a PKS member of parliament, furiously refuted the charge. Soeripto based his argument on the legal-procedural mechanism for producing regulations in parliament.[97] The same argument has also been employed by Al-Khaththath, an activist of HTI.[98]

Local Shari'ah-minded by-laws come in various types and forms. In most cases, the Islamists are reluctant to mention explicitly the word Shari'ah on the title of the proposed by-laws. Rather, they tend to break the by-laws down into smaller sections and employ a more accepted formulation such as

PERDA *Anti-Maksiat* (anti-immorality by-laws) as in South Sulawesi, PERDA *Anti-Pelacuran* (anti-prostitution by-laws) in Tangerang City, and PERDA *Miras* (anti-liquor by-laws) in some parts of Java.[99] In South Sulawesi, the ceaseless campaigns for the implementation of Shari'ah have been championed by KPPSI (Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syari'ah Islam, or Committee for the Preparation of the Implementation of Islamic Shari'ah) led by Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar, the son of legendary Kahar Muzakkar, a leader of the Darul Islam rebellion.[100]

IDEOLOGICAL RUPTURE

The attempts to craft a religion-based democracy as spearheaded by PKS should be appreciated as a breakthrough in the political impasse between those who accept democracy and those who reject it without reservation. These efforts can serve as a bridge between the two poles: anti-democracy groups such as MMI and HTI on the one hand and pro-civil society religious organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU on the other, which fully support democracy.[101]

Having said that, many accuse PKS of gradually succumbing to pragmatism. Critics maintain that the party is no longer essentially different from other parties whose aims are to gain strategic resources and power.[102] This can be seen in its attempts to engage as many cadres as possible in the process of coalition-building with the ruling government. Instead of remaining consistent with its initial decision to be a "constructive opposition party",[103] PKS has chosen the option of being a "critical partner" of the ruling government.[104] The ruling Yudhoyono-Kalla government has given the party three ministerial positions in return for the party's involvement. In response to this "compensation", the party's elites have reportedly demanded even more from the president, namely, the position of the Attorney General (Jaksa Agung), which had allegedly been promised to PKS prior to the forging of the coalition.[105]

On the one hand, the coalition between PKS and other elements of the nation may be viewed as merely a "marriage of convenience".[106] PKS often stands accused of abusing its power to gain access to vested interests for its own sake and of not achieving its original ideals. One of PKS' critics is Herman Y. Ibrahim, the chair of research and development in MMI and a retired army general, who, for instance, considers the PKS' goal as a "mission impossible" unless it takes a different, new direction of its own.[107] He criticizes the PKS adventure as a political absurdity since the Shari'ah and democracy are irreconcilable. In his opinion, there is no meeting point between the two;

they will always be opposed to each other. In his view, democracy is a product of liberalism, which is in itself contradictory to the Shari'ah.[108]

In this context, Ibrahim can be seen as representing a culturalist view par excellence, where Islam and non-Islamic ideologies are irreconcilable. He is convinced that democracy will never allow Islam to triumph in any country of the world. To support his argument, he refers to the historical experience of several general elections where Islam had been destined to become a dominant power. For instance, in the 1955 general election in Indonesia, a secret interference is said to have been completed to the body of Masyumi which had forced NU to retreat from this party and Islam was subsequently defeated by the nationalist secular party, PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party). In Algeria, the Islamic party FIS (Front Islamique du Salut, or Islamic Liberation Front) had won the election with eighty-three per cent of vote, but the result was allegedly annulled after the United States intervened; FIS was subsequently defeated in the next election. Necmetin Erbakan led the Islamic Refah Party to victory in Turkey in 1994, but the election was cancelled due to a direct intervention of the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the party was accordingly outlawed. Taking such stories into account, Ibrahim is convinced that there is no historical evidence that shows that Islam can triumph by means of democratic processes.[109]

The discontentments over the PKS' "betrayal" are mostly derived from the discrepancy between the party's vision and practice. The party's vision, as Ibrahim argues, is to implement the Shari'ah in the public sphere. But what happens in practice? Ibrahim charges that this sacred ideal has been sacrificed in return for short-term, pragmatic interests and that this opportunism is blatantly displayed at almost every turn. The PILKADA (provincial and district general elections) across the country have become venues for PKS activists to take part in power struggles that he describes as morally inappropriate. According to PKS' own internal data, the party has entered into at least fifty-four different political coalitions by 2005, supporting various gubernatorial, mayoral, or regental candidates across the archipelago. Some analysts say there was no discernible common political or social thread that would identify these candidates as particularly suitable for support by PKS.[110] Moreover, rumours about money politics, albeit unverified, have also surfaced. One case in point is Nur Mahmudi Isma'il, the former minister of forestry in Abdurrahman Wahid's government, who ran to become the mayor of Depok in the regional election on 26 June 2005. A third-party source had spread a rumor that a well-known business tycoon, Tomy Winata, was one of the factors behind Isma'il's success in the election.[111]

The pragmatism of PKS can be seen in the run-up to a number of electoral contests. It was reported by Ibrahim that some of the party's elites had approached a certain candidate to seek clarification (*tabayun*) over whether they had deliberately come to the party or were invited.[112] He also makes an unverified charge that an agreement of mutual support had been taken by both sides on the basis of short-term, pragmatic interests. Another example given by Ibrahim to show the party's pragmatism is the case of the Cianjur local elections, where PKS was willing to coalesce with any party — for instance, PD (Partai Demokrat, or Democrat Party) regardless of ideological difference. This invited harsh criticism from some Islamists, especially from MMI activists, who asserted that PKS no longer deserves to be called an Islamic party.[113] More surprisingly, as Ibrahim reported, PKS has not supported the concept of "Gerbang Marhamah" (an acronym for *Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Berakhlaqul Karimah*, or the movement of development towards a virtuous society), developed by the municipality of Cianjur as an initial step towards the implementation of Shari'ah.[114]

In support of his allegations, Ibrahim speculated that PKS had received some funds prior to the first round of the 2004 presidential election from a certain candidate, but that the party had given its support to another, Muslim-supported candidate.[115] He accused PKS of having betrayed the political contract made with this candidate in order to keep its high profile as an Islamic party. In the second round of the general election, PKS did not stay neutral even though the candidate they had originally supported was defeated in the first round of the election. Unlike other parties such as PAN and PPP that in the second round released their members and supporters to vote for whomever they liked, PKS made a political contract with Yudhoyono-Kalla and urged their supporters to vote for this pair.[116] It is for their support that the party was eventually given three ministerial posts at the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Youth and Sport, and the Department of People's Housing. In Ibrahim's view, this indicates that PKS is essentially not much different from other pragmatic parties.

In Ibrahim's opinion, political coalitions, alliances, collaborations, or whatever one calls the effort to combine Islamic and non-Islamic elements, will lead to the defeat of Islam and the triumph of non-Islamic forces. Ibrahim refers to the historical gentlemen's agreement made by the members of the PPKI (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, or the Investigatory Committee for Indonesia's Independence) in 1945, which had sealed the inclusion of the legendary seven words in the preamble of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945. As is well known, the words were eventually dropped after minority groups from the eastern part of Indonesia expressed their

objection to it.[117] Even legislation produced by a parliament in which the majority of members are Muslim cannot guarantee that the purity of Islam will be maintained. In Ibrahim's view, this is because Muslims are enmeshed in deep ideological differences that lead to the politics of compromise. Therefore, he regards the non-ideological coalition formed by PKS as a violation of the party's initial ideals. The question Ibrahim asks is: "Where does PKS want to go?"[118]

Ibrahim himself is said to have been personally close to some of the party's elites, in particular Nur Mahmudi Isma'il. During the early stages of the party's establishment, he had a conversation with Isma'il regarding the latter's commitment to the implementation of Shari'ah law (*tatbiq al-Shari'ah*). Ibrahim saw that the party was on the right track during its early stages; he found its campaign for the 1999 election was still focused on the issue of Shari'ah implementation. But soon after the party decided to take an active part from within the fold of the ruling government in 2004, he could not resist expressing his discontentment. He seemed to consider PKS as too cooperative with non-Islamic parties such as the president's Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party) and the vice-president's Golkar (Functional Groups Party) whose ideological visions are totally different from that of PKS.

In the context of democracy, nevertheless, coalitions among parties can also mean power-sharing, a tradition that gives each partner the same space of articulation and expression. If this is the case, PKS could win a larger audience in the future. This assumption has been indeed articulated repeatedly by some of its leaders. Their argument is that if the party gains the majority of votes in parliament it will provide more space for collaboration or coalition-forming.[119] In the world of Indonesian politics, the term "coalition" has been understood by many to mean, notoriously, the sharing of short-term political interests (*bagi-bagi kue kekuasaan*, "distribution of political interests"). As long as politics intrudes on the sacredness of religion, power-sharing will be seen as a bad thing.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of this comparative analysis, it seems clear that the idea of power is central to contemporary Indonesian Islamists, be they utopian or meliorist. They share with one another the view that the textual proofs that Islam is a glorious religion must be actualized at a practical level. At this juncture, they are on the same path. The will to ascend to power seems to be dominant in their political vision. Politics is understood as an arena where endeavours must be made power gain. They also share the same vision of transforming

society from its current manifestation to the one that encompasses the Islamic *ummah* (community). They also share to some degree the commitment to implementing Shari'ah through proposed national and local by-laws. At the surface, they agree to accomplish their goals in a peaceful manner. No violent acts are tolerated since these might undermine their image, although physical *jihad* is accepted under highly limited conditions and as a last resort.

At a practical and methodological level, however, the Islamists are in conflict with each other. While the utopian Islamists tend to harness extra-parliamentary approaches to politics, the meliorists subscribe to parliamentary approaches. Second, while the former takes an uncompromising attitude towards its "opponents", the latter tries to be realistic and accommodating to the existing power structures regardless of differences in political and ideological vision. As a result, political coalitions are a common thing to engage in for the latter when it is regarded as necessary. In the eyes of meliorist Islamists, politics is a matter of the art of transforming society by means of power-sharing. While meliorists choose evolutionary methods of transformation, the others tend to prefer a revolutionary, radical transformation.

There are internal ruptures among the Islamists, particularly over the meliorist Islamists' deep involvement in practical politics. According to some utopian Islamists, PKS, representing the meliorists, no longer deserves to be called a committed or idealistic Islamic political party since it is too much concerned with power struggles in a purely pragmatic sense. The commitment of PKS to implementing the Shari'ah has been deflated by pragmatic coalitions with other parties, some of which have a very different political vision. In addition, PKS' platform on democracy is seen as a "mission impossible" because Islam and democracy are by nature irreconcilable.

Nevertheless, PKS' engagement with the political party system is a healthy sign of the life of democracy in the country in general and of democratic discourses among meliorist Islamists in particular. It demonstrates the party's willingness to engage in the existing political party system — something which is considered to be forbidden by the utopian Islamists. The party can play a bridging role between those Islamists who totally reject democracy and refuse to participate in the political party system on the one hand and those who accept it without reserve on the other. There is no other choice for PKS than to play a moderate role in politics, which might affect the attitude of Muslims towards democracy. If PKS can successfully play its role in combining democracy and Islam, it is not inconceivable that a new hybrid form of Islam-based democracy might emerge in Indonesia. But this is a difficult, not to say impossible, task to achieve.

Notes

1. Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
2. One should not conflate "public Islam" with the notion of "public matters" in Islam. For a preliminary discussion on public and private matters in Islam, see, for instance, Mohsen Kadivar, "An Introduction to the Public and Private Debate in Islam", *Social Research* 70, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 659–80.
3. Dale F. Eickelman and Armando Salvatore, "Muslim Publics", in *Public Islam and Common Good*, edited by Dale F. Eickelman and Armando Salvatore (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004), p. 5.
4. Shmuel N. Esenstadt, "Concluding Remarks: Public Sphere, Civil Society, and Political Dynamics in Islamic Societies", in *The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies*, edited by Miriam Hoexter et al. (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), p. 141, as cited in Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman, "Preface: Public Islam and the Common Good", in *Public Islam and the Common Good*, edited by Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004), p. 5.
5. Simon Chambers, "A Critical Theory of Civil Society", in *Alternative Conception of Civil Society*, edited by Simon Chambers and Will Kymlicka (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 92.
6. Ibid.
7. Simon Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein, "Bad Civil Society", *Political Theory* 29, no. 6 (December 2001): 837–65.
8. Ibid., p. 844.
9. Michel Whine, "Islamism and Totalitarianism: Similarities and Differences", *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 2, no. 2 (Autumn 2001): 54–72.
10. Al-Mawdudi, *The Islamic Way of Life*, translated by Khurshid Ahmad (Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami, 1967), p. 19.
11. Sayyid Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam*, as cited in appendix in William E. Shepard, "The Development of the Thought of Sayyid Qutb as Reflected in Earlier and Later Editions of 'Social Justice in Islam'", *Die Welt des Islams*, new series 32, no. 2 (1992): 235.
12. Eisenstadt, "Concluding Remarks: Public Sphere, Civil Society, and Political Dynamics in Islamic Societies", p. 142.
13. For further discussion on the bonding and bridging functions of civil society see, for instance, Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).
14. Michel Foucault, *Religion and Culture*, edited by Jeremy R. Carette (New York: Routledge, 1999).
15. Ibid., p. 107.
16. For further information about Foucault's theory of truth, see Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth", *Political Theory* 12, no. 2 (May 1984): 152–83.

[17] Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
[18] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, *Vol. 3: The Care of the Self*, translated by Robert Hurley (London: Allen Lane, 1988).
[19] Michel Foucault, "Technologies of the Self", in *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*, edited by Luther H. Martin et al. (Amherst, MA: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), pp. 16–49.
[20] Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 38.
[21] This theoretical construct has been the hallmark of Geertzian functionalism in that while religion serves as the "model of" society, the society is the "model for" religion. See Clifford Geertz, "Religion as Cultural System", in *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (London: Hutchinson, 1975), pp. 87–125.
[22] Peter L. Berger, *The Social Reality of Religion* (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin, 1973), especially pp. 13–37.
[23] Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger, "Does Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical Approaches to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 3 (2000): 641–74.
[24] Armando Salvatore, *Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1997), p. 28.
[25] Ibid., p. 29.
[26] Ibid., p. 30.
[27] R. Scott Appleby, "History in the Fundamentalist Imagination", *The Journal of American History* 89, no. 2 (September 2002): 498–511.
[28] Ibid., p. 498.
[29] R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985), pp. 27–32.
[30] Abu Ridha, "Tegakkan Izzah atau Musnah", *Sabili* 7, 23 October 2003, pp. 106–8.
[31] Ibid.
[32] For a helpful account of the Golden Age of Muslim civilization, see, for instance, Ira M. Lapidus, "The Golden Age: The Political Concepts of Islam", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 524 (November 1992): 13–25.
[33] Tifatul Sembiring, the current chairman of PKS, for instance, could not help but take sides with the culturalists' point of view as can be seen from his column, "Relasi Konflik Ala Huntington", *Republika*, 3 March 2006.
[34] This view is reflected through a column written by Y. Herman Ibrahim, the chairman of the research and development division of MMI, "Semuanya Kita Punya, Kecuali Keberanian", *Republika*, 27 March 2006 <http://www.republika.co.id/koran_detail.asp?id=241353&kat_id=16&kat_id1=&kat_id2=>.
[35] Muhammad Lazuardi Al-Jawi, "Benturan Peradaban Islam vs. Barat", *Al-Wa'ie* 61, 1 September 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=73>

(accessed 12 April 2006). See also Farid Wadjdi, "Tak Ada Benturan Peradaban? Catatan untuk Prof. Tariq Ramadan", *Sabili* 4, September 2003, pp. 10–11. The International Hizbut Tahrir has also published a book that defends the clash of civilizations hypothesis, entitled *The Inevitability of the Clash of Civilizations* (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 2000).

36 Ibrahim, "Semuanya Kita Punya, Kecuali Keberanian".

37 Hasan A. Hasan, "Kemajuan dan Stabilitas Kaum Muslimin Ada pada Islam, Bukan pada Demokrasi", *Al-Wa'ie* 61, September 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=71> (accessed 29 May 2006).

38 Hasan A. Hasan, "Kemajuan dan Stabilitas Kaum Muslimin Ada pada Islam, Bukan pada Demokrasi".

39 The text reads "*Al-Islam ya'lu wala yu'la 'alayh*".

40 Hasan. A. Hasan, "Kemajuan dan Stabilitas Kaum Muslimin Ada pada Islam, Bukan pada Demokrasi".

41 Ibid.

42 Denny Kodrat, "Barat dan 'Ideologi Setan'", *Al-Wa'ie* 61 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=70> (accessed 13 December 2005).

43 Ibid.

44 Hasan A. Hasan, "Kemajuan dan Stabilitas Kaum Muslimin Ada pada Islam, Bukan pada Demokrasi".

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 "Menjemput Fajar Kebangkitan Umat", *Sabili* 16, 27 February 2004, pp. 40–45.

49 For a general survey on international Hizb al-Tahrir and the ideology of the Islamic Caliphate, see, among others, Suha Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate* (London: Grey Seal, 1996). See also Hizbut Tahrir, *The Methodology of Hizbut-Tahrir for Change* (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, n.d.).

50 For further information on Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, see, for instance, Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, eds., *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2004), especially pp. 161–203. See also Muhammad Iqbal Ahnaf, "MMI dan HTI: The Image of Others", in *Negara Tuhan: The Thematic Encyclopedia*, edited by A. Maftuh Abegebriel et al. (Jakarta: SR-Ins Publishing, 2004), pp. 691–725; Agus Salim, "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982–2004): Its Political Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilization, and Collective Action Frames", (Masters thesis, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2005).

51 Mohammad Al-Khaththath (DPP HTI), "Akar Masalah Umat", *Al-Wa'ie* 65, 1 January 2006 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=140> (accessed 14 April 2006).

52 This explanation of the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate can be found in, for example, Zaim Saidi, "Jerat Utang Runtuhkan Khilafah", *Republika*, 18 March

2006 <http://www.republika.co.id/kolom_detail.asp?id=240110&kat_id=16>. See also 'Abd al-Qadim Zallum, "How the Khilafah was Destroyed" <http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english/books/howthekwasdestroyed/kdestroyed.htm>.

53 Taqi al-Nabhani, *Pembentukan Partai Politik Islam* (Bogor: Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 2002), pp. 16–17.

54 Interview with Ismail Yusanto, Jakarta, 11 May 2005; cf. Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia*, pp. 186–87.

55 Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani founded Hizbut Tahrir in al-Quds, Palestine, in 1952. He wrote many books that have been translated into Indonesian and are referred to as a major source in HTI circles. Among his books are *Nizam al-Hukm fi al-Islam* (Al-Quds: Hizb al-Tahrir, 1953), *Al-Dawla al-Islamiyya* (Al-Quds: Hizb al-Tahrir, 1953), *Nizam al-Islam* (Al-Quds: Hizb al-Tahrir, 1953), *Al-Khilafa* (Kuwait: al-Matba'a al-'Asriyya, 1967).

56 Interview with Ismail Yusanto, Jakarta, 11 May 2005.

57 Ibid.

58 Farid Wadjdi, "Hanya dengan Khilafah Kita Merdeka", *Al-Wa'ie* 60, 1 August 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=65> (accessed 12 April 2006).

59 Farid Wadjdi, "Kegagalan Sekularisme dan Kembalinya Islam", *Al-Wa'ie* 67, 1 March 2006 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=176> (accessed 12 April 2006); cf. Fahmi Amhar, "Kehancuran Peradaban Kapitalisme", *Al-Wa'ie* 67 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=177> (accessed 12 April 2006).

60 Yahya Abdurrahman, "Khilafah Akan Segera Tegak Kembali", *Al-Wa'ie* 64, 1 December 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=150> (accessed 13 April 2006).

61 The Hadith usually used by the proponents of the *Khilafah* is that narrated by Ahmad ibn Hanbal predicting the return of the *Khilafah* empire. This Hadith is one of the most popular of its kind among HTI ideologues. The Hadith says: "The prophetic era will come amidst you, by God's consent it remains to exist. Then He shall assign him (a Caliph) when He wants. The *Khilafah* shall also come to which follow the prophetic method (*manhaj*). It does exist and by God's consent it will always exist. Then He shall assign him when He wants. A despotic ruler will also come; it does exist and by God's consent it will always remain to exist. Then He shall assign him when He wants. There will come a tormenting authoritarian regime; it does exist and by God's consent it will always exist. The *Khilafah* that follows the prophetic method will return. Then he (the Prophet) silenced." See Ahmad ibn Hanbal, *Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal*, IV (Cairo: Muassasah Qurthubah, n.d.), p. 273.

62 Further details about the NIC's release can be seen at <www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html>; cf. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2005/nic_globaltrends2020_index.htm>.

[63] Farid Wadjdi, "Skenario Dunia 2020: Khilafah Akan Berdiri?" *Al-Wa'ie* 56, 1 April 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=3> (accessed 14 April 2006).

[64] Yoyok Rudianto, "Kemuliaan Islam dan Kaum Muslim: Hanya dengan Syariah, Khilafah, dan Jihad", *Al-Wa'ie* 65 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=137> (accessed 29 May 2006).

[65] Ibid.

[66] Anthony Giddens, "The Constitution of Society", in *Power: A Reader*, edited by Mark Haugaard (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2002), pp. 151–65.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid. p. 166.

[69] Hilman Rosyad Shihab, "PKS Berkuasa, Siap Jalin Kerjasama dengan Semua Pihak", *Fraksi PKS DPR-RI online* <http://www.fpks-dpr-ri.com/new/index.php?op=isi&id=1398> (accessed 28 April 2006).

[70] Hidayat Nur Wahid, "PKS Solusi Permasalahan Bangsa (1)", *Ensiklopedi Tokoh Indonesia* <http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/h/hidayat-nur-wahid/wawancara.shtml> (accessed 3 January 2006).

[71] Andi Rahmat (Anggota Badan Legislasi DPR-RI), "Pro-Kontra Draft UU Bukti Partisipasi Publik Meningkat", *Fraksi PKS DPR-RI online* <http://www.fpks-dpr-ri.com/new/main.php?op=isi&id=1489> (accessed 6 May 2006).

[72] In Islamic studies literature, the concept of *taqiyya* is referred to as "an act of precautionary dissimulation" or "the concealment of one's true beliefs in times of adversity". The word *taqiyya* is derived from *ittaqa*, which means "to fear [God]" and "to practice dissimulation" as only a secondary meaning. This doctrine is widely considered the central tenet of Imami-Shi'ism in the attempt to resort to harassment and persecution by the ruling Sunni regimes. The first clear attribution of *taqiyya* dates back to the generation of Muhammad al-Baqir (d. 114/732 or 117/735) and his son Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 148/765), the fifth and sixth Imams respectively. Given the fact that *taqiyya* is attributed to Imami-Shi'ism, it does not mean that this doctrine is not recognized and practised outside of Imami-Shi'ism, especially among the Sunnis. For more detailed information about *taqiyya*, see, for instance, Etan Kohlberg, "Some Imami-Shi'i Views on *Taqiyya*", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 95, no. 3 (July–September 1975): 395–402.

[73] Hidayat Nur Wahid, "Kedepankan Moral dan Dakwah", *Ensiklopedi Tokoh Indonesia* <http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/h/hidayat-nur-wahid/index.shtml> (accessed 3 January 2006).

[74] For further discussion on the indivisibility of Islam from the realm of politics, see, among others, Eickelman and Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*; cf. James P. Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); cf. Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991).

[75] According to a Hadith popular in Muslim society, there are three methods of commanding good and forbidding wrong: the first method is by hand (power/state), the second one is by tongue, and the last one is by heart, which is the weakest manifestation of faith.

[76] "Syari'at di Jalur Lambat", *Tempo Interaktif*, 14 May 2006 <http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/mbmtempo/free/nasional.html> (accessed 8 May 2006).

[77] See website of Tangerang City <http://www.kotatangerang.go.id/>. Wahidin Halim is the mayor of Tangerang City and the younger brother of Hasan Wirajuda, the foreign minister under both presidents Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Under his leadership, Perda No. 8 on anti-prostitution was implemented, inviting much controversy and chaos at the level of its practical implementation.

[78] See, among others, "Perda Larangan Pelacuran akan Diterapkan di Jakarta", *Detikcom* <http://www.detiknews.com/index.php/detik.read/tahun/2006/bulan/03/tgl/08/time/002356/idnews/554326/idkanal/10> (accessed 2 May 2006).

[79] In Tegal, for instance, the identity of those who are drunk will be revealed in the local newspaper. See "Identitas Pemabuk di Tegal Bakal Dimuat Koran", *Republika*, 21 October 2005.

[80] Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), pp. 12 and 73–79. See also Craig Calhoun, "Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere", in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, edited by Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 7–9.

[81] M.R. Kurnia, "Meraih Kekuasaan", *Al-Wa'ie* 62, 1 October 2005 <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=92> (accessed 19 December 2005).

[82] Interview with Ismail Yusanto, Jakarta, 11 May 2005.

[83] Ibid.; cf. interview with Irfan S. Awwas, Yogyakarta, 27 April 2005; cf. interview with Zulkieflimansyah, Jakarta, 12 May 2005.

[84] Based on a series of interviews in Surabaya, Solo, Yogyakarta, and Jakarta from March through May 2005.

[85] Fauzan Al-Anshari, *Saya Teroris? (Sebuah Pledoi)* (Jakarta: Penerbit Republika, 2002), p. 14.

[86] Ibid., pp. 13–14.

[87] Interview Irfan S. Awwas, Yogyakarta, 27 April 2005.

[88] Nasir Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI* (Jakarta: Grafindo, 2005), pp. 172–73.

[89] Ibid.

[90] The process of Ba'asyir's trial has been recorded in the following two books: Irfan S. Awwas, *Pengadilan Teroris: Klarifikasi Fakta dan Dusta yang Terungkap di Persidangan* (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2004); and Fauzan Al-Anshari, *Melawan Kezaliman* (Jakarta: Pustaka Basyira, 2005).

[91] Interview with Irfan S. Awwas, Yogyakarta, 27 April 2005.

[92] Some of the dialogues have been published, including the public debate in response to the idea of inter-religious *fiqh* proposed by exponents of Paramadina, held in the Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta on 15 January 2004. See Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), *Kekafiran Berfikir Sekte Paramadina* (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2004). Another small book derived from a seminar paper given by Irfan S. Awwas at UKDW (Christian University Duta Wacana), Yogyakarta, on 21 July 2004 was also published; see Irfan S. Awwas, *Citra Orang Kristen di Mata Orang Islam* (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2004).

[93] Zulkieflimansyah, "PKS Tidak akan Paksakan Penerapan Syari'ah Islam", *Republika*, 19 April 2006 <http://www.republika.co.id/koran_detail.asp?id=244261&kat_id=43>.

[94] Interview with Zulkieflimansyah, Jakarta, 12 May 2005.

[95] Tifatul Sembiring, "Paranoid Syari'at Islam: Tak Mencari Format Lain di Luar NKRI", *Gatra*, 6 May 2006, p. 28.

[96] See Chapter 6.

[97] See "PKS Bantah Dalangi Keluarnya Perda Syari'at", *Rakyat Merdeka*, 28 June 2006 <http://www.rakyatmerdeka.co.id/situsberita/index.php?pilih=lihat_edisi_website&id=14802> (accessed 13 July 2006).

[98] "Perda Syariat Islam Tak Terkait dengan Ormas Islam", *Rakyat Merdeka*, 28 June 2006 <http://www.rakyatmerdeka.co.id/situsberita/index.php?pilih=lihat_edisi_website&id=14797> (accessed 13 July 2006).

[99] The PERDA on the prohibition of liquor has been regulated in some regions in the country such as in Sukabumi, Jepara, Tegal, Kebumen, Hulu Sungai Utara, and some other regions. See "Perda Miras, Peni Ngotot", *Kompas* (East Java edition), 10 March 2006; cf. "Perda Miras Disahkan DPRD Kota Sukabumi", *Kompas*, 4 August 2004; and "Hotel dan Restoran Dilarang Sediakan Miras", *Suara Merdeka*, 24 March 2006.

[100] The various Shari'ah-based proposed by-laws (PERDA) in South Sulawesi have been reported by the weekly magazine *Gatra*; see "Gelora Syariah Mengepung Kota", *Gatra*, 6 May 2006, pp. 20–32.

[101] Elizabeth Fuller Collins and Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, "Islam and Democracy! The Successful New Party PKS is a Moderate Alternative to Radical Islamism", *Inside Indonesia* 81 (January–March 2005): 21–22; cf. Elizabeth Fuller Collins, "Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS): Justice and Welfare Party or Prosperous Justice Party", unpublished paper <http://www.ohiou.edu/pols/faculty/malley/collins3.html>.

[102] Andrew Steele, "The Decline of Political Islam in Indonesia", *Asia Times*, 28 March 2006 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HC28Ae03.html> (accessed 23 April 2006).

[103] "Selamat Datang Oposisi", *Sabili* 22, 21 May 2004, pp. 29–32.

[104] "PKS Tetap Loyal kepada Pemerintah", *Pikiran Rakyat*, 28 November 2005 <http://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/cetak/2005/1105/28/0102.htm> (accessed 2 May 2006).

105 "PKS Minta Presiden Penuhi Janji", *Kompas*, 20 November 2005 <http://www.kompas.com/utama/news/0511/20/035619.htm> (accessed 2 May 2006).

106 Steele, "The Decline of Political Islam in Indonesia".

107 Y. Herman Ibrahim, "'Fa-aina Tadzhabun' PKS?" *Pikiran Rakyat*, 16 January 2006 <http://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/cetak/2006/012006/16/0902.htm>.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 Steele, "The Decline of Political Islam in Indonesia".

111 This information was given by a third-party source who did not want to be identified. At the time of writing, no convincing evidence had been found to verify this information.

112 When speaking of "a certain candidate", Ibrahim was referring to Wiranto, a retired army general who was the presidential candidate of Golkar in the first round of the 2004 presidential election.

113 This discontentment was expressed by Irfan S. Awwas and Y. Herman Ibrahim, the chair of the research and development department of MMI.

114 For more information about the concept of "Gerbang Marhamah", see the website of Cianjur <http://www.cianjur.go.id/content/isi_menu_gm.php>.

115 In the first round of the 2004 presidential election, PKS gave its support to the Amien Ra'is-Siswono Yudhohusodo partnership. Ibrahim suspected that PKS had received some funds from Wiranto-Salahuddin Wahid in return for its support for the latter contestant. He also suspected that both sides had reached a contractual agreement but that it was ruined by the PKS' support for Amien-Yudhohusodo. See Y. Herman Ibrahim, "'Fa-aina Tadzhabun' PKS?" The PKS' showing during the 2004 presidential elections had received wide media coverage, including in *Sabili*. See, for instance, *Sabili*'s special report under three titles as follows: (1) "Di Balik Koalisi Skandal Oportunis dan Misionaris"; (2) "Awasi Kecurangan"; and (3) "Siapapun Presidennya, Jangan Musuhi Umat", *Sabili* 5, 24 September 2004, pp. 16–27.

116 Many PKS cadres refused to call their support for SBY-JK a "coalition". Instead, they argued it was only "conditional support". The support was finalized after several points had been agreed on: (1) civilian, usually translated as "non-military" supremacy; (2) support for the Palestinian struggle and no open diplomatic relations with Israel; (3) no oppression of the Muslim community and fellow citizens; (4) building clean governance; (5) keeping away from foreign donors; and (6) maintaining the sovereignty of the nation under the framework of NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, or Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia). See Al Muzammil Yusuf, "Jika SBY Menarik, Kita akan Masuk", interview, *Sabili* 5, 24 September 2004, p. 29.

117 For the political background to the debate in the Constituent Assembly, see Chapter 4.

118 Ibrahim, "'Fa-aina Tadzhabun' PKS?"

119 Shihab, "PKS Berkuasa, Siap Jalin Kerjasama dengan Semua Pihak".

8

CONCLUSION
Findings and Theoretical Reflection

This study has found that the Islamists' discourses and counter-discourses on democracy in post-New Order Indonesia are as wide-ranging as Islamism itself. With regard to democracy, Indonesian Islamism falls into two identifiable streams of thought. The first stream is represented by groups that operate *outside* the formal political system. These groups reject democracy and do not participate in formal party politics, but are politically active, if only informally. This utopian variant of Islamism, as this study has named it, is represented by the Islamists of HTI and MMI. At a rhetorical level, their reason for not immersing themselves in the political party system has to do with the struggle to maintain the purity of their faith in fulfilling the holy duty of "commanding good and forbidding wrong". At a practical level, however, their attitude has a lot to do with strategic choices. Having recognized their failure to Islamize the state as manifested in the abortive attempts to incorporate the Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta) and Islamic Shari'ah law into the state Constitution (UUD 1945), both Islamist groups from this end of the spectrum have shifted their strategies from the state to society as the main target of their political struggles.[1] The second stream comprises a group that operates *within* the formal political party system and who formally accept procedural democracy in order to participate in it. This meliorist variant, as this study identifies it, is mainly represented by the Islamists of PKS.

On the surface, the differing strategies adopted by the two streams of Islamism might reflect internal cleavages among Indonesian Islamists. The

differences between these groups are, however, largely superficial, because at a deeper level even the Islamists of PKS have failed to genuinely reconcile democracy and Islam.[2] Although they have successfully reconciled democracy and Islam in an electoral sense by participating in general elections, the extent to which they subscribe to democracy in a more substantive sense remains questionable. It is doubtful that PKS activists would advocate democratic values such as civic liberties — freedom of religion, freedom of speech, equality, and the like. Rather, it seems as if tolerance and pluralism are the only two democratic values that PKS activists uphold, but even those values are mainly adhered to externally and not internally. Internally, in fact, PKS activists must adhere to a rather stringent internal code of behaviour that would appear to contradict some basic principles of democracy.

Nonetheless, one should bear in mind that this lack of freedom is not unique to PKS. It is widely accepted that most political parties, if not all, will allow its activists to exercise freedom only as long as it does not violate the party's policies. Once a member tries to exercise freedoms that are not in line with the party's internal policies, he or she will be considered unfaithful to the party and accordingly subject to punishment. Therefore, it is not surprising that there is no unlimited freedom in the political party system.

The case is even more clear-cut to an Islamist party like PKS on issues pertaining to religion. Religion, to an Islamist party like PKS, is a non-negotiable area. It is hard to imagine that PKS would allow its activists to exercise freedom in religion and it is almost impossible — if not totally impossible — that this party might have activists whose religious understanding was secular or liberal. Prior to being accepted as a cadre of the party, a potential activist is examined against selection criteria set out by the party's elites. It is totally understandable that homogeneity in religious background serves as a bonding factor for the party's activists. Only in areas where Islam is a minority religion does PKS allow non-Muslims to be its representatives. In Papua, for instance, PKS has Christian representatives in the provincial parliament.

It is in the above context that PKS activists, when dealing with matters pertaining to religious commitment and knowledge, abide by their own internal codes of conduct set out by the Majlis Shura (Advisory Council), a supreme body consisting of several unelected figures. This undoubtedly contributes to the lack of autonomy among PKS activists to exercise freedom in understanding religion. The lack of autonomy among PKS activists is to a large degree also inspired by the cell system (*usroh*) inherited from the *Tarbiyyah* method, which relies heavily on collective action. Most PKS cadres and activists have undergone such training at university. This chain

of collectivism, in turn, is responsible for the strength of the party's activists when interacting with the rest of society. They are well trained in militant doctrines such as *nakhtalitun walakin natamayyazun* ("we are engaged in society but not immersed in or polluted by bad practices of the society"). This is a clear indication that, as far as the internal structural level is concerned, the Islamists of PKS are not totally faithful to the basic principles of democracy, which contradict their public statement that they are newly born Muslim democrats.

The question of the relationship between Islam and democracy has been debated among scholars, both non-Muslim and Muslim, for a long time. Basically, there are two identifiable streams with regard to this question: (i) the culturalists who argue that Islam is essentially inimical to democracy. They rely on the argument that the cultural essence of Islam is undemocratic in itself. (ii) The structuralists who point to socio-political factors outside Islam as the main reason behind the low levels of Muslims' acceptance of democracy.[3] The internal debate among Muslims on this issue has been much more vigorous compared to that among non-Muslim scholars. The key streams in this internal debate can be identified as follows: (i) the liberal Muslims who accept democracy without reserve; (ii) the utopian Muslims who reject democracy; and (iii) the meliorist Muslims who stand in between — they accommodate some particular aspects of democracy but they reject others.

It may be said that Indonesia is marching towards democracy even though, like all democracies, it has idiosyncrasies and imperfections. Democracy has been welcomed by the majority of Indonesian Muslims, although a small minority, especially utopian Muslims, have rejected it. As in other Muslim countries, the three approaches to democracy mentioned above are those adopted by Indonesian Muslims.

The utopian Islamists' rejection of democracy is without question. The deployment of democracy's own arguments against itself, however, is a new phenomenon. These Islamists deploy such democratic values as relativism, freedom, multiculturalism, electoral politics, and secularism. In addition, it is not democracy in a procedural sense per se that is rejected by the utopian Islamists, but the ideas of secularism, pluralism, and liberalism that are considered as essentially alien to Islam.

The meliorists' accommodating stance towards democracy marks a point of divergence among the Islamists. The proponents of this Islamism, especially cadres and activists from PKS, propose a compromise between Islam and democracy or between pietism and pragmatism. They promulgate non-violent struggles as a means of public deliberation and aspiration. Much inspired by Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*), this stream tends to

see the world more optimistically and tries to restore it through legal and formal ways in accordance with Islamic values.

The idea of power lingers in the hearts and minds of all Indonesian Islamists, be they utopian or meliorist. Both share with one another one critical commonality: the view that Islam is a glorious religion that must be actualized in the public sphere. In addition, both agree on the idea of implementing the Shari'ah. At a practical and methodological level, however, they are at odds over how the Islamic Shari'ah should be implemented.

INTERSECTION: COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES

As previous chapters have demonstrated, the Islamists learn well from history. They quickly and easily change direction if they feel they have reasonable grounds. The strategic shift adopted by Indonesian Islamists, among other things, shows how flexible Islamism can be in the face of various circumstances and challenges. There are several examples that demonstrate the shrewdness of the Islamists in their ability to shift paradigms. PKS' paradigmatic shift from "political Islam" to "Islamic politics" is an obvious case in point. In the former paradigm, there is a sense of the "politicization of Islam" through the abuse of religious symbols for the sake of vested political interests. The latter, however, marks a different approach to politics by arguing that the wickedness of politics must be replaced by Islamic moral values such as integrity and sincerity in serving people and empowering them by means of religious values. By adopting this shift, PKS activists wish to represent themselves as the antithesis of some former and contemporary Islamic parties who were unable to practise genuine and "true" Islamic politics. This inability, in their opinion, has caused the disillusionment of constituents with previous Islamic parties.

Another example that proves that Islamists are good learners is the non-formal approach to politics adopted by the utopian Islamists. They are fully aware that the formal politics adopted by former Islamist groups had failed to Islamize the state and society. Their present strategy is inextricably linked with their attempts to maximize the benefits of their activism.[4] By such acts, the Islamists show themselves to be rational agents. Their paradigm shift from formal to non-formal struggles indicates their readiness to change gear as soon as their strategies are in gridlock. As far as MMI is concerned, the failure to incorporate Islam into the Constitution through the Jakarta Charter by the old generation of Islamists provided invaluable lessons for the Islamists in their present-day activism. Moreover, the bitter personal journey of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir under the New Order regime has inspired the Islamists to be socio-

politically and intellectually literate. Prior to the establishment of MMI, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir had to flee to Malaysia from the harsh political repression of the New Order regime. In Malaysia, Ba'asyir, together with Abdullah Sungkar, established a new form of Islamist activism through *dakwah* and education, as well as a network covering Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, usually referred to as JI (*Jemaah Islamiyah*). Later on, he disagreed with Abdullah Sungkar over the interpretation of *jihad*: while Sungkar advocated the use of violence, Ba'asyir emphasized persuasion. Violent *jihad*, in Ba'asyir's view, must be conducted within strict limits such as the area of conflict and whether or not it was the only way for Muslims to defend themselves from the attack of non-Muslims. This difference, in turn, led to the founding of MMI by Ba'asyir upon his return to Indonesia.

Eclecticism plays a crucial part in the Islamists' struggle to adapt to ever-changing challenges in society, especially in their attempts to define the self and the other. The strains of eclecticism, however, varies between the utopian Islamism and the meliorist. In the first type of Islamism, the process of self-identification is marked by selective, at times xenophobic, attitudes towards anything new.[5] The eclecticism is applied very selectively to matters pertaining to method and not to substance. This is so because they are highly concerned to protect the self throughout encounters with anything perceived as "strange" or "alien". By doing so, they try to maintain the purity of their Muslimhood as defined precisely in religious texts. This may be why the utopian Islamists are very quick to identify democracy as their anathema.

In the second type of Islamism, however, the process of identifying the self and the other is less harsh. The subscription to formal party politics does play a crucial role in the openness of this group. It is not surprising that this group adopts "eclectic politics", a pragmatic attitude based on selection from different sources as long as they are considered morally — and particularly religiously — unadulterated and politically advantageous. For example, this group adopts the method of cell developed by the community of the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*) while accommodating more moderate viewpoints in its interactions with the rest of society. On the one hand the proponents of this group pay homage to the purity of religion, but on the other hand they do not stay away from the pragmatic world of politics, which is considered corrupt by the first group of Islamists. This moderate attitude is the corollary of the search for centrist voters. This group does not have many choices except to put up with the radical differences across society at large.

Nevertheless, Islamism in Indonesia flows on the basis of the principles of continuity and discontinuity.[6] One of the characteristics of Islamism *is* eclecticism, where the interaction of Islamists with their external social

environment results in an internal contest to define the identity of the group. What seems to prevail among the Islamists is the essence of Islamic doctrines in their various interpretations. Insofar as the adaptation to democracy is concerned, the Islamists will not tolerate, for instance, the free circulation of liquor since drinking alcohol is forbidden in Islam. They likewise will not tolerate gambling in any of its manifestations. As a result, despite their acceptance of democracy, the Indonesian Islamists will be of the view that secularism and liberalism are alien to the fundamental principles of Islam. Accordingly, these values are rejected on the basis of essentialist arguments.

They are also likely to change their minds along with the circumstances. There are some cases where the Islamists have been consistent in their thoughts and ideas throughout the change of times, but there are also cases where they have not. This phenomenon depends very much on the social, political, and intellectual transformations undergone by the Islamists, yet psychological characteristics such as strength of personality can determine changes of thinking. As previous chapters have shown, the social transformation of PKS activists influences their understanding of an Islamic state. If their forerunners supported the idea of an Islamic state and the insertion of the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution, today's PKS activists do not simply follow. Instead, they have created a political platform different from that of the old generation, that is, by expounding the Madinah Charter, which is more tolerant and denotes more religious pluralism.

It is worth noting that ambivalence and uncertainty seem to prevail in the life of Islamism in Indonesia. The ambivalence can be found in the conflicting opinions and views with regard to the notions of democracy and politics in general. The utopian Islamists' rejection of democracy is without question. Nevertheless, there is no unanimity among them as to whether Muslims should participate in general elections. Within the MMI alone, for instance, we can find the conflicting views of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Fauzan Al-Anshari regarding the ballot box; while the first strongly recommends that Muslims cast their votes only for those leaders or Islamic parties whose aspiration is to fully enforce the Islamic Shari'ah, the latter neither endorsed nor forbade his activists to abstain (*golput*) in the 2004 general elections. In his view, this is because there was no single political party, in particular no Islamic party, that deserved to be elected, in that they all lacked the will to enforce the Islamic Shari'ah as the sole basis for overcoming Indonesia's multidimensional crises. There is a sense of half-heartedness among utopian Islamists in rejecting democracy. Although at a rhetorical level they reject and denounce democracy as un-Islamic, some of them acknowledge it by endorsing Muslims participation in elections.

The struggle of Islamism is ultimately inseparable from the struggle to seize the public sphere, where meanings and sources are contested within the framework of the law. Despite their different paths, both utopian Islamism and meliorist Islamism share the same concern: gaining access to power structures. They aspire to the capacity for imposing Islamic Shari'ah on the public on a legal basis. It is within this sense that the so-called "Islamic leviathan" has been a central notion among Indonesian Islamists.[7] If we look at the main themes proposed by each Islamist group — that is, Islamic Shari'ah, *Khilafah Islamiyah*, and Islamic democracy — the idea of power is embedded in each concepts. Following Giddens, I mean by power the capacity to influence others to maintain regularized relations of autonomy and dependence between them in terms of social interaction.[8] However, the idea of power is perceived by Islamists in a broader sense, not only in terms of formal or non-formal power structures, but also in the sense of a civilizational global contest.

WHITHER ISLAMISM?

The intersection of Islamism and democracy marks an important juncture in the trajectory of Indonesian Islam. The newly born democracy of post-New Order Indonesia allows Islamism to exercise freely its power in the public sphere. A huge range of public opinion, resulting from power contests and public debates over the public good among various groups of society, will be simply unavoidable. This makes democracy healthier. In this situation, the government must be neutral in order for democracy to mature. Only if societal dialectics are managed peacefully can all groups of society, including the Islamists, contribute to the maturation of democracy. The rise of something called "Muslim Democracy" as Vali Nasr has predicted is not impossible as long as public debates within society remain peaceful.[9]

Within the circle of Islamism itself, discourses and counter-discourses on democracy are anything but univocal, as this study has demonstrated. Disputes and divergences will remain. The various attitudes among the Islamists towards democracy are caused not only by different understandings of religious texts, but also by social and political factors. Both the rejection of utopian Islamists and the accommodation of meliorist Islamists of the idea of democracy are inextricably associated with mutually interwoven factors such as religion, politics, and social development. This study suggests that the various approaches among Indonesian Islamists to democracy indicate the significant role of power in the relational pattern of Islamism and

democracy. Such an interaction is not a unique phenomenon as the same thing also happens elsewhere in the Muslim world.

However, in a newly emerging democratic society such as Indonesia, the question of how far civil liberties can be guaranteed by democracy poses a challenging task. The existence of Islamism itself is a result of civil liberty in a broader sense, even though it is considered by many to be essentially "uncivil".[10] The existence of Islamism, in other words, is not against the basic values of democracy if democracy is understood as a system that guarantees basic rights and freedoms. It is the job of a democratic government to ensure that the inclusiveness of society and the principle of equality before the law can be maintained. A democratic public sphere accommodates the interactions of all elements of society with regard to discourses and counter-discourses on democracy. An open and democratic public sphere allows dialogue, negotiation, and even contestation to take place — public policies may be derived as these debates are refined. In this case, the public sphere entails a power contest for Islamists to engage in defining the common public good, a process which forms the basis of any social transformation.[11]

Is it likely that a new "democracy" could be produced as a result of the interaction of democracy and Islamism? More precisely, could Islamists give rise to another sort of democracy than Mawdudi's "Islamic democracy" or Natsir's "theistic democracy"? For the time being, the answer may be no. As this study has demonstrated, the Islamists of PKS seem at best capable of producing something equivalent to Natsir's "theo-democracy" or Mawdudi's "Islamic democracy". This does not mean that the meliorist Islamism in Indonesia is an exact replica of Natsir's political vision; it is instead a continuation, with necessary revisions and variations as a result of learning from the past and adaptation to new circumstances and challenges.

While a new kind of democracy seems unlikely to emerge in Indonesia at the moment, this does not mean that the birth of another sort of "democracy", facilitated by the meliorist Islamists, would be impossible in the future. Their participation in the existing political party system and their readiness to compete with other parties signifies an important step towards "full-fledged democracy". The question of what the Islamist version of that "full-fledged democracy" looks like is still uncertain. One may call it an "imagined democracy", at least until it may be achieved in reality. What is certain is that the meliorist Islamists want something different from the Western style of democracy, where secularism, liberalism, and individualism are ever present. Based on the findings of this study it is fair to assume that what they wish to achieve is an "ideal democracy" minus secularism, liberalism,

and individualism. As a result, the Islamist version of "democracy" might be characterized by the placement of religion at the centre of the public sphere, where every citizen is bounded by religiously inspired law. In contrast to the utopian version of Islam, which tends to be literal and oriented towards the past, the meliorist Islam transforms religion into values that serve as the spirit of public life in matters pertaining to good and clean governance.

Taking the failures of culturalist approaches into account, this sort of "democracy" might assume distinctive features and characteristics. If Western democracy has been characterized by the removal of religion from the public sphere, this sort of democracy might put heavier emphasis on the role of religion in the public sphere. However, this sort of "imagined democracy" will come into existence only provided that the meliorist Islamists can overcome their internal disputes over several basic issues related to civil liberties and construct theological underpinnings for the notion of an ideal democracy for Indonesia. In addition, the theological underpinnings of an ideal democracy must be constructed in a genuinely "authentic" language of Islam derived from the classical heritage of Islamic thought. If they are able to deal with these issues, the chances of meliorist Islamism establishing democracy can be as good as that of liberal Muslims. For the public, this authentic language does really matter since "criticisms made in Islamic terms possess greater depth and authority than they would if framed in some other rhetoric".[12] In the context of Indonesian Islam, liberal democracy as promulgated by liberal Muslims tends to be resisted by some Islamist elites as it is constructed with a too heavy reliance on secular language. This is the view taken by Casanova who stated:

> democracy is unlikely to grow and thrive in Muslim countries until political actors who are striving for it are also able to 'frame' their discourse in a publicly recognizable Islamic idiom. Calls for the privatization of Islam as a condition for modern democracy in Muslim countries (Tibi, 1990) will only produce antidemocratic Islamist responses. By contrast, the public reflexive elaboration of Islam's normative traditions in response to modern challenges, political learning experiences, and global discourse has a chance to generate various forms of public civil Islam which may be conducive to democratization.[13]

Casanova predicts the rise of another sort of democracy among Muslim societies based on the parallel experiences of Confucian and Catholic societies that had been judged as undemocratic in a Weberian sense but that proved to be democratic later on. According to Casanova, Catholicism was able to come to terms with democracy — after Protestantism — because it was

able to change the direction of its official formulation (*aggiornamento*), as manifested in the Second Vatican Council, to be more conducive to democracy. The transformation of Catholic-majority countries such as Spain, Italy, and Brazil from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones was inextricably linked to the willingness of the Catholic Church to change its direction. Thus, in Casanova's view, one can hardly make the argument that Islam is essentially undemocratic as "one can hardly make the argument that Catholicism is intrinsically — that is, 'essentially' — democratic or has affinities with democracy".[14]

The following statement by Zulkieflimansyah, a respected PKS figure, seems to imply that it is not impossible that the meliorist Islamists might give birth to "full-fledged democracy" in Indonesia in the future:

> The beauty of Indonesia today is that democratic space allows for these views [Islamo-phobia views] to be heard. In any democracy, some voices can appear louder than they seem, and some can come to dominate at times. The answer is to have democratic structures well-institutionalized and an effective state in place so that excesses can be checked.
>
> Indonesia is unlikely to go down the path of Afghanistan under the Taliban, unless a substantial majority of the electorate is going to vote for a political party that will impose *hudud* laws throughout the country. Or alternatively, there may be absolute state failure vis-a-vis groups who are going to successfully impose *hudud* laws and declare an Islamic state. All indications thus far point the other way.[15]

The problem, however, remains as to how this concept of "full-fledged democracy" can be constructed on a sound and strong theological basis. It is a matter of fact that PKS' acceptance of democracy is based not on such a theological basis but rather on a pragmatic one. The considerable increase in the share of the vote during the 2004 parliamentary elections exemplifies the party's pragmatism as the party downplayed the issue of Shari'ah implementation and instead campaigned on more popular issues such as clean governance and economic justice. The problem is even more critical when one looks at some of the "uncivil" materials distributed in the party's exclusive cadre recruitment programmes and its internal religious gatherings (*pengajian*). In particular, the overwhelming belief in conspiracy theories and the strong emphasis on religious exclusivity are not exactly conducive to the emergence of democracy from within.

The final question that needs to be addressed would be: what are the practical implications of this study for the future of Indonesia's current democratization process? The notion of Habermasian "communicative action"

remains one of the most important rules that might be obeyed by all elements of a democratic society.[16] As mentioned earlier, there might be something to learn for Indonesian Islamists from the process of social interaction with the rest of society. This social interaction might result in moderation among Islamists in the process of defining the self and the other. Room in the public sphere for negotiation and participation must be opened as widely as possible for all elements of society, including the Islamists, to define what constitutes the common good. By their participation, the Islamists will have to moderate their views and compromise with the rest of society. The Islamists must be encouraged to increase their involvement in the process of social interaction so that they will know how complex it is to deal with the real problems facing society at a practical level. The utopianism of some Islamists must be counterbalanced by meliorism through the invitation of inclusion practical politics.

Notes

1 Olivier Roy has coined the term "post-Islamism" to signify the strategic shift among Islamists from Islamizing the state to Islamizing society. See Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (London: Hurst, 2004), especially Part 2.

2 This is in line with Roy's argument in his *The Failure of Political Islam*, translated by Carol Volk (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).

3 For the definitions of and the scholarly debates between the culturalists and the structuralists, see Chapter 2.

4 Laurence R. Iannaccone, "Voodoo Economics? Reviewing the Rational Choice Approach to Religion", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 34 (1995): 77.

5 The immediate identification of democracy with capitalism, liberalism, and secularism among utopian Islamists is the most obvious example of their selective and xenophobic attitude towards anything new simply because democracy as adopted in the West is commonly accompanied by these qualities.

6 For a general overview of continuity and change in religion, see, for instance, Harry M. Johnson, ed., *Religious Change and Continuity* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1979).

7 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

8 See excerpt from Anthony Giddens, "The Constitution of Society", in *Power: A Reader*, edited by Mark Haugaard (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 160.

9 Vali Nasr, "The Rise of 'Muslim Democracy'", *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 2 (April 2005): 13–27.

[10] See Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, "Concluding Remarks: Public Sphere, Civil Society, and Political Dynamics in Islamic Societies", in *The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies*, edited by Miriam Hoexter et al. (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), p. 141.

[11] Salwa Ismail, *Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), especially pp. 165–75.

[12] Noah Feldman, *After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2003), p. 21.

[13] José Casanova, "Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections on Catholicism and Prospective Reflections on Islam", *Social Research* 68, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 1075–76.

[14] Casanova, "Civil Society and Religion", pp. 1042–43.

[15] Zulkieflimansyah, "Islam, Muslims, and Democracy in Indonesia", *Jakarta Post*, 12 September 2006.

[16] For further details on Habermas' "Communicative Action Theory", see, among others, Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, eds., *Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen Habermas's The Theory of Communicative Action* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).

APPENDIX 1

FULL TEXT OF THE MADINAH CHARTER
(622 C.E.)

In the Name of Allah, In the name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful.

1. This is a document from Muhammad the Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace), governing relations between the Believers, that is, Muslims of Quraysh and Yathrib and those who followed them and worked hard with them. They form one nation — Ummah.
2. The Quraysh Mohajireen will continue to pay blood money, according to their present custom.
3. In case of war with anybody they will redeem their prisoners with kindness and justice common among Believers. (Not according to pre-Islamic nations where the rich and the poor were treated differently.)
4. The Bani Awf will decide the blood money, within themselves, according to their existing custom.
5. In case of war with anybody all parties other than Muslims will redeem their prisoners with kindness and justice according to practice among Believers and not in accordance with pre-Islamic notions.
6. The Bani Saeeda, the Bani Harith, the Bani Jusham, and the Bani Najjar will be governed on the lines of the above (principles).
7. The Bani Amr, Bani Awf, Bani Al-Nabeet, and Bani Al-Aws will be governed in the same manner.

8. Believers will not fail to redeem their prisoners; they will pay blood money on their behalf. It will be a common responsibility of the Ummah and not of the family of the prisoners to pay blood money.
9. A Believer will not make the freedman of another Believer as his ally against the wishes of the other Believers.
10. The Believers, who fear Allah, will oppose the rebellious elements and those that encourage injustice or sin, or enmity or corruption among Believers.
11. If anyone is guilty of any such act, all the Believers will oppose him even if he be the son of any one of them.
12. A Believer will not kill another Believer, for the sake of an un-Believer. (that is, even though the un-Believer is his close relative).
13. No Believer will help an un-Believer against a Believer.
14. Protection (when given) in the Name of Allah will be common. The weakest among Believers may give protection (in the Name of Allah) and it will be binding on all Believers.
15. Believers are all friends to each other to the exclusion of all others.
16. Those Jews who follow the Believers will be helped and will be treated with equality. (Social, legal, and economic equality is promised to all loyal citizens of the State.)
17. No Jew will be wronged for being a Jew.
18. The enemies of the Jews who follow us will not be helped.
19. The peace of the Believers (of the State of Madinah) cannot be divided. (It is either peace or war for all. It cannot be that a part of the population is at war with the outsiders and a part is at peace.)
20. No separate peace will be made by anyone in Madinah when Believers are fighting in the Path of Allah.
21. Conditions of peace and war and the accompanying ease or hardships must be fair and equitable to all citizens alike.
22. When going out on expeditions a rider must take his fellow member of the Army share his ride.
23. The Believers must avenge the blood of one another when fighting in the Path of Allah. (This clause was to remind those in front of whom

there may be less severe fighting that the cause was common to all. This also meant that although each battle appeared a separate entity it was in fact a part of the War, which affected all Muslims equally.)

24. The Believers (because they fear Allah) are better in showing steadfastness and as a result receive guidance from Allah in this respect. Others must also aspire to come up to the same standard of steadfastness.

25. No un-Believer will be permitted to take the property of the Quraysh (the enemy) under his protection. Enemy property must be surrendered to the State.

26. No un-Believer will intervene in favour of a Quraysh (because the Quraysh having declared war are the enemy).

27. If any un-Believer kills a Believer without good cause, he shall be killed in return, unless the next of kin are satisfied (as it creates law and order problems and weakens the defence of the State). All Believers shall be against such a wrongdoer. No Believer will be allowed to shelter such a man.

28. When you differ on anything (regarding this Document) the matter shall be referred to Allah and Muhammad (may Allah bless him and grant him peace).

29. The Jews will contribute towards the war when fighting alongside the Believers.

30. The Jews of Bani Awf will be treated as one community with the Believers. The Jews have their religion. This will also apply to their freedmen. The exception will be those who act unjustly and sinfully. By so doing they wrong themselves and their families.

31. The same applies to Jews of Bani Al-Najjar, Bani Al Harith, Bani Saeeda, Bani Jusham, Bani Al Aws, Thaalba, and the Jaffna (a clan of the Bani Thaalba), and the Bani Al Shutayba.

32. Loyalty gives protection against treachery. (Loyal people are protected by their friends against treachery. As long as a person remains loyal to the State he is not likely to succumb to ideas of being treacherous. He protects himself against weakness.)

33. The freedmen of Thaalba will be afforded the same status as Thaalba themselves. This status is for fair dealings and full justice as a right and equal responsibility for military service.

34. Those in alliance with the Jews will be given the same treatment as the Jews.

35. No one (no tribe which is party to the Pact) shall go to war except with the permission of Muhammed (may Allah bless him and grant him peace). If any wrong has been done to any person or party it may be avenged.

36. Anyone who kills another without warning (there being no just cause for it) amounts to his slaying himself and his household, unless the killing was done due to a wrong being done to him.

37. The Jews must bear their own expenses (in War) and the Muslims bear their expenses.

38. If anyone attacks anyone who is a party to this Pact the other must come to his help.

39. They (parties to this Pact) must seek mutual advice and consultation.

40. Loyalty gives protection against treachery. Those who avoid mutual consultation do so because of lack of sincerity and loyalty.

41. A man will not be made liable for misdeeds of his ally.

42. Anyone (any individual or party) who is wronged must be helped.

43. The Jews must pay (for war) with the Muslims. (This clause appears to be for occasions when Jews are not taking part in the war. Clause 37 deals with occasions when they are taking part in war.)

44. Yathrib will be Sanctuary for the people of this Pact.

45. A stranger (individual) who has been given protection (by any one party to this Pact) will be treated as his host (who has given him protection) while (he is) doing no harm and is not committing any crime. Those given protection but indulging in anti-state activities will be liable to punishment.

46. A woman will be given protection only with the consent of her family (Guardian). (A good precaution for avoiding inter-tribal conflicts.)

47. In case of any dispute or controversy which may result in trouble, the matter must be referred to Allah and Muhammad (may Allah bless him and grant him peace). The Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) of Allah will accept anything in this document, which is for (bringing about) piety and goodness.

48. Quraysh and their allies will not be given protection.
49. The parties to this Pact are bound to help each other in the event of an attack on Yathrib.
50. If they (the parties to the Pact other than the Muslims) are called upon to make and maintain peace (within the State) they must do so. If a similar demand (of making and maintaining peace) is made on the Muslims, it must be carried out, except when the Muslims are already engaged in a war in the Path of Allah (so that no secret ally of the enemy can aid the enemy by calling upon Muslims to end hostilities under this clause).
51. Everyone (individual) will have his share (of treatment) in accordance with what party he belongs to. Individuals must benefit or suffer for the good or bad deed of the group they belong to. Without such a rule, party affiliations and discipline cannot be maintained.
52. The Jews of al-Aws, including their freedmen, have the same standing, as other parties to the Pact, as long as they are loyal to the Pact. Loyalty is a protection against treachery.
53. Anyone who acts loyally or otherwise does it for his own good (or loss).
54. Allah approves this Document.
55. This document will not (be employed to) protect one who is unjust or commits a crime (against other parties of the Pact).
56. Whether an individual goes out to fight (in accordance with the terms of this Pact) or remains in his home, he will be safe unless he has committed a crime or is a sinner (that is, no one will be punished in his individual capacity for not having gone out to fight in accordance with the terms of this Pact).
57. Allah is the Protector of the good people and those who fear Allah, and Muhammad (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) is the Messenger of Allah (He guarantees protection for those who are good and fear Allah).

This text is taken from the Constitution Society
<http://www.constitution.org/cons/medina/macharter.htm>.

Appendix 2

YOGYAKARTA CHARTER

1. It is obligatory to implement the Islamic shari'ah for all Muslims in Indonesia and the world in general;
2. to reject all types of human-made ideologies contradictory to Islam which led to *shirk* (polytheism) and *nifaq* (hypocrisy) as well as violating human rights;
3. to build a strong unified *shaf* (line) of *mujahidin* to implement the Islamic shari'a, either nationally, regionally or internationally;
4. to establish an institution of *mujahidin* towards an *imamah Islamiyah* (Islamic Imamate);
5. to call all Muslims for upholding propagation (*dakwah*) and jihad (holy struggles, including physical war) all over the world for the sake of upholding Islam as *rahmatan lil alamin* (blessing for universe).

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D. INTERVIEWS

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SUNAN AMPEL

SURABAYA – INDONESIA

Most scholarly works conducted within the period of post-New Order Indonesia have underlined the fact that Indonesian Islamists reject the notion of democracy; no adequate explanation nonetheless has been attempted thus far as to how and to what extent democracy is being rejected.

This book is dedicated to filling the gap by examining the complex reality behind the Islamists' rejection of democracy. It focuses its analysis on two streams of Islamism: the two Islamist groups that seek "extra-parliamentary" means to achieve their goals, that is, MMI and HTI, and the PKS Islamists who choose the existing political party system as a means of their power struggle.

As this book has demonstrated, there are times when the two streams of Islamism share a common platform of understanding and interpretation as well as an intersection where they are in conflict with one another. The interplay between contested meanings over particular theological matters on normative grounds and power contests among the Islamists proves to be critical in shaping this complexity.

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